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Note	on	transliteration	of	Arabic	and	Indonesian	terms			For	 Arabic	 terminology,	 I	 have	 used	 the	 transliteration	 system	 of	 the	




Around	eight	o’clock	in	the	morning	on	February	8,	2015,	Malika	was	in	hurry	to	get	on	a	minivan	waiting	for	her	in	front	of	the	lodge	where	she	was	staying	in	 Tarim,	 Yemen.	 She	 almost	 forgot	 to	 put	 on	 the	 face	 veil	 her	 nephew	 had	bought	for	her	as	it	was	considered	improper	for	women	in	Hadramaut	to	go	outside	without	completely	covering	their	body.	She	had	arrived	in	the	Yemeni	town	of	Tarim	a	 few	days	 earlier	 after	 a	 long	 journey	 from	Ambon	and	 then	Jakarta	 in	 Indonesia,	 to	 Sana’a,	Mukalla,	 and	 finally	 Tarim	 in	 Yemen.	 	Malika	had	yet	to	get	used	to	covering	her	head	and	abiding	with	local	rules	of	female	comportment:	 the	 heat	 in	 Hadramaut	 bothered	 her	 and	 she	 regretted	 the	restriction	 of	 movement	 of	 women,	 who	 spent	 most	 of	 their	 time	 in	 the	domestic	 sphere.	 	 While	 being	 grateful	 for	 the	 opportunity	 to	 stay	 in	Hadramaut	 for	 a	 while,	 Malika	 felt	 grateful	 that	 her	 permanent	 home	 is	 in	Indonesia.	February	 8	 was	 the	 first	 of	 several	 days	 during	 which	 Malika	 and	 her	fellow	travellers	 from	Indonesia	visited	various	sites	 in	northern	Hadramaut.	Every	 time	 the	 party	 arrived	 at	 the	 site	 of	 a	 shrine	 of	 a	 holy	 man,	 the	 tour	leaders	gave	instructions	about	proper	conduct	and	the	rites	to	be	carried	out	there.	Malika	performed	the	customary	rituals	at	every	shrine.	Before	leaving	a	shrine,	 the	participants	and	 their	 tour	 leaders	documented	every	moment	by	taking	many	pictures	of	themselves	or	what	is	now	popularly	called	‘selfies’	or	‘wefies’.	Collecting	water,	sand,	or	stones	surrounding	the	tombs	was	another	part	 of	 concluding	 the	 visit.	 Malika	 herself	 filled	 empty	 plastic	 bottles	 with	water	or	sand	intending	to	bring	them	back	home	to	Indonesia	to	use	them	as	medicines	for	her	eldest	daughter’s	illness.	Malika	is	a	descendant	of	a	Hadrami	family	that	migrated	to	Ambon	in	the	nineteenth	 century.	 The	 fragment	 above	 gives	 an	 impression	 of	 her	 first	pilgrimage	tour	to	Hadramaut,	a	region	with	which	she	identifies	as	being	the	land	where	her	forefathers	originate	from	but	also	a	land	to	which	she	feels	a	stranger	in	comparison	to	her	own	everyday	life	on	Ambon.	Malika	and	many	other	 descendants,	 particularly	 those	 from	 Sada	 (from	 the	 Arabic	 singular:	
sayyid,	descendants	of	the	Prophet)	families,	whom	I	met	during	the	tour	that	Malika	made,	had	no	intention	to	return	to	Hadramaut	for	good.		Rather,	they	returned	on	temporary	trips	as	pilgrims	in	search	of	baraka,	divine	blessing,	or	as	students	in	the	pursuit	of	religious	knowledge.		Visiting	 saint	 shrines	 in	 Hadramaut,	 as	Malika	 did,	 is	 only	 one	 of	many	diasporic	practices	of	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon.	Other	Hadrami	Arabs	of	Ambon	pay	similar	diasporic	return	visits	but	with	 the	main	purpose	to	reunite	with	
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immediate	 family	members	with	whom	they	had	 lost	contact	over	 time.	Such	diasporic	returns	imply	that	although	there	was	a	long	period	of	disconnection	between	the	country	of	the	forefathers’	origin	and	the	country	of	the	migrants’	settlement	 after	 the	 emergence	 of	 nation-states	 (Freitag	 2003;	 Freitag	 and	Clarence-Smith	 1997),	 a	 diasporic	 consciousness	 remains	 alive	 among	 some	descendants	 of	 Hadrami	migrants	 today.	 This	 does	 not	mean,	 however,	 that	diasporic	 senses	 of	 belonging	 to	 Hadramaut	 are	 the	 same	 for	 all	 Hadrami	diasporas	 throughout	 time.	 Hadramis	 that	 have	 converted	 to	 Shi’ism,	 for	example,	tend	to	prefer	to	visit	 Iran	rather	than	Hadramaut.	Also,	Hadramaut	in	 the	 collective	 memory	 of	 contemporary	 diasporic	 Hadramis	 who	 wish	 to	make	a	 return	 journey	 to	 it,	 is	 quite	 a	different	place	now	 than	 it	was	at	 the	time	their	ancestors	left.	Morever,	not	all	Hadramis	living	in	the	diaspora	share	similar	 views	 of	 what	 constitutes	 Hadramaut	 culture	 today.	 Therefore,	Hadramaut	 as	 an	 imaginary	 homeland	 is	 also	 a	 contested	 homeland,	 and	 as	much	a	space	of	imagination	as	a	space	of	contestation.		The	 aforementioned	 description	 of	Malika’s	 diasporic	 return	 journey	 to	Hadramaut	 reflects	 one	 of	 the	 main	 points	 addressed	 in	 this	 dissertation,	which	 is	 an	 ethnographic	 study	 of	 present-day	 descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	Arab	migrants	 in	Ambon	and	 their	articulations	of	diasporic	 identity	 through	everyday	 life	 practices.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 research	 tries	 to	 discern	 how	diasporic	 identity	 is	 played	 out	 in	 everyday	 life	 by	 individuals	 who	 identify	themselves	 or	 are	 identified	 by	 others	 as	 Hadrami	 Arabs	 or	 descendants	 of	migrants	from	Hadramaut	in	the	southern	part	of	Yemen.		More	specifically,	the	focus	in	this	dissertation	is	on	how	religion	informs	the	 everyday	 performance	 of	 diasporic	 identity.	 The	 history	 of	 the	 Hadrami	Arabs	who	migrated	to	the	Indonesian	Archipelago	in	the	late	eighteenth	up	to	the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 is	 often	 regarded	 as	 a	 success	 story	 in	 terms	 of	transnational	 economic,	 political,	 and	 religious	 engagement.	One	 of	 the	main	factors	 contributing	 to	 this	 success	 is	 often	 perceived	 to	 be	 their	 shared	Muslim	 identity	with	mainstream	 Indonesian	 society	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	while	preserving	 a	 distinct,	 Hadrami	 cultural	 identity	 on	 the	 other.	 This	 specific	combination	 of	 claiming	 sameness	 and	 difference	 simultaneously	 provided	them	 with	 social	 and	 symbolic	 capital	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 develop	 and	maintain	 networks	 both	 in	 local	 settings	 and	 in	 their	 country	 of	 origin.	However,	 while	 the	 emphasis	 on	 a	 distinct	 cultural	 identity	 facilitates	integration	 into	 the	host-societies	 in	some	contexts,	 in	other	situations	 it	 can	also	 hamper	 full	 integration.	 The	 active	 maintenance	 of	 a	 distinct	 cultural	identity	 as	 Hadrami	 Arabs	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 shaped	 by	 social,	 political	 and	religious	developments	both	in	Hadramaut	and	in	local	contexts.		Particularly	 the	drawing	on	 Islam	as	 a	 cultural	 and	 religious	 source	has	played	a	major	role	both	in	the	construction	of	a	distinct	cultural	identity	and	in	 local	 social	 integration	 processes.	 Interestingly,	 the	 emergence	 of	 Islamic	
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reform	 movements	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 added	 a	 new	dimension	 to	 the	 transnational	 religious	 positioning	 of	 diasporic	 Hadrami	Arabs.	The	symbolic	dominance	of	Sada	Hadramis,	who	claim	descent	from	the	Prophet	 Muhammad,	 was	 increasingly	 questioned	 and	 challenged	 by	 local	reformist	Muslims	from	both	within	and	outside	the	Hadrami	community.		To	 investigate	 the	 situation	 of	 present-day	 descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	migrants	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 build	 upon	 this	 historical	 context	 to	 understand	changes	 as	 well	 as	 continuities	 in	 their	 ethno-religious	 identity	 making	 and	their	 social	 relations	 to	 a	 larger	 society.	 This	 study,	 thus,	 aims	 at	understanding	the	interplay	between	ethnicity	and	religion	in	the	construction	of	diasporic	 identity	and	 the	social	 integration	of	present-day	descendants	of	Hadrami	Arab	migrants	to	Ambon.		To	a	considerable	extent,	the	relevance	of	this	study	lies	in	the	context	of	Ambon	 itself.	 As	 will	 be	 sketched	 in	 the	 section	 on	 the	 literature	 review,	although	Ambon	was	an	 important	destination	 for	Hadrami	migration	during	the	 colonial	 era,	 it	 remains	 largely	 neglected	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 Hadrami	diaspora.		Similarly,	the	contemporary	situation	of	the	Hadrami	descendants	in	Ambon	 has	 hardly	 received	 any	 attention	 so	 far.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 fill	 this	lacune,	 since	 the	socio-economic	and	 the	ethno-religious	historical	 context	of	Ambon	 differs	 significantly	 from	 other	 places	 in	 the	 Indonesian	 Archipelago	where	Hadramis	have	settled,	thus	providing	a	unique	situation	to	investigate	how	local	social	structures	have	shaped	the	diasporic	identity	construction	of	descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 there.	 Moreover,	 as	 a	 site	 of	 two	contesting	religious	communities	and	multiple	ethnic	groups	that	experienced	recent	 communal	 conflicts	 between	 Muslims	 and	 Christians	 (1999-2002),	post-conflict	 Ambon	 provides	 a	 special	 context	 in	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	formation	of	a	diasporic	identity	by	Hadrami	Arabs,	especially	concerning	their	articulation	of	religious	identity.		Another	innovative	dimension	of	this	study	concerns	the	focus	on	gender	identity	 construction.	 As	 it	 were	 men	 who	 first	 migrated	 and	 carved	themselves	 a	 new	 niche	 in	 the	 places	 where	 they	 settled,	 the	 Hadrami	diasporic	 life	and	identity	have	been	gendered	in	specific	ways.	Women	were	mostly	 located	 in	 the	 domestic	 sphere	 and	 were	 responsible	 for	 the	socialization	 of	 new	 generations	 and	 transmitting	 the	 Hadrami	 identity	 to	them.	 As	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 opening	 fragment	 to	 this	 chapter	 about	Malika’s	 journey	 to	 Hadramaut,	 some	 Hadrami	 women	 in	 the	 present-day	diaspora	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 shaping	 Hadrami	 diasporic	 consciousness	through	 return	 visits	 to	 Hadramaut	 and	 other	 diasporic	 practices.	 Given	 the	socio-political	 changes	 coupled	 with	 advances	 of	 travel	 and	 communication	technologies,	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 allows	 not	 only	 hyper-connectivity	between	 diasporic	 people	 in	 different	 regions	 with	 the	 homeland	 and	 each	other,	but	also	positions	women	as	the	significant	Hadrami	‘other’	within,		who	
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thus	 insert	 their	 own	 ways	 of	 to	 make	 sense	 their	 diasporic	 life	 through	specific	 diasporic	 practices.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 this	 diasporic	 trajectory,	the	 female	 perspective	 needs	 to	 be	 equally	 taken	 into	 account.	 This	 study	therefore	 aims	 specifically	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	production	of	 knowledge	 and	insights	into	the	views	and	practices	of	Hadrami	women	in	Ambon.	In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 introduction,	 I	will	 provide	 a	 literature	 review	and	a	 theoretical	 framework	and	will	 conclude	by	giving	an	account	on	what	aspects	and	concepts		this	research	wishes	to	contribute.		
2. Literature	Review	
The	 study	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 diaspora	 began	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	pioneered	by	some	Dutch	scholar-officials,	notably	L.W.C	van	den	Berg	(1886)	and	 C.	 Snouck	 Hurgronje	 (Gobee	 and	 Adrianse	 1959).	 Yet,	 Hadrami	communities	in	the	diaspora	have	become	popular	subjects	of	study	only	since	the	mid-1990s,	as	a	response	to	the	rise	in	diaspora	studies	in	general.	A	large	number	of	publications	ranging	from	historical	to	anthropological	studies	have	been	dedicated	 to	 this	 subject.	 An	 analysis	 of	 diasporic	 identity	 construction	among	the	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora,	thus,	has	been	of	much	interest.			An	 important	 early	 volume	 edited	 by	 Ulrike	 Freitag	 and	 William	 G.	Clarence-Smith	 (1997)	 discusses	 the	 wave	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migration	 in	 the	Indian	 Ocean	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 adversity	 and	 political	 unrest	 in	Hadramaut	in	the	nineteenth	century.	In	this	volume,	the	scholars	argued	that	the	 Hadramis	 had	 a	 distinctive	 feature	 as	 a	 transnational	 community	 who	maintained	 a	 shared	 lineage,	 which	 enabled	 them	 to	 develop	 trans-local/national	networks	and	to	play	a	significant	role	in	politics,	economy	and	religion.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Linda	 Boxberger	 addresses	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	socio-political	 structure	 and	 religio-political	 contestation	 in	 Hadramaut,	 and	also	 provides	 a	 historical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 emigration	 to	 the	 Indian	Ocean	as	a	result	of	economic	and	social-political	instability	within	the	region	(2002).	 In	 her	monograph	on	Hadrami	diaspora	 in	 the	 Indian	Ocean,	 Freitag	(2003)	 further	 developed	 the	 argument	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 kinship	ties	 and	 the	 roles	 of	 the	Hadramis	 in	 political,	 economic,	 and	 social	 changes	both	 in	 their	 host-societies	 and	 countries	 of	 origin.	 Freitag	 suggests	 that	 the	Hadrami	 identity	 has	 been	 shaped	 by	 various	 political	 changes	 in	 the	 pre-colonial,	colonial	and	post-colonial	periods.		Similarly,	 a	 volume	 edited	 by	 Huub	 de	 Jonge	 and	 Nico	 Kaptein	 (2002)	discusses	 the	 migration	 of	 Arabs	 and	 their	 roles	 in	 Islamic	 proselytization,	trade,	 and	 politics	 in	 Southeast	 Asia.	 The	 emphasis	 of	 this	 volume	 is	 on	different	patterns	of	the	Arab	migration	before	and	after	the	massive	wave	of	the	Hadrami	migration	in	the	nineteenth	century.	The	volume	suggests	that	the	
Chapter	1:	Introduction	
5		
formation	of	a	diasporic	identity	among	the	Hadrami	migrants	was	shaped	by	colonial	 policies	 issuing	 social	 segregation	 between	 the	 Hadramis	 and	 other	groups	 in	 the	 Indies.	 The	 recent	 edited	 volume	 by	 Noel	 Brehony	 (2017)	touches	 upon	 politics,	 identity	 and	 migration	 of	 Hadrami	 communities.	 The	volume	discusses	several	issues	concerning	both	past	and	present	situations	of	the	Hadramis	in	Yemen	and	in	various	diasporas	in	the	Indian	Ocean.																			The	 debate	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 cultural	 identity	 maintenance	and	 the	 integration	 or	 assimilation	 of	 Hadramis	 in	 diasporic	 contexts	 is	explicitly	described	 in	 the	collected	studies	of	Ahmed	 Ibrahim	Abushouk	and	Hassan	 Ahmed	 Ibrahim	 (2009).	 Abushouk	 and	 Ibrahim	 concluded	 that	 the	Hadramis	 did	 not	 assimilate	 fully	 in	 the	 host-societies	 as	 they	 maintain	 a	certain	degree	of	cultural	identity.		Building	on	an	interest	in	the	Hadrami	community	in	the	Netherland	East	Indies,	 Natalie	 Mobini-Kesheh	 (1999)	 carried	 out	 research	 on	 the	 changing	patterns	 of	 identity	 within	 the	 community	 in	 the	 Indies	 around	 1900-1942.	With	 a	 special	 focus	 on	 an	 Islamic	 reform	 organization,	 al-Irshad,	 Mobini-Kesheh	argues	that	the	early	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	were	a	period	of	
nahda,	awakening,	as	a	way	to	make	progress,	for	the	Hadrami	community	in	the	 Indies	 by	 three	 aspects,	 namely	 the	 adoption	 of	 modern,	 western	 style	methods	of	organization,	education,	and	publication.		In	his	The	Graves	of	Tarim	(2006),	Engseng	Ho	combines	a	historical	and	an	ethnographic	study	of	the	Hadrami	diaspora	in	the	Indian	Ocean	by	focusing	on	 their	genealogy	and	mobility.	He	argues	 that	genealogy	plays	a	significant	role	in	preserving	the	Hadrami	identity	in	the	diaspora	especially	for	those	of	Sada	origin.	By	analyzing	some	Hadramis’	early	writings,	Ho	studies	Hadrami	identity	 construction	 through	 cultural	production,	 such	 as	poetry,	 biography,	history,	 law,	 novels,	 and	 prayers.	 He	 argues	 that	 these	 texts	 cannot	 be	understood	solely	by	patrilineality,	as	 the	genealogies	seem	to	claim	but	also	depend	 on	 contingencies	 that	 the	 diaspora	 overseas	 is	 confronted	 with.	 His	central	 argument	 lies	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 hybridity	 (creole),	 in	 which	 the	Hadrami	 societies	have	developed	a	distinct	 creole	Malay	 speaking	Hadrami-Malay	 community	 in	Malaysia,	 Indonesia	 and	 Singapore,	which	was	different	from	both	host	and	home	societies.		Using	the	same	concept	of	hybridity,	in	his	
Becoming	 Arabs	 Sumit	 K.	 Mandal	 (2018)	 examines	 transregional	 ties	 and	hybridity	underlying	modern	Asian	identities	by	focusing	on	the	formation	of	Arab	 identities	 in	 the	Malay	world.	Mandal	pointed	out	 that	 the	 formation	of	Arab	 identities	 among	 the	Hadrami	migrants	 and	 their	 descendants	 resulted	from	 European	 racial	 segregation	 policies.	 He	 further	 argued	 that	 although	causing	 constraints,	 colonial	 policies	 did	 not	 fully	 hamper	 the	 formation	 of	fluid	 identities	 of	 the	 Arabs,	 as	 the	 Arabs	 were	 successful	 in	 establishing	transregional	networks	between	homeland	and	diaspora,	and	also	beyond.		
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Apart	 from	 functioning	 as	 cultural	 capital	 in	 building	 transregional	 and	transnational	networks,	 religious	 identity	 is	 also	 an	 important	means	 for	 the	Hadramis	to	gain	access	to	the	colonial	politics.	One	example	is	Sayyid	‘Uthman	(1822-1914),	 the	 most	 eminent	 Muslim	 scholar	 of	 his	 time	 who	 provided	Islamic	 guidance	 to	 the	 Muslim	 community	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 served	 as	advisor	 in	 the	 colonial	 government.	 By	 scrutinizing	 the	 biography	 of	 Sayyid	‘Uthman	 (1822-1914),	Nico	Kaptein	 (2014)	 focuses	on	 this	modern	 scholar’s	view	on	the	position	of	 Islam	 in	 the	colonial	state	and	other	responses	 to	his	view	from	other	Muslim	scholars	in	both	national	and	international	levels.		Drawing	upon	the	discussion	on	identity	of	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora,	Leif	Manger	 (2010)	 conducted	 a	 comparative	 study	 on	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 various	diasporas.	The	study	shows	the	socio-cultural	dynamics	 that	characterize	 the	lives	 of	 Hadramis	 in	 Southeast	 Asia,	 India,	 and	 East	 Africa	 in	 terms	 of	 their	successful	 adaptation	 to	 changing	 circumstances	 and	 their	 preservation	 of	 a	certain	 degree	 of	 a	 cultural	 identity	 of	 their	 own.	 The	 research’s	 central	argument	is	a	call	for	looking	at	many	historical	processes	that	allow	a	variety	of	experiences	and	changes	within	the	Hadramis	in	their	diaspora	places.		Studies	on	the	Hadrami	Arabs	in	present-day	Indonesia	cover	a	range	of	subjects	such	as	Islamic	roles,	kinship	networks,	integration,	renewed	links	to	the	 homeland	 and	 gender.	 In	 her	 research	 on	 the	 Arab	 community	 in	 Sasak,	Lombok,	 for	 example,	 Kendra	 Clegg	 (2005)	 argues	 that	 the	 Arabs	 enjoyed	 a	respected	 status	 because	 they	 played	 a	more	 considerable	 role	 in	 delivering	and	maintaining	Islamic	religious	traditions	than	in	other	social	and	economic	practices.	Frode	F.	Jacobsen	(2009)	studied	kinship	ties	between	the	Hadramis	in	 Bali,	 Surabaya,	 Lombok	 and	 Sumbawa.	 He	 suggests	 that	 the	 dynamics	between	Hadrami	communities	 in	these	different	areas	were	not	only	related	to	 internal	 distinctions	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 groups	 but	 also	 to	differences	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Islam	 and	 in	 everyday	 life	 practices.	Jacobsen	 concludes	 by	 stating	 that	 the	 Hadramis	 did	 not	 fully	 assimilate	 to	local	societies	but	maintained	some	elements	of	a	distinct	cultural	identity.		Somewhat	to	the	contrary,	in	her	research	on	the	Sada	families	in	Jakarta	Yasmine	Zaki	Shahab	(2005a;	2005b)	contends	that	the	practice	of	endogamy	among	the	Arabs,	particularly	among	Sada	families	in	Jakarta,	has	not	impeded	their	 assimilation	 process	 within	 local	 society	 since	 they	 have	 proven	themselves	 as	 leading	 figures	 in	 many	 public	 aspects,	 especially	 in	 Islamic	missionary.	 In	 a	 similar	 argument,	 Ummu	 Hafizhah	 (2007)	 postulates	 that	despite	the	prevalence	of	kafa’a	marriage	system	based	on	the	compatibility	or	equality	between	partners	 in	marriage	among	 the	Arabs	 in	Gresik,	 they	have	made	a	significant	contribution	on	material	cultures,	 such	as	 language,	dress,	and	 art,	 and	 religious	 rituals,	which	 led	 to	 social	 integration	with	 other	 local	communities.		
Chapter	1:	Introduction	
7		
The	characteristics	of	Hadrami	Arabs	 in	Medan	were	studied	by	Chalida	Fachrudin	(2005).	Fachrudin	discusses	the	role	of	Hadramis	in	trade	and	their	relationship	 with	 their	 (fore)	 fathers’	 homeland	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 other	neighboring	 countries.	 The	 author	 sketches	 how	 the	 social	 and	 political	changes	after	the	Second	World	War	influenced	the	lives	of	Hadramis	in	some	countries	 including	 those	 in	Medan,	 especially	 their	 kinship	 networks	which	were	restricted	to	Medan	and	Java.		A	 study	 on	Hadramis	 in	 the	 eastern	 part	 of	 Indonesia,	 especially	 in	 the	provinces	 of	 Central	 Sulawesi,	 Gorontalo,	 North	 Sulawesi	 and	 North	Maluku	was	carried	out	by	Martin	Slama	(2011).	In	that	study	he	discusses	translocal	networks	 among	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 regions.	 Besides,	 in	 an	 earlier	 work	Slama	 examines	 how	 connections	 between	 Indonesia	 and	 Hadramaut	 have	been	 renewed	 in	 the	 recent	 decades	 (2005).	 Another	 issue	 he	 has	 touched	upon	 is	about	Hadrami	women	 in	 their	participation	 in	 the	public	 life	(2012)	and	 their	marriage	 practice	 (2014).	 In	 another	work,	 Johan	Heiss	 and	 Slama	(2010)	 relate	 genealogy	 to	 the	 process	 of	 Hadrami	 migration	 and	 the	construction	of	hierarchy	and	identity	among	Hadramis.	In	addition	to	persons	and	 ideas	 travelling	 along	 genealogical	 networks	 from	 Hadramaut	 to	Indonesia,	 they	 investigate	 long-distance	 flows	 originating	 from	 Middle	Eastern	 centres	of	 Islamic	 learning,	or	 Islamic	 reformism,	which	was	used	 to	question	a	genealogically	based	social	hierarchy.		A	number	of	recent	studies	on	Hadramis	in	Indonesia	specifically	focus	on	gender	relations.	A	dissertation	on	the	Arabs	in	Jakarta	by	Kunthi	Tridewiyanti	(2009)	 emphasizes	 the	 linkage	 in	marriage	practices	 of	 the	Arab	 community	and	those	of	other	ethnic	communities	between	the	Indonesian	legal	system	on	one	hand,	 and	 specific	 gender	 constructions	on	 the	other	hand.	Tridewiyanti	argued	that	the	Indonesian	legal	system	has	adopted	a	legal	pluralism	in	which	several	 legal	 systems	 coexist.	 Although	 she	 relates	 the	 practice	 of	 endogamy	and	 kafa’a	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 gender,	 she	 does	 not	 elaborate	 further	 on	gender	inequality	on	the	basis	of	the	marriage	practice.	This	topic	was	picked	up	by	Hamka	Siregar	(2009),	who	further	developed	a	more	explicit	study	on	gender	inequality	within	the	Sada	community.	Findings	of	his	research	on	the	Sada	 community	 in	 Pontianak,	West	 Kalimantan	 suggest	 that	 the	 practice	 of	
kafa’a	maintained	by	 the	Sada	community	 in	Pontianak	 limits	 the	 freedom	of	women.	 The	 coercive	 acceptance	 of	 this	marriage	 system	by	women	 of	 Sada	families	 has	 resulted	 in	 unhappy	marriages.	 Siregar	 argues	 that	 this	was	not	only	due	 to	a	 lineage	 cultural	pattern	as	 such,	but	 that	 certain	economic	and	political	interests	also	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	maintenance	of	the	marriage	tradition.		In	a	similar	vein,	M.	Adlin	Sila	(2005)	analyzed	the	practice	of	kafa’a	in	the	Sada	 community	 in	 Cikoang,	 South	 Sulawesi,	 by	 taking	 a	 socio-psychological	perspective.	 The	 importance	 of	 notions	 of	 honor	 and	 shame	 rooted	 in	 the	
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cultural	patterns,	motivated	this	marriage	practice	according	to	Sila.	The	fear	for	 loss	 of	 dignity	 and	 the	 shame	 that	 the	 family	 would	 be	 confronted	 with	prevented	daughters	from	being	permitted	to	marry	a	man	of	non-Sada	origin.	In	 his	 more	 comprehensive	 study	 on	 the	 Sada	 community	 in	 Cikoang,	 Sila	(2015)	examines	the	role	of	descendants	of	Sayyid	Jalaluddin	al-‘Aidid	in	both	their	 religious	 development	 and	 social	 integration	 with	 the	 society	 in	Indonesia.		Likewise,	 the	 Sada	descendants	 become	 special	 subjects	 of	 Ismail	 Fajrie	Alatas’	studies	(2008;	2011;	2014;	2016a;	2016b;	2016c).	In	his	studies,	Alatas	examines	the	Sada	descendants	with	traditionalist	backgrounds	and	their	role	in	 Islamic	missionary	 in	 Indonesia	 (2008;	2016c),	 their	 relationship	with	 the	homeland	 (2011;	 2016b)	 and	 the	 diaspora	 (2011;	 2016a),	 as	 well	 as	 the	significance	 of	 religious	 rituals,	 such	 as	 haul	 (annual	 commemoration	 of	 a	deceased	person)	 and	pilgrimage	 to	 local	 shrines	 (2014).	 	Alatas	 argues	 that	recognized	 claims	 of	 descent	 to	 the	 Prophet	 Muhammad	 continues	 to	 allow	Sada	 identity	 to	 function	 as	 important	 cultural	 capital	 contributing	 to	 the	success	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 community	 of	 followers	 as	 well	 as	 the	formation	 and	maintenance	 of	 religious	 authority	 both	 in	 the	 homeland	 and	diaspora.	There	 is	 a	 book	 on	 the	 contributions	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 economy	 and	society	across	the	Indian	Ocean	(Alatas	2010)	and	an	annotated	bibliography	that	 offers	 an	 interdisciplinary	 paradigm	 of	 the	 study	 of	 the	 Hadrami	communities	 in	Southeast	Asia	(Samad	2010).	These	 two	books	published	by	the	 National	 Library	 of	 Singapore	 include	 various	 fields	 of	 studies	 and	publications.		Despite	 this	 rich	 documentation	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 diasporic	 Hadrami	communities	and	and	practices,	very	little	has	been	published	on	the	Arabs	in	Central	Maluku.	In	one	article	William	G.	Clarence-Smith	(1998)	suggests	that	the	 role	 of	 the	 Arabs	 in	 gaining	 economic	 success	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	was	 considerable,	 but	 unfortunately	 his	 sketch	 remains	 rather	 brief	 and	fragmented.	 	 Another	 article,	 written	 by	 Roy	 Ellen	 (1996)	 delineates	 the	economic	 activities	 of	 the	 Arab	 community	 in	 the	 Geser-Gorom	 Islands.	 He	elaborates	on	the	economic	role	of	this	Arab	community	in	the	local	economy	and	on	its	business	networks	during	the	last	two	decades	of	the	New	Order	in	a	brief	section	of	his	monograph’s	On	the	Edge	of	Banda	Zone	(Ellen	2003).		Most	 historical	 studies	 emphasize	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 the	economy,	 politics,	 and	 religion,	 and	 their	maintenance	 of	 cultural	 identity	 as	well	as	their	orientation	towards	the	country	of	origin,	particularly	before	the	emergence	 of	 nation-states,	 and	 the	weakened	 links	 afterward.	 Some	 recent	ethnographic	 studies,	 however,	 have	 indicated	 that	 renewed	 links	 between	Hadramaut	 and	 Indonesia	 have	 been	 revitalized	 since	 the	 mid-1994	 (Knysh	2001;	Slama	2005;	Ho	2006;	Jacobsen	2009;	Alatas	2008	[2016b]).		
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Building	upon	 the	broad	ranch	of	 research	on	 the	Hadramis	 in	 the	diasporas	that	 I	have	outlined	above,	my	 research	 consists	of	 an	ethnographic	 study	of	the	Arab	 community	 in	which	 I	provide	a	 contextualized	analysis	of	how	 the	descendants	 of	 Hadrami	 Arabs	 in	 Ambon	 articulate	 their	 identity	 through	everyday	 life	practices.	The	aim	of	my	emphasis	on	everyday	 life	practices	 in	relation	to	diasporic	identity	construction	is	to	examine	in	what	circumstances	and	 situations	 the	 Hadramis	 claim	 and	 play	 out	 one	 or	 more	 specific	 social	identifications	as	part	of	a	group	or	a	diasporic	community.	The	 focus	 in	 this	study	 is	 much	 more	 on	 the	 level	 of	 individual	 research	 subjects	 than	 on	 a	group/community	level,	the	latter	of	which		is	used	as	a	category	of	analysis	in	order	to	locate	the	individuals	in	their	social	positions.						On	a	concrete	level,	the	study	thus	aims	at	making	a	contribution	to	filling	the	 gap	of	 knowledge	on	 the	diaspora	of	 the	Hadrami	Arabs	 in	 the	diaspora,	especially	in	Eastern	Indonesia.	On	a	more	meta-level,	this	research	relates	to	the	intersectionality	of	ethnicity,	religion,	class	and	gender	in	the	construction	of	identity.	In	order	to	avoid	essentialism	and	to	emphasize	ongoing	processes	of	 identification,	 a	 constructivist	 approach	 will	 be	 adopted,	 which	 will	 be	elaborated	in	theoretical	framework	below.		
4. Theoretical	Framework	
4.	1			Diaspora:	Meanings	and	Elements	Diaspora	 is	 an	 old	 concept,	 whose	 uses	 and	 meanings	 have	 undergone	significant	 change	within	 academic	 disciplines	 since	 the	 1970s	 (Baubok	 and	Faist	 2010).	 In	 more	 recent	 years,	 it	 has	 increasingly	 been	 used	interchangeably	with	the	concept	‘transnationalism’		(Baubok	and	Faist	2010).	The	 term	 ‘diaspora’	 often	 refers	 to	 any	 group,	 community	 or	 population	regarded	‘deterritorialised’	or	‘transnational’	that	originally	comes	from	a	land	other	 than	which	 the	 group	 currently	 lives,	 and	whose	 social,	 economic	 and	political	 networks	 cross	 the	 borders	 of	 nation-states	 or	 span	 the	 world	(Vertovec	1997,	277).	As	 used	 in	 conceptual	 frameworks,	 the	 term	 ‘diaspora’	 has	 no	 a	 unified	meaning	 (Hall	 1990;	 Safran	 1991;	 Bhabha	 1994;	 Clifford	 1994;	 Cohen	 1997;	Gilroy	1997;	Vertovec	1997;	Sheffer	2003;	Kokot,	Tölölyan,	and	Alfonso	2004;	Reis	 2004;	 Brubaker	 2005;	 Carment	 and	 Bercuson	 2008;	 Dufoix	 2008;	Chivallon	 and	 Alou	 2011).	William	 Safran	 (1991)	 conceptualizes	 diaspora	 in	terms	of	several	criteria	as	referring	to	those	who:	have	been	dispersed	from	a	particular	centre	to	two	or	more	places;	continue	to	have	a	collective	memory	about	 the	 origin	 or	 homeland	 and	 believe	 that	 the	 homeland	 is	 their	 ideal	
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home	 and	 have	 a	 desire	 to	 return;	 continue	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	homeland;	 have	 been	 committed	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 homeland;	maintain	a	strong	bond	with	the	same	members	of	diaspora;	have	a	trouble	of	relations	with	 the	 host-societies	 and	 feel	 partly	 alienated	 from	 the	 societies.	Similarly	Gabriel	Sheffer	(2003)	defines	diaspora	as	a	social	political	formation	that	 is	 the	 product	 of	 either	 voluntary	 or	 forced	 migration,	 and	 whose	members	consider	themselves	as	belonging	to	the	same	ethno-national	origin	and	who	permanently	live	as	minorities	in	one	or	several	countries.	Likewise,	Robin	Cohen	(1997)	classifies	diaspora	into	four	basic	types:	forced	migration,	labour,	 imperial	policies,	and	trade,	as	well	as	adding	two	more	criteria:	 first,	in	 regard	 to	 causes	 of	 dispersal,	 diaspora	 can	 include	 both	 forced	 and	voluntary	 dispersal,	 such	 as	 trade	 or	 economic	 purposes;	 second,	 although	despite	a	sense	of	solidarity	with	co-ethnic	members	in	various	places,	there	is	possibility	for	the	diaspora	community	to	have	a	good	relation	with	the	host-countries.	Contradictory	 to	 previous	 scholars,	 Stuart	 Hall	 defines	 diaspora	 as	 ‘the	recognition	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 experiences	 of	 identity,	 “which	 lives	 and	through,	 not	despite,	 difference;	 by	hybridity.”’	 (Hall	 1990,	 235).	 In	 a	 similar	vein,	 James	Clifford	conceives	of	 	diaspora	as	various	 transnational	networks	created	 from	 multiple	 belongings	 that	 include	 practices	 of	 both	accommodation	with	 and	 resistance	 to	 host-societies	 as	well	 as	 their	 norms	(Clifford	 1994,	 307-308).	Michele	 Reis	 (2004)	 divides	 diaspora	 into	 classical	(Jewish	 and	Armenian),	modern	 (slave	 and	 colonial),	 and	 contemporary.	 She	argues	 that	 contemporary	 modalities	 of	 diaspora	 are	 the	 product	 of	 a	postcolonial,	 globalized	 world.	 Diaspora	 is	 characterized	 by	 fragmentation,	dislocation,	 and	 an	 ongoing	 transnational	 communication.	 Dispersal	 to	overseas	 territories	 does	not	 imply	 a	 decisive	 break	with	 the	 homeland,	 and	the	 uprooting	 of	 the	 members	 of	 a	 diasporic	 group	 is	 not	 permanent.	Meanwhile,	Carment	and	Bercuson	(2008)	takes	diaspora	as	a	broad	category	of	a	transnational	population	that	includes		migrants	and	their	first	and	second	generation-descendants,	expatriates,	refugees,	students,	and	guest	workers.	In	 regard	 to	 those	 various	 conceptualizations,	 Steven	 Vertovec	 (1997)	classified	diaspora	 as	 referring	 to	 three	 categories	of	meaning:	diaspora	 as	 a	social	 form,	 diaspora	 as	 a	 type	 of	 consciousness,	 and	 diaspora	 as	 a	mode	 of	cultural	 production.	 Diaspora	 as	 a	 social	 form	 gives	 much	 reference	 to	 the	Jewish	 experience	 associated	 with	 forced	 dispersion,	 but	 also	 includes	voluntary	 dispersal	 or	 migration.	 Diaspora	 as	 a	 social	 form	 emphasizes	 an	identified	group	characterized	by	a	 ‘triadic	 relationship’:	 a	 strong	connection	to	 co-ethnic	members	of	 a	diaspora	 community	around	 the	world	and	 to	 the	homeland,	but	a	weak	connection	to	the	host-land	(Vertovec	1997,	278-279).		Diaspora	as	a	type	of	consciousness	focuses	more	on	‘a	variety	of	experience,	a	state	 of	mind,	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 identity’	marked	 by	 ‘a	 paradoxical	 nature’	 and	
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‘awareness	of	multilocality’,	such	as	being	‘home	away	from	home‘	or	‘here	and	there’	(Vertovec	1997,	281-282).		Diaspora	as	a	mode	of	cultural	production	is	defined	 as	 the	 constant	 production	 and	 reproduction	 of	 transnational	 social	and	 cultural	 phenomena.	 It	 emphasizes	 the	 fluidity	 of	 identities	 which	 are	called	syncretic,	creole,	hybrid,	translated,	cut	and	mix,	or	alternate	(Vertovec	1997,	289).	Although	 diaspora	 has	 several	meanings,	 there	 are	 three	 core	 elements	 that	remain	widely	understood	to	be	constitutive	of	diaspora:	dispersion	in	space,	original	 homeland	 orientation,	 and	 boundary	maintenance	 (Brubaker	 2005).	In	regard	to	these	three	elements,	older	and	newer	notions	differ	in	how	they	conceptualizing	these	elements.	For	the	first	element,	dispersion,	older	notions	refer	to	forced	dispersal	rooted	in	the	experience	of	Jews,	Armenians,	Greeks,	but	also	more	recently	of	Africans	and	Palestinians.	Newer	notions	refer	to	any	kind	 of	 dispersal.	 This	 thus	 includes	 trade	 diasporas,	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	Chinese,	 or	 labour	migration	diasporas,	 such	as	 those	of	 the	Turkish	and	 the	Mexicans	(Cohen	1997).	Concerning	 the	 second	 element,	 the	 orientation	 on	 a	 real	 or	 imagined	‘homeland’	 as	 an	 authoritative	 source	 of	 value,	 identity,	 and	 loyalty,	 a	significant	shift	can	be	discerned	in	recent	discussions.	Older	notions	strongly	emphasized	this	criterion.	For	example	what	Safran	(1991)	conceptualizes	as	diaspora	is	that	four	of	the	six	criteria	specified	to	concern	on	the	orientation	to	 a	 homeland.	 Clifford	 (1994),	 however,	 has	 criticized	 what	 he	 called	 the	‘centered’	model	of	Safran	and	others,	 in	which	diasporic	communities	are	by	definition	‘oriented	by	continuous	cultural	connections	to	a	(single)	source	and	by	a	teleology	of	 ‘return’.	In	other	words,	older	notions	clearly	imply	a	return	to	 an	 (imagined)	 homeland	 (Safran	 1991)	 or	 to	 homeland	 oriented	 projects	intended	 to	 shape	 a	 country’s	 future	 by	 influencing	 it	 from	 abroad	 or	 by	encouraging	 return	 there.	 Newer	 notions	 replace	 return	 with	 dense	 and	continuous	 linkages	 across	 borders,	 as	 in	 the	 migration-development	 nexus	(Faist	 2008).	 These	 newer	 views	 do	 not	 remain	 focused	 on	 the	 imagery	 of	origin	and	destination,	but	rather	include	countries	of	onward	migration,	and	emphasize	lateral	ties.	Wider	use	of	the	orientation	dimension	also	relate	it	to	diasporic	 experiences	 of	 all	 mobile	 persons	 as	 ‘trans-national’	 (Appadurai	1996).	Some	also	take	non-territorial	imagined	homeland	into	account,	such	as	a	global	Islamic	umma	(community).	The	 third	 element	 is	 boundary-maintenance,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	 the	preservation	 of	 a	 distinctive	 identity	 vis-à-vis	 a	 host-society.	 Older	 notions	emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 boundaries	 for	 collectivities	 that	 do	 not	 have	‘their	 own’	 territorial	 polity	 (Amstrong	 1976,	 384-397).	 Newer	 notions,	however,	 emphasize	 hybridity,	 fluidity,	 creolization	 and	 syncretism	 (Hall	1990;	 Bhabha	 1994;	 Gilroy	 1997;	 Chivallon	 and	 Alou	 2011).	 This	 trend	 is	
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especially	characteristic	of	the	literature	on	transnationalism,	which	tended	to	fuse	in	recent	years	with	literature	on	diaspora.	There	 is	 thus	a	 tension	 in	the	 literature	between	boundary-maintenance	and	 boundary-erosion	 (Brubaker	 2005).	 The	 third	 aspect/element	 is	 closely	related	 to	 the	 incorporation	 or	 integration	 of	migrants	 into	 the	 countries	 of	settlement.	 Older	 notions	 implied	 that	 members	 of	 diaspora	 do	 not	 fully	integrate	 socially,	 politically,	 culturally,	 into	 the	 host-countries,	 making	 and	maintaining	 boundaries	 vis-à-vis	 the	 majority	 groups.	 Assimilation	 would	mean	 the	 end	 of	 diaspora,	 whether	 ethnically	 or	 religiously	 defined.	 In	contrast,	 newer	 notions	 imply	 boundary-erosion	 and	 emphasize	 fluidity	 of	identity	 coined	 as	 ‘hybridity’.	 In	 fact,	 both	 notions	 imply	 that	 members	 of	diaspora	do	not	 fully	assimilate	 into	 the	host-society	but	maintain	a	 sense	of	distinct	cultural	identity	(Baubok	and	Faist	2010,	12).	The	older	notions	are	a	modern,	centered,	political,	and	territorial,	while	the	newer	notions	are	a	post-modern,	deterritorialized,	emancipatory	and	cultural	(Dufoix	2008,	10).	There	are	thus	tensions	between	older	and	newer	notions.	First,	newer	usages	refer	to	 any	 kind	 of	 dispersal	 and	 blur	 the	 distinctions	 between	 various	 kinds	 of	cross-border	mobility.	 Second,	 the	 emphasis	 on	 return	 has	 been	 replaced	 by	circular	 exchange	 and	 transnational	 mobility.	 Third,	 while	 both	 older	 and	newer	 usages	 emphasize	 that	 diasporic	 groups	 do	 not	 assimilate	 in	 host-societies,	 more	 recent	 discussions	 go	 beyond	 the	 idea	 of	 cultural	distinctiveness	 and	 focus	 on	 processes	 of	 cultural	 innovation.	 This	 raises	 a	question	 whether	 migrant	 integration	 and	 maintaining	 cultural	 distinctions	may	coexist	(Baubok	and	Faist	2010).	Recent	academic	debates	in	Hadrami	studies	reflect	the	different	notions	of	 diaspora	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 diaspora	 and	 cultural	 studies	 in	general.	Most	 of	 the	 scholars	 argue	 that	 the	Hadramis	 exemplify	 a	 diasporic	community	 that	 preserves	 a	 distinct	 cultural	 identity	 vis-à-vis	 host	 societies.	However,	 they	 differ	 in	 their	 definition	 of	 this	 cultural	 distinctiveness.	 Some	identify	 Hadramis	 as	 having	 ‘a	 dual	 (ethnic-religious)	 identity’	 (for	 example	Abushouk	and	Ibrahim	2010),	others	prefer	to	use	a	notion	of	creole	or	hybrid	identity	in	order	to	overcome	an	issue	on	cultural	variations	(ethnic	mixture)	while	claiming	 the	same	 identity	(Feener	2004;	Ho	2006;	Slama	2005;	Alatas	2011	 &	 2016b;	 Mandal	 2018)	 or	 a	 ‘transnational’	 one	 (see	 Freitag	 2003).	Instead	 of	 choosing	 one	 over	 another,	 Leif	 Manger	 (2010)	 avoids	 of	typologizing	a	diasporic	 community,	 such	as	Cohen’s	Global	Diaspora	 (1997),	or	essentializing	diaspora	as	social	form	(Safran	1991).	Rather,	he	emphasizes	heterogeneity	 of	 lived	 experiences	 and	 intersectionality	 of	 many	 historical	processes	and	forms	of	agency.	Following	Manger’s	 suggestion,	 I	build	my	study	upon	an	actor-oriented	approach	that	locates	meanings	and	practices	within	the	actors’	constructions.	This	 allows	 for	 studying	 both	 continuity	 and	 change	 in	 the	 identity	 of	 the	
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diasporic	community	and	its	members.	By	adopting	this	approach	my	aim	is	to	get	more	insights	into	the	commonalities	and	differences	in	the	experiences	of	individuals	 in	 different	 (historical)	 contexts	 as	 well	 as	 to	 understand	 the	complexity	of	multiple	 senses	of	 belonging	 and	of	multiple	 ideas	of	 home.	 In	this	 regard,	 I	 found	 some	 conceptions	 of	 a	 few	 specific	 scholars	 on	 diaspora	particularly	 useful	 for	 my	 study.	 For	 instance,	 Rogers	 Brubaker	 (2005)	suggests	 to	 overcome	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘groupism’	 and	 essentialism	 by	 treating	diaspora	 as	 a	 category	 of	 practice,	 as	 a	 claim,	 a	 project,	 and	 as	 a	 stance,	 by	studying	 empirically	 the	 degree	 and	 form	 of	 support	 for	 a	 diasporic	 project	among	members	of	its	putative	constituency,	and	exploring	to	what	extent,	and	in	 what	 circumstances,	 those	 claimed	 as	 members	 of	 putative	 diasporas	actively	 adopt	 or	 at	 least	 passively	 sympathize	 with	 the	 diasporic	 stance’	(Brubaker	 2005,	 13).	 Another	 suggestion	 I	 find	 particularly	 useful	 is	 that	 of	Vertovec	 (1997)	who	proposes	 the	concept	of	 ‘multicultural	 competences’	or	‘crossing	and	moving’	that	refers	to	the	ability	of	individuals	not	only	to	create	syncretic	 forms,	 but	 also	 to	 enact	 and	 improvise	 upon	 some	 cultural	 and	linguistic	 systems.	 To	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 identities,	 Rima	 Berns-McGown	 (2007-2008)	 proposes	 a	 broad	 definition	 of	 diaspora	 as	 a	 space	 of	imagination	and	of	balancing	two	connections:	a	connection	to	the	host-states	and	 a	 connection	 to	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 (real	 or	 mythic	 homeland),	 and	 a	balance	 between	 a	 specific	 community	 connection	 and	 a	 connection	 to	 the	wider	communities.	Furthermore,	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	 the	 binary	 position	 between	assimilation/social	 integration	 to	 the	 host-societies/states	 and	 cultural	distinctiveness,	 I	 consider	 Peggy	 Levitt	 and	 N.	 Glick	 Schiller’s	 concept	 of	‘simultaneity	 of	 connection’	 fruitful	 to	 study	 the	 complex	 ways	 or	 multi-layered	of	attachment	and	belonging	among	transnational	members,	including	diasporic	 groups	 (Levitt	 and	 Glick-Schiller	 2004;	 Glick-Schiller	 2005).	 Levitt	and	Glick-Schiller	argue	that	the	incorporation	of	individuals	into	nation-states	and	 the	 maintenance	 of	 transnational	 connections	 are	 not	 opposed	 to	 each	other.	In	other	words,	the	concept	‘simultaneity’	tries	to	see	the	experience	of	individuals	 (migrants	or	 their	descendants)	 living	 simultaneously	within	 and	beyond	the	boundaries	of	a	nation-state	(Levitt	and	Glick-Schiller	2004,	1006).	This	 simultaneity	 is	 enacted	 through	 two	 different,	 interlinked	 actions:	transnational	 ways	 of	 being	 and	 ways	 of	 belonging.	 Transnational	 ways	 of	being	concern	‘the	actual	social	relations	and	practices	that	individuals	engage	in	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 identities	 associated	 with	 their	 actions’.	 Transnational	ways	of	belonging	 is	defined	as	practices	 that	signal	conscious	 identifications	or	 emotional	 connection	 to	 a	 particular	 group	 or	 people	who	 are	 elsewhere.	These	 ways	 of	 belonging	 are	 enacted	 through	 ‘not	 symbolic	 but	 concrete,	visible	 actions	 that	 mark	 belonging’.	 Individuals	 within	 transnational	 social	fields	 may	 combine	 these	 two	 transnational	 ways	 differently	 in	 particular	
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contexts,	 and	 they	 may	 shift	 from	 one	 way	 to	 another	 depending	 on	 the	context	(Levitt	and	Glick-Schiller	2004,	1010;	Glick-Schiller	2005,	458-459).	




4.3			Ethnicity	As	 there	 is	a	debate	on	 the	 issue	whether	we	can	speak	of	a	distinct	 cultural	identity	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora,	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 term	 ‘ethnic	identity’	 seems	 to	 be	 relevant	 here.	 A	 common	 debate	 on	 ethnic	 identity	concerns	whether	 it	 is	 based	 on	 common	 descent	 or	 shared	 culture.	 Fredrik	Barth	 and	 his	 colleagues	 in	 the	 seminal	 work	 Ethnic	 Groups	 and	 Boundaries	(1969)	sought	to	signify	ethnic	boundaries	rather	than	the	cultural	content	of	ethnic	collectivities.	Barth	argues	that	the	focus	in	the	study	of	ethnicity	should	focus	on	the	‘ethnic	boundary	that	defines	the	group	and	not	the	cultural	stuff	that	 it	 encloses’	 (Barth	 1969,	 15).	 Barth	 argued	 that	 what	 categorizes	 as	 an	ethnic	group	is	what	people	regard	significant,	and	thus	it	is	not	so	much	about	the	content	of	cultural	features	(Barth	1969,	14).	However,	Barth	later	realized	that	 the	 cultural	 stuff	 does	 matter.	 Within	 the	 contested	 positions	 on	 the	question	 of	 ethnicity	 I	 have	 used	 an	 approach	 that	 is	 closer	 to	 T.H.	 Eriksen	(1992;	 1997;	 1998)	 and	 Jenkins	 (1995;	 1997),	 who	 both	 build	 on	 and	responded	 to	 Barth’s	 approach.	 Eriksen’s	 understanding	 of	 ethnicity	 focuses	on	 interactional	 aspects.	 He	 argues	 that	 cultural	 differences	 between	 ethnic	groups	are	not	necessarily	decisive	features	of	ethnicity	unless	they	are	made	so	 in	 social	 interaction.	 	 Jenkins	 suggests	 that	 ethnicity	 and	 culture	 are	 not	what	 people	 have	 or	 belong	 to	 but	 ‘’...complex	 repertoires	 which	 people	experience,	use,	 learn	and	do	 in	their	daily	 lives,	within	which	they	construct	an	 on-going	 sense	 of	 themselves	 and	 an	 understanding	 of	 their	 fellows.	Ethnicity,	 in	 particular	 is	 best	 considered	 as	 an	 ongoing	 process	 of	 ethnic	identification”	(Jenkins	1997,	14).		Therefore,	taking	insights	from	Eriksen	and	Jenkins,	I	approach	ethnicity	in	 terms	 of	 socially	 constructed	 ‘similarity’	 and	 ‘difference’	 with	 some	reference	 to	 culture	 and	 putative	 claims	 of	 common	 descent.	Moreover,	 this	study	 takes	 as	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 that	 these	 processes	 of	 similarities	 and	differences	are	not	exclusively	enacted	in	political	claims	but	also	in	the	realm	of	 everyday	 existence.	 Avoiding	 taking	 either	 a	 primordialist	 approach	 to	ethnicity	which	assumes	ethnicity	as	fixed	at	birth	and	cannot	be	changed,	lost	or	 transformed,	 and	an	 instrumentalist	 approach	which	assumes	ethnicity	as	far	 from	fixed’	or	 fluid,	 I	have	 found	 taking	 the	constructivist	position	useful.	The	 constructivist	 approach	 combines	 primordial	 and	 instrumental	approaches	 to	 argue	 that	 any	 kind	 of	 identity	 is	 never	 the	 result	 of	 a	 single	action	 of	 an	 individual	 but	 always	 the	 result	 of	 interaction	 between	 the	individual	 and	 the	outside	world.		 In	 other	words,	 ethnicity	 is	 the	product	 of	
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social	 processes	 rather	 than	 a	 cultural	 given,	 made	 and	 remade	 rather	 than	taken	 for	 granted,	 chosen	 depending	 on	 circumstances	 rather	 than	 ascribed	through	 birth.	 Yet,	 since	 culture,	 and	 thus	 cultural	 identity	 is	 embodied,	individuals	 can	 experience	 their	 ethnic	 identity	 as	 a	 given	 that	 defines	 who	they	 are	 and	which	 cannot	be	 changed,	 or	 only	 at	 a	 great	 cost.	 Furthermore,	the	 discourse	 on	 ethnicity	 bears	 parallels	 with	 other	 social	 identification	processes	such	as	religious,	social,	and	gender	identification.		
4.4			Multiple	Social	Identities	and	Intersectionality		The	problem	of	 conceptualizing	diaspora	 lies	 in	 categorizing	 individuals	 into	one	 particular	 group	 and	 a	 single	 sense	 of	 belonging.	 However,	 like	 non-diasporic	individuals,	people	from	diasporic	communities	bear	multiple	social	identities	in	several	social	categories,	such	as	ethnicity,	religion,	class,	gender,	and	 others.	 The	 descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 in	 my	 study	 have	complex	ways	of	constructing	 identity	boundaries	not	only	 in	terms	of	ethnic	identifications,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 	 Islamic	 denominational	 ones,	 class	membership	 (Sada	 and	 non-Sada),	 gender,	 and	 other	 collectivities,	 which	 all	more	or	 less	 intersect	 in	 their	 construction	of	diasporic	 identity.	 Sociological	identity	 theory	 has	 posited	 that	 people	 possess	 multiple	 identities	 because	they	 occupy	 multiple	 roles,	 are	 members	 of	 multiple	 groups,	 and	 claim	multiple	 personal	 characteristics	 (Burke	 and	 Stets	 2009,	 4).	 Although	 this	identity	theory	concerns	the	interrelation	of	these	multiple	identities	in	social	relations,	reference	to	the	dynamics	of	power	relations	which	are	embedded	in	social	relations	and	may	create	hierarchy	and	inequality	in	the	construction	of	these	 multiple	 identities	 is	 made	 less	 explicit.	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 found	 that	intersectionality	 theory	 as	 it	 is	 developed	 in	 feminism	 studies	 fruitful	 to	analyze	 the	 multidimensional	 and	 complex	 articulation	 of	 forms	 of	 social	division	and	identity	which	involve	power	relations	in	different	societal	arenas	(Brah	and	Phoenix	2004;	Yuval-Davis	2006;	Anthias	2008a[2008b][2013]).	There	 is	 no	 a	 unified	 approach	 to	 intersectionality	 (Crenshaw	1989[1991];	Anthias	and	Yuval-Davis	1983	[1992][2011];	Brah	1996).	Critics	as	 well	 as	 supporters	 to	 intersectionality	 from	 recent	 different	 academic	disciplines	are	various	(eg.;	Gimenez	2001;	Brah	and	Phoenix	2004;	Buitelaar	2006;	 Yuval-Davis	 2006;	Hancock	2007;	Davis	 2008;	 Ferree	2009;	 Erel	 et	 al.	2011;	 	 Levine-Rasky	 2011;	 Lutz	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Taylor	 et	 al.	 2011).	 It	 is	 not	my	purpose	to	review	all	these	approaches.	Rather,	I	will	use	intersectionality	in	a	broad	 sense	 to	 underscore	 the	 significance	 of	 certain	 social	 categories	 or	divisions	 that	 may	 interlock	 in	 the	 production	 of	 the	 social	 relations	 and	identities	 in	 people’s	 lives.	 Intersectionality	 theory	 emphasizes	 that	 these	social	 categories	 or	 divisions	 do	 not	 ‘add	 up’	 but	 are	 rather	 mutually	constitutive,	in	the	sense	that	they	are	affected	by	and	affect	each	other	(Brah	
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and	 Phoenix	 2004;	 Anthias	 2008a[2008b][2013).	 The	 interlocking	 of	 social	categories	depends	on	concrete	social	relations	in	different	societal	arenas	and	historical	processes,	so	 that	some	social	categories	may	 interlock	 in	a	certain	setting	but	not	in	another	setting	or	in	a	period	of	time	but	not	in	another	time.	As	 Floya	 Anthias	 (2013)	 argued,	 this	 position	 is	 important	 in	 order	 to	 go	beyond	 a	 focus	 on	 intersectional	 categories	 as	 such	 without	 looking	 at	 the	broader	 social	 landscape	 of	 power	 and	 hierarchy.	 I	 consider	 Anthias’s	suggestion	useful	 in	understanding	how	 the	active	maintainance	of	diasporic	identity	 in	 the	 different	 historical	 processes	 is	 shaped	 by	 a	 broader	 social	landscape	of	power	and	is	played	out	in	concrete	social	relations	and	practices.	In	 adopting	 an	 intersectionality	 approach	 in	 this	 study	 I	pay	attention	 to	 the	structural	 dimensions	 and	 constructivist	 dimensions	 of	 how	 Hadramis	 in	Ambon	 are	being	positioned	 and	position	 themselves	 in	 various	networks	 of	concrete	social	relations.		
5. Research	Question(s)	
The	central	question	of	this	research	is:	how	do	ethnicity	and	religion	intersect	in	 individual	 and	 collective	 constructions	 of	 identity	 of	 present-day	Hadrami	Arab	descendants	in	Ambon	and	how	does	this	process	of	identity	construction	relate	 to	 their	 positions	 in	 Ambonese	 socio-economic,	 political	 and	 religious	power	 constellations?	 	 	 This	 central	 research	 question	will	 be	 addressed	 by	seeking	answers	to	the	following	sub-questions:	a. How	do	Hadrami	Arabs	actively	claim	and	maintain	their	ethnic	identity	in	everyday	 practices?	 (e.g.	 dress,	 speech,	 food	 habits,	 marriage	 patterns,	rituals	&	festivals)	b. How	do	they	present	their	sense	of	(multiple)	belongings	in	individual	and	collective	 self-narratives	 and	 practices,	 and	 what	 (wishes	 for)	 concrete	relations	with	the	country	of	origin	do	they	have?		c. What	kind	of	Islamic	discourses	and	practices	do	they	engage	in	and	how	do	these	relate	to	their	claims	of	(multiple)	belonging?	d. What	 kind	 of	 local	 religious,	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 networks	 do	they	participate	in	and	how	do	these	networks	extend	over	various	ethnic	and	religious	communities	both	within	and	outside	Ambon?				
6. Research	Methods		
This	 PhD.	 dissertation	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 based	 on	 ethnographic	 research.	Data	for	this	ethnography	are	mainly	gathered	through	fieldwork	consisting	of	interviews	and	participant	observation.	For	documenting	data,	besides	notes,	I	took	photos	and	made	audio	and	visual	recordings.	
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I	conducted	fieldwork	in	Ambon	for	nine	months,	from	September	2014-May	 2015.	 I	 lived	 in	 a	 rented	 room	 owned	 by	 Ambonese	 family	 of	 Chinese	origin	in	a	Christian	neighbourhood	in	Kota	Ambon.	This	was	not	the	first	time	I	spent	in	Ambon.	I	had	lived	for	two	years	around	January	2011-	July	2013	in	a	boarding	house	in	a	Muslim	neighbourhood	in	Batumerah	when	I	started	to	work	 as	 lecturer	 at	 State	 Institute	 of	 Islamic	 Studies,	 IAIN,	 of	 Ambon.	 In	Batumerah	Atas,	I	had	rented	a	room	from	a	family	of	Hadrami	Sada	origin	for	three	months	and	 for	 the	 rest	of	1,5	years	 I	moved	 in	as	a	boarder	 in	a	 local	Ambonese	 family.	While	 boarding	with	 a	 Sada	 family,	 I	 had	 no	 idea	 that	 the	family	was	related	to	my	later	research	subjects.	My	preliminary	knowledge	of	the	Arabs	in	Ambon	is	based	on	my	small	research	project	funded	by	the	IAIN	of	 Ambon	 around	 November-December	 2011	 and	 July-December	 2012.	 The	aim	of	the	preliminary	research	was	to	examine	the	role	of	the	Arabs	in	Islamic	developments	 in	 Ambon,	 and	 I	 used	my	 observations	 and	 findings	 from	 this	project	 to	 further	 investigate	 the	 main	 topic	 of	 this	 PhD.	 dissertation.	 In	addition,	prior	to	my	moving	to	the	Netherlands	for	the	PhD.	project,	in	April-June	 2013,	 I	 conducted	 a	 small	 survey	 on	 the	 political	 activities	 of	 the	 Arab	descendants	in	Ambon	by	interviewing	forty-six	people	from	different	clans.	I	included	the	findings	of	the	survey	in	the	topic	of	the	political	engagement	of	the	Hadrami	Arab	descendants	in	the	local	politics	in	this	study.	My	 fieldwork	was	mainly	based	 in	Ambon	and	 I	 spent	much	of	 the	 time	doing	field	research	in	this	area.	As	diasporic	space	is	 ‘a	space	of	connections	to	 multiple	 sites’	 (Berns-McGown	 2007-2008),	 to	 conduct	 a	 research	 on	diaspora,	 conducting	 multi-sited	 fieldwork	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 diasporic	networks:	 links	to	the	(real	or	 imagined)	homeland,	to	the	wider	society,	and	to	 the	 same	 community	 in	 other	 diasporas,	 is	 an	 issue	 that	 is	 considered	increasingly	 in	 anthropological	discussions	of	 diaspora	 (Kokot,	Tölölyan,	 and	Alfonso	 2004,	 5).	 I	 have	 therefore	 also	 conducted	 multi-sited	 fieldwork	 by	following	 the	 flow	 of	 the	Hadramis	 to	 some	 places.	 Using	 a	 kinship	 network	analysis,	I	found	that	the	Hadrami	Arabs	in	Ambon	are	related	to	the	Hadramis	in	other	Maluku	 Islands	as	well	 as	other	 regions	 in	 Indonesia.	 I	 visited	 some	other	islands	in	Maluku,	such	as	Seram,	Buru,	Banda,	Kei,	and	Ternate,	as	well	as	Papua	(particularly	Fak-Fak)	and	Java,	particularly	Jakarta,	in	order	to	trace	this	kinship	relation.	Furthermore,	I	joined	a	group	of	Hadramis	who	went	on	pilgrimage	to	Hadramaut	for	two	weeks	from	February	5-21,	2015.		On	 Ambon	 I	 attended	 small	 and	 big,	 private	 and	 public	 religious	gatherings	 or	 preachings	 organized	 by	 Shi’ite,	 Sunni	 traditionalist	 and	 Salafi	groups.	Such	small	gatherings	and	preachings	are	usually	held	once	or	twice	a	week	in	different	places,	such	as	at	a	follower’s	house,	an	office	building,	or	a	mosque.	 To	 accommodate	 the	 numerous	 attendees,	 public	 preachings	 and	festivities,	 such	 as	 maulid	 al-nabi,	 the	 commemoration	 of	 the	 Prophet’s	birthday,	and	‘ashura,	the	commemoration	of	the	martyrdom	of	Husain	one	of	
Chapter	1:	Introduction	
20		
the	Prophet’s	grandsons	on	the	tenth	day	of	the	Islamic	new	year,	are	usually	held	 in	a	big	mosque	or	an	open	area	such	as	a	sports	 field.	Apart	 from	such	religious	 activities,	 I	 also	 attended	 cultural	 feasts,	 such	 as	 weddings	 and	 a	funeral.	I	attended	two	wedding	parties	(one	in	Ambon	and	the	other	in	Tual)	and	a	 funeral	of	a	Sada	woman	in	a	special	cemetery	 for	Prince	Diponegoro’s	offspring	in	Ambon.	Likewise,	during	fieldwork	in	Hadramaut,	I	participated	as	a	pilgrim	 in	 religious	 rituals	at	 the	 shrines,	 and	also	attended	other	 religious	activities	 there,	 such	 as	 in	 hauls	 (annual	 commemorations	 of	 a	 deceased	person),	 maulids	 and	 other	 festivities.	 Besides,	 I	 attended	 sessions	 of	 a	religious	 course	 in	 Dar	 al-Zahra	 school.	 Moreover,	 although	 I	 had	 my	 own	room	to	rent	during	my	field	research,	I	conducted	participant	observation	by	staying	 with	 some	 Arab	 families,	 especially	 in	 Ambon,	 Buru,	 Tual,	 and	Hadramaut.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 I	 could	 participate	 in	 the	 daily	 activities	 of	 some	Hadramis,	such	as	eating,	praying,	chatting	(gossiping)	or	watching	TV.	Doing	participant	observation	offered	me	the	possibility	to	engage	a	lot	in	‘small	 talk’	 and	 informal	 interviews,	 either	 in	 shops,	 houses,	 or	 cafes.	 I	benefitted	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 from	 opportunities	 to	 have	 casual	conversations	with	my	informants	because	I	soon	noted	that	in	such	informal	and	more	 ‘natural’	 situations,	 despite	 the	 fact	 the	 people	 I	 talked	with	 knew	that	 I	 was	 there	 to	 do	 research	which	 explained	my	 interest,	 they	 felt	more	relaxed	 and	 were	 more	 easily	 ready	 to	 share	 information	 than	 in	 formal	interviews.		Nevertheless,	I	have	also	conducted	a	significant	number	of	more	formal	interviews.	 	 For	 such	 more	 formal	 appointments,	 I	 used	 in-depth	 semi-structured	 interview	 formats	 as	 this	 method	 gave	 me	 the	 flexibility	 to	 gain	more	insight	by	posing	follow-up	questions	when	some	ideas	come	up	during	the	 conversation.	 Many	 of	 my	 informants	 were	 reluctant	 to	 have	 the	interviews	 recorded,	 so	 that	 I	 did	 a	 lot	 of	 note	 taking	 during	 the	 interviews	rather	than	record	them.	I	interviewed	men	and	women	aged	between	twenty	and	eighty,	belonging	(or	making	claims	to	belong)	to	one	of	the	forty	Hadrami	clans.			I	interviewed	more	people	from	some	clans	than	from	some	other	clans	as	 some	 are	 bigger	 and	 consist	 of	 more	 families	 than	 others.	 This	 is	 due	 to	emigration	 process	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 from	 which	 strata	 and	 clans	 migrated	most,	but	also	to	different	marriage	practices	(exogamy,	endogamy,	and	kafa’a)	that	have	resulted	in	a	different	number	of	the	families	in	each	clan.		There	are	several	key-informants	with	whom	I	have	worked	more	closely.	Among	 these	key-informants	were	 some	 individuals	with	whom	 I	had	a	very	good	‘click’	and	who	on	the	basis	of	our	mutual	appreciation	were	willing	and	capable	 to	 cooperate	 more	 intensively.	 Other	 key	 informants	 possess	 much	knowledge	 about	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 or	 occupy	 leading	 positions	 in	socio-religious	 foundations	 or	 organizations.	 In	 general,	 for	 my	 interviews	 I	tried	 as	much	as	possible	 to	 speak	 to	 individuals	 from	different	 occupations,	
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both	those	belonging	to	the	elite	and	those	of	the	non-elite.		I	also	interviewed	some	Indonesians	of	Hadrami	origin	in	Hadramaut,	as	well	as	the	present	and	former	principals	of	Dar	al-Zahra	school	in	the	city	of	Tarim	in	Hadramaut	(see	list	 of	 informants/interviewees	 in	 Appendix	 3).	 Besides	 interviewing	Hadramis,	I	also	interviewed	some	local	people	of	non-Hadrami	origin.	The	 issue	 concerning	 the	 researcher’s	 access	 to	 knowledge	 in	 the	 field	research	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 their	 identity	 as	 insider	 or	 outsider,	 which	 is	associated	 with	 subjectivity-objectivity	 matters.	 My	 multiple	 identities	 are	important	factors	in	shaping	my	field	research.	As	I	am	an	Indonesian	Muslim,	I	share	with	my	informants	part	of	my	social	identity	in	terms	of	religion	and	citizenship.	Does	 that	mean	 I	 am	an	 insider?	 I	would	 say	 I	 am	partly	 insider	and	 partly	 outsider.	 It	 might	 be	 true	 that	 I	 may	 have	 had	 a	 more	 access	 to	knowledge	 than	 other	 foreign	 researchers	 of	 non-Muslims	 as	my	 informants	could	speak	Indonesian	fluently	and	I	could	join	in	some	religious	rituals,	such	as	 prayers.	 Yet,	 I	 also	 have	 other	 identities	 that	 I	 do	 not	 share	 with	 my	informants	in	terms	of	culture	and	my	personal	identities	or	preferences.	I	was	not	born	in	Ambon;	I	prefer	Javanese	food	and	I	have	no	Hadrami	origin	as	far	as	 I	 know.	 A	 recurring	 question	 that	many	 informants	 posed	me	 during	 our	interviews	was	whether	I	am	jama’a	(literally	meaning	‘congregation’),	part	of	the	community	of	Arabs.	Considering	those	frequently	asked	questions,	I	could	imagine	 that	my	Hadrami	 interlocutors	might	 have	 been	more	 open	 in	 their	answers	if	I	had	been	part	of	their	community.	Besides	my	non-Arab	identity,	my	position	as	a	researcher	was	probably	further	complicated	by	the	fact	that	I	was	 affiliated	 with	 a	 university	 in	 a	 foreign,	 European	 country.	 Why	 a	European	 university	 would	 be	 interested	 in	 financing	 my	 research	 was	 a	conundrum	 to	my	 informants,	 as	 it	was	 to	my	own	 relatives	 for	 that	matter.	This	 may	 have	 contributed	 to	 possible	 reservations	 that	 certain	 informants	may	 have	 had	 in	 talking	 to	 me.	 I	 can	 only	 speculate	 whether	 their	 concern	about	 the	 reasons	 behind	my	 own	 investment	 in	 the	 project	 and	 that	 of	 the	organization	 supplying	my	 grant	would	 have	 been	 different	 if	 another	 party	had	sponsored	my	research.		In	general,	of	course,	becoming	research	subjects	can	be	a	sensitive	issue;	while	 some	 people	 like	 the	 attention,	 others	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 be	 an	 object	 of	investigation.	Many	of	my	research	subjects,	for	instance,	were	reluctant	to	be	interviewed	 formally.	 Some	 even	 cancelled	 an	 appointment	 or	 asked	 me	 to	interview	 somebody	 else.	 A	 cousin	 of	 mine,	 who	 is	 a	 follower	 of	 a	 religious	preacher	of	Sada	origin	in	Java,	even	suspected	me	to	be	a	Western	intelligence	agent,	especially	after	I	had	been	on	a	fieldtrip	to	Hadramaut.		The	last	relevant	aspect	of	my	identity	that	is	likely	to	have	had	in	impact	on	my	 rapport	with	 informants	 and	 hence	 the	 information	 they	 shared	with	me,	is	related	to	my	gender.	Being	a	female	researcher	in	the	field	research	was	challenging	 as	 in	 certain	 places,	 like	 in	 Hadramaut,	 I	 was	 confronted	 with	
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This	 dissertation	 consists	 of	 seven	 chapters.	 After	 this	 first,	 introductory	chapter	in	which	I	presented	a	problem	analysis	of	the	research,	my	research	objectives,	 questions,	 methods,	 a	 literature	 review	 and	 a	 theoretical	framework,	 and	 present	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 study,	 the	 second	 chapter	describes	 the	 history	 and	 collective	memories	 concerning	 that	 history	 of	 the	Hadrami	 migration	 to	 Ambon.	 The	 main	 purpose	 of	 the	 first	 part	 on	 this	historical	 sketch	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 historical	 processes	 that	 have	 affected	the	 formation	 of	 a	 diasporic	 Hadrami	 identity.	 This	 historical	 part	 falls	 into	three	 sections.	 The	 first	 section	 deals	 with	 the	 push-and	 pull-factors	 of	Hadrami	migration,	 the	 second	 section	 discusses	 the	 specific	 patterns	 of	 the	migration	 that	 can	 be	 discerned,	 and	 the	 third	 section	 describes	 colonial	policies	 and	 their	 impacts	 on	 the	 Hadramis.	 Episodes	 from	 the	 collective	memory	about	the	Hadrami	migration	from	the	perspective	of	the	present-day	descendants	 are	 discussed	 in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 chapter,	 which	 aims	 at	understanding	 links	 between	 collective	 memory,	 identity	 and	 power	 in	 the	construction	of	diasporic	identity.		Chapter	 three	 provides	 a	 general	 overview	 of	 the	 present-day	 Hadrami	descendants	 in	 Ambon.	 This	 chapter	 aims	 to	 sketch	 general	 patterns	 of	 the	lives	of	today’s	Hadramis’	and	to	locate	them	into	a	particular	social	structure	of	 Ambon.	 Chapter	 three	 is	 divided	 into	 several	 parts,	 addressing	 social	groupings,	spatial	distribution,	economic	activities	and	political	affiliations,	as	well	as	everyday	life	practices	related	to	issues	such	as	language,	food	habits,	and	dress.	Chapter	 four	 focuses	 on	 kinship,	 marriage,	 and	 gender	 in	 order	 to	examine	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 Hadramis	 engage	 in	 variously	 situated	practices	of	kinship	relations.	 In	particular,	 I	ask	how	these	kinship	practices	affect	 gender	 relations	 among	 the	 Hadramis	 and	 the	 social	 reproduction	 of	diasporic	identity	construction.	The	chapter	is	divided	into	two	parts.	The	first	part	 sketches	 the	 kinship	 system,	 zooming	 in	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	patrilineal	descent,	kin	terms,	genealogy,	and	the	naming	system.	The	second	part	discusses	the	different	trends	in	marriage	patterns	of	Sada	and	non-Sada,	as	well	as	their	views	on	the	kafa’a	system	and	its	impact	on	gender	relations.	Chapter	 five	 sketches	 the	 religious	 developments	 within	 the	 Hadrami	community	 in	 Ambon	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 continuity	 and	 change	 in	religious	 beliefs	 and	 practices	 among	 the	 Hadramis.	 Before	 zooming	 in	 on	
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An	initial	contact	between	the	South	Arabian	Peninsula	and	Indonesia	cannot	be	precisely	determined.	Historians	argue	that	as	early	as	the	seventh	century	C.E.	 regular	 contacts	 between	 South	 Arabia	 and	 the	 Indonesian	 Archipelago	appear	 to	 have	 existed	 through	 trade.	 From	 the	 thirteenth	 century	 onwards,	small	 Arab	 settlements	 in	 major	 trading	 centres	 in	 the	 archipelago	 were	present	 (Natalie	 Mobini-Kesheh	 1999,	 21).	 Concerning	 Maluku,	 some	Portuguese	accounts	mention	that	a	small	number	of	the	Arab	residents	before	the	Portuguese	came	to	the	islands	in	the	early	sixteenth	century.	According	to	these	accounts,	during	the	visit	of	the	Jesuit	Priest	Francis	Xavier	in	Ternate	in	1547,	 Arabs	 had	 built	 an	 alliance	 with	 royal	 families	 in	 the	 Kingdom	 of	Ternate.	Francis	Xavier	is	reported	to	have	converted	to	Catholicism	a	number	of	 nobles,	 including	 an	Arab	 of	 Sada	 origin	 (Aritonang	 and	 Steenbrink	 2008,	50).	Similarly,	a	century	later	when	the	Dutch	arrived	at	Banda	Naira	in	1599,	Arab	 merchants	 were	 already	 present.	 Following	 the	 massacre	 of	 the	indigenous	Bandanese	 in	1621,	 the	Dutch	depended	heavily	on	both	Chinese	and	 Arab	 traders	 to	 fill	 economic	 niches.	 Ternate	 and	 Banda	 became	 two	important	areas	in	Maluku,	which	were	visited	on	a	regular	basis	by	some	Arab	merchants.	However,	as	in	other	parts	of	the	archipelago	before	the	eighteenth	century,	 these	Arabs	 in	Maluku	 cannot	be	 specifically	 identified	 as	Hadramis	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	21).		The	first	substantial	waves	of	Hadramis	migrating	to	Indonesia	occurred	in	 the	 latter	half	of	 the	eighteenth	century.	 	These	Hadrami	migrants	 initially	settled	in	the	northern	tip	of	Sumatra,	Aceh	and	then	began	to	form	colonies	in	other	 areas	 such	 as	 Palembang	 and	 Pontianak.	 Substantial	 Hadrami	settlements	emerged	on	the	coasts	of	Java	in	the	1820s	and	in	the	eastern	part	of	 the	 archipelago	 in	 the	 1870s	 onwards	 (Natalie	 Mobini-Kesheh	 1999,	 21;	Jacobsen	2009,	15).	Although	the	Arab	traders	in	Maluku	became	more	visible	during	the	second	English	occupation	of	1810-17,	probably	only	a	few	of	them	settled	 permanently	 (Ellen	 1996,	 239).	 	 In	 1826,	 there	 were	 only	 two	 Arab	families	in	Ambon,	called	Shaikh	Ali	and	Shaikh	Djoban	(Leirissa	2000,	247).		Being	 part	 of	 a	 network	 of	 traders	 from	 maritime-oriented	 societies,	 a	substantial	number	of	the	Hadrami	traders	came	to	Maluku	in	the	course	of	the	nineteenth	century.	The	 first	wave	of	Hadrami	migration	 to	Maluku	occurred	in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 particularly	 after	 the	 gradual	liberalization	of	 the	economy	 from	the	 late	1840s	onwards,	 coupled	with	 the	introduction	of	 the	steamer	 in	 the	1850s.	The	Arab	traders	 from	the	western	part	of	 Indonesia,	 particularly	 from	 Java,	 began	 to	 settle	 in	Maluku	and	 soon	outnumbered	 the	 Chinese	 from	 Manila.	 A	 second	 wave	 of	 the	 migration	occurred	after	 the	growth	of	steam	ship	 transportation	 from	Arabia	after	 the	
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opening	of	 the	Suez	Canal	 in	1869.	During	this	period,	 increasing	numbers	of	Arabs	 came	 to	many	 islands	 of	 Indonesia	 by	 steamer	 (Clarence-Smith	 1998,	35).		In	 the	 context	 of	 Hadrami	 emigration	 to	 Maluku,	 two	 points	 should	 be	emphasized	here:	first,	Hadramis	in	Maluku	have	not	necessarily	come	directly	from	Hadramaut,	but	may	first	have	resided	in	the	western	part	of	Indonesian	Archipelago;	second,	as	 in	many	various	parts	of	 the	 Indonesian	Archipelago,	economic	motives	appear	to	have	been	the	most	important	factor	for	Hadrami	migration	to	Maluku.	However,	religious	motives	regarding	an	Islamic	mission	should	 not	 be	 underestimated.	 In	 many	 cases,	 Islamic	 missionary	 work	 in	Indonesia	was	undertaken	by	Muslim	traders,	 including	Hadrami	 traders	(De	Jonge	and	Nico	Kaptein	2002;	Warnk	2010,	130).	 In	order	 to	understand	 the	factors	contributing	to	the	migration	of	Hadramis	to	Ambon,	the	following	sub-sections	 will	 present	 the	 socio-political,	 and	 economic	 contexts	 of	 both	homeland	and	host-land.					
2.1 Hadramaut:	Social	Structure,	Political	Unrest	and	Economic			Scarcity		
	Figure	2.1:	Map	of	Hadramaut.	Source:	http://www.paleophilatelie.eu/country/quaiti.html.	Accessed	September	22,	2016.		Geographically,	 Hadramaut	 is	 located	 in	 the	 southern	 part	 of	 Arabian	Peninsula,	on	the	border	with	the	Empty	Quarter,	al-Rub	al-Khali,	a	large	area	of	desert	to	its	north	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	17).	It	has	two	basic	geographical	
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features	 (Bujra	 1971,	 1).	 The	 first	 is	 an	 area	 immediately	 behind	 the	 coast	consisting	of	a	range	of	mountains	whose	rugged	peaks	rise	to	5,000	feet.	This	range	 is	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 vast	 and	dry	 plateau	 (jol),	with	 a	mean	height	 of	2,500	 feet,	which	extends	northwards	 for	about	150	miles.	Consisting	of	 two	parts	in	the	North	and	the	South,	the	plateau	area	makes	up	almost	90%	of	the	land	 area	 of	Hadramaut.	 The	 northern	 plateau	 is	more	 barren,	 desolate,	 and	more	sparsely	populated	than	the	southern	part.	About	half	of	the	tribesmen	in	Hadramaut	are	from	the	southern	plateau.	The	second	basic	physical	feature	is	the	wadi	 (dry	 river	 bed,	 valley,	 or	 channel)	 system	which	 separates	 the	 two	plateaus.	The	main	valleys	include	Wadi	Hadramaut,	Wadi	Du’an,	Wadi	Al-Ein,	and	Wadi	Amd.	The	valley	system	makes	up	less	than	10	%	of	the	total	area	of	Hadramaut,	but	it	is	densely	populated,	about	one	third	of	the	estimated	total	population	 in	 the	 1960s	 lived	 there.	 Wadi	 Hadramaut	 is	 the	 most	 densely	populated	of	all	the	main	valleys.	It	contains	skyscraper	towns,	such	as	Shibam,	Sa’yun,	and	Tarim	(Bujra	1971,	1).	In	terms	of	economic	resources,	Hadramaut	has	had	to	cope	with	limited	agricultural	produce	due	to	a	limited	agricultural	land	and	an	extreme	climate	(Bujra	1971;	Boxberger	2002;	Freitag	2003).	The	agricultural	area	in	the	wadis	depends	 entirely	 on	 occasional	 floods	 resulting	 from	 rainfall.	 The	 rainwater	goes	down	from	the	plateau	to	the	valleys.	Agricultural	areas	are	located	in	the	valleys,	where	the	infrequent	flows	of	rainwater	from	the	plateaus	is	collected	and	 constitutes	 the	 only	 source	 of	 date-palm	 cultivation	 in	 the	 wadis.	 The	infrequent	 rainfall	 over	 the	 plateau	 and	 the	 wadi	 system	 can	 result	 in	prolonged	 droughts,	 exacerbating	 the	 agricultural	 resources	 and	 the	 low	productive	 quantity	 of	 the	 land.	 The	 limited	 agricultural	 resources	 and	vegetation	 in	Hadramaut	 also	 should	 cater	 for	 the	domestic	 animals,	 such	 as	camels,	cattle,	donkeys,	sheep,	and	goats	(Bujra	1971,	2-3).	In	 terms	 of	 social	 structure,	 particularly	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	 South	Yemen	 as	 a	modern-nation	 state	 in	 1967	 Hadramaut	was	 a	 highly	 stratified	society	 (Mobini-Kesheh	 1999,	 26-27).	 The	 Hadrami	 society	 was	 based	 on	ascriptive	 status	 or	 descent,	 which	 determined	 one’s	 position	 in	 social,	economic,	political,	 and	 religious	aspects	 (Bujra	1971,	9;	 Serjeant	1977,	226-247;	Boxberger	2002,	17-37;	Freitag	2003,	41-42).	The	highest	rank	was	that	of	 the	 Sada,	 descendants	 of	 the	 Prophet,	who	were	 unarmed	 and	 occupied	 a	high	religious	position.	The	second	layer	consisted	of	the	mashaikh	and	qabail.	The	 former	 were	 descendants	 of	 a	 prominent	 religious	 elite	 who	 could	 not	claim	 the	status	of	 the	prophetic	 lineage,	 thus	occupying	 the	second	rank	 for	their	 religious	 status.	 The	 latter	were	 tribesmen,	who	 acted	 as	 protectors	 of	the	tribes	and	the	society	against	outsiders	and	rival	parties,	and	thus	had	the	capacity	 to	 bear	weapons.	 The	 third	 level	 was	 occupied	 by	 the	masakin,	 the	sedentary	 poor,	 and	 the	 du’afa,	 or	 weak,	 who	 were	 unable	 to	 claim	 a	prominent	status	from	their	ancestors.	Slaves	were	also	included	in	this	rank.	
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While	the	masakin	and	du’afa	were	free	natives,	slaves	were	considered	to	be	non-Arab	people.	Although	leaders	during	the	emergence	of	a	modern	socialist	state	in	1967	tried	to	abolish	the	ascriptive	social	system,	in	the	first	decade	of	the	socialist	state	the	ascriptive	social	system	was	still	the	main	framework	for	political	action	in	the	Hadramaut	towns	(Bujra	1971,	9).	For	many	centuries,	political	instability	characterized	Hadramaut	as	there	was	 no	 central	 government	 (Jacobsen	 2009,	 8).	 The	 political	 instability	endured	 through	 a	 series	 of	 political	 feuds	 between	 tribes	 attempting	 to	conquer	 the	 area,	 from	 the	 small	 dynasties	 in	 the	 thirteenth	 century	 to	 the	Kathiri	 sultanate	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century.	 Such	 skirmishes	 diminished	 after	the	British	colonial	intervention,	followed	by	the	establishment	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	South	Yemen	 in	1968.	During	 the	British	 intervention,	 the	region	was	divided	into	two	major	regional	powers:	the	Kathiri	controlling	the	main	




	Figure	2.2:		Map	of	Ambon-Lease	Islands.	Source:	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambon_Island.	Accessed	September	22,	2016.		The	historical	context	of	Ambon	as	an	emerging	port	city	during	Dutch	colonial	times	 is	 very	 significant	 to	 understand	 the	 migration	 and	 settlement	 of	Hadrami	 Arabs	 in	 Ambon.1	Being	 well	 known	 as	 islands	 producing	 cloves,	nutmeg,	and	mace,	Maluku	was	located	at	the	crossroads	of	two	major	ancient	trading	routes:	east-west	from	Sumatra	to	Banda	Islands	and	north-south	from	the	 Philippines	 to	 Timor.	 It	 had	 established	 contacts	 with	 Malay,	 Javanese,	Chinese,	 Indian,	 and	 Arab	 traders	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Portuguese	(Hulsbosch	2014,	20).	Chinese	contacts	with	Maluku	date	back	from	at	least	in	the	first	millennium	B.C	(Ellen	2003,	5),	while	by	the	thirteenth	or	fourteenth	century	 most	 of	 the	 traders	 transporting	 Indonesian	 spices	 to	 Europe	 were	Muslims	 from	 South	 Asia	 and	 the	 Middle	 East	 (Brown	 2003,	 31).	 Arab	 and	Sulawesi	 traders	are	said	 to	have	continued	 to	 transport	 spices	until	 the	 late	
                                                1	The	 term	 ‘Ambon’	 is	 used	 to	demarcate	 five	different	 categories:	 1.	 the	name	of	 the	island;	 2.	 the	 administrative	 subdivision	 of	 the	 southern	 part	 of	 Maluku;	 3.	 the	residency	 in	 Central	 Maluku;	 4.	 the	 port	 town	 situated	 on	 Ambon	 Island;	 5.	 the	indigenous	 inhabitants	 of	 the	 residency	 (see	 Leirissa	 2000,	 620).	 These	 indigenous	inhabitants	 of	 Ambon	may	 cover	 some	 areas	 in	 Central	Maluku	 such	 as	Ambon-lease	Islands	(Ambon,	Haruku,	Saparua,	and	Nusalaut),	and	islands	of	southern	and	western	Seram	and	Buru	(see	Chauvel	1990,	1).	From	all	categories,	I	use	the	term	Ambon	in	the	first	 four	categories	 interchangeably	 in	order	 to	emphasize	a	historical	 importance	of	the	area	within	Maluku	Islands	especially	after	Ambon	became	an	emerging	port	centre	during	the	colonial	times.	
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fifteenth	century.	 Intensive	contacts	between	Muslims	traders	 from	Arab	and	Malay	 (Javanese)	 origin	 have	 probably	 influenced	 the	 Islamization	 of	 the	northern	 Maluku’s	 Kingdoms	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 fifteenth	 century	(Andaya	1993,	132;	De	Graaf	1977,	20;	Brown	2003;	Abdurrahman	2008).			Before	the	European	intrusion	in	the	sixteenth	century,	the	world’s	clove	production	came	from	the	small	northern	islands	of	Maluku,	while	nutmeg	and	mace	were	originally	produced	in	Banda	Islands	in	Central	Maluku	(Hulsbosch	2014,	19).	With	the	 increasing	global	demand	for	spices	 from	Southeast	Asia,	by	 the	 fifteenth	century,	cloves	and	nutmeg	were	not	 just	harvested,	but	also	being	planted	in	Maluku	(Ellen	2003,	5).	 	Thus,	Ternate	and	Banda	in	Maluku	had	already	become	the	world’s	major	spice	production	before	 the	European	hegemony.	The	emergence	of	Ambon	 town	was	 the	 result	of	Portuguese	 interest	 in	having	 the	 spice	 monopoly	 in	 Maluku	 and	 of	 their	 broken	 alliance	 with	 the	Ternaten	sultanate	in	the	North	(Knaap	1991,	105).	Having	failed	to	establish	cooperation	 with	 the	 local	 Islamic	 powers	 of	 the	 Ternate	 sultanate’s	 vassal	state	 on	 the	 Leihitu	 Peninsula	 on	 Ambon	 Island	 the	 Portuguese	 turned	 to	Leitimur	 Peninsula	 where	 they	 established	 Ambon	 town,	 which	 consisted	predominantly	 of	 Christian	 inhabitants	 (Andaya	 1993).	 The	 town	was	 taken	over	 by	 the	 Dutch	 in	 the	 early	 seventeenth	 century	 after	 defeating	 the	Portuguese.	 In	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	Ambon	 emerged	 as	 one	 of	 the	 three	important	 trading	 centres	 in	 Maluku	 along	 with	 Banda	 and	 Ternate	 (Ellen	2003)	and	it	was	the	centre	of	colonial	administration	in	Central	Maluku	until	1819	(Leirissa	2000).	During	the	VOC	(Vereenigde	Oost-Indische	Compagnie),	and	Dutch	governance,	 the	 town	served	as	 an	 important	 trading	port	 linking	eastern	ports	such	as	Ternate,	Banda,	and	Makasar,	with	Java	and	beyond	the	archipelago.	 As	 it	 developed	 into	 a	 commercial	 port	 in	 eastern	 Indonesia,	Ambon	 also	 became	 a	 major	 commerce	 centre	 in	 eastern	 Indonesia	 and	attracted	 foreign	 traders	 from	 Java,	 Sulawesi,	 China,	 Arab	 and	 India	 (Knaap	1991;	Leirissa	2000).	 	During	 the	height	of	Dutch	 colonial	power,	 the	 capital	Ambon	in	Central	Maluku	was	considered	one	of	the	main	central	Dutch	port	centers,	along	with	Ternate-Tidore	and	Banda	 (Ellen	2003,	10	&	136;	Warnk	2010,	128).	The	 changing	 geo-political	 and	 economic	 position	 of	 Ambon	 as	 both	 an	administrative	and	port	centre	in	eastern	Indonesia	during	the	Dutch	colonial	era	accounted	for	its	attracting	foreign	traders	in	search	for	economic	fortune	in	 the	 region	 more	 generally,	 and	 Hadramis	 more	 specifically.	 By	 the	 mid-nineteenth	century,	Ambon	was	a	major	commercial	centre	of	Arab	traders.	In	1850,	 it	was	reported	that	Arabs	were	arriving	in	Ambon	in	greater	numbers	each	year.	The	 increasing	 interest	 of	 the	Hadramis,	 especially	 traders	 among	them,	in	Ambon	appears	to	be	related	to	the	opening	of	the	port	towns	such	as	Ambon,	Ternate,	Kayeli	(Buru	Island),	and	Banda	in	1854	as	the	Arabs	began	
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to	play	a	dominant	role	 in	certain	aspects	of	the	 local	economy	in	this	period	(Leirissa	2000,	625).	Their	 fierce	competitors	were	Chinese	traders,	who	had	settled	in	the	region	earlier,	while	the	trade	positions	of	Christian	inhabitants	of	Ambon	as	other	competitors	had	weakened.	By	1856,	 the	Arabs	had	taken	over	 trade,	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 both	 Chinese	 and	 Europeans	 (Clarence-Smith	1998).	Their	economic	success	 led	 to	 the	 rise	of	 leading	Arab	 families.	These	Arab	 families	 included	 the	 Attamimy	 family,	 the	 Bahasoan	 family,	 the	Basalamah	 family,	and	 the	Lapary	 family	 (Lerissa	2000,	628).	The	 families	of	al-Amudi,	 Ba’adillah,	 al-Saqqaf,	 and	 al-Habshi	 were	 also	 among	 the	 wealthy	Arab	families	successful	in	their	trade	in	Maluku	(Clarence-Smith	1998;	Spyer	2000).	The	position	of	Ambon	as	a	Dutch	political	and	economic	centre	in	eastern	Indonesia	also	contributed	to	the	 increasing	number	of	the	Hadramis	settling	in	 the	 region.	 According	 to	 colonial	 statistics,	 the	 number	 of	 the	 Hadrami	migrants	 in	 Indonesia	 rose	dramatically	 in	 the	 last	 quarter	of	 the	nineteenth	century.	 From	 the	mid-nineteenth	until	mid-twentieth	 centuries,	 the	number	of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 increased	 from	 7,768	 to	 80,000.	 The	 Hadrami	migrants	 spread	 in	 thirty-six	 residencies	 around	 the	 archipelago,	 the	 biggest	colonies	of	which	were	unevenly	distributed	in	Java,	Sumatra,	and	Kalimantan.	In	 eastern	 Indonesia,	 the	major	 Arab	 colonies	 resided	 in	Maluku	 residencies	such	as	Ambon,	Ternate,	and	Manado	(Van	den	Berg	1886,	103-109).	
Table	2.1:	Number	of	Arabs	in	Maluku	residencies	Residencies	 1859	 1870	 1885	 1905	 1915	Ambon	-Ambon		-Saparua	-Banda,	Seram,	Aru	
53			 170	 444	 875				(518)		
n.a	
Ternate	-Ternate	-Bacan	-New	Guinea2	
23	 66	 111	 368				(52)		
n.a	
Manado	-Manado	-Gorontalo	-Non-Minahasa	
11	 17	 147	 819				(543)		
1,600	
Total		 87	 253	 702	 3,175	 	Source:	Clarence-Smith	(1998,	34)	
                                                2	New	 Guinea	 was	 the	 region	 later	 included	 in	 the	 1905	 statistics.	 The	 Hadrami	residents	 in	 New	 Guinea	 are	 said	 to	 have	 come	 from	Maluku,	 who	 travelled	 to	west	coasts	 of	 New	Guinea	 to	 trade	 from	 1880	 onward.	 The	Hadramis	 from	Maluku	were	said	 to	have	contributed	to	 the	 Islamization	of	 the	western	part	of	New	Guinea	 in	 the	early	twentieth	century	(Warnk	2010,	128).		
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Table	 2.1	 above	 shows	 that	 Arabs	 seem	 to	 be	 more	 present	 in	 Ambon	than	 other	 parts	 of	 Maluku	 residential	 areas.	 Ambon	 residency	 during	 the	Dutch	 colonial	 government	 covered	 vast	 regions	 in	 southern	 part	 of	 the	Maluku	Islands	of	Ambon-Lease,	Seram,	Buru,	Banda,	Kei,	and	Aru.	From	1859	to	 1905,	 the	 total	 number	 of	 Arab	 residents	 in	 Ambon	 residency	 increased	from	 53	 to	 1,393	 people.	 This	 increase	 was	 partly	 related	 to	 a	 changing	demography	of	Arabs,	which	more	and	more	also	comprised	descendants	born	in	marriages	with	 local	 women.	 Unlike	 the	 British	 colonial	 census	 in	Malay-Singapore,	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 census	 in	 1885	 included	 both	 the	 number	 of	Arabs	 who	 were	 born	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 those	 who	 were	 born	 in	 the	Indonesian	Archipelago	(Van	den	Berg	1886,	103-109).	Compared	to	previous	years,	 the	 statistics	 in	 1885	 (table	 2.2)	 shows	 the	 inclusion	 of	 Arab	 women	born	 in	Maluku,	who	might	have	been	 the	product	of	 intermarriage	between	the	Arabs	and	the	non-Arab	women.	These	women	could	have	been	mainly	of	mixed	Arab	and	Ambonese,	Chinese,	or	Malay-Indonesian	origin	as	many	of	my	informants	have	both	local	and	non-local	origins	(see	chapter	4	section	4.3.1).		




Gender		Different	Hadrami	migration	patterns	can	be	discerned	to	various	Indonesian	regions	 including	Ambon.	A	 first	pattern	 is	based	on	 the	occupation	of	 those	who	 migrated.	 Most	 Hadrami	 migrants	 worked	 as	 shop	 assistants	 or	 small	traders	for	a	relative	or	acquaintance	already	residing	in	the	colony.	As	soon	as	they	earned	sufficient	 capital	 they	would	become	an	 independent	 trader	and	earn	their	money	as	middlemen,	buying	imported	goods	from	large	European	firms	and	reselling	them	to	other	traders	or	Indonesian	consumers.	They	were	engaged	 in	 trading	 various	 commodities	 such	 as	 textiles,	 and	 manufactured	goods	such	as	watches,	iron,	and	steel,	middle	eastern	goods	such	dates,	ghee,	prayer	beads,	and	books,	or	engage	in	local	trade,	for	example	of	livestock	such	as	horses	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	22).	The	textual	evidence	Mobini-Kesheh	provides	is	confirmed	in	the	stories	of	 my	 informants.	 Many	 of	 them	 told	 me	 that	 their	 fathers	 or	 (great)	grandfathers	had	come	to	join	their	uncles	or	fathers	who	had	preceded	them	in	coming	to	Maluku.	This	 illustrates	the	importance	to	Hadrami	descendants	of	having	knowledge	about	 their	 family	migration	stories	 from	Hadramaut.	A	recurring	 topic	 in	 their	 stories	was	 that	 once	 they	 had	 become	 successful	 in	trade	 after	 some	 periods	 of	 time,	 the	 first	 migrants	 returned	 to	 their	 home	villages	in	Hadramaut	and	took	younger	male	family	members	with	them	upon	returning	 to	 Indonesia.	 The	 more	 experienced	 migrants,	 as	 those	 from	 the	second	generation	onward,	 preferred	 to	work	with	 their	 own	 clan	members.	Besides	wishing	to	help	one’s	own	group,	choosing	to	work	with	clan	members	was	based	on	mutual	 trust	and	commitment.	Also,	not	yet	having	a	 family	 to	take	care	of	 in	the	home	country	young	unmarried	men	could	be	expected	to	devote	 themselves	wholeheartedly	 to	 the	migration	 project.	 	 The	 capacity	 to	include	more	kinsmen	to	take	a	part	in	the	burgeoning	enterprises	of	the	host-land	 demonstrates	 the	 economic	 success	 in	 the	 host-society	 resulting	 in	 an	ever-growing	 Hadrami	 male	 movement	 between	 their	 homeland	 and	 host-land.	A	second	migration	pattern	 is	related	to	the	origin	of	 the	Hadramis.	Van	den	Berg	(1886)	argues	that	most	of	the	Hadramis	settling	in	the	Indian	Ocean	came	 from	 the	 interiors	 of	 Hadramaut,	 while	 those	 who	 migrated	 to	 closer	areas	like	Africa	and	India	were	mostly	from	coastal	areas.	The	migrants	in	the	archipelago	mostly	came	from	interiors	under	the	Kathiri	territory,	stretching	between	Shibam	and	Tarim	(Mobini	Kesheh	1999,	22).	There	 are	 indications	 that	 migration	 within	 Hadramaut	 seems	 to	 have	preceded	 migration	 to	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world;	 some	 clans	 which	 are	supposed	 to	 originate	 from	 the	 interiors	 or	 the	 coasts	 could	 be	 found	 in	 the	other	 regions	 as	well	 (Arai	 2004).	 In	 the	Graves	of	Tarim	 (2006),	 Ho	 argues	
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that	the	prominence	of	the	Sada	groups	in	Hadramaut	also	reflects	in-and	out-movement	 of	 elite	 members	 of	 the	 Hadramis,	 which	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	structuring	 of	 the	Hadrami	 society	 and	 the	 spread	of	 their	 religious	 belief	 in	Hadramaut.	Of	the	Hadrami	descendants	in	Ambon	whom	I	interviewed,	only	a	few	 were	 able	 to	 specify	 where	 in	 Hadramaut	 their	 forefathers	 came	 from.	They	mentioned,	 for	 instance,	Huraydah,	 ‘Inat,	 and	Say’un,	 regions	which	are	located	in	the	interiors	of	Hadramaut.		In	this	regard,	although	a	general	trend	in	 the	 social	 origins	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 can	 be	 distinguished,	 the	significance	 to	 the	 descendants	 of	 Hadrami	migrants	 of	 exact	 categorization	should	not	be	overestimated.	Class	 and	elite	membership	 also	 shaped	Hadrami	migration	patterns.	 In	the	early	period	of	migration,	especially	before	 the	nineteenth	century,	 those	who	 travelled	 to	 Indonesia	 came	 mainly	 from	 the	 Sada	 group,	 the	 highest	stratum	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 possessing	 much	 wealth.	 In	 the	 middle	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century,	many	Hadramis	 of	 various	 social	 classes,	 including	 poor	and	isolated	people,	also	began	to	travel	(De	Jonge	2002).		During	this	period,	Hadrami	 migration	 was	 no	 longer	 dominated	 by	 Sada,	 but	 equally	 included	groups	of	lower	strata	such	as	mashaikh	and	qabail.	A	Dutch	report	in	the	early	twentieth	 century	 states	 that	 about	 75	 %	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 were	traders	 who	 possessed	 their	 own	 money,	 while	 18	 %	 had	 the	 guaranteed	support	 of	 family	 already	 resident	 in	 the	 colony,	 and	 7	 %	 arriving	 without	capital	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	22).	The	 figures	 show	 that	 the	vast	majority	of	migrants	 came	 from	 families	 who	 possessed	 some	 money	 or	 had	 family	connections	in	the	archipelago.	The	poorer	Hadramis	tended	to	migrate	to	the	closest	 destinations,	 like	 the	 Red	 Sea	 and	 East	 African	 coastal	 regions	(Boxberger	2002,	40).		Although	 some	 Hadramis	 from	 the	 lowest	 strata	 participated	 in	 the	migration,	their	existence	cannot	be	clearly	figured	out	today.	This	is	due	to	a	common	 claim	 among	 most	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants,	 who	 regard	themselves	as	part	of	the	first	(Sada)	and	second	categories	(mashaikh-qabail)	within	 Hadrami	 social	 hierarchy	 (see	 chapter	 3	 section	 3.2).	 In	 this	 regard,	particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 non-Hadrami	 communities,	 descendants	 of	 the	Hadramis,	either	Sada	or	non-Sada,	commonly	emphasize	a	high	status	of	their	Arab	 identity	 in	general.	They	 feel	honored	 to	be	part	of	 the	globalized	Arab	diaspora.	While	they	tend	to	emphasize	patrilineal	links	to	Hadramaut,	claims	of	 belonging	 to	 respected	 local	 families	 in	 Ambon	 through	 matrilineal	 links	also	 occur.	 Regardless	 whether	 they	 are	 based	 on	 patrilineal	 or	 matrilineal	links,	 the	 stories	 of	 my	 informants	 indicate	 that	 most	 of	 the	 Hadrami	descendants	 maintain	 an	 ideal	 image	 of	 their	 family	 records.	 I	 will	 address	descent	further	in	chapter	3	and	4.	Gender	also	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	patterns	of	Hadrami	migration	in	 the	 Indian	 Ocean.	 The	 majority,	 if	 not	 all,	 first	 generation	 migrants	 to	
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Indonesia	were	men	(Van	den	Berg	1886).	Most	of	these	first	migrants	who	left	Hadramaut	 were	 married	 (Mobini-Kesheh	 1999).	 They	 left	 their	 wives	 and	family	 members	 behind	 in	 order	 to	 seek	 a	 good	 fortune	 in	 a	 fertile	 land	 of	Indonesia.	As	the	Hadrami	men	married	local	women	in	the	new	land,	from	the	second	generation	onwards	Hadrami	families	in	the	diaspora	consisted	of	both	male	and	female	descendants.	By	practicing	out-marriage	in	the	host-land,	the	Hadrami	male	migrants	formed	a	new	‘Hadrami’	community	in	their	new	home	country,	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 colonial	 statistics	 in	 table	 2.2,	 which	shows	the	statistics	of	female	Hadrami	descendants	in	1885.	The	stories	of	my	informants	mostly	 confirm	 that	migration	 of	Hadramis	was	 predominantly	 a	male	 affair.	 The	 existence	 of	 the	Hadrami	 community	 until	 today	 is	 thus	 the	result	 of	 an	 ongoing	 particularly	 gendered	 construction	 of	 group	 identity	which	 privileges	Hadrami	men’s	 social	mobility	 by	mingling	with	 non-ethnic	members	and	at	the	same	time	domesticating	Hadrami	women	in	their	social	relations	(see	chapter	4	section	4.3).		
3. Colonial	Rule	and	Its	Impact	on	Hadramis	
Like	 other	 colonies	 in	 Indonesia,	 during	 the	 colonial	 era	 Ambon	 was	 a	stratified	 society	 based	 on	 racial-religious	 segregation.	 Segregation	 policies	based	 on	 social	 categories	 of	 race	 and	 religious	 beliefs	 had	 been	 initially	introduced	by	the	Portuguese,	and	were	later	continued	by	the	Dutch	colonial	regime.		As	 a	 centre	 of	 the	 Europeans’	 stronghold	 in	 Maluku,	 especially	 in	 the	towns	 during	 the	 colonial	 times,	 Ambon	 had	 a	 heterogeneous	 population	classified	 into	 three	 vertically	 organized	 ethnic	 groups:	 European,	 Foreign	Oriental,	 and	 indigenous	 (Knaap	 1991,	 119).	 The	 categories	 of	 each	 group	slightly	varied	over	time,	depending	on	in-	and	out-	movement	of	the	people	in	the	 town.	 In	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Dutch	 VOC,	 the	 first	 category	 comprised	Europeans	 and	 their	 descendants,	mestizo	 (those	mixed	of	 European	 fathers	and	Asian	or	local	women).	The	second	category	consisted	of	foreign	migrants	from	 China,	 while	 the	 third	 category	 was	 mixed,	 but	 mainly	 of	 Malay-Indonesian	origin	 such	 as	Ambonese,	mardijkers	 or	 freed	 slaves,	 and	 ese.	 	 In	the	 late	 seventeenth	 century,	 almost	 two	 thirds	 of	 the	 population	 in	 Ambon	town	were	 of	Malay-Indonesian	 origin,	while	 the	 rest	were	 of	 European	 and	Chinese	(Knaap	1991,	118).		In	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 the	 Dutch	 reorganized	 the	town	dwellers	after	the	Pattimura	rebellion	in	1818.	In	this	period,	the	Dutch	forced	the	population	to	live	in	homogeneous	quarters	that	were	organized	on	the	basis	of	race	and	religious	affiliation.	The	Dutch	appointed	a	chief	 in	each	quarter.	 	 The	 Christian	 community	 was	 represented	 by	 the	 Europeans	 and	
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Ambonese,	 while	 the	 Muslim	 community	 was	mainly	 of	 Chinese	 and	Malay-Indonesian	 origin.	 Unlike	 those	 in	 Ternate,	 the	 Chinese	 in	 Ambon	 were	Muslims	(Leirissa	2000,	628).	 In	a	Muslim	quarter,	 leadership	over	moorsche	
burgers	 (Muslim	 citizens)	 comprising	 Buginesse,	 Malay	 and	 Javanese,	 and	Chinese	were	frequently	given	to	the	Chinese,	such	as	the	families	of	Kyat,	Djin,	and	Tan.	Some	of	my	Arab	informants	have	maternal	relations	with	Muslims	of	Chinese	 origin,	 such	 as	Kiat,	 Tan,	 and	Niou	 (see	 chapter	 4	 section	 4.3.1).	My	informant	Hasnan	 (67	 years	 old)	who	 originally	 is	 of	 Chinese	 origin	 told	me	that	 there	are	other	Chinese	 families,	such	as	Yongken,	Oei,	Ayuba,	Liem,	and	Ambon,	who	have	been	Muslims	for	several	generations.3	In	a	later	period,	the	Chinese	formed	a	separate	religious-ethnic	enclave	(Leirissa	2000,	628).		The	 configuration	 of	 Muslim	 burgers	 or	 citizens	 changed	 during	 the	colonial	 times.	During	 the	VOC	 times,	 they	only	 included	migrants	of	Chinese	and	Malay-Indonesian	 origin,	 while	 in	 the	 period	 of	 the	 British	 interregnum	and	then	the	Dutch	governance	they	also	included	native	inhabitants	and	Arab	traders	 (Leirissa	 2000,	 629).	 This	 citizenry	 expansion	 was	 as	 a	 result	 of	urbanization	 and	 of	 a	 colonial	 policy	 to	 grant	 villagers	a	 burger	 status.	 This	policy	 attracted	 both	 Muslims	 and	 Christians	 to	 Ambon	 Island	 to	 work	 and	settle	 in	 the	 town.	Until	 the	 1930s,	 the	majority	 of	 the	 population	 in	Ambon	town	 was	 Christian.	 Muslim	 inhabitants	 predominantly	 had	 a	 migration	background	 and	 consisted	mostly	 of	 non-Ambonese	 Indonesian	 and	 ‘Foreign	Orientals’	(Chauvel	1990,	3).		By	 the	 time	 Hadramis	 settled	 in	 Ambon,	 the	 town	 dwellers	 were	 still	categorized	 in	 terms	 of	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 affiliation:	 Europeans,	 Christian	
burgers,	Chinese,	Arabs,	and	other	Muslim	burgers	 (Leirissa	2000,	620).	 	This	regulation	was	 officially	 regulated	under	 article	 109	of	Dutch	 government	 in	1854,	which	applied	a	two-tier	system:		ethnic	Indonesians	and	foreign	Asians	(mostly	 those	 of	 Chinese,	 Japanese,	 or	 Arab	 origin)	made	 up	 one	 group,	 and	Eurasians,	 indigenous	people	with	European	 status,	 and	Europeans	made	up	the	other	group	(Hulsbosch	2014,	28).	As	urban	dwellers	including	these	foreign	traders	were	assigned	separate	quarters	on	the	basis	of	ethnic	and	religious	groupings,	each	group	had	its	own	head	 called	 kapitein	 (Leirissa	 2000,	 621). 4 	During	 the	 colonial	 times,	leadership	within	the	Arab	community	was	assigned	to	the	non-Sada	families	of	Basalamah,	al-Zagladi,	and	Bahasoan	 in	1866,	1939,	and	1941	respectively	(Bahfdullah	 2010,	 190).	 I	 was	 able	 to	 interview	 descendants	 of	 these	 three	
                                                3	Interview	with	Hasnan,	May	3,	2015.	4	Kapitein	was	a	high-ranking	government	position	 in	 the	colonial	civil	administration	in	Indonesia	and	other	Malay	regions.	The	holder	of	the	post	exercised	various	degrees	of	power	and	 influence,	 from	legal	 jurisdiction	over	his	own	ethnic	group/community	to	ceremonial	precedence	for	community	 leaders.	This	post	existed	 in	different	ethnic	groups,	such	as	Arabs,	Chinese	and	Indians	(Buxbaum	1967,	151-153).			
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families	 of	 Arab	 chieftainship	 in	 Ambon.	 Interestingly,	 the	 descendants,	who	are	mostly	third	or	fourth	generation	of	non-Sada	origin,	could	not	provide	me	with	 information	 regarding	 their	 grandfathers’	 activities	 in	 Ambon.	 They	explained	that	photographs	and	other	documents	regarding	their	grandfathers	have	been	 lost,	either	during	wars	or	political	conflicts	or	because	 the	 family	members	had	already	long	ago	moved	out	of	their	grandfather’s	houses.				
3.1 Religious	Segregation	and	Discrimination	The	Dutch	colonial	policies	based	on	racial	and	religious	difference	have	had	an	 enormous	 impact	 on	 religious	 segregation	 and	 tensions	within	Ambonese	society.	 Eventually,	 Muslims	 and	 Christians	 have	 become	 the	 two	 dominant	religious	 groups	 in	 Ambon.	 Rivalry	 between	 the	 two	 religious	 communities	initially	came	to	the	fore	in	a	political	context,	particularly	in	the	competition	between	 foreign	 and	 regional	 powers.	 While	 the	 Europeans	 brought	Christianity	to	Maluku,	the	local	kingdoms	of	Maluku	exercised	their	influence	through	 Islam	 as	 their	 official	 religion.	 Both	 these	 local	 and	 foreign	 powers	used	religion	to	seek	support	and	allegiance	from	the	larger	Ambonese	society	in	order	to	gain	political	and	economic	supremacy	(Andaya	1993).		The	 colonial	 segregation	 policies	 based	 on	 religion	 are	 reflected	 in	 the	residential	 organization	 (Leirissa	 2000,	 622).	 During	 the	 last	 colonial	 times,	the	majority	 of	 the	 Ambonese	 lived	 in	 the	 81	negeris	 (village	 based	 on	 local	customs)	 and	 12	 burgerkampongs	 (state-founded	 village),	 mostly	 dotted	around	the	coast.	The	negeris	are	either	Muslim	(26	villages)	or	Christian	(55	villages).	 These	 negeris	 date	 from	 the	 mid-seventeenth	 century,	 when	 the	Dutch	 forced	 the	 Ambonese	 out	 of	 their	 mountain	 settlements	 down	 to	 the	coast,	 where	 the	 population	 and	 the	 clove	 cultivation	 could	 be	 more	 easily	controlled.	 The	 segregation	 of	 the	 Ambonese	 population	 in	 Christian	 and	Muslim	negeris	 (villages)	 also	 reflects	 the	process	of	 conversion	 that	 centred	respectively	in	Muslim	areas	of	Leihitu	Peninsula	and	the	Portuguese	foothold	in	 Leitimur	 Peninsula	 during	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 (Chauvel	 1990,	 4).	 The	majority	of	Muslim	villages	on	Ambon	Island	 today	are	 located	 in	 the	Leihitu	Peninsula	in	the	northern	part	of	Ambon,	while	the	Christian	villages	are	in	the	southern	part,	the	Leitimur	Peninsula.	During	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 times,	 the	 government	 gave	 a	 preferential	treatment	 of	 local	 Christians	 over	 Muslims.	 As	 Christian	 converts,	 local	Christians	enjoyed	European	status.	Together	with	other	European	inhabitants	and	 Eurasians,	 the	 local	 Christian	 converts	were	 the	main	 actors	 engaged	 in	the	administration,	military,	and	commerce.		In	terms	of	education	policies,	the	Christians	 enjoyed	 more	 Dutch	 education	 than	 their	 Muslim	 fellow	 citizens.	Public	religious	schools	in	Ambon	for	Christians	had	been	already	introduced	in	 the	 Portuguese	 and	 their	 number	 increased	 during	 the	 Dutch	 era.	 In	 the	
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middle	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 following	 the	 separation	 of	 Church	 and	school,	a	modern	Dutch	educational	system	was	introduced	in	Christian	areas	in	 1871,	 and	 only	 much	 later	 in	 Muslim	 enclaves.	 The	 Dutch	 also	 recruited	many	 Dutch	 soldiers,	 Koninklijke	 Nederlands-Indische	 Leger	 (KNIL)	 from	Christian	community	(Chauvel	1990).	As	a	result	of	Dutch	differential	treatment,	 from	1886	onward	there	was	fierce	 competition	 between	 Christians	 (both	 Protestant	 and	 Catholic)	 and	Muslim	missionaries	 in	 South	Maluku.	 In	 this	 period,	 the	 Dutch	 government	supported	 Christian	 missionary	 works	 to	 counter	 Islamic	 propaganda	(Broersma	1936,	32).	As	the	Christians	got	closer	to	the	Dutch,	their	everyday	performance	began	to	resemble	that	of	 the	Dutch.	The	close	ties	between	the	Christian	Ambonese	and	 the	Dutch	did	not	only	 come	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 terms	of	socio-economic	 status	 and	 political	 power,	 but	 also	 through	 embodied	performance,	 such	 as	 dress	 style	 (Hulsbosch	 2014,	 25),	 and	 as	 well	 as	language.	The	 legacy	of	 the	colonial	preferential	 treatment	of	Christians	over	Muslims	 in	 terms	 of	 education,	 economy,	 employment,	 and	 the	 military	resulted	 in	a	political	divide	 that	continues	 to	characterize	relations	between	Muslims	and	Christians	 today.	Most	 recently,	 it	 resulted	 in	violent	communal	conflicts	between	Muslims	and	Christians	between	1999	and	2002.	5	
3.2 Colonial	Policies	and	Arab	Identity		In	 his	 Imagined	 Communities,	 Benedict	 Anderson	 (1991)	 points	 to	 the	contribution	of	the	colonial	state	to	the	imagining	of	history	and	power	in	the	construction	 of	 a	 particular	 cultural	 identity,	 which	 formed	 the	 basis	 of	 a	‘nation’.	 Through	 three	 institutions	 of	 colonial	 power:	 census,	 maps,	 and	museums,	 a	 particular	 imagined	 identity	 emerged.	 	 In	 fact,	 ethnic-racial	classifications	 that	 were	 employed	 by	 earlier	 colonial	 regimes,	 underwent	 a	systematic	 quantification	 from	 the	 1870s	 onward.	 The	 colonial	 census	classified	 the	population	based	on	 regions,	 languages,	monuments,	 and	other	factors.	 Late	 colonial	 regimes,	 frequently	 attempted	 to	 fuse	 ethnicity	 and	religion	 together,	 ethnizing	 religious	 communities	 and	 religionizing	 ethnic	communities	(Anderson	1991,	244-258).		
                                                5	Officially	the	communal	conflicts	ended	in	2002	with	the	peace	treaties	called	Malino	II	 between	 Christians	 and	 Muslims	 in	 Maluku.	 Yet,	 in	 practice	 they	 continued	 in	different	 regions.	 For	 instance,	 in	 Ambon	 there	were	 conflicts	 between	 19	December	1999-25	April	2005/6,	while	a	 conflict	 in	South	East	Maluku	 lasted	 for	a	year	 (1999-2000).	 This	 difference	 is	 related	 to	 the	 role	 of	 customary	 law	 (adat,	 pela-gandong)	which	was	stronger	in	the	Southeast	Maluku	rather	than	in	Central	Maluku	(Thorburn	2008).	 Pela-gandong	 is	 a	 concept	 of	 inter-village	 alliance	 between	 Muslims	 and	Christians	 based	 on	 claiming	 to	 putative	 common	descent.	 It	 is	 usually	 used	 to	 settle	conflicts	between	villagers	who	are	within	the	pela	treaty	(Bartels	1977).		
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Anderson’s	analysis	of	the	impact	of	colonial	regimes	on	the	construction	of	 identities	 can	 be	 recognized	 in	 Ambon	 as	 well.	 In	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	statistics,	the	Hadramis	were	classified	under	a	sub-category	of	‘Arabs’	within	a	broader	 category	of	 ‘Foreign	Orientals’	 (Van	den	Berg	1886,	103-109).	The	identification	of	the	Hadramis	and	their	descendants	in	Indonesia	and	Ambon	as	‘Arabs’	remains	a	dominant	identity	marker	until	today	(see	chapter	3-6).	As	part	of	the	Dutch	racial	policy,	separate	living	and	travel	pass	policies	(wijken	 stelsel	 and	 passen	 stelsel)	 were	 issued	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century.	Like	other	foreign	orientals,	the	Arabs,	most	of	whom	Hadramis,	were	subject	 to	all	kinds	of	stipulations	 that	restricted	 their	 freedom	of	movement	inside	the	colony.	One	measure	that	restricted	their	freedom	of	movement	was	the	 regulation	 of	 living	 in	 separate	 quarters	 and	needing	 a	 travel	 pass	when	leaving	 one’s	 place	 of	 residence	 for	 business	 or	 family	 visits.	 This	 regulation	was	to	ensure	the	social	order	within	local	society	by	protecting	it	from	foreign	influences,	especially	the	pan-Islamic	movement.	The	fear	of	the	Dutch	colonial	government	concerning	the	role	of	Hadramis	in	spreading	pan-Islamism	from	Middle	East,	which	might	provoke	local	revolts	against	the	Dutch,	is	one	of	the	main	 reasons	 for	 issuing	 the	 policy.	 This	 pass	 regulation	 was	 accordingly	applied	more	 harshly	 to	 the	 Hadramis	 than	 to	 other	minorities,	 such	 as	 the	Chinese.	Forced	settlement	and	segregation	were	perpetuated	until	1919	(De	Jonge	1993,	77-78	[2002,	223-225]).	These	modes	of	colonial	rule	marked	the	end	of	a	 full	assimilation	process	of	 the	Hadramis	 in	 the	diaspora	(Abushouk	and	Ibrahim	2009,	4).	Although	the	emergence	of	a	sense	of	‘Arabness’	among	the	Hadramis	and	their	descendants	in	Indonesia	can	thus	to	a	significant	extent	be	attributed	to	the	colonial	ethnic-racial	policies,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	establish	exactly	how	these	policies	 affected	 the	 freedom	 of	 movement	 and	 social	 integration	 of	 the	Hadramis	in	Ambon.	What	we	do	know,	is	that	in	economic	terms,	the	policies	did	 not	 seem	 to	 hamper	 the	 Arabs’	 commercial	 activities	 very	 gravely	(Clarence-Smith	 1998).	 Together	with	 European,	 Chinese	 and	Malay	 traders,	the	Arabs	became	one	of	the	prominent	players	in	the	economy	of	Maluku.	Due	to	the	1866	reorganization	of	colonial	administration	in	Maluku	by	abolishing	the	 central	 government	 of	 Maluku	 in	 Ambon	 that	 had	 been	 established	 in	1817,	many	Dutch	families	who	had	been	engaged	 in	trade	 left	Ambon.	Their	place	in	commercial	business	was	replaced	by	a	new	generation	of	Chinese	and	Arab	 traders.	 One	 of	 the	 lucrative	 businesses	 was	 shipping.	 Many	 sailing	vessels	 in	Ambon	were	 owned	 by	 the	Arabs	 and	 the	 Chinese	 (Leirissa	 2000,	629).	 In	a	 certain	period	 in	 the	 late	nineteenth	century,	 the	economic	 role	of	Arabs	was	more	dominant	than	that	of	the	Chinese	(Clarence-Smith	1998,	32).	In	this	sense,	the	Dutch	and	the	local	society	in	Maluku	depended	on	the	Arabs	for	 their	 economic	 contribution	 to	 filling	 particular	 economic	 niches	 (Ellen	1996;	2003).	
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Theoretically,	 the	 segregation	 policy	 based	 on	 a	 wijken	 stelsel,	 quarter	system,	required	that	each	category	of	the	colonial	subjects	lived	in	a	separate	quarter.	 However,	 in	 practice	 different	 patterns	 of	 Arab	 settlements	 existed	around	Maluku.	 In	 some	 regions	 such	 as	 Ternate	 and	 Buru,	 the	 Arabs	 lived	together	 with	 other	 Muslim	 groups,	 while	 in	 Banda	 and	 Dobo	 they	 lived	separately	 in	 their	 own	 quarter.	 In	 Christian	 towns	 like	 in	 Manado	 and	neighbouring	Kema,	the	Arabs	lived	together	with	other	Muslims	in	a	Muslim	quarter	(Clarence-Smith	1998,	34).	In	the	Christian	town	of	Ambon,	the	Arabs	could	 also	 live	 side	 by	 side	 with	 other	 Muslim	 communities,	 excluding	 the	Chinese,	who	had	been	living	in	their	own	special	quarter	since	the	beginning	of	the	Dutch	VOC	(De	Graaf	1977,	138-139).	When	 visiting	 my	 informants	 in	 their	 homes,	 I	 learned	 that	 some	descendants	of	Hadrami	migrants	still	live	in	the	old	settlements	today.	Other	informants	 lived	 scattered	 around	 the	Ambon	 town.	 Interestingly,	 one	 of	my	informants	 told	me	 that	 he	 had	 never	 heard	 about	 a	 special	 Arab	 quarter	 in	Ambon	 and	 claimed	 that	 no	 particular	 Arab	 quarter	 as	 such	 had	 existed.		Apparently,	 for	 the	 families	 of	 these	 Hadramis,	 collective	 memories	 about	previous	 living	 arrangements	 in	 Ambon	 was	 not	 relevant	 for	 sustaining	 an	Arab	identity	in	the	same	way	as	descent	and	the	actual	migration	stories	are.	This	makes	sense,	as	inter-ethnic	marriage	and	shared	religion	have	been	two	 important	 channels	 that	 contributed	 to	 a	 relative	 degree	 of	 social	integration	between	Hadramis	and	other	ethnic	groups	in	Ambon.	As	reflected	in	other	regions	in	Indonesia	(Jacobsen	2009),	an	exogamy	trend	appeared	in	the	 first	Arab	 generation	 in	Ambon,	while	 endogamy	became	 the	 trend	 from	the	second	generation	onward.	Although	the	second	Arab	generation	seems	to	be	more	strictly	endogamous	in	their	marriage	choices,	this	is	only	true	for	its	female	descendants.	Many	men	of	 the	 second	generation	 continued	 to	marry	non-Arab	 Muslims.	 As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 during	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 times,	through	 intermarriage	with	 the	more	prestigious	 families	who	resided	 in	 the	town	of	Ambon,	Muslim	traders—Arabs	and	Chinese	—maintained	close	links	with	the	negeris	or	villages	(Chauvel	1990,	4).	This	was	confirmed	by	many	of	my	 informants,	 and	 is	 addressed	 by	 the	 narrators	 of	 the	 first	 and	 second	example	in	the	Hadrami	migration	stories	that	I	will	present	here	below,	who	were	related	to	families	of	village	headmen.	The	 other	 factor	 of	 social	 alliance	 is	 religion.	 Sharing	 the	 position	 of	 a	minority	religious	group	of	Muslims	that	was	being	confronted	with	the	same	colonial	discrimination	policies,	may	have	led	the	Hadramis	to	prioritize	their	shared	 religious	 and	 political	 plight	 with	 other	 Muslims	 groups	 over	 their	ethnic	 differences.	 Religious	 affiliation	 thus	 functioned	 and	 continues	 to	function	as	a	form	of	social	and	cultural	capital	in	bridging	(ethnic)	differences	and	 connecting	 the	 Hadramis	 with	 other	 Muslim	 communities	 of	 different	ethnic	 groups.	 Social	 solidarity	 of	 Muslims	 regardless	 of	 their	 ethnic	
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differences	 comes	 to	 the	 fore,	 for	 example,	 in	 their	 religious	 activities.	 The	Hadramis	 and	 other	 Muslim	 groups,	 to	 some	 extent,	 together	 established	Islamic	education	and	organized	 religious	 rituals	 in	 the	oldest	mosque	called	Jami’	Mosque,	which	was	built	 around	1860	 (see	 further	 figure	3.2	page	61).	Also,	the	succession	of	a	religious	imam	(leader)	in	the	mosque	in	Ambon	was	never	ethnically	dominated	by	a	particular	ethnic	group,	but	varied	over	time	(Leirissa	2000).	In	this	context,	the	Dutch	segregation	policies	affected	a	social	integration	process	only	to	a	certain	extent.		
4. Collective	Memories	of	the	Hadrami	Migration	
	Figure	2.3:	Photograph	of	Ali	b.	Hasan	b.	Haider	al-Hamid,	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar’s	grandmother’s	father.	Source:	a	private	collection	of	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	In	 the	 previous	 sections	 I	 have	 sketched	 how	 the	 formation	 of	 collective	identity	among	the	Hadrami	migrants	at	a	particular	intersection	of	ethnicity,	religion,	 class,	 gender,	 has	 been	 shaped	 by	 cultural,	 economic,	 socio-political	factors	 both	 in	 the	 homeland	 and	 the	 diaspora,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 global	 power	dynamics.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 collective	 memories	 of	 the	present-day	 generation	 of	 Hadrami	 descendants	 about	 their	 forefathers’	migration.	 I	will	do	so	by	discussing	two	specific	narratives	that	were	shared	with	me	by	 a	 Sada	and	a	non-Sada	narrator	 respectively.	The	 first	 story	was	
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told	me	 by	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar	 (43	 years	 old)6,	 who	 is	 currently	 the	head	 of	 the	 branch	 of	 the	 organization	 Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya	 in	 Maluku	 (see	chapter	4	pages	118-121).	I	got	to	know	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	through	a	colleague	 of	 mine	 at	 the	 IAIN	 of	 Ambon,	 who	 introduced	 me	 to	 Hasan	 Bin	Syech	 Abubakar	 on	 October	 2012	 when	 I	 did	 my	 preliminary	 research	 on	Arabs	 in	 Maluku.	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar	 told	 me	 the	 story	 about	 his	forefathers’	migration	when	I	came	to	visit	his	house	in	Wara	Kebun	Cengkeh	Batumerah	Atas	on	November	24,	2014.		I	 am	 from	 the	 Bin	 Shaikh	 Abu	 Bakr	 family,	 and	 so	 I	 am	 from	 the	 fifth	generation.	 I	 am	 told	 that	my	 great-great	 grandfather	was	 from	 ‘Inat	 in	Hadramaut.	When	he	came	to	Ambon,	he	married	a	daughter	of	Habib	Ali	(see	 figure	 2.3),	 whose	 wife	 was	 the	 grand-daughter	 of	 Prince	Diponegoro.	My	 forefathers	 in	Arabia	were	well-known	 for	 their	 Islamic	knowledge.	They	came	to	the	archipelago	because	they	intended	to	teach	Islam,	and	not	to	trade.	They	did	not	come	alone	but	together	with	other	
mashaikh	 (people	 of	 non-prophetic	 descent,	 Istiqomah).	 I	 am	 the	descendant	of	the	Prophet	through	his	grandson,	Husain,	from	whom	our	first	ancestor	from	Hadramaut,	 Isa	al-Muhajir	descended.	I	have	heard	it	claimed	 that	 the	 descendants	 of	 the	 Prophet’s	 grandson,	 Husain,	 died	during	the	Karbala	war.	But	this	is	not	true	because	one	of	his	sons,	Zain	al-‘Abidin,	 stayed	 alive.	 Most	 of	 the	 descendants	 of	 the	 Prophet’s	grandson	 Husain	 migrated	 to	 Asia,	 while	 his	 brother,	 descendants	 of	Hasan	went	 to	Tunisia,	Marocco,	and	Libya.	 I	heard	 in	other	stories	 that	the	 preachers	 from	 Hadramaut	 went	 to	 regions	 all	 around	 Indonesia	under	the	guidance	of	their	(fore)	fathers.	In	my	family’s	case,	before	they	departed	 to	 Indonesia,	 they	already	knew	the	name	of	 their	destination.	In	former	times,	these	preachers	taught	Islam	with	profound	knowledge,	spirituality,	 and	 character	 so	 that	 Islam	 was	 easily	 accepted.	 Our	ancestors	 came	 together	with	many	people	 including	 their	 relatives	and	followers/servants.	 And	 yes,	 in	 many	 regions	 they	 married	 women	 of	locals	 including	women	 from	 kings’	 family.	Well,	 that	 is	 why	we	 are	 so	integrated,	compared	to	the	Chinese.	The	 first	 narrator	 above	mentions	 teaching	 Islam	 as	 the	main	motive	 of	 his	great	great	grandfather	to	migrate	to	the	Indonesian	Archipelago.	The	narrator	of	 the	 second	 story	Umar	Attamimy	 (63	 years	 old),	 a	 former	member	 of	 the	management	board	of	al-Hilal	foundation	(1999-2012),	whom	I	interviewed	in	his	 office	 similarly	 emphasizes	 religious	motives	 for	 his	 great	 grandfather	 to	migrate.		Between	the	lines,	however,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	family	was	also	very	successful	in	trade:		
                                                6	Please	 note	 that	 a	 rule	 I	 protect	 the	 privacy	 of	 my	 informants	 by	 giving	 them	pseudonyms.	 I	 make	 an	 exception	 for	 well-known	 public	 figures	 such	 as	 Hasan	 Bin	Syech	Abubakar	who	talked	to	me	in	their	capacity	of	their	public	role.	
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I	am	from	the	Tamim	family	from	Hadramaut.	Our	great-grand	father	first	came	to	East	Java,	then	moved	to	Sulawesi,	and	finally	settled	in	Maluku.	I	don’t	 know	when	 he	 came,	 but	 I	 am	 the	 fourth	 generation.	 Because	my	great	 grandfather	 did	 not	 bring	 his	wife	 from	Hadramaut,	 he	married	 a	local	woman,	that	is	why	we	use	the	term	akhwal	to	address	our	mothers’	family.	Our	great	grandfathers	did	not	just	marry	women	of	lower	status,	but	married	daughters	of	local	kings.	That	is	why	we	are	also	descendants	of	local	kings.	This	is	different	from	the	Chinese,	who	like	to	marry	within	their	 own	 clans.	My	 great	 grandfathers	married	 four	 local	women	 from	different	 parts	 such	 as	 Bugis,	 Buton,	 Ambon,	 and	 Fak-Fak.	 The	 main	reason	they	came	here	was	to	propagate	 Islam.	Unlike	 the	colonials,	our	forefathers	 converted	 locals	 peacefully.	 That	 is	 why	 Islam	 was	 spread	quickly	 and	 easily	 in	 the	 archipelago	 (Indonesia).	 	 It	 is	 said	 that	 Bani	Tamim,	 the	 Attamimy	 family,	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 a	wealthy	 family	 in	Maluku	 because	 the	 family	 had	 storage	 business	 houses	 both	 off-shore	and	 on-shore.	 That	 is	 why	 later	 on	 many	 people	 of	 the	 Attamimy	 clan	came	 to	 Maluku	 since	 they	 heard	 about	 the	 success	 of	 our	 family	members	here.	The	Attamimy	tribe	consists	of	more	than	200	clans,	and	they	 resided	 in	 Hadramaut	 long	 before	 those	 of	 the	 Ba’Alawi	 (the	Prophet’s	descendants,	 Istiqomah)	 tribe.	We	are	unlike	 the	Chinese,	you	know,	 they	 are	 more	 distant	 to	 the	 locals	 (Umar	 Attamimy,	 October	 8,	2014).	The	narratives	above	are	two	among	many	other	similar	narratives	of	present-day	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 who	 convey	 their	 perception	 of	 their	 forefathers’	migration.	As	part	of	‘collective	(social)	memory’,	the	narratives	underline	the	significance	of	transmission	of	the	collective	past	through	several	generations	within	the	Hadrami	community	and	the	influence	of	contemporary	discourses	and	practices.	In	other	words,	the	narratives	show	how	both	past	and	present	discourses	 and	 practices	 have	 shaped	 the	 collective	 representations	 of	 the	Hadrami	migrants	in	the	eyes	of	the	present-day	generation.		Since	 the	 two	 narratives	 present	 the	 perspectives	 of	 a	 Sada	 and	 a	 non-Sada	 descendant,	 they	 give	 us	 an	 impression	 of	 how	 both	 groups	 remember	their	collective	past,	or	more	precisely:	what	aspects	they	consider	important	to	 tell	 audiences	 such	 as	 myself	 as	 researcher	 and	 probably	 also	 their	 own	descendants.	 	 As	 the	 first	 example	 is	 narrated	 by	 a	 person	 claiming	 descent	from	the	Prophet	or	Sada,	and	the	second	is	by	a	non-prophetic	descendant	or	non-Sada,	 besides	 similarities	 in	 positioning	 themselves	 within	 a	 broader	social	 configuration,	 the	 narratives	 also	 point	 to	 the	 diversity	 within	 the	Hadrami	community	and	an	ongoing	power	struggle	between	the	two	groups.	Migration	stories	are	an	important	means	of	gendered	diasporic	identity	making	 for	 the	Hadrami	 community	 in	Ambon.	 In	both	narratives	 the	 role	of	the	male	Hadrami	migrants	 in	 identity	making	 in	host-societies	 comes	 to	 the	fore;	 the	 first	migrants	 that	 are	 said	 to	 have	made	 their	 journeys	 to	Maluku	were	 all	 men.	 This	 central	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 identity	 making	 in	 host-
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societies	of	 the	male	Hadrami	migrants	shapes	 the	way	migration	stories	are	told	 by	 present-day	 Hadrami	 descendants.	 Unlike	 a	 gender	 regime	 in	 the	present	 day	 Hadramaut,	 where	 strict	 gender	 segregation	 regulations	 are	applied,	 in	Ambon	 I	was	 able	 to	 speak	with	both	male	 and	 female	members,	and	with	members	of	both	elder	and	younger	generation	in	the	Arab	families.		Although	 both	 male	 and	 female	 Hadrami	 descendants	 have	 an	 equal	opportunity	 to	 speak	 about	 their	 family	 history,	 it	 is	 no	 coincidence	 that	 the	narrators	of	the	stories	presented	were	male;	 in	fact,	 I	 found	that	 it	 is	mostly	male	 Hadramis	 who	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 reference	 group	 to	 tell	 family	 stories.	 In	terms	of	age,	the	older	generation	in	the	Arab	families	have	more	authority	to	tell	migration	stories	than	the	younger	generation	as	the	elderly	are	supposed	to	 be	 more	 experienced	 and	 more	 knowledgeable.	 Significantly,	 however,	 I	noted	 that	 in	 many	 cases,	 old	 Arab	 women	 tended	 to	 leave	 this	 matter	 to	younger	male	 family	members	 unless	 there	was	 no	male	member	 left	 in	 the	family.	Thus,	the	authority	to	transmit	collective	memories	and	thus	contribute	to	the	ongoing	process	of	identity	construction	among	Arab	families	on	Ambon	depends	on	one’s	social	position	on	the	basis	of	one’s	gender,	age,	and	religious	knowledge.		Non-Sada	groups	tend	to	be	more	flexible	in	this	respect	than	the	Sada,	who	consider	 their	 family	history	a	 sacred	history.	To	 share	 the	Sada’s	history	 with	 outsiders	 is	 the	 privilege	 of	 a	 particular	 person,	 who	 is	 mostly	male	and	highly	regarded,	such	as	being	a	religious	expert	or	belonging	to	the	elderly.		In	 line	 with	 Michel	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 of	 power-knowledge	 relations	(1978)	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 hegemony	 by	 Ernesto	 Laclau	 and	 Chantal	Mouffe	(1985),	this	practice	illustrates	how	transmitting	knowledge	about	the	past	is	connected	 to	who	 has	 the	 authority	 to	 define	what	 constitutes	 the	 historical	truth	 and	what	 its	 consequences	 are.	 Authority,	 then,	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	the	 power	 to	 interpret	 and	 define	 what	 counts	 as	 relevant	 stories	 and	interpretations	of	the	past	(see	Langenbacher,	Niven,	and	Wittlinger	2013,	44).		Apart	 from	 some	 qualifications	 in	 terms	 of	 gender,	 age,	 and	 authority	mentioned	 above,	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	make	 more	 or	 less	 similar	 claims	 concerning	 their	 family	 status;	 they	commonly	 emphasize	 the	 high	 status	 of	 their	 Arab	 identity.	 The	 narratives	presented	above,	for	example,	are	not	so	much	different	in	terms	of	content	or	in	style.	Both	narrators	present	their	(fore)	fathers,	the	first	migrants	in	their	family	history,	as	noble	and	wealthy	families	navigating	their	way	in	a	foreign	land	with	much	 capital	 in	 their	 disposal.	 Their	 narratives	 reflect	 a	 symbolic	reference	to	what	Tomas	Gerholm	(1977,	152)	calls	‘tribalism’	which	includes	tribal	idioms	such	as	lineage	(genealogy),	honor,	and	social	status.		As	will	be	further	argued	in	chapter	4,	Arab	tribalism	tends	to	be	present	more	 strongly	 among	present-day	generation	 if	 its	 family	members	maintain	endogamy	 (in-marriage)	 and/or	 kafa’a	 (compatibility	 or	 equality	 between	
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partners	 in	 marriage).	 Marriages	 based	 on	 kafa’a	 regulations,	 especially	 by	descent	are	a	very	important	source	for	and	marker	of	social	honor,	which	has	had	considerable	impact	on	social	relations,	including	kinship	ties,	among	the	Hadramis	themselves,	and	between	the	Hadramis	and	other	non-Hadramis	in	the	 region.	 The	 more	 out-marriages	 occur	 in	 the	 family,	 the	 more	 broken	stories	 on	 their	 Arab	 family	 migration	 story	 will	 be.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	case	 when	 female	 family	 members	 have	 married	 out.	 It	 struck	 me	 that	Hadrami	 families	 in	 Ambon	 tend	 to	 talk	more	 proudly	 about	 their	 degree	 of	Arabness	when	most	 of	 their	 family	members	 are	married	within	 their	 own	clans.	The	 two	 narratives	 also	 illustrate	 ethnic	 boundary	 making	 by	differentiating	 Hadrami	 descendants	 from	 other	 groups	 in	 Ambon.	 Like	 the	narrators	 of	 these	 stories,	 Hadrami	 descendants	 often	 compare	 themselves	explicitly	 to	 other	 ethnic	 groups	 such	 as	 Malay,	 Ambonese,	 Chinese,	 and	European.	 Although	 they	 differentiate	 between	 themselves	 and	 other	 ethnic	groups,	 religion	 and	 ethnicity	 intersect	 in	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 other	 groups.	Hadrami,	 Malay,	 and	 some	 Ambonese	 are	 considered	 to	 constitute	 one	religious	community,	while	Chinese	and	European	are	considered	foreign.	Collective	 memories	 about	 European	 colonialism	 handed	 down	 to	 the	present	Arab	generation	are	often	connected	to	the	way	the	European	powers	struggled	 to	 conquer	 the	 colonies	 with	 both	 military	 force	 and	 religious	missionary	work.	Highlighting	 the	 endeavors	 of	 forefathers	 to	bring	 Islam	 to	the	 island	 and	 contrasting	 peaceful	 religious	 conversion	 by	 the	 Arabs	 with	forced	 religious	 conversion	 by	 the	 Europeans	 is	 a	 recurrent	 theme	 in	 the	migration	 stories	 of	my	 informants.	 The	 narrators	 thus	 tend	 to	 highlight	 the	more	noble	intention	(purpose)	of	emigration	and	distinguish	it	from	having	to	make	a	living	in	the	foreign	land	as	a	vehicle	for	doing	so.	Most	of	them	agree	that	 their	 (fore)	 fathers	 engaged	 in	 trade	 in	 order	 to	 survive,	 but	 they	make	sure	to	present	economic	motives	as	subordinate	to	religious	ones	to	account	for	their	ancestors’	emigration.	As	the	two	narratives	illustrate,	Islamization	has	become	a	central	topic	of	the	 present-day	 Hadramis’	 narratives	 about	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 Hadrami	migration	to	Maluku.	The	selection	of	a	certain	kind	of	narrative	regarding	the	past	 is	 thus	 related	 to	 how	 group	 identity	 or	 ‘we’	 should	 be	 presented	 to	outsiders	as	well	 as	 to	 insiders	as	orientations	 in	a	 long-term	project	of	how	next	 generations	 should	 behave	 in	 the	 future	 (Langenbacher,	 Niven,	 and	Wittlinger	2013,	44).	There	is	more	to	the	foregrounding	of	the	role	of	Islamic	missionary	work,	however.	 	Both	stories	presented	here	were	narrated	by	Sunni	followers,	and	both	narrators	argued	that	the	Hadrami	migrants	spread	Sunni	teachings	and	practices	 to	 the	 local	 population.	 Abdurahman	Assagaf,	 a	 thirty-five-year-old	
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convert	of	Sada	origin	 from	Sunni	 to	Shi’a	and	currently	 the	head	of	a	Shi’ite	organization	in	Maluku,	challenged	such	representations	in	his	story:				If	 you	 look	 at	 the	 Islamic	 rituals	 of	 Ambonese	Muslims,	 you	may	 notice	that	these	are	very	much	the	legacy	of	Shi’ite	teachings.	You	will	see	that	celebrating	maulids	 is	 very	 common	here…well,	we	don’t	want	 to	 speak	about	 this.	 Our	 forefathers	 propagated	 the	 teachings	 very	 gently	 and	concealed	themselves	as	Sunnis	because	we	don’t	want	the	rest	of	us	(ahl	
al-bayt,	 the	Prophet’s	 family)	to	be	executed	and	we	cannot	practice	our	beliefs	anymore	(Abdurrahman	Assagaf,	March	25,	2015).	My	Shi’ite	informant’s	statement	above	hints	at	religious	contestations	among	the	 Hadramis	 as	 well	 as	 among	 other	 Muslims	 groups	 that	 will	 be	 further	discussed	 in	 chapter	 5.	 What	 is	 relevant	 to	 my	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 such	religious	 divisions	 among	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants	 also	 affect	 the	ways	 the	present-day	Hadramis	narrate	their	history.		Furthermore,	 in	 many	 of	 the	 stories	 that	 I	 was	 told,	 the	 Chinese	 often	figure	 as	 an	 ethnic	 reference	 point	 to	 compare	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 Arab	migrants	 succeeded	 in	 assimilating	 themselves	 in	 local	 society.	 Many	 of	 the	Arab	 descendants	 point	 out	 that	 their	 forefathers	married	 local	 women	 and	that	 the	Hadramis	 are	 therefore	more	 inclusive	 than	 the	 Chinese.	While	 this	might	 be	 true	 in	 many	 Chinese	 communities	 around	 Indonesia,	 most	 of	 the	Chinese	 migrants	 in	 Ambon	 during	 the	 Portuguese	 and	 Dutch	 eras	 were	Muslims	and	married	local	women	(Leirissa	2000).		As	has	been	stated	earlier,	migration	narratives	such	as	the	two	discussed	here	cannot	be	treated	as	historical	facts,	but	they	are	part	of	an	oral	tradition	through	 which	 memories	 of	 the	 past	 are	 kept	 alive	 among	 the	 present-day	Hadrami	 community.	 Although	 the	 narratives	 cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	testimony	 of	 facts,	 they	 provide	 clues	 that	 reflect	 general	 norms	 and	 values	adopted	 by	 the	 Hadramis.	 These	 norms	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 social,	 cultural,	economic	and	political	dimensions	that	shaped	the	historical	context	in	which	the	Hadramis	are	embedded.			
5. Conclusion	
The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 was	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 history	 and	 collective	memories	about	the	migration	of	the	people	from	Hadramaut	in	the	southern	part	 of	 Arabian	 Peninsula	 to	 Ambon.	 I	 have	 done	 so	 by	 discussing	 both	historical	 studies	 and	 narratives	 of	 the	 present-day	 Hadrami	 generation	 of	Ambon	that	represent	collective	memories	about	the	early	Hadrami	migrants.	The	historical	studies	were	used	to	outline	the	relations	between	the	contexts	of	 the	 homeland	 and	 host-land,	 as	 well	 as	 global	 and	 regional	 economic-political	constellations	 that	effected	on	 the	Hadrami	emigration	 in	 the	course	of	 the	 nineteenth	 to	 the	 early	 twentieth	 centuries.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 social	
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representation	 of	 the	 collective	 past	 through	 oral	 narratives	 among	 the	present-day	descendants	of	the	Hadrami	Arab	migrants	were	used	to	examine	the	relations	between	collective	memory,	identity	and	power,	and	to	argue	that	the	 representation	 of	 the	 collective	 past	 in	 the	 present	 is	 often	 used	 to	 seek	and	maintain	a	particular	power	interest.	In	 the	 historical	 sketch	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migration	 I	 have	 demonstrated	how	 push-and	 pull-factors	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 emigration	 to	 Ambon	 are	interlinked	with	 the	 social,	 political,	 economic,	 and	 cultural	 contexts	 of	 both	the	 home-	 and	 the	 host	 lands.	 Civil	 wars	 and	 economic	 scarcity	 of	 the	homeland	 and	 the	 opportunities	 offered	 by	 the	 host	 land	 pushed	 and	 pulled	the	 Hadramis	 to	 emigrate.	 Besides	 trade,	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 were	 also	engaged	in	Islamization	in	the	host	country.	Present-day	Hadrami	descendants	tend	 to	 emphasize	 Islamization	 over	 economic	 motives.	 Such	 claims,	 I	 have	argued,	 function	 to	 differentiate	 both	 between	 Hadrami	 migrants	 and	 other	groups	in	Maluku	society,	as	well	as	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	within	the	Hadrami	community.	Furthermore,	the	combination	between	the	legacy	of	a	highly	stratified	social	structure	in	the	homeland	and	the	Dutch	segregation	policies	 in	the	host-land	contributed	to	the	rise	among	the	Hadrami	migrants	of	a	heterogeneous	ethno-religious	identity	as	being	‘Arabs’	and	‘Muslims’	that	continues	 to	 inform	 self-presentations	 of	 the	 present-day	 generation	 of	Hadramis.	Keeping	 alive	 collective	memories	 about	 the	Hadrami	migration	 history	through	story	telling	such	as	illustrated	in	the	two	narratives	discussed	here,	is	one	 of	 the	 diasporic	 identity	 practices	 through	which	 present-day	 Hadramis	continue	 to	 be	 oriented	 towards	 Hadramaut	 as	 an	 authoritative	 source	 of	value,	identity,	and	loyalty.	Today’s	Hadramis	identify	themselves	as	being	part	of	the	larger	Arab	and	Muslim	 society	 through	 patrilineal	 descent.	 Yet,	 they	 also	 recognize	 their	maternal	 relations	 to	 local	 society	 (Ambonese	 Malay).	 The	 heterogeneous	ethno-religious	identity	of	the	Hadramis	is	complicated	further	by	hierarchical	descent	 claims	 (Sada	 and	 non-Sada)	 as	 well	 as	 by	 Islamic	 divisions	 in	 the	community	(Sunni	and	Shi’ite).	Despite	being	far	from	a	unified	identity	group,	the	 present-day	 Hadrami	 community	 shares	 a	 heritage	 that	 is	 passed	 down	from	one	generation	to	another	and	that	 is	actively	maintained	and	reshaped	through	 ‘collective	 memories’	 embedded	 in	 both	 the	 perception,	 as	 well	 as	some	 commemorative	 rituals	 and	 bodily	 practices	 (see	 chapter	 4,	 5	 and	 6).	Narratives	 about	 Hadrami	migration	 have	 thus	 shaped	 the	 construction	 and	maintenance	of	a	heterogeneous	‘imagined’	Hadrami	community	until	today.	The	 Hadrami	 Arab	 descendants	 constitute	 what	 Anat	 Feldman	 (2015,	171-189)	 calls	 ‘a	 modern	 ethno-religious	 community	 of	 memory’.	 What	characterizes	such	a	community	of	memory	is	that	very	little	‘identity	marking’	is	visible	in	the	public	sphere;	Hadramis	in	general	do	not	necessarily	dress	in	
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The	 chapter	 sketches	 a	 general	 overview	 of	 the	 present-day	 Hadrami	 Arab	descendants	in	Ambon.	It	aims	at	mapping	their	general	life	patterns	and	their	positions	 in	 the	specific	social	structure	 in	Ambon	society.	Thus,	 insights	will	be	 provided	 in	 continuities	 and	 changes	 in	 Hadrami	 social	 identity	 among	today’s	generation	of	diasporic	Hadrami	in	Ambon.	On	a	meta	level,	it	will	shed	light	 on	 the	 interplay	 between	 local	 and	 translocal	 dynamics	 in	 the	 ‘identity	work’	 of	 diasporas	 as	 they	 position	 themselves	 and	 are	 being	 positioned	 as	citizens	of	a	certain	category.		In	 the	 first	 place,	 I	 will	 address	 the	 internal	 heterogeneity	 of	 the	descendants	of	 the	Hadrami	migrants	 in	Ambon,	which	 is	due	not	 in	 the	 last	place	 because	 of	 the	 persistence	 of	 traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 stratification.	Although	it	no	longer	reflects	the	division	of	labor	and	other	social	activities	as	it	did	 in	 the	past,	 this	 traditional	Hadrami	social	stratification	has	not	 lost	 its	value	 for	 today’s	 generation	 altogether.	 In	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 present-day	Hadrami	 descendants	 of	 Ambon,	 Hadrami	 identity	 is	 still	 partly	 based	 on	particular	 Hadrami	 practices,	 most	 notably	 patrilineal	 descent	 reckoning.	 At	the	same	time,	local	cultural	elements	are	incorporated	into	the	formation	of	a	diasporic	 identity	as	a	 result	of	 engagement	 in	 the	wider	 local	 community	 in	fields	 such	 as	 education,	 social	 organizations,	 economy,	 politics,	 and	 other	everyday	 life	 practices.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 pay	 particular	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	formation	of	a	distinct	Hadrami	identity	depends	for	a	 considerable	extent	on	marriage	options,	 comportment	 in	daily	 life	and	the	 transmission	 of	 certain	 values	 by	 female	 members	 of	 the	 community.	Therefore,	 particular	 attention	 will	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Hadrami	women	 have	 not	 only	 played	 a	 specific	 role	 in	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	Hadrami	community	in	the	diaspora,	but	also	in	the	creation	of	a	new	sub-culture	within	the	Hadrami	community	which	differs	from	cultural	practices	in	the	homeland.								In	 the	 second	 place,	 the	 sections	 that	 follow	 will	 demonstrate	 that	engagement	in	local	social	fields	and	the	incorporation	of	the	cultural	elements	from	various	contexts	have	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	multiplicity	in	the	‘social	identity’	among	the	Hadrami	descendants.	In	other	words,	regardless	of	internal	 differentiation	 based	 on	 clans,	 the	 community	 of	 the	 Hadrami	descendants	 today	 can	 be	 categorized	 as	 a	 ‘soft	 culture’	 community,	 which	allows	 a	 relative	 flexibility	 of	 social	 meanings,	 values,	 and	 organizations	(Appadurai	 1997,	 90).	 The	 ‘soft	 culture’	 model	 allows	 such	 a	 community	 to	engage	in	various	social	networks,	which	may	include	different	social	customs	
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and	beliefs	without	fear	of	losing	its	distinct	ethno-religious	identity	(Feldman	2015,	182).	 	To	demonstrate	how	this	plays	out	on	 the	ground,	 the	 following	aspects	will	 be	 addressed:	 descent	 categorization,	 family	 distribution,	 spatial	living	 arrangements,	 economic	 occupation,	 political	 engagement,	 and	 other	everyday	life	practices	concerning	language,	food,	and	dress.		
2. Social	Groups	within	the	Community	of	Hadrami	Descendants		
2.1 The	Sada	and	non-Sada	Distinction		The	tribal	 ideology	seems	to	survive	under	present-day	conditions	as	an	affirmative	 philosophy,	 justifying	 access	 and	 claims	 of	 traditional	 role	incumbents	 to	 values	 and	 resources	 that	 are	 furnished	 by	 a	 new	 and	different	system.	(Kruse	1979,	394)		This	 section	will	 address	 the	 role	 of	 traditional	Hadrami	 social	 stratification,	particularly	 the	 distinction	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 in	 (sub)group	identifications.	 This	 stratification	 continues	 to	 inform	 social	 and	 family	 life	within	 the	Hadrami	community	 in	 the	diaspora,	particularly	 in	Ambon	today.	The	 section	 aims	 at	 understanding	 in	 what	 ways	 the	 social	 stratification	 is	maintained	 by	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 their	 social	 relations	 and	 how	 they	 use	 it	 to	seek	power	and	influence	within	the	broader	local	society	of	Ambon.	Traditionally,	Hadramaut	was	considered	a	stratified	society,	based	on	a	complex	system	of	hereditary	rules,	a	combination	between	religion	and	tribal	their	occupational	functions	in	the	society	(Hartley	1961;	Bujra	1971;	Serjeant	1977;	Camelin	1997;	Boxberger	2002).	Although	there	is	no	agreement	among	scholars	 working	 on	 social	 stratification	 of	 Hadramaut	 concerning	 the	 issue	which	descent	status	of	a	group	has	a	higher	status	than	other	descent	groups,	they	 do	 agree	 on	 several	 categories	 of	 occupation	 in	 the	 social	 hierarchy	(Hartley	1961;	Bujra	1971;	Camelin	1997;	Serjeant	1977;	Boxberger	2002).	The	 first	category	had	a	religious	 function.	 It	 consisted	of	 the	Sada,	who	claim	 descent	 from	 the	 Prophet,	 and	 the	mashaikh,	 who	 claim	 descent	 from	well-known	and	prominent	Hadrami	scholars	and	holy	men	of	the	past,	but	no	prophetic	descent.		The	Sada	and	mashaikh	have	similar	roles	in	society,	which	were	 attributed	 to	 their	 religious	 authority.	 They	 controlled	 religious	institutions,	rituals	and	ceremonies,	and	also	played	a	central	part	in	mediating	intertribal	 conflicts.	 Although	 the	mashaikh	 were	 considered	 inferior	 to	 the	Sada	in	terms	of	descent,	they	could	play	roles	with	higher	status	than	the	Sada	in	certain	places	of	Hadramaut	(Camelin	1997).	The	 second	 category	 was	 an	 aristocracy	 and	 which	 had	 a	 military-like	function.	 It	 consisted	 of	 the	 qabail,	 tribesmen	 who	 claimed	 descent	 to	 the	eminent	 founding	 ancestors	 of	 their	 respective	 tribes	 such	 as	 Qahtan.	 The	
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function	of	this	group	was	bearing	arms	and	defending	the	honor	of	a	certain	territory	 during	 a	war.	 The	 group	 included	 the	 kin	 and	 close	 family	 of	 those	who	 occupied	 these	 positions.	 Those	 who	 claim	 descent	 of	 qabail,	 are	considered	 to	 belong	 to	 the	 same	 dynasty.	 When	 the	 early	 modern	 state	 of	South	 Yemen	 was	 founded,	 this	 category	 filled	 the	 state	 apparatus,	 which	consisted	of	members	from	various	descent	groups.	These	groups	were	in	the	top	hierarchy	in	certain	places	(Hartley	1961),	while	they	occupied	the	second	rank	in	other	places	(Bujra	1971).	The	third	category	had	a	market-based	function	and	was	occupied	by	the	
masakin	 or	du’afa	(literally	 ‘poor’	 and	 ‘weak’).	 They	were	 considered	 to	be	 a	residual	category	in	terms	of	descent	because	they	belonged	neither	to	the	line	of	the	Prophet	nor	to	that	of	Qahtan	(people	originating	from	the	southern	part	of	Arabian	Peninsula,	notably	Yemen,	and	who	are	considered	as	pure	Arabs)	and	 did	 not	 have	 ancestors	 who	 were	 religious	 leaders.	 In	 society,	 they	conducted	menial	jobs	and	worked	as	peasants,	 laborers,	and	servants.	These	groups	were	generally	considered	to	be	of	the	lowest	rank	(Bujra	1971).	With	the	 emergence	 of	 modern	 market,	 however,	 the	 category	 also	 included	merchants	who	might	 come	 from	 a	 respected	 descent	 group	 and	 thus	 had	 a	higher	status	in	the	social	hierarchy	(Hartley	1961).	Although	 there	 is	 no	 single	 social	 hierarchy	 that	 organizes	 the	 entire	Hadramaut	 society	 (Hartley	1961;	Bujra	1971;	Camelin	1997;	 Serjeant	1977;	Boxberger	2002),	social	stratification	based	on	descent	is	still	a	very	important	aspect	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 both	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 among	 Hadramis	 in	 the	diaspora	as	I	will	demonstrate	in	subsequent	chapters	4,	5	and	6.	Due	to	changing	social	and	political	circumstances	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	 the	 traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 stratification	 was	 challenged	 both	 in	the	 homeland	 and	 in	 the	 diaspora,	 albeit	 in	 different	 ways	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999).	 The	 criticism	 on	 the	 social	 stratification	 was	 initiated	 by	 a	 group	 of	newly	 emergent	 elite	 among	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999;	Freitag	2003).	This	criticism	was	formulated	on	the	basis	of	a	religious	rationale	 among	 religious	 reformers,	 who	 were	 predominantly	 Hadramis	 of	non-Sada	 background	 (Mobini-Kesheh	 1999).	 The	 social	 reform	 based	 on	 a	religious	basis	initiated	by	the	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora	was	exported	back	to	the	homeland,	although	for	a	long	time	it	had	little	success	there.	The	challenge	of	 the	traditional	social	stratification	 in	Hadramaut	gained	a	momentum	only	after	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 modern	 state	 of	 South	 Yemen	 in	 1967,	 which	marked	the	beginning	of	 the	 transformation	 from	an	old	social	structure	 to	a	modern	 one,	 in	 which	 social	 ascriptive	 strata	 were	 abolished.	 This	transformation	 was	 initiated	 at	 an	 institutional	 level;	 it	 was	 a	 government	regulation.	 	 In	 the	 diaspora,	 where	 such	 state	 intervention	 was	 absent,	 a	similar	 transformation	 was	 the	 result	 of	 an	 Islamic	 reformist	 debate	 which	contested	religious	status	based	on	descent.	
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Despite	 the	 structural	 changes	 in	Hadramaut	 from	a	 traditional	political	system	toward	a	modern	order	system,	in	practice,	the	old	social	structure	was	not	 completely	 abolished.	 In	 his	 research	 on	 modern	 Hadramaut	 and	 its	relation	 to	 social	 stratification,	 Michael	 Rodionov	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 the	system	of	traditional	social	strata	has	managed	to	survive,	although	it	has	lost	some	 of	 its	 social	 and	 economic	 functions.	 Rodionov	 points	 out	 that	 de-stratification	in	the	modern	Hadramaut	is	a	re-stratification	in	itself,	due	to	the	alteration	of	 social	 roles	and	 structures	of	 certain	 strata.	Rodionov’s	 findings	are	in	conjunction	with	other	research	results	that	point	to	the	persistence	of	traditional	social	strata	 in	 the	northern	part	of	Yemen	(Gerholm	1977;	Kruse	1979),	 and	 various	 Middle	 Eastern	 countries	 in	 the	 modern	 era	 (Eisenstadt	1977).	 Eisenstadt	 argues	 that	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 traditional	 social	stratagem	 in	 the	 Middle	 Eastern	 societies	 can	 partly	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	Islamic	heritage.	During	my	own	 short	 fieldwork	 in	Hadramaut,	 especially	 in	the	 town	 of	 Tarim	 in	 February	 2015,	 I	 observed	 that	 many	 local	 people	considered	members	 of	 the	 Sada	 to	 have	 a	 high	 status.	 This	 appeared	 to	 be	particularly	the	case	 in	some	places,	such	as	Tarim,	where	traditionalist	Sada	groups	are	dominant.	The	 persistence	 of	 some	 basic	 practices	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 traditional	Hadrami	 social	 hierarchy	 can	 also	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 present-day	 diaspora,	particularly	 in	 Indonesia,	 where	 Hadrami	 descendants	 tend	 to	 identify	themselves	by	distinguishing	two	general	descent	groups:	Sada	and	non-Sada	(Jacobsen	2009;	Slama	2005).	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	whom	I	studied,	 the	 persistence	 of	 Hadramaut	 social	 strategy	 seems	 to	 confirm	 the	outcomes	of	previous	studies.	Evidently,	the	Sada	and	non-Sada	distinction,	as	expressed	 amongst	 others	 in	 using	 different	 terms	 of	 address,	 continues	 to	play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 contemporary	 Arab	 community	 of	 Ambon.	 Hadramis	 in	Ambon	 identify	 the	 following	 internal	 groupings:	 Sada	 and	mashaikh,	habaib	and	 non-habaib,	 dhurriyya	 and	 non-dhurriyya.	 These	 identifications	 are	organized	 in	 a	 social	 hierarchy	 that	 is	 articulated	 explicitly.	 A	 fifty-year-old	Sada	descendant,	Faiza,	for	instance,	stated	about	her	own	group:	“Don’t	get	it	wrong.	We	are	different	from	other	Arabs…	you	see	many	Arabs	here,	but	we	are	high	Arabs	because	we	are	habaib…	what	I	mean	is:	we	are	descendants	of	the	Prophet”.7		On	 the	 basis	 of	 my	 observations	 and	 interviews	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	although	 the	distinction	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	 is	no	 longer	manifest	 in	public	 sectors	 of	 life,	 such	 as	 the	 economic	 sector,	 it	 still	 regulates	 an	important	 dimension	 of	 internal	 Hadrami	 social	 relations,	 most	 notably	marriage.	 The	 persistence	 of	 social	 hierarchy	 by	 descent	 among	 the	descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 of	 Ambon	 today	 has	 symbolical	
                                                7	Interview	with	Faiza,	October	17,	2014.		
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significance	and	is	related	to	social	status	rather	than	referring	to	a	social	class.	By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 terms	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 have	 shifted	 symbolically	from	indicating	an	economic	position	to	indicating	a	social	status	position.	Although	social	hierarchy	within	the	community	of	Hadrami	descendants	still	persists	today,	internal	criticism	also	occurs.	However,	the	many	critiques	delivered	 by	 non-Sada	Hadramis	 do	 not	 result	 in	 a	 complete	 break	 from	 the	traditional	 social	 stratification.	By	 the	 same	 token,	 social	hierarchy	or	power	difference	 embedded	 in	 descent-based	 ranking	 still	 comes	 the	 fore	 in	 claims	and	counter-claims	about	family	status	of	the	present-day	Hadrami	generation.	My	 informant	 Umar	 Attamimy	 (see	 chapter	 2	 pages	 43-44)	 for	 example,	narrated	his	origin	as	follows:	We	know	the	Prophet	did	not	have	a	son	and	I	doubt	their	claim	(Sada’s	claim,	Istiqomah)…	Muslims	are	all	the	same,	as	long	as	we	have	the	same	religion…	Yes,	of	course	I	am	proud	myself,	you	know	Abu	Bakr,	the	first	Caliph	of	Muslim	community,	was	 from	my	clan.	Our	clan	 is	also	a	well-known	clan	due	 to	 its	 courage	 in	 the	war	and	we	defended	 Islam	 in	 the	early	 period.	 Our	 clan	 has	 settled	 in	 Arabia	 and	 has	 lived	 there	 in	Hadramaut	 even	 longer	 than	 Ahmad	 bin	 Isa	 Al-Muhajir	 (the	 person	considered	 to	 be	 the	 first	 ancestor	 of	 the	 Sada	 who	 migrated	 to	Hadramaut,	Istiqomah).8	Umar	 Attamimy’s	 statement	 reflects	 an	 ambivalent	 stance.	 On	 one	 hand,	 he	expresses	 an	 egalitarian	 view	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 religious	 similarity	 and	 he	states	to	believe	in	equality	of	all	Muslims,	by	questioning	a	consistent	use	of	patrilineal	kinship	system	by	the	Sada.	On	the	other	hand,	he	still	considers	his	descent	status	as	superior,	by	criticizing	the	authenticity	of	the	Sada	identity	as	pure	 Arabs	 from	 a	 historical	 point	 of	 view	 and	 claiming	 himself	 to	 be	 an	authentic	 Arab	 coming	 from	 a	 respected	 Arab	 family.	 A	 similar	 view	 was	expressed	 by	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri,	 a	 seventy-five-year-old	 non-Sada	 and	 who	holds	 an	 important	 position	 at	 an	 Arab	 organization	 of	 Ambon.	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri	noted,	 “We	are	qabail,	 but	 from	a	 royal	 family	 in	Hadramaut	because	the	Sultan	 in	Hadramaut	 is	 from	our	clan…	well,	you	know	between	us	(non-Sada)	we	have	different	ranks	too	and	you	cannot	even	marry	each	other.	That	was	during	my	father’s	era,	now	it	is	not	existent”.9	Despite	 claiming	 a	 high	 status,	my	 informant’s	 statement	 above	 reveals	that	there	is	a	shift	in	the	positioning	among	different	groups	of	the	non-Sada	from	accepting	to	be	of	lower	social	status	than	Sada	to	claiming	equality.	This	is	 also	 marked	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 of	 the	 non-Sada	 tend	 to	 claim	 their	
mashaikh	 status,	which	has	 a	more	positive	 status	 connotation.	Although	 the	non-Sada	group	criticizes	the	claim	of	a	higher	status	by	the	Sada,	some	of	the	
                                                8	Interview	with	Umar	Attamimy,	October	8,	2014.	9	Interview	with	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	May	19,	2015.	
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non-Sada	 accept	 this	 social	 hierarchy,	 especially	 those	who	 are	married	 into	Sada	families.	In	other	cases	I	noted	that	the	criticism	toward	the	status	of	the	Sada	by	the	non-Sada	concerns	primarily	hierarchal	status	claims,	rather	than	the	claim	of	being	descendants	of	the	Prophet.	For	example,	a	fifty-nine-year-old	 non-Sada,	 Ahmad,	 stated,	 “We	 are	 equal,	 aren’t	 we?	 …in	 the	 Arab	community,	we	have	the	ahl	al-bayt,	the	Family	of	the	Prophet.	I	myself	respect	them,	 especially	 those	 who	 prove	 themselves	 to	 acquire	 deep	 religious	learning,	good	guidance	and	morality”.10	Ahmad’s	statement	hints	at	a	specific	message	by	drawing	boundary	between	highly	knowledgeable	Sada	in	terms	of	religion,	and	those	who	could	claim	the	status	of	the	Sada	but	who	according	to	him	 do	 not	 qualify	 as	 such	 in	 terms	 of	 performing	 religious	 knowledge.	 By	extension,	 his	 statement	 illustrates	 a	 general	 pattern	 according	 to	 which	religious	knowledge,	particularly	where	 it	distinguishes	 lay	and	 learned	men,	is	an	important	source	or	cultural	capital	among	Muslims.	To	conclude	this	section	on	social	hierarchy	among	Hadrami	descendants,	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	relevance	of	the	social	hierarchy	based	on	the	distinction	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 within	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	Ambon	should	not	be	overestimated,	and	the	same	can	be	said	about	internal	criticism	on	status	claims.	To	assess	 their	 import	 in	practice,	we	must	have	a	closer	look	at	concrete	social	relations	between	individual	Sada	and	non-Sada	family	 members	 as	 well	 as	 between	 them	 and	 other	 social	 groups	 of	 non-Hadrami	descent.	The	extent	to	which	traditional	social	hierarchy	is	accepted	is	shaped	by	the	degree	of	relatedness	through	marriage	between	individuals	from	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 families,	 in	 which	 kafa’a,	 compabiity	 between	partners	in	marriage,	with	all	kinds	of	version	plays	a	part.	Besides,	acceptance	of	 the	 traditional	 social	 hierarchy	 is	 also	 much	 related	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	power	 relationships	 between	 different	 individuals	 of	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	groups,	 and	 between	 them	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 population	 in	 different	 social	settings.	The	 following	 section	will	 describe	 the	Hadramis	 in	 their	 smaller	 units,	namely	that	of	clan	and	family,	on	the	basis	of	Sada	and	non-Sada	distinction.		
2.2 Clan,	Family	and	Generation	An	 exact	 number	 of	 Arabs	 and	 their	 descendants	 in	 Indonesia	 after	 its	independence	cannot	be	precisely	estimated.	This	 is	mainly	due	to	the	state’s	policy	 of	 nationalization,	 which	 forbids	 dual	 citizenship.	 This	 citizenship	policy,	 to	 some	 extent,	 forced	 the	 foreigners	 including	 Arabs	 and	 their	descendants	settling	 in	 Indonesia	to	embrace	one	nationality.	After	the	 fall	of	the	 New	 Order	 regime	 in	 1998,	 censuses	 from	 Central	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	
                                                10	Interview	with	Ahmad,	October	16,	2014.		
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(BPS)	in	Indonesia	reveal	quite	a	number	of	inhabitants	with	Arab	citizenship	mainly	 spread	 in	 several	 regions	 of	 Java	 (Shahab	 2005a,	 1).	 It	 is	 not	 clear	whether	inhabitants	with	Arab	citizenship	are	Arab	newcomers	or	old	settlers	as	 the	 data	 does	 not	 explain	 further	 details,	 although	 residents	 recorded	 as	having	 Arab	 citizenship	 may	 well	 be	 citizens	 from	 any	 Arabic	 country	 who	migrated	to	Indonesia	in	the	later	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.	In	 Ambon	 today,	 all	 Hadrami	 Arab	 descendants	 have	 Indonesian	citizenship	and	have	been	residents	of	Ambon	 for	more	 than	one	generation.	Therefore,	 there	 are	 no	 census	 data	 that	 identify	 Indonesian	 citizens	 with	Hadrami	 background.	 In	 the	 census,	 they	 are	 categorized	 as	 Muslim	Indonesians.	According	to	the	2012	census	conducted	by	the	BPS	(BPS	Maluku,	2013),	 the	 number	 of	 Muslims	 in	 Ambon	 regency	 constitutes	 approximately	125.169	 inhabitants	or	43%	of	 the	 total	population	 (305.827),	while	 roughly	58	 %	 of	 the	 population	 is	 registered	 as	 Christian	 (179.852).	 For	 the	 whole	province	of	Maluku,	the	total	Muslim	population	(52,54%)	slightly	exceeds	that	of	 the	 Christians	 (46,89%).	 Hence,	 together	 with	 citizens	 of	 other	 various	ethnic	 backgrounds,	 the	 Arab	 community	 is	 lumped	 together	 under	 the	category	of	Muslims.	According	 to	 Shahab	 (2005a,	 1)	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 we	 can	 identify	 the	Hadramis	 in	 Indonesia	 by	 their	 physical	 and	 biological	 appearances	 and	 by	their	 family	 names/surnames.	 For	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants	 of	 Ambon,	identification	based	on	physical	appearance	cannot	be	completely	maintained	because	many	of	the	descendants	look	‘mixed’	or	even	completely	local-Malay	(Ambonese).	 I	 sometimes	 managed	 to	 recognize	 Arab	 descendants	 through	some	 distinctive	 Arab	 physical	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 hair,	 face,	 nose,	 and	skin,	 but	 many	 others	 I	 could	 not	 distinguish	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 local	population	and	my	informants	acknowledge	that	physical	appearance	as	such	is	 not	 a	 sound	 criterium	 to	 recognize	 Hadrami	 descent.	 This	 reflects	 the	different	degrees	of	intermarriage	between	the	Hadramis	and	other	groups	in	the	local	society	(see	chapter	4	in	section	3.1).	In	contrast,	the	use	of	the	family	names	continues	to	be	a	salient	marker	of	Hadrami	identity	in	Ambon,	despite	the	fact	that	most	ethnic	groups	in	Indonesia	do	not	use	family	names,	with	a	few	exceptions	in	some	regions	including	Maluku	(Rony	1970).		Nowadays,	 there	 are	 about	 forty	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	 clans	 in	Ambon.	 The	 classification	 into	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 is	 based	 mostly	 on	informants	 claiming	membership	 to	 the	Sada	group	and	 superiority	over	 the	other	 group.	 Their	 fixed	 classification	 of	 clan	 names	 into	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	categories	 are	 judged	 from	 a	 genealogical	 record	 dictated	 from	 the	 Sada	organization	Rabita	al-‘Alawiyya,	whose	headquarter	is	located	in	Jakarta	(see	chapter	 4	 pages	 118-121).	 The	 list	 of	 the	 names	 of	 the	 descendants	 of	 the	Prophet	 is	 circulated	 around	 Indonesia,	 both	 in	 printed	 papers	 and	 online.	 I	noted	 that	 some	 Sada	 families	 in	 Ambon	 had	 copies	 of	 the	 list	 displayed	 in	
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wooden	frames	on	a	wall	in	their	house.	The	very	display	of	their	genealogy	is	a	 statement	 about	 prophetic	 descent;	 the	 houses	 of	 non-Sada	 families	 that	 I	visited	were	never	decorated	with	 family	 trees.	Few	people	have	memorized	the	names	of	all	clans	that	belong	to	the	Sada,	so	that	the	list	also	functions	as	a	device	to	check	who	does	and	who	does	not	belong.	Members	of	the	Sada	who	have	less	knowledge	about	who	belongs	to	whom	or	who	do	not	have	a	copy	of	the	list,	usually	consult	their	group’s	experts	(see	chapter	4	section	2.3.1).	The	Sada	group	 in	Ambon	consists	of	 the	 following	clans:11	al-Hamid,	al-Saqqaf,	Bin	Shaikh	Abu	Bakr,	al-Attas,	al-Aydrus,	Jamal	al-Lail,	Abu	Futaim,	al-Muhdar,	 Bafaqih,	 al-Habshi,	 Bin	 Yahya,	 Bin	 Tahir,	 al-Shatri,	 al-Zawawi,	 al-Mahdali,	Bin	Smith,	Bin	Aqil,	Barakwan,	al-Bar	and	al-Haddad.	The	other	group,	non-Sada,	 is	 represented	 by	 clans	 such	 as	 al-Kathiri,	 al-Tamimy,	 al-Amudi,	Basalamah,	 Ba’adillah,	 Bamahri,	 Basharahl,	 Bahajay,	 Bamatraf,	 Bahwereis,	Bahasoan,	 Bahalwan,	 Bakhmid,	 Bin	 Sheban,	 Shaban,	Mardas,	 Najar,	 Hamdun,	al-Zagladi,	Bin	Talib,	al-Asiri,	and	Bamakhmid.	Al-Hamid	and	al-Saqqaf	are	the	two	 largest	 members	 of	 the	 Sada	 group,	 while	 al-Kathiri	 and	 al-Tamimy	represent	the	two	biggest	clans	of	the	non-Sada	group.			The	number	of	 clans	 in	Ambon	varies	 from	 time	 to	 time.	 Some	clans	no	longer	exist	while	others	are	newcomers	in	the	present-day	context.	According	to	my	 informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	 (see	chapter	2	page	43),	Ba’bud,	al-Mashur,	al-Hinduan,	and	Bawazier	are	clans	that	no	longer	exist	in	Ambon.	This	does	not	mean	that	these	clans	do	not	exist	in	other	regions.		The	Bawazir	clan,	for	instance,	is	still	prevalent	in	Java.	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	further	claimed	that	the	majority	of	the	above	mentioned	Arab	clans	have	lived	in	Ambon	for	several	 generations,	 except	 Barakwan,	 al-Bar	 and	 al-Haddad,	 who	 are	considered	 to	 have	 come	 in	 a	 later	 period	 and	 presently	 only	 have	 a	 first	generation	 in	Ambon.	The	Barakwan	and	al-Haddad	clans	predominantly	 live	in	Java,	and	al-Bar	is	in	Ternate.12	The	 colonial	 reports	 on	 Hadramis	 in	 Maluku	 reveal	 that	 Ambon	 Island	represents	the	largest	Hadrami	distribution	in	Central	Maluku	residency	(Van	den	 Berg	 1886,	 109).	 This	 may	 still	 be	 valid	 today.	 During	 my	 fieldwork	 in	Ambon	 I	 have	 come	 across	 people	 claiming	 to	 belong	 to	 the	 Arab	 clans	
                                                11	Clans	are	one	among	classical	units	of	division	among	 the	Arabs.	Categorized	along	the	 lines:	 sha’b	 (people),	 qabila	 (tribe),	 ‘amara	 (sub-tribe),	 batn	 (clan),	 fakhd	 (kin),	
fasila	(joint	family),	the	classical	units	are	flexible	and	vary	according	to	time	and	space.	This	 means	 that	 a	 smaller	 unit	 can	 shift	 into	 another	 larger	 unit,	 or	 the	 other	 way	around,	after	a	few	generations	due	to	a	changing	demography	(Kruse	1979,	384).		12	This	 statement	 is	 solely	based	on	my	 informants´	 accounts	and	observations	which	do	not	represent	a	historical	evidence	as	I	have	not	further	explored	(Dutch)	archives,	which	 may	 contain	 more	 information	 about	 the	 list	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 emigrants’	 clan	names	 in	 the	 former	 times.	 For	 example,	 Van	 den	 Berg	 (1886)	 in	 his	 work	 only	mentioned	the	list	of	the	Hadrami	clan	names	in	Hadramaut,	but	did	not	give	a	detailed	account	of	the	emigrants´	clan	names	in	Indonesia.		
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mentioned	 above.	 Other	 islands	 of	Maluku	 such	 as	 Saparua	 (Siri	 Sori	 Islam),	Seram	 (Manipa,	 Sawai,	Wahai,	 Geser),	 Buru	 (Namlea),	 Banda	 (Banda	 Naira),	South	 East	 Maluku	 (Tual	 and	 Aru)	 have	 significantly	 less	 Arab	 clans	 than	Ambon. 13 	There	 have,	 however,	 always	 been	 close	 contacts	 between	 the	Hadramis	 living	 in	 Ambon	 and	 those	 living	 on	 other	 islands	 in	 the	 Maluku	Islands	and	the	wider	Indonesian	Archipelago.	The	 Hadrami	 community	 in	 Ambon	 is	 divided	 into	 roughly	 forty	 clans.	Every	 clan	 consists	 of	 smaller	 units,	 which	 are	 called	 ‘families’,	 of	 which	 I	estimate	there	are	currently	around	250	in	Ambon.	Some	Hadrami	families	do	not	only	consist	of	those	affiliated	by	consanguinity	(by	birth)	and	affinity	(by	marriage),	 but	 also	 by	 co-residence.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 term	 ‘family’	 is	applied	here	on	the	basis	of	both	nuclear	and	extended	family	structures.14		It	is	 not	 uncommon	 to	 find	 in	 one	Hadrami	 family	 unit	 a	 husband,	 a	wife,	 and	children,	who	co-reside	with	a	wife’s	or	husband’s	parents	or	parents’	siblings.	I	also	 found	children	who	 live	with	their	uncle’s	 family	because	their	parents	died.	Also,	 in	some	cases	single	women	choose	 to	 live	with	 their	brother’s	or	sister’s	family,	while	in	other	instances	they	live	by	themselves.	As	the	Hadrami	migration	to	the	Indian	Ocean,	especially	Indonesia,	was	a	gradual	process	that	began	in	the	mid	eighteenth	century	and	lasted	until	the	early	 twentieth	 century,	 present-day	 Hadrami	 descendants	 may	 come	 from	different	 generation-descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants. 15 	Historical	evidence	 confirms	 my	 ethnographic	 data	 on	 this	 issue.	 The	 Hadramis	 I	 met	range	from	being	the	second	until	the	seventh	generation	of	Hadrami	migrants.	In	any	case,	 the	wulayti,	or	pure	Hadramis	(Hadrami	migrants)	can	no	 longer	be	 found,	 and	 all	 Hadramis	 identify	 themselves	 as	muwallads,	 descendants.	Those	belonging	to	the	second	generation	are	very	few.	During	my	fieldwork,	I	only	met	two	people	from	the	second	generation,	and	many	of	those	belonging	to	the	third	generation	were	in	their	sixties	or	seventies.				




This	 section	will	 shed	 light	 on	how	old	 and	 recent	 residential	 locations	have	impacted	the	Hadramis’	social	relations	with	other	communities	of	Ambon	by	delineating	the	spatial	distribution	of	Hadramis	in	the	present,	post-communal	conflicts	(1999-	2002)	context.		
3.1 Old	Settlements	
	Figure	3.1:	Map	of	Ambon	Town,	numbers	1-10	are	where	the	Hadrami	descendants	live	taken	from	Google	map	and	elaborated	by	the	author		The	 Hadrami	 descendants	 today	 are	 dispersed	 around	 Ambon	 Island,	especially	in	the	coastal	areas	in	both	Leitimur	and	Leihitu	Peninsulas.	Most	of	them	 live	 in	 the	district	 of	Kota	Ambon,	which	 is	mainly	 located	on	Leitimur	Peninsula,	 and	 they	 are	 dispersed	 in	 all	 sub-districts	 around	 Kota	 Ambon,	except	 in	 Leitimur	 Selatan.	Although	 the	Arab	dwellings	 are	distributed	over	almost	all	sub-districts	along	the	coast,	the	main	settlements	concentrate	in	the	city	 center,	 stretching	 the	 northern	 shores	 of	 the	 Leitimur	 Peninsula.	 Places	such	as	Pantai	Pasar	(or	popularly	called	Lorong	Arab),	Silale-Waihaong,	Jalan	Baru,	Diponegoro,	Batumerah	Dalam	and	Tantui	are	where	we	find	the	current	residences	of	the	Arab	descendants	(see	figure	3.1).	Other	current	residences	outside	the	town	are	mainly	situated	in	Air	Salobar,	Kota	Jawa,	Wayame,	Laha,	Larike	and	Hila.	
Chapter	3:	A	Survey	of	the	Present-Day	Hadrami	Arab	Descendants	in	Ambon	
60		
Many	of	my	informants	who	currently	live	in	places	such	as	Pantai	Pasar,	Silale,	 Jalan	 Baru,	 Diponegoro,	 and	 Batumerah	 Dalam	 claim	 that	 their	 house	already	belonged	to	 their	parents	and	grandparents,	which	seems	to	 indicate	that	these	areas	could	be	old	Hadrami	settlements.	 In	addition,	 there	are	two	other	 old	 residences	 around	 the	 town	 that	 are	 no	 longer	 inhabited	 by	 Arab	families	 today.	 These	 places	 are	 located	 in	 the	 adjacent	 quarters	 of	 Anthony	Rhebok	and	Paradijs.		Anthony	Rhebok	is	where	the	Arab-initiated	foundation	called	 al-Hilal	 is	 situated	 (see	 al-Hilal	 in	 chapter	 5	 section	 3.2).	 Between	Anthony	Rhebok	and	Paradijs	is	where	the	al-Hilal-initated	mosque,	an-Nur,	is	located	(see	further	figure	5.2	on	an-Nur	mosque	page	169).	Some	Hadramis	I	met	claimed	that	their	former	residences,	which	they	had	inherited	from	their	parents	 (grandparents),	 were	 located	 in	 Anthony	 Rhebok	 and	 Paradijs.	According	 to	 them,	 their	 families	 moved	 to	 other	 places	 during	 communal	conflicts	between	Muslims	and	Christians	between	1999	and	2002.	Before	the	conflicts,	 some	 families	 of	 Najjar,	 al-Tamimy,	 Mardas,	 Bahajay,	 Banama,	Bahasoan,	al-Aydrus,	al-Asiri,	Basalamah,	Bahwereis	were	said	to	have	lived	in	these	two	places.	My	informants	added	that	their	former	houses	were	sold	to	the	Chinese,	who	have	turned	them	into	shops,	restaurants	and	cafes.		On	 the	 basis	 of	 my	 rough	 sketch	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 old	 settlements,	 a	relationship	 between	 Hadrami	 residential	 distributions	 and	 economic	 and	religious	 activities	 becomes	 apparent.	 Historically,	 trade	 and	 religious	activities	 were	 interlinked	 in	 the	 Hadrami	 diaspora	 (Freitag	 and	 Clarence-Smith	 1997;	 Freitag	 2003;	 Ellen	 2003).	 The	 fact	 that	 old	 settlements	 of	Hadrami	migrants	spread	around	the	harbor,	the	main	market,	and	city	center,	suggests	 that	 trading	 activities	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 pattern	 of	settlement	 in	 this	area.	 In	addition,	 the	settlements	are	not	only	 located	near	the	harbor,	but	 also	 close	 to	 the	oldest	mosque	of	Kota	Ambon	called	Masjid	Jami’16,	 which	 in	 former	 times	 functioned	 as	 the	 main	 mosque	 (see	 figure	3.2). 17 	My	 informants	 from	 the	 Jamal	 al-Lail	 family	 claimed	 that	 their	grandfather(s)	 were	 among	 the	 respected	 imams	 of	 the	 oldest	 mosque	 in	former	 times.	 In	 this	mosque,	 the	main	 imam	 of	Hadrami	migrants	 is	 said	 to	have	played	a	significant	role	in	Islamic	missionary	work.		The	 stories	 of	my	 informants	 suggest	 that	 the	 old	 Hadrami	 settlements	were	 concentrated	 not	 only	 around	 the	 city	 center,	 but	 also	 outside	 the	 city	
                                                16	This	mosque	 is	 said	 to	 have	 been	 constructed	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century	 (around	 1860)	 by	 a	 rich	 merchant	 from	 Sumatra,	 Abdul	 Qadir	 Hatala.	 An	Interview	with	a	management	board	member	of	the	mosque,	Munir,	March	11,	2015.	17	The	term	‘main	mosque’	means	that	it	is	the	mosque	where	the	religious	activities	of	the	 whole	 Islamic	 community	 in	 the	 district	 are	 centralized.	 After	 Indonesia’s	Independence	 the	 state	 under	 the	 religious	 affairs	 department	 has	 intervened	 in	 its	managements	 such	 as	 the	 allocation	 of	 a	 budget	 and	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 imam.	Today,	the	main	mosque	al-Fatah	is	situated	next	to	the	oldest	mosque.	
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center	 of	 Ambon.	 Outside	 the	 city	 center	 Arab	 families	 have	 lived	 in	 several	places,	namely	Air	Salobar,	Kota	Jawa,	Laha,	Larike	and	Hila.	According	to	my	informants,	their	families	have	been	residents	of	these	areas	since	their	(great)	grandparents	settled	there.	They	also	claimed	to	be	part	of	local	noble	families	in	 the	 villages	 or	 related	 to	 families	 of	 the	 local	 headmen.	 In	 this	 regard,	despite	 the	 salience	 of	 economic	 and	 religious	 aspects	 related	 to	 cultural	dimensions,	 kinship	 ties	 as	 a	 result	 of	 intermarriage	 become	 another	important	aspect	of	the	spatial	distribution	of	Hadrami	families.	I	will	address	this	matter	further	in	chapter	4.			
	Figure	3.2:	Jami’	Mosque	(photographed	by	the	author)		
3.2 New	Settlements	in	Post-Conflicts	Ambon	Ambon	has	recently	faced	communal	conflicts	between	Muslims	and	Christians	from	 early	 1999	 up	 to	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 peace	 treaties	 called	 Malino	 II	 on	February	13,	2002	(Hasan	2005,	2009).	However,	on	a	small	scale	the	conflicts	continued	 after	 the	 peace	 treaty.	When	 I	 lived	 in	 Ambon	 in	 October	 2011,	 I	experienced	a	 riot	between	Muslims	and	Christians	 from	different	villages	 in	the	town	of	Ambon.	Fortunately,	the	local	authorities	managed	to	contain	the	riot,	 and	 it	 did	 not	 spread	 to	 other	 areas.	 Nonetheless,	 several	 people	 were	killed	and	houses	were	destroyed	during	the	riot.			Although	 various	 accounts	 circulate	 on	 how	 the	 communal	 conflicts	started,	 it	 is	widely	reported	that	both	Muslim	and	Christian	groups	began	to	attack	 each	 other	 after	 an	 initial	 confrontation	 between	 a	 Christian	minibus	(ind.	angkot)	driver	and	either	a	drunk,	a	Muslim	conductor,	or	some	Buginese	
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youths	close	to	a	bus	terminal	in	the	town	on	January	19,	1999,	the	day	of	Eid	al-Fitr,	 an	 Islamic	 holiday	 concluding	 the	 fasting	month	 of	 Ramadan.	 On	 the	same	day	this	 incident	occurred,	there	were	confrontations	between	Muslims	and	 Christians	 from	 the	 neighbouring	 villages	 of	 the	 town,	 Batumerah	 and	Mardika.	 Incidents	 then	 spread	 to	 other	 areas,	 where	 both	 Muslims	 and	Christians	 launched	 attacks	 and	 counter-attacks	 by	 burning	 properties	 (e.g	houses	 and	 shops),	 as	 well	 as	 trying	 to	 attack	 religious	 worship	 buildings	(churches,	 mosques).	 Such	 attacks	 were	 mostly	 based	 on	 rumors	 that	properties	 and	mosques	 or	 churches	 of	 their	 religious	 fellows	 in	 other	 areas	were	already	burnt.	As	the	conflict	escalated,	these	confrontations	could	not	be	handled	 by	 police	 officers,	 who	 were	 not	 in	 full	 force	 because	 of	 it	 being	 a	national	 holiday.	 In	 the	 first	 year	 of	 the	 conflicts,	 the	 actors	 involved	 were	mostly	 local	 people,	 but	 in	 the	 second	 year	 later	 (2000),	 Islamic	 hard-liners	from	Java	came	to	Ambon	to	help	the	Ambonese	Muslims	fight	the	Christians.	According	 to	 some	people,	 the	 arrival	 of	 these	 Islamic	 fighters	 from	 Java	has	considerably	exacerbated	 the	conflicts.	Others	consider	 these	 Islamic	 fighters	to	be	heroes.	Although	 different	 studies	 on	 the	 communal	 conflicts	 in	 Ambon	emphasize	 different	 factors	 that	 caused	 them,	 it	 is	 widely	 agreed	 that	 they	were	 the	 result	 of	 a	 combination	 of	 socio-political	 and	 economic	 to	 cultural	factors.	 The	 first	 factor	 is	 overpopulation	 and	 unemployment	 among	 the	Ambonese	 people.	 This	 factor	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 migration,	 either	 forced	 or	voluntary,	of	non-Ambonese	people,	namely	 Javanese	 (from	 Java)	and	Buton,	Bugis,	 and	 or	 called	 BBM	 (from	 Sulawesi),	 around	 1970s	 to	 1990s.	 The	migrants	who	came	to	work	in	the	agricultural	and	informal	economic	sectors	did	well	and	many	amassed	property	(lands	and	houses),	while	the	Ambonese	people	in	the	middle-lower	class	had	difficulties	finding	jobs	and	getting	access	to	their	already	sold	lands.	Following	the	triggering	clash	between	a	Christian	Ambonese	 and	 a	 Muslim	 Bugis,	 the	 conflicts	 were	 first	 seen	 as	 a	 conflict	between	 indigenous	 and	 non-indigenous	 people,	 and	 the	 conflicts	 became	 a	moment	to	displace	non-Ambonese	people	and	to	reclaim	economic	resources	and	 also	 some	 customary	 communal	 lands.	 As	 the	 conflicts	 escalated	 and	turned	into	a	conflict	between	two	religious	communities,	political	competition	between	Christian	and	Muslim	communities	 further	 fuelled	the	violence.	This	factor	 is	 related	 to	 a	 long-term	 of	 religious	 politization	 rooted	 in	 the	 Dutch	colonial	 policies	 on	 social	 segregation	 and	 religious	 discrimination,	 which	privileged	 Christians	 over	 Muslims	 in	 access	 to	 political	 and	 economic	resources	 such	 as	 positions	 in	 the	 administration	 and	 military	 force.	 This	communal	 politization	 along	 religious	 lines	 in	 the	 access	 to	 political	 and	economic	resources	continued	after	the	independence	of	Indonesian	state	until	before	the	outbreak	of	the	conflicts	in	1999.	Furthermore,	the	conflicts	cannot	be	 separated	 from	 a	 broader	 context	 of	 the	 socio-political	 changes	 in	 the	
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country.	 The	 fall	 of	 the	 New	 Order	 regime	 led	 to	 a	 transformation	 from	 an	authoritarian	 to	 a	 democratic	 era,	 and	 from	 a	 centralization	 to	 a	decentralization	policy.	This	transformation	offered	different	groups	of	people	opportunities	to	renegotiate	access	to	the	state,	to	gain	economic	resources,	or	to	spread	particular	 ideological	 influences.	This	socio-political	situation,	 thus,	also	contributed	to	the	conflicts	(Gos	2000;	Bertrand	2002;	Van	Klinken	2007;	Bertrand	 2008;	 Davidson	 2009;	 Adam	 2010;	 Duncan	 2013;	 Bräuchler	 2005;	Schulze	2017).	Over	 the	 course	 of	 four	 years	 and	 even	 longer,	 these	 conflicts	 caused	thousands	 of	 deaths	 and	 many	 properties	 of	 both	 Muslims	 and	 Christians	being	 destroyed.	 It	 also	 caused	 traumas,	 and	 mutual	 hatred	 and	 distrust	between	Muslims	and	Christians.	The	conflicts	have	substantially	affected	the	social	 structure	of	 the	Ambonese	 society	 (Bertrand	2002;	Van	Klinken	2007;	Bertrand	 2008;	 Davidson	 2009;	 Adam	 2010;	 Duncan	 2013,	 Bräuchler	 2015;	Schulze	 2017).	 During	 the	 conflicts,	 there	 were	 about	 60.000	 internally	displaced	 persons	 (IDP)	 in	 Ambon,	 25	 %	 of	 whom	 fled	 to	 places	 outside	Maluku,	 while	 the	 rest	 remained	 in	 Ambon	 (Adam	 2008).	 Arab	 descendants	were	 among	 the	 displaced	 people,	 especially	 those	 whose	 residences	 were	located	in	the	border	area	with	Christian	settlements	or	in	the	predominantly	Christian	 quarters.	 In	 order	 to	 mitigate	 the	 conflicts	 and	 prevent	 further	casualties,	 resettlement	 and	 relocation	 of	 internally	 displaced	 people	 was	undertaken	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 ethno-religious	 differences	 (Adam	 2008[2010a];	Adam	 and	 Peilouw	 2008).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Ambonese	 society	 is	 now	restructured	along	communal	lines.	Muslims	and	Christians	live	segregated	in	their	 own	 quarters,	 a	 situation	which	 resembles	 the	 former	 Dutch	 policy	 on	social	segregation	during	the	colonial	era.	Being	composed	of	mixed	religious	communities,	the	city	center	of	Ambon	was	one	of	the	main	areas	where	many	Arab	families	together	with	residents	of	 other	 origins	were	 forced	 to	move	 out	 during	 the	 conflicts	 (Adam	2010a;	Adam	and	Peilouw	2008).		Batumerah	Atas	became	one	of	the	main	centers	for	the	 relocation	 of	 Muslims	 inside	 Ambon,	 as	 the	 upper	 part	 of	 Batumerah	village,	Batumerah	Atas,	 lies	 in	 the	 interior,	 bordered	by	 the	Christian	upper	village	 Soya.	 Before	 the	 conflicts,	 both	Muslim	 and	 non-Muslims	 lived	 there,	although	 the	 majority	 population	 was	 Muslim. 18 	During	 my	 2014-2015	fieldwork	 and	my	 previous	 two-year	 stay	 in	 Batumerah	 Atas	 between	 2011	and	2013,	 I	 observed	how	on	 the	one	hand	Batumerah	Atas	kept	developing	into	 a	 homogenous	 religious	 area,	 while	 on	 the	 other	 reinforcing	 its	 ethnic	diversity.	 In	post-conflict	Ambon,	 this	area	has	become	densely	populated	by	Muslim	 migrant	 communities	 of	 various	 ethnic	 backgrounds,	 coming	 from	
                                                18	In	the	first	year	of	the	conflicts,	700	Christian	households	in	Batumerah	fled	to	other	Christian	areas,	such	as	Karang	Panjang	(Adam	2008,	4).	
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Sulawesi,	 Ambon,	 Kei,	 Java,	 and	 other	 regions.	 I	 noticed	 that	 most	 of	 the	migrant	 communities	 tended	 to	 live	with	 those	 of	 similar	 ethnic	 origin,	with	the	 exception	of	Arabs,	who	were	 a	minority	 among	 the	other	 ethnic	 groups	and	lived	dispersed	throughout	the	area.19	According	to	my	informants,	many	Arab	 families	 from	 the	 city	 center	 moved	 to	 Batumerah	 Atas.	 During	 my	fieldwork,	there	were	about	40	Arab	families	living	in	the	area,	many	of	whom	had	resided	there	long	before	the	outbreak	of	the	conflicts.	During	 the	 1999-2002	 conflicts,	 many	 Arab	 descendants	 left	 Ambon	either	temporarily	or	permanently.	According	to	my	informants,	some	of	their	family	members	moved	to	Java,	particularly	to	Surabaya,	Probolinggo,	Malang,	and	Jakarta.	A	few	of	them	moved	to	Kalimantan	and	Sulawesi.		Some	returned	to	Ambon	when	the	situation	returned	back	to	normal,	while	others	decided	to	stay	 in	 new	 places	 permanently.	 The	 return	 of	 people	 a	 few	 years	 after	 the	conflicts	is	confirmed	by	the	recent	census	by	the	BPS;	the	total	population	in	the	 administrative	 Sirimau	 sub-district	 where	 Batumerah	 is	 situated	 has	witnessed	 a	 50%	 increase	 between	 2007	 (105.010)	 and	 2012	 (160.808).	Sirimau,	in	fact,	 is	the	most	densely	populated	sub-district	area	in	the	district	of	 Kota	 Ambon	 today.	 Almost	 half	 of	 the	 total	 population	 lives	 in	 this	 sub-district	in	the	Kota	Ambon.	Considerations	to	 leave	Ambon	either	temporarily	or	permanently	differ	from	one	person	to	another.	The	considerations	are	related	to	factors	such	as	family	support,	conflict	trauma,	profession,	and	other	practical	matters.		Many	informants	 could	 easily	 move	 to	 Java	 because	 they	 had	 relatives	 there	 who	offered	 them	 temporary	 residence	 and	 support.	 In	many	 cases,	 some	 family	members	would	move	out,	while	others	stayed	in	Ambon	in	order	to	look	after	the	 family	 property.	 Among	 my	 informants	 there	 were	 people	 who	 were	witnesses	or	victims	of	the	conflicts.	Feelings	of	insecurity	induced	them	to	sell	all	their	possessions	and	move	to	other	islands.	This	is	the	case,	for	example,	of	
                                                19	Clashes	between	different	ethnic	groups	have	happened,	something	that	I	witnessed	myself	 near	 the	 neighbourhood	 I	 lived.	 Tensions	 between	 communities	 are	 not	 only	based	 on	 ethnicity,	 but	 also	 on	 different	 religious	 ideas,	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 social	arenas	 (public	 sphere).	 I	noticed,	 for	example,	 that	many	 former	 Islamic	 fighters	who	came	from	Java	during	the	conflicts	now	live	in	a	specific	quarter.	According	to	the	local	people,	 before	 the	 conflicts	 Christians	 inhabited	 this	 quarter.	 In	 this	 quarter,	 we	 can	now	find	a	mosque	surrounded	by	houses	of	the	former	families	of	the	 jihadist	group,	all	female	adult	members	of	which	wear	a	niqab	(a	form	of	enveloping	black	cloak	and	face	 veil).	 Some	 local	 Muslim	 residents	 saw	 this	 Islamic	 group	 as	 intruders,	provocateurs,	and	even	propagators	of	 foreign	religious	 ideas,	while	others	were	very	thankful	to	the	group	for	to	its	assistance	during	the	conflicts.	Adherents	of	a	neo-Salafi	ideology	 live	 side	 by	 side	 with	 people	 who	 have	 different	 Islamic	 life	 styles,	 yet	 the	different	groups	compete	each	other	in	the	public	sphere	such	as	in	the	organization	of	education.	I	noted	religious	schools	affiliated	with	competing	Islamic	ideologies	in	this	area.	 After	 the	 peace	 treaty,	 the	 jihadist	Salafi	 group	 has	 turned	 into	 a	more	 quietist	Salafism	(see	neo-Salafism	in	chapter	5	section	3.3.1).	
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some	families	living	in	Anthony	Rhebok	and	Paradijs,	a	place	where	the	al-Hilal	foundation	 and	 the	 orphanage	 foundation	 called	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 were	formerly	 located	 (see	 chapter	 5	 section	 3.2	 and	 section	 4.2).	 None	 of	 the	families	 live	 in	 these	places	 anymore	 as	 they	mostly	moved	 to	 Java	 and	 sold	their	 properties	 to	 Chinese	 businessmen.	 Rina,	 a	 seventy-year-old	 non-Sada	descendant,	 told	me	 that	during	 the	 first	day	of	 the	outbreak	of	 the	 conflicts	the	houses	of	Arabs	were	attacked	by	un-known	people,	allegedly	Christians.	She	had	heard	 from	members	of	 the	 families	 living	 there	how	they	could	not	sleep	at	night	and	decided	to	leave	the	house,	hoping	to	return	home	when	the	situation	was	deemed	relatively	secure,	but	finally	selling	their	houses	because	of	what	seemed	to	be	unending	conflicts.20	Not	 all	 Hadrami	 Arab	 families	 left	 Ambon.	 Especially	 those	 engaged	 in	trade	stayed.	Some	of	my	informants,	for	example,	stated	that	they	would	think	twice	before	moving	because	they	had	gained	a	substantial	success	with	their	business	 in	Ambon.	 For	 them,	Batumerah	Atas	 is	 the	 best	 place	 to	 reside.	 In	some	cases,	people	kept	half	of	their	properties	in	the	town	by	renting	them	to	other	 businessmen	 while	 buying	 new	 properties	 in	 Batumerah	 Atas.	 Other	informants	 stated	 that	 they	 could	 not	 leave	 Ambon	 because	 of	 their	responsibilities	in	the	government	office.	During	the	most	intense	phase	of	the	conflicts,	these	informants	were	accompanied	and	guarded	by	the	army	or	by	police	officers	on	their	way	to	the	work.	The	 1999	 –	 2002	 communal	 conflicts	 in	 Ambon	 have	 affected	 the	Hadramis	 in	 several	 respects.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 resettlement	 of	 some	Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 resulting	 in	 changing	 relationships	 with	 broader	 co-religious	 communities,	 especially	 Muslims	 of	 Ambon.	 According	 to	 some	informants,	there	was	no	Arab	quarter	in	Ambon	like	the	kind	of	Arab	quarters	you	 find	 in	most	of	 the	 towns	 in	 Java	 in	 former	 times.	 Indeed,	 there	are	only	references	to	clearly	demarcated	Arab	quarters	for	Dobo	and	Banda	in	Maluku	(Clarence-Smith	 1998).	 Some	 Arabs	 who	 used	 to	 live	 in	 the	 town	 in	 houses	inherited	 from	 their	 grandparents	 told	me	 that	 they	used	 to	have	Ambonese	Christian	neighbours	and	that	 their	relations	with	neighbours	was	good	until	the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 conflicts.	 This	means	 that	 due	 to	 the	 conflicts	 the	 social	interaction	 between	 members	 of	 different	 religious	 communities	 has	diminished,	while	new	space	opened	up	 for	encounters	between	members	of	co-religious	communities	of	different	ethnic	groups,	namely	between	the	Arabs	and	Muslims	of	other	origins.	Another	 result	 of	 the	 1999-2002	 conflicts	 is	 that	 the	 social	 boundaries	between	different	 categories	 of	 citizens	 in	Ambon	have	 been	 fortified.	 These	boundaries	 are	 reasserted	 not	 only	 by	 ethnicizing	 religion	 or	 religionizing	ethnicity,	 but	 also	 by	 ethnicizing	 people	 or	 a	 group	 of	 the	 community	 as	 a	
                                                20	Interview	with	Rina,	March	10,	2015.		
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strategy	in	a	political	project	to	claim	particular	resources,	such	as	land	tenure	and	political	positions	(Adam	2008	[2010a][2010b]).	The	Hadramis	are	among	the	victims	of	this	ethnicization	as	they	were	accused	of	being	non-indigenous	Ambonese,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 were	 born	 in	 Ambon	 and	 that	 their	families	have	 lived	 in	Ambon	 for	 generations.	This	 ethnicization	project	was,	for	 example,	 taken	 as	 an	 issue	during	heated	 campaigns	 of	 the	2013	 general	governor	election	in	Maluku,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	section	of	political	engagement.	A	 last	 consequence	 of	 the	 conflicts	 that	 should	 be	 mentioned	 is	 the	emigration	of	some	Hadramis	and	their	reconnection	with	other	Hadramis	 in	other	major	diasporic	centers	of	Indonesia	and	in	the	homeland.	As	mentioned	above,	 the	 religious	 conflicts	 pushed	 many	 Hadramis	 to	 leave	 Ambon	 and	resettle	in	other	areas,	mainly	in	places	where	they	found	family	support.	Their	resettlement	 outside	 Ambon,	 mainly	 Java,	 has	 affected	 their	 strong	 ethno-religious	sentiment	as	Hadramis.	As	a	result,	we	can	observe	a	revived	interest	in	 their	 heritage	 and	 the	 traditions	 from	 the	 homeland,	 as	 I	 will	 discuss	 in	chapter	6.						
4. Economic	Positions	and	Activities	
This	section	describes	the	engagement	of	the	present-day	Hadramis	of	Ambon	in	 economic	 activities.	 Paying	 attention	 to	 this	 economic	 dimension	 is	important	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 not	 only	 the	 Hadramis’	 present	 economic	role	 in	 society	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 their	 social	 relations	 with	 a	 broader	Ambonese	 society,	 but	 also	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 local	 social	 structure	 on	 the	participation	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 labor	market.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 will	 also	reflect	 on	 configurations	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 women’s	 participation	 in	 the	economic	production	and	its	impacts	on	shifts	in	gender	role	divisions	within	the	Hadrami	community.	
4.1 From	Commerce	to	Other	Sectors	of	the	Labor	Market			Today,	 the	 Hadramis	 with	 all	 kinds	 of	 professions	 participate	 in	 the	 labor	market.	 This	 seems	 to	 suggest	 a	 decline	 of	 the	 Hadramis’	 interest	 in	commercial	 activities	 and	 a	 growing	 interest	 in	 other	 economic	 sectors.	 This	change	in	economic	activities	is	related	to	changing	socio-political	contexts.		During	 the	 colonial	 era,	 access	 to	 public	 sectors,	 education	 and	employment	 were	 the	 privilege	 of	 local	 Christians.	 After	 the	 Indonesian	independence,	 ‘Foreign	Orientals’,	particularly	Hadramis	and	local	Muslims	in	Ambon	 also	 gained	 access	 to	 modern	 education	 and	 positions	 in	 the	government	(Chauvel	1990).	The	opening	of	public	sectors	provided	Muslims,	including	the	Hadramis,	access	to	wider	public	sectors.		As	a	consequence,	the	
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commercial	 sector	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 main	 domain	 of	 Hadramis’	 economic	activities.	Today,	 the	 Hadramis	 engage	 in	 the	 same	 variety	 of	many	 jobs	 as	 other	Ambonese	people.	They	are	employed	 in	both	 formal	and	 informal	economic	sectors.	 Many	 work	 in	 building	 construction,	 communication,	 financing,	business	services,	manufacture	industry,	and	other	fields.	In	these	sectors,	they	work	either	as	employers	or	as	employees.	Many	others	work	in	formal	public	sectors	 such	 as	 the	 education	 sector,	 government	 offices,	 law	 firms,	 justice	offices,	health	care	centers,	military	offices,	and	others.	In	all	of	these	economic	sectors,	 they	 occupy	 different	 levels	 of	 positions	 in	 their	 workplace,	 from	middle-lower,	to	middle-upper	ranks.	The	capacity	of	the	Hadramis	to	participate	in	the	public	sector	and	their	influential	 positions	 in	 certain	 institutions	 is	 due	 to	 their	 generally	 high	educational	level.	Although	some	older	generations	of	Hadramis	have	a	lower	level	 of	 education,	 many	 of	 younger	 generations	 hold	 a	 university	 degree,	having	graduated	in	various	fields	of	study	in	local,	national	and	even	overseas	universities.	 Some	 of	 them	 also	 hold	 doctoral	 degrees.	 For	 instance,	Muhammad	Attamimy	(59	years	old),	a	younger	brother	of	my	informant	Umar	Attamimy,	 and	 Haikal	 (46	 years	 old)	 have	 doctoral	 degrees	 from	 Islamic	universities	in	Java.	The	former	is	from	a	non-Sada	family	and	the	latter	is	from	a	 Sada	 family.	 Many	 of	 my	 younger	 informants	 tended	 to	 study	 general	sciences	 rather	 than	 Islamic	 studies.	 Pattimura	 University,	 for	 example,	 the	oldest	 State	 University	 of	 Maluku	 located	 in	 Poka	 Ambon,	 produces	 many	alumni	of	Arab	descent.	Some	Hadramis	have	pursued	their	education	outside	Ambon,	 such	 as	 Sulawesi	 and	 Java	 because	 these	 two	 islands	 have	 more	different	 universities	 and	 colleges.	 Among	 those	 interested	 in	 Islamic	knowledge,	some	have	a	degree	from	the	relatively	new	Islamic	institute	called	IAIN	(State	Institute	of	Islamic	Studies)	in	Ambon	while	a	few	others	studied	in	Middle	Eastern	countries	such	as	Saudi	Arabia,	Egypt,	and	Hadramaut.	Because	 of	 their	 high	 educational	 level,	 many	 Hadramis	 have	 access	 to	various	domains	 in	 the	public	 sector,	 especially	 in	 the	 formal	economic	 field.	Most	 of	my	 informants	who	work	 in	 formal	 public	 sector	 are	well	 educated,	holding	 a	 university	 degree	 in	 various	 fields.	 In	 total,	 about	 half	 of	 my	informants,	both	men	and	women,	worked	in	the	public	sector.	Apart	from	the	changing	socio-political	context	and	the	accessibility	of	the	public	 sector,	 the	participation	of	Hadramis	 in	 the	wider	economic	 sectors	 is	also	 related	 to	 their	 interest	 in	 having	 access	 to	 power,	 economic	 resources,	political	 influence,	 and	 social	 status.	 	 In	 many	 cases,	 I	 noted	 that	 for	 my	informants	 holding	 a	 certain	 job	 in	 the	 government	 is	 not	 only	 a	 means	 to	accumulate	 economic	 capital,	 but	 that	 it	was	 also	 valued	 for	 the	 access	 such	positions	 might	 provide	 to	 symbolic	 capital	 (see	 Bourdieu	 1984),	 such	 as	prestige	and	honor,	as	well	as	political	power.	
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For	 example,	 my	 informant	 Anisa	 (67	 years	 old),	 who	 is	 of	 non-Sada	origin	 from	 an	 al-Kathiri	 family,	 expressed	 her	 disappointment	 when	 her	daughter	failed	to	get	a	position	in	the	government	as	follows:		Yes,	 for	 sure	 I	 wanted	 my	 kids	 to	 prosper…	 all	 of	 my	 daughters	 work,	except	one.	I	tried	to	help	my	daughter	to	get	a	job	in	the	governor’s	office	where	I	work,	but	I	did	not	manage	to	help	her	because	the	position	offer	was	limited	and	finally	taken	by	a	family	member	of	an	official	of	a	higher	rank,	and	I	will	retire	soon.21		Anisa’s	statement	illustrates	how	acquiring	a	position	in	the	government	is	not	only	 very	 competitive,	 but	 also	 demands	 collusion	 in	 which	 personal	connections	easily	overrule	personal	qualities.	Many	of	my	informants	viewed	a	government	position	not	only	as	a	way	to	enhance	their	social	status	 in	the	society,	but	also	a	good	opportunity	to	gain	access	to	wealth	and	power	in	the	public	domain.	Apparently,	some	Hadramis	do	very	well	in	this	respect:	I	met	or	was	 told	about	several	who	held	strategic	positions	 in	 the	government.	At	the	 time	of	my	 fieldwork,	 significant	positions	 in	 the	 land	affairs	department	were	 held	 by	 members	 of	 Bin	 Smith	 and	 al-Aydrus	 families	 and	 influential	positions	 in	 the	 governor’s	 office	were	wielded	 by	members	 of	 an	 al-Saqqaf	family	as	were	some	positions	in	other	departments.	The	second	factor	that	contributes	to	the	decline	in	commercial	activities	among	present-day	Hadramis	is	related	to	cultural	practices,	particularly	those	related	 to	 marriage	 and	 inheritance.	 Polygamy	 is	 still	 practiced	 by	 some	Muslims,	 including	 Hadramis.	 Such	 polygamous	 marriages	 result	 in	 the	distribution	of	a	person’s	wealth	among	the	many	heirs	after	their	death.	Alif	(57	 years	 old),	 from	 a	 polygamous	 Sada	 family,	 said	 that	 one	 of	 the	 main	reasons	 for	 selling	 the	 family’s	 properties	 is	 related	 to	 having	 to	 provide	 all	family	members	with	their	share	of	the	inheritance:	My	 father	 owned	 a	 cloth	 shop	 in	 Gotong	 Royong	 Market.22	Most	 of	 the	Arabs	 owned	 cloth	 shops	 in	 this	 market	 and	 in	 A.Y	 Patty	 street.	 I	 also	helped	my	father	in	his	shop.	But	I	did	not	follow	his	career	as	a	merchant	because	 I	was	accepted	to	work	 in	 the	department	of	 land	affairs.	There	are	 a	 few	 Arab	 shops	 in	 Ambon	 now.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 inheritance	should	 be	 distributed	 to	 the	 family	members	 and	 the	 people	 sold	 their	assets.	A	 grandfather	 collected	wealth	 and	his	 grandchildren	use	 it	 up…	now	 most	 of	 the	 traders	 in	 the	 shopping	 center	 are	 Buginesse	 and	Chinese.23	
                                                21	Interview	with	Anisa,	January	17,	2015.		22	Gotong	Royong	market	is	a	former	main	market	in	the	city	center,	and	is	not	longer	existent	 as	 it	 has	 been	 turned	 into	 a	modern	 shopping	 center	 called	Ambon	Plaza	 or	popularly	called	Amplaz	located	in	Sam	Ratulangi	street.	23	Interview	with	Alif,	April	19,	2015.	
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The	 reference	 in	 Alif’s	 statement	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 new	 competitors	 in	 the	trading	 activities	 points	 to	 the	 third	 factor	 that	 explains	 why	 engaging	 in	commerce	is	being	replaced	by	seeking	other	professions.	Today,	the	Hadrami	Arabs	 are	 confronted	 with	 fierce	 economic	 competitors,	 such	 as	 those	 of	Chinese,	Bugis,	Buton,	 Padang,	 and	merchants	 of	 Java	origin.	The	majority	 of	these	 new	 merchants	 came	 to	 Ambon	 in	 the	 1970s,	 especially	 after	 the	transmigration	 programme	 promoted	 by	 the	 Indonesian	 government.	 After	that,	many	migrants	both	 forcefully	and	voluntarily	 came	 to	Ambon	until	 the	outbreak	 of	 the	 1999-2002	 communal	 conflicts	 between	 Christians	 and	Muslims.	Some	locals	told	me	that	the	dominance	of	these	new	migrants	in	the	informal	 economic	 sector	 predates	 the	 conflicts,	 and	 has	 grown	 ever	 since.	During	my	fieldwork,	these	merchants	specialized	in	specific	commodities.	For	example,	the	Buginese	are	in	a	clothing	business;	the	Butonese	in	agricultural	cash	 crops,	 particularly	 fruit	 and	 vegetables;	 the	 Padang	 in	 restaurant	 food;	and	the	Javanese	in	ready	food	sold	on	wheels.	The	 decline	 of	 the	 Hadramis’	 interest	 in	 commercial	 activities	 is	 a	combination	 of	 all	 interrelated	 factors	 mentioned	 above.	 It	 has	 not	disappeared	 altogether,	 however;	 many	 Hadramis	 still	 engage	 in	 various	commercial	 activities	 operating,	 to	 some	 extent,	 in	 kinship-based	 economic	networks,	as	will	be	discussed	below.		
4.2 Commerce:	Kinship-Based	Economic	Networks		During	the	colonial	era	Hadrami	migrants	in	the	diaspora,	including	in	Maluku,	played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 economic	 activities,	 especially	 in	 trade	 and	shipping	 (Clarence-Smith	 1998).	 	 This	 also	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 in	many	 of	 the	family	 stories	my	 informants	 shared	with	me;	most	of	 them	stated	 that	 their	(fore)fathers	used	to	be	merchants,	often	without	specifying	what	they	traded.	Today,	 the	Hadrami	 descendants	 have	more	 various	 jobs	 and	 no	 longer	engage	predominantly	in	trade.	For	instance,	one	can	now	find	many	Hadramis	working	 in	 the	 service	 sector	 by	 opening	 advertising	 companies,	 travel	agencies,	restaurants,	and	hotels.	Many	of	those	still	 involved	in	trade	engage	mainly	in	intermediary	trading	activities	by	operating	small	and	medium	scale	shops.	They	purchase	and	sell	a	wide	range	of	different	commodities,	such	as	groceries,	 traditional	 snacks,	 staple	 foods,	 cloth,	 perfume,	 jewelry,	 cosmetics,	drugs,	 shoes,	 bags,	 construction	materials,	 electronic	 devices,	 and	 traditional	handcrafts.	The	commodities	they	trade	in	are,	in	fact,	sold	by	retailers	of	other	origins,	 such	 as	 Chinese,	 Buginese,	 Butonese,	 and	 others.	 This	 differs	considerably	 from	 Hadrami	 trading	 strategies	 in	 the	 past.	 For	 example,	Hisham,	 a	 sixty-seven-year-old	 non-Sada,	 recalled	 the	 following	 childhood	memory:		
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I	remember	around	the	1960s,	helping	my	grandfather	sell	clothes	when	I	was	kid…	In	the	1960s,	we	could	specify	what	the	Arabs	and	the	Chinese	traded.	 At	 that	 moment,	 the	 Arabs	 sold	 clothes,	 while	 the	 Chinese	 sold	staple	 foods.	 From	 the	 1980s	 onwards,	 this	 differentiation	 no	 longer	existed.	My	father	and	grandfather	were	cloth	merchants.24	Hisham’s	 recollections	 of	 Hadramis	 concentrating	 on	 specific	 commodities	during	 certain	 periods,	 and	 that	 the	 differentiation	 of	 commodities	 between	the	Hadramis	and	the	Chinese	traders	ended	before	the	1980s,	is	confirmed	in	Roy	 Ellen’s	 research	 on	 economic	 network	 in	 East	 Seram	 conducted	 around	the	same	period	(Ellen	2003).		
	Figure	3.3:	Making	Pearl	Handcraft	(photographed	by	the	author)		At	the	time	of	my	fieldwork,	many	shops	in	Kota	Ambon	owned	by	the	Arabs	were	 located	 in	 the	 city	 center	 and	 in	 the	 two	 main	 markets,	 Mardika	 and	Batumerah.	 In	 the	 city	 center,	 there	 were	 about	 thirty	 shops	 belonging	 to	Hadrami	 families,	 eight	 of	 which	 possessed	 by	 Sada	 families.	 Most	 of	 these	shops	 were	 family-run	 businesses.	 Many	 of	 them	 were	 inherited	 from	 one	generation	to	another,	while	others	were	newly	established.	Two	shops,	Zafaya	and	Biam,	for	example,	were	owned	by	two	brothers	of	a	Bamahri	family.	The	Zafaya	 shop	 sold	 all	 kinds	 of	 things,	 such	 as	 Muslim	 dress,	 cosmetica,	 soap,	perfume,	while	Biam	only	sold	cloth	especially	Muslim	dress.	Jamu	Nikmat	and	Hidayah	were	shops	run	by	a	Bakhmid	family,	specializing	in	traditional	snacks	
                                                24	Interview	with	Hisham,	November	14,	2014.		
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and	 cookies.	 Al-Hamid	 and	 Bin	 Shaikh	 Abu	 Bakr	 families	 were	 the	 main	perfume	 chain-shop	 owners;	 their	 shops	 called	 Dunia	 Parfum	 and	 Sumber	Wangi	were	scattered	around	several	areas	around	the	city	center.	Traditional	handicraft	makers	were	specialized	of	members	of	different	al-Saqqaf	families	of	Batumerah	(see	figure	3.3	above).		Some	 successful	 Hadrami	 families	 have	 been	 able	 to	 expand	 their	business	 from	 a	 one-sided	 focus	 on	 a	 specific	 product	 to	 other	 commercial	activities.	Among	these	successful	Hadrami	traders	was	a	Shaban	family,	who	run	the	Wayame	shop.	The	Shaban	family	not	only	trades	in	electronic	devices,	but	also	in	material	construction	and	real	estate,	besides	owning	a	minimarket	and	a	hotel.	The	success	of	the	family’s	commercial	activities	even	extends	into	the	educational	sector.	Similar	 to	 the	 Shaban	 family’s	 expanding	 economic	 activities,	 was	 a	commercial	enterprise	run	by	Ajib	(67	years	old)	from	a	non-Sada	family.	Ajib	was	 a	 construction	 businessman	 in	 Ambon.	 He	was	 architect	 and	 builder	 of	two	Islamic	buildings,	namely	a	four-storey	building	of	Darussalam	University,	and	of	an	old	building	of	the	main	mosque,	Al-Fatah,	 in	Ambon.	 	According	to	Ajib,	 he	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 learn	 from	 his	 father’s	 main	 commerce	 in	 a	construction	 material	 shop	 in	 Tual,	 and	 expanded	 his	 parents’	 business	 by	opening	a	construction	project	company.25	Significantly,	 the	 economic	 networks	 of	 Hadrami	 traders	 continue	 to	operate	on	a	kinship	based	mode.	For	example,	my	informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	 (see	 chapter	2	page	43),	 an	owner	of	 Salim	Shop	 in	Silale,	 told	me	how	his	business	operates:	I	 usually	 order	 perfumes	 every	month	 via	 phone	 calls.	 I	 order	 them	 in	Surabaya.	 I	 do	 not	 have	 to	 go	 there.	 I	 know	 the	 salesman	 through	 my	brother	in-law	and	my	family.	Sometimes	I	just	purchase	from	my	brother	in-law	here	if	he	still	has	much	in	stock.	As	for	clothes,	my	wife’s	business,	she	 purchased	 them	 from	Malang	 through	 her	 family…	 no,	 I	 did	 not	 go	myself	 because	 I	 just	 asked	 people	 that	 I	 have	 known	 very	 well	 in	 the	harbor	to	deliver	the	good.26	Similarly,	my	informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri	(see	page	54),	an	owner	of	a	shop	for	staple	foods	in	Batumerah,	told	me	about	his	business:		I	 asked	 my	 youngest	 son	 in	 Tual	 to	 operate	 this	 business.	 I	 purchased	honey	from	Yemen,	then	I	distributed	it	to	several	shops,	here	in	my	shop	(Ambon),	 in	 my	 son’s	 (in	 Tual),	 and	 in	 the	 shops	 of	 my	 relatives	 in	Jakarta…	oh	now	I	don’t	need	to	go	to	Yemen	to	purchase	it,	I	just	call	my	cousin,	a	son	of	my	step-sister	in	Bahere	Hadramaut.27	
                                                25	Interview	with	Ajib,	January	13,	2015.		26	Interview	with	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	January	2,	2015.		27	Interview	with	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	Januari	11,	2015	
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The	 two	statements	above	 illustrate	how	the	ways	some	Hadramis	engage	 in	commercial	 activities	 today	 are	 mediated	 by	 a	 modern	 means	 of	communication	that	has	facilitated	their	kinship-based	economic	networks.	By	the	 same	 token,	 some	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 today	 still	 operate	 their	 economic	networks	based	on	kinship	ties	with	other	Hadramis	in	other	diasporic	centers	of	Indonesia	and	in	their	forefathers’	homeland.			
4.3 Commerce:	Economic	and	Religious	Motives		The	decline	that	can	be	observed	in	commercial	activities	of	Hadramis	does	not	mean	 that	 the	 interest	 in	 commerce	has	disappeared	 altogether.	While	 some	do	 shift	 their	 interest,	 others	 are	 motivated	 to	 plunge	 into	 new	 commercial	activities	and	setting	up	new	enterprises.	For	example,	Fathur	 (33	years	old)	from	a	Sada	family,	set	up	an	advertising	agency	in	2010.	He	told	me	the	story	of	 how	 he	 ended	 up	 in	 the	 business	 when	 I	 visited	 him	 in	 his	 home	 on	November	4,	2014:		My	 father	worked	 in	 the	 flight	business,	and	 I	 followed	his	 trajectory	by	studying	 in	 a	 university	 majoring	 in	 flight	 management	 in	 Java.	 But	 I	realized	I	did	not	like	to	work	in	the	flight	business,	and	I	returned	here.	I	started	 this	 advertising	 company	 because	 I	 liked	 working	 with	 my	computer.	 When	 I	 came	 back	 here	 it	 was	 not	 easy	 to	 find	 an	 event	organizer	 specializing	 in	 advertisements	 in	 Ambon	 among	 the	 Muslim	community.	So	 far,	 I	have	received	orders	 from	people	organizing	music	concerts,	seminars,	or	conferences.	Like	Fathur,	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid	(33	years	old),	a	young	Sada	preacher	started	 a	 pilgrimage	 tour	 service	 in	 Ambon	 called	 ar-Rahmah	 in	 2010.	 Ar-Rahmah	 is	 both	 the	 name	 of	 his	 religious	 foundation,	 and	 the	 name	 of	 a	commercial	 enterprise	 established	by	Muhammad	Rifki	 al-Hamid.	One	 of	 the	ar-Rahmah’s	main	commercial	activities	is	offering	pilgrimage	tour	services	to	Mecca	 and	 to	 Hadramaut.	 This	 pilgrimage	 is	 arranged	 by	 several	 travel	agencies	 in	Ambon	and	other	areas	such	as	Java.	Ar-Rahmah	also	has	 its	own	shop,	 which	 sells	 products	 such	 as	 cosmetics,	 Muslim	 attire,	 and	 religious	booklets.	 This	 shop	 is	mainly	managed	 by	Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid’s	 wife	(see	figure	3.4).	At	the	time	of	my	fieldwork	in	2015,	the	couple	possessed	only	one	shop	located	in	Silale.	They	told	me	more	recently	that	they	have	decided	to	open	another	shop	in	the	shopping	mall	as	part	of	promoting	their	business	to	a	wider	circle,	especially	to	Muslims	from	the	middle-upper	class.		
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																													Figure	3.4:	the	ar-Rahmah	foundation’s	office	and	shop		(photographed	by	the	author)		Running	 pilgrimage	 tour	 services	 is	 not	 a	 new	 commercial	 activity	 for	 the	Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora;	 during	 the	 colonial	 era	 many	 Hadramis	 became	important	agents	for	the	pilgrimage	to	Mecca	(Freitag	2003,	226-227).	What	is	new	about	 today’s	pilgrimage	 tour	 services	 arranged	by	 the	Hadramis	 in	 the	diaspora	is	not	the	business	itself	but	the	expansion	to	include	other	routes	or	destinations	 in	 the	 pilgrimage	 tour	 package,	 most	 specifically	 journeys	 to	Hadramaut.	 Including	 visits	 to	Hadramaut	 in	 the	 pilgrimage	 tour	 business	 is	not	 merely	 an	 economic	 activity	 for	 the	 Hadramis,	 but	 it	 also	 signifies	 the	renewal	of	connections	between	 the	homeland	and	 the	old	diasporic	centers,	as	well	as	 the	revival	of	a	 (neo)	 traditionalist	movement	 in	 the	diaspora,	as	 I	will	demonstrate	in	chapter	6.	Comparing	their	commercial	activities,	Fathur	seems	to	be	motivated	by	economic	 reasons,	 while	 for	 Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 religious	 motives	predominate.	Yet,	commercial	activities	 like	those	of	Fathur	and	many	others	are	not	devoid	of	religious	motives.28	Many	of	my	informants	expressed	similar	views	on	their	engagement	in	commerce	by	stating	that	they	wanted	to	follow	the	path	of	the	Prophet	to	conduct	trade	for	a	living.	Some	added	that	they	had	opted	for	running	a	business	because	it	gave	them	control	over	their	own	time,	which	allowed	them	to	perform	their	daily	prayers.	
                                                28	Obviously,	vice	versa	the	pilgrimage	business	is	not	devoid	of	commercial	interests.	
Chapter	3:	A	Survey	of	the	Present-Day	Hadrami	Arab	Descendants	in	Ambon	
74		
The	diversity	 of	 economic	 activities,	 ranging	 from	 formal	 economic	 into	informal	 sectors	 nowadays	 shows	 the	 ability	 of	 the	Hadrami	 descendants	 to	adapt	 to	 the	 changing	 labor	market	 in	 society	and	 their	 capacity	 to	 integrate	into	the	local	economic	structure.	
4.4 Hadrami	Women	and	their	Participation	in	the	Workforce		Much	research	on	the	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora	specifically	focuses	on	the	role	of	 the	 male	 members	 in	 the	 economic	 sphere	 (Freitag	 and	 Clarence	 Smith	1997;	 Clarence-Smith	 1998;	 others).	 This	 raises	 the	 question	 concerning	women’s	 activities	 and	 gendered	 spatial	 practices	 in	 everyday	 life	 among	present-day	 Hadrami	 descendants.	 This	 section	 describes	 how	 Hadrami	women	in	Ambon	are	active	in	both	the	public	and	private	sphere.	Indonesian	 women’s	 participation	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 is	 shaped	 by	different	gender	orders	that	operate	side	by	side	in	Indonesia,	particularly	that	of	the	state,	local	regional	norms,	and	various	religions	(Robinson	2009).	As	a	consequence,	 in	 daily	 life	 Indonesians	 navigate	 and	 improvise	 upon	 various	systems	 that	 regulate	 the	gendered	use	of	 space.	 	Despite	a	 religious	 ideal	of	women’s	 seclusion	 in	 the	 homes,	 for	 example,	 in	 practice	 many	 women	participate	 in	 public	 spaces.	 They	 do	 so	 particularly	 in	 the	 economic	 sphere,	where	 many	 of	 them	 work	 either	 as	 main	 breadwinners	 or	 to	 support	 the	family	income	generated	by	their	male	kin.	The	2014	World	Bank’s	report	on	Indonesia	reveals	that	women’s	participation	in	the	formal	workforce	was	51,4	percent,	while	men’s	 reached	80	percent	 (see	Garcia	 et.al	 2015,	8).	Although	women	 are	 more	 generally	 active	 in	 services,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 health	 sector,	educational	 sector,	 social	 sector	 or	 as	 cleaners	 in	 restaurants,	 hotels	 and	private	homes,	quite	 a	number	of	women	are	 engaged	 in	 the	 industry	 sector	(Garcia	et.al	2015,	8).	On	an	ideological	level,	however,	many	Indonesians	still	locate	women	in	their	 traditional	 roles	 of	 housewives	 and	 mothers.	 Thus,	 many	 women	 face	double	 sets	 of	 responsibilities,	 by	 participating	 both	 in	 public	 arenas	 and	undertaking	 nearly	 all	 domestic	 roles.	 This	 general	 pattern,	 which	characterizes	 in	 Indonesia	 as	 a	 whole,	 can	 also	 be	 recognized	 on	 Ambon.	During	 the	 1999	 -	 2002	 communal	 conflicts,	 many	men	 lost	 their	 jobs,	 as	 a	consequence	of	which	many	women	were	forced	to	enter	the	economic	sphere	in	order	to	support	their	family	(Adam	2008;	Adam	and	Peilouw	2008).	I	have	come	across	quite	some	women	who	engage	in	economic	activities	while	at	the	same	 running	 the	 family	 home,	 since	 childcare	 and	 household	 chores	 are	considered	the	exclusive	responsibility	of	women.	Of	the	Hadrami	women	I	interviewed,	many	of	them	work	either	inside	or	outside	the	home.	These	women	can	be	found	working	in	the	same	economic	sectors	 as	 their	 husbands	 or	 brothers.	 Most	 women	 who	 work	 outside	 the	
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home	 are	workers	 in	 the	 public	 sector,	 either	 in	 state	 or	 private	 companies,	while	 most	 home-based	 workers	 are	 independent	 entrepreneurs,	 who,	 for	example,	have	opened	shops	in	their	own	houses.		Although	the	Hadrami	women	of	Ambon	are	part	of	the	wider	society	of	Ambon	and	Indonesia	in	general,	in	practice	their	access	to	and	engagement	in	the	 public	 arena	 may	 vary	 from	 other	 groups	 and,	 of	 course,	 also	 between	different	 individual	 families.	Such	differences	are	not	 in	 the	 last	place	related	to	how	family	members	are	brought	up	with	a	specific	set	of	values	and	norms.	Some	women	come	from	conservative	families,	while	others	have	more	liberal	views.	Some	are	from	well-to-do	families,	while	others	are	from	poor	families	and	are	obliged	to	find	a	job	to	support	their	family.	Engagement	in	the	public	arena	thus	depends	on	a	configuration	of	relations	between	economic,	social,	and	cultural	capital.	How	 this	 may	 work	 out	 in	 practice	 can	 be	 illustrated	 by	 taking	 the	example	of	Fariha,	who	was	65	years	old	when	I	met	her.		Fariha	belongs	to	a	non-Sada	 family	 and	 is	 one	 of	 the	 few	 medical	 doctors	 in	 the	 Hadrami	community.	She	received	her	medical	 training	at	a	university	outside	Ambon.	Her	husband,	who	is	from	a	Bahalwan	family,	has	the	same	profession	as	she.	Fariha’s	parents	were	among	the	rich	merchants	in	Ambon.	The	record	of	her	family’s	 success	 starts	 with	 her	 grandfather,	 who	 was	 not	 only	 a	 successful	merchant	 but	 also	 occupied	 an	 influential	 political	 position	 as	 the	 first	 Arab	leader	or	kapitein	for	the	Arab	community	of	Ambon.	This	leadership	position	was	 appointed	 by	 the	 Dutch	 authorities	 during	 the	 colonial	 era.	 In	 my	interview	with	 Fariha,	 she	 expressed	 her	 gratitude	 to	 her	 family	 and	 stated	that	 she	 had	 been	 blessed	 with	 open-minded	 parents	 who	 had	 encouraged	their	 daughter	 to	 obtain	 a	 good	 education.29	Her	 engagement	 in	 the	 public	sphere	is	thus	a	result	of	her	access	to	modern	education,	matched	by	financial	and	mental	support	from	her	parents.	Not	 all	 parents	 share	 the	 attitude	 of	 Fariha’s	 parents.	 There	 are	 many	different	views	on	the	participation	of	Hadrami	women	in	Ambon	in	the	public	sphere.	In	our	discussions	about	these	matters,	some	women	stated	that	they	enjoyed	 freedom	and	 independency,	while	others	spoke	 in	 terms	of	women’s	fate	 and	 traditional	 roles.	 	 Rahma,	 for	 example,	 a	 fifty-four-year-old	 woman	from	a	Sada	family,	is	a	lecturer	in	the	social-political	department	in	Pattimura	University.	She	reflected	on	her	position	as	follows:			I	am	very	thankful	of	my	position	now.	I	know	that	many	women	from	my	community	 (Sada)	 on	 Java	 could	 not	 enjoy	 as	 much	 freedom	 as	 I	 have	here.	Many	of	them	married	at	a	very	young	age.	Look,	I	graduated	from	a	university,	and	I	also	have	a	good	 job…I	don’t	 feel	 that	 I	need	to	restrict	
                                                29	Interview	with	Fariha,	December	20,	2014.		
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myself	here.	I	make	many	friends	with	different	kinds	of	people,	not	only	my	own	group.30	To	 be	 sure,	 there	 are	 Sada	 women	 in	 Java	 who	 work	 in	 the	 public	 sector.31	Rahma’s	 reference	 to	 the	 social	 restrictions	 that	 female	 members	 of	 Sada	families	face	on	Java	therefore	reflects	her	own	memories	of	the	time	that	she	used	to	live	in	Java.	I	did	not	ask,	but	it	could	well	be	that	Rahma’s	relative,	like	many	Arabs	 on	 Java	 still	 do,	 live	 in	 special	 quarters.	 Rahma’s	 statement	 also	implies	that	many	parents	from	Sada	families	in	Java	impose	social	restrictions	on	 their	 daughters	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 them	 from	 deviating	 from	 the	 parents’	traditions.	Someone	with	a	similar	feminist	point	of	view	as	Rahma’s	is	Rafa,	a	thirty-three-year-old	Sada	woman.	 	At	the	time	of	my	fieldwork,	Rafa	studied	at	the	Pattimura	University.	She	is	one	of	the	rare	Hadramis	who	decided	to	pursue	a	career	in	journalism.	Note	the	challenging,	if	not	defensive	note	in	Rafa’s	story	about	her	exceptional	choice:		I	feel	free	to	choose	what	I	want	to	be.	You	know,	I	am	from	a	Sada	family	but	my	family	cannot	dictate	me	to	be	what	I	do	not	want.	 I	know	many	families	from	my	community	(Sada)	who	are	very	conservative,	even	my	own	 family	 (from	 father’s	 side)…well,	 with	 my	 career,	 I	 get	 to	 know	different	people,	different	cases,	including	horrible	events	like	the	recent	conflicts.	I	also	often	get	home	very	late.	In	fact,	I	engage	with	more	men	than	women.	But	that	is	the	consequence	with	this	job.32	Rafa’s	 statement	 illustrates	 how	 a	 certain	 occupation	 available	 in	 the	 labor	market	 may	 not	 only	 broaden	 social	 networks	 but	 may	 also	 help	 to	 break	social	 restrictions	 in	 conservative	 families,	 a	 challenge	which,	 as	Rafa’s	 story	appears	to	suggest,	one	must	be	strong	to	take	on.	While	in	Rafa’s	case	it	was	obviously	the	profession	itself	that	appealed	to	her,	 for	 many	 other	 Hadrami	 women	 occupational	 choices	 are	 first	 and	foremost	related	to	the	need	to	raise	money,	either	to	support	their	family,	or	in	 order	 not	 to	 depend	 on	 family	 support.	 For	 instance,	when	 I	met	 a	 forty-eight-year-old	non-Sada,	Jasmin,	she	told	me	the	following:		I	visit	my	family	here,	actually	I	work	in	Bula	(East	Seram).	I	tried	to	get	a	position	here	(Ambon),	but	I	did	not	succeed.	I	am	lucky	anyhow	to	work	as	a	civil	servant.	When	I	am	retired,	I	will	get	a	pension.	So	I	do	not	have	
                                                30	Interview	with	Rahma,	December	7,	2014.		31	Yasmine	Zaki	Shahab,	for	example,	analyzed	how	many	Sada	women	in	Jakarta	were	well	educated	and	had	an	opportunity	to	engage	in	the	public	arenas	(Shahab	2005a).	The	 author	 (Shahab)	 herself	 is	 a	 Sada	 descendant	 and	 has	 a	 professional	 career	 in	academia.		32	Interview	with	Rafa,	September	13,	2014.	
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to	worry	about	anything	when	I	am	old,	nor	will	I	have	to	depend	on	my	children’s	help.33	The	 statement	 above	 reflects	 how	 the	 opportunities	 that	 modern	 economic	structures	 offer	 can	 change	 the	 relations	 between	 family	members,	 bringing	about	new	views	on	the	merits	or	need	of	economic	independence	for	women.	While	 the	 women	 whose	 career	 choices	 were	 discussed	 so	 far	 present	themselves	 mostly	 in	 terms	 of	 being	 agents	 of	 change	 themselves,	 not	 all	women	with	whom	I	discussed	their	jobs	talked	about	them	in	terms	of	having	made	 a	 voluntary	 choice.	 	 Some	women	 reported	 social	 pressure	 from	 their	husband’s	 family	 to	participate	 in	 the	economic	 life	of	 the	 family.	This	seems	particularly	the	case	when	they	have	married	up,	 that	 is,	 if	 the	status	of	their	parental	 family	 is	 lower	 than	 that	of	 their	husband’s,	which	 is	often	 the	case.		Also,	the	pressure	tends	to	be	much	higher	in	patrilocal	families,	where	wives	live	 with	 or	 nearby	 their	 in-laws,	 and	 far	 away	 from	 their	 parents’	 family.	Thirty-eight-years-old	Naura,	for	instance,	confided	to	me:				To	 be	 honest	 with	 you,	 I	 prefer	 taking	 care	 of	 my	 children	 to	 working	outside	 the	 home.	 I	 have	 five	 kids	 now.	 Because	 I	 work,	 I	 employ	 a	domestic	 assistant.	 In	 Java,	 we	 may	 choose	 to	 be	 at	 home.	 But	 my	husband’s	family	did	not	consider	that	a	good	option.	The	main	reason	for	this	 is	 that	 I	 have	 a	 degree	 from	 abroad	 (Master	 in	 Islamic	 studies	 in	Pakistan,	Istiqomah)	and	many	of	my	husband’s	sisters	and	cousins	work	in	 government	 offices.	 My	 husband’s	 family	 thought	 I	 should	 share	 my	knowledge	 to	 others	 as	 having	 a	 job	 outside,	 preferably	 one	 in	 the	government,	 which	 is	 honourable.	 Fortunately,	 I	 could	 apply	 a	 job	 in	 a	university	here…yeah,	with	a	help	of	my	husband.34	Naura	herself	is	of	non-Sada	origin.	She	was	born	in	Jakarta	where	her	parents	still	 lived	 at	 the	 time	 that	 she	 shared	 her	 story	 with	 me.	 Marrying	 into	 her	husband’s	family,	she	had	to	adapt	to	their	views	and	practices	as	well	as	those	that	 characterize	 Ambon’s	 broader	 society.	 The	 kind	 of	 tension	with	 in-laws	that	 Naura	 alluded	 to	 in	 her	 story,	 I	 also	 observed	 in	 other	 cases	 in	 which	lower	status	women	married	into	Sada	families.		Contrary	 to	 Naura’s	 case,	 living	 up	 to	 high	 status	 family	 standards	 can	also	 mean	 that	 wives	 are	 expected	 to	 stay	 at	 home	 rather	 than	 seek	 a	 job.	Lubna	Mauladawilah,	a	twenty-eight-years-old	woman	from	a	Sada	family,	told	me	 that	 she	 did	 not	 find	 it	 very	 difficult	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 wishes	 of	 her	husband’s	 family.	 	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 a	 ring	 of	 pride	 in	 the	way	 she	 expressed	agreement	with	their	more	traditional	view	on	gender	relation	roles:		I	 want	 to	 serve	my	 husband	 and	 future	 kids.	 …well,	 in	 the	 beginning,	 I	considered	taking	a	job	in	the	government,	but	my	husband	did	not	allow	
                                                33	Interview	with	Jasmin,	May	23,	2015.	34	Interview	with	Naura,	January	15,	2015.		
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me.	So,	 I	should	respect	and	obey	him.	As	a	married	woman,	 I	no	 longer	belong	 to	 my	 parents	 or	 myself	 but	 to	 my	 husband.	 Whenever	 I	 go	outside,	I	should	ask	his	permission.	This	is	women’s	destiny,	and	that	is	what	 the	 religion	asks	us	 to	do.	 I	 can	still	work	now,	even	at	home,	as	 I	and	my	husband	started	to	open	a	shop	a	few	years	ago.35	Arguing	from	a	religious	point	of	view,	Lubna	Mauladawilah	who	is	married	to	the	 founder	 of	 the	 ar-Rahmah	 (see	 pages	 72-73)	 presents	 traditional	 gender	roles	 in	 a	 positive	 light	 in	 the	 above	 quotation.	 She	 has	 found	 a	 satisfactory	compromise	by	taking	on	a	home-based	job	which	allows	her	to	contribute	to	her	 family’s	 income,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 living	 up	 to	 expectations	 of	women’s	 responsibilities	 in	 the	 domestic	 sphere.	 During	 my	 fieldwork	 in	Ambon,	 Mauladawilah	 spent	 almost	 2	 years	 in	 Hadramaut	 for	 a	 religious	training,	which	proved	to	be	a	transformative	experience	for	her	(see	further	chapter	6	pages	236-237).	After	she	came	back	to	Ambon	I	noted,	for	instance,	that	 her	 view	 on	 traditional	 gender	 roles	 had	 become	 stronger.	 She	 also	changed	 the	way	 she	 looks	 and	 now	wears	 a	 complete	 black	niqab	 in	 public	spaces.	 Also,	 she	 tries	 to	 restrict	 her	 social	 interaction	 with	 men.	 She	 does,	however,	still	run	the	 family’s	home-based	shop.	Mauladawilah’s	engagement	with	 the	modern	economic	 sphere	 reflects	how	views	on	 ‘traditional’	 gender	roles	should	not	necessarily	be	perceived	in	terms	of	a	rigid	division	between	men	 generating	 incomes	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 and	women	 taking	 care	 of	 the	domestic	sphere.		Even	in	the	views	of	many	conservative	families	women	can	engage	 in	 income	 generating	 activities,	 as	 long	 as	 they	 operate	 in	 gender	segregated	public	spaces.	Few	families	hold	as	conservative	views	on	gendered	division	of	roles	as	those	 expressed	 by	 Lubna	 Mauladawilah	 here	 above.	 Indeed,	 many	 women	who	participate	in	the	economic	sphere	do	not	seem	to	ponder	on	the	issue	if	doing	so	compromises	traditional	gender	roles.	Also,	it	struck	me	that	although	having	 responsibilities	 both	 in	 domestic	 and	 public	 spaces	 can	 be	 quite	demanding,	most	women	do	not	 talk	about	a	 ‘double	burden’	 in	 the	way	that	women	 in	western	 Europe	 often	 discuss	 the	 challenge	 of	 balancing	 a	 career	and	running	a	 family.	Obviously,	having	a	domestic	worker	at	home,	which	is	quite	common	on	Ambon	and	Indonesia	in	general,	can	make	a	big	difference.	I	noted	 that	many	Hadrami	women	who	worked	 outside	 the	 home,	 especially	those	who	had	 full	 time	 jobs,	employed	domestic	workers	 to	 take	care	of	 the	children	 and	 do	 household	 chores.	 Some	 domestic	 workers	 live	 together	 in	their	employer’s	house,	while	others	only	come	in	for	work.	Those	who	live	in	are	 mostly	 related	 to	 the	 family,	 such	 as	 members	 from	 distant,	 poorer	relatives.	
                                                35	Interview	with	Lubna	Mauladawilah,	January	3,	2015.		
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Although	most	household	chores	are	done	by	such	domestic	workers,	the	way	these	women	perform	their	jobs	is	dictated	by	their	female	employer.	The	position	of	domestic	workers	are,	thus,	an	extension	of	traditional	gender	roles	undertaken	 by	 modern	 women,	 including	 Hadramis,	 who	 participate	 in	 the	wider	economic	structure	of	Ambon	in	a	contemporary	era.	On	the	basis	of	my	observations	on	and	the	stories	aforementioned	above,	there	 is	 no	 clear	 distinction	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 groups	 in	 the	women’s	participation	 in	the	workplace	 in	Ambon.	Women	from	both	groups	have	 similar	motivations	 to	participate	 in	 the	workplace.	These	motives	may	be	 related	 to	 economic	 factors,	 such	 as	 to	 contributing	 to	 an	 otherwise	unsufficient	 family	 income	 or	 realizing	 a	 higher	 standard	 of	 living.	 Socio-cultural	 factors,	 however,	 such	 as	 seeking	 self-realization	 and	 independence	may	 also	 play	 a	 role.	 Furthermore,	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 groups	 show	resemblances	 in	 their	 diversity	 of	 views	 concerning	 gender	 relations,	 some	expressing	 conservative	 views,	 while	 others	 taking	 a	 liberal	 stance.	 This	diversity	 is	 in	 some	 respect	 linked	 to	 one’s	 socio-cultural	milieu	 in	 terms	 of	family	 upbringing,	 social	 network,	 education,	 religious	 understanding	 and	 so	on.	By	extension,	both	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	have	been	able	 to	adapt	 to	the	local	structure	of	Ambonese	society	in	relation	to	changing	socio-economic	configurations,	 in	 which	 contemporary	 women	 may	 have	 opportunities	 for	self-realization	in	the	public	place.	The	participation	of	Hadrami	women	in	the	workplace	 is	 thus	not	 specifically	 linked	 to	 their	group	 identities	as	Hadrami	Arab	 descendants,	 nor	 did	 I	 notice	 any	 significant	 internal	 differentiations	between	Sada	and	non-Sada.	The	 discussion	 of	 the	 stories	 some	 of	 individual	 present-day	 female	descendants	of	Hadrami	migrants	 to	Ambon	 in	 this	section	demonstrates	 the	importance	 of	 adopting	 the	 intersectionality	 approach	 that	 feminist	 scholars	like	Floya	Anthias	and	Nira	Yuval-Davis	(1983;	1992;	2011)	propose	to	study	diasporic	identity	making.	The	above	examples	shed	light	on	how	the	specific	interplay	of	power	 relations	 related	 to	 social	 categories	of	 ethnicity,	 religion,	gender	 and	 class	 shape	 the	 aspirations	 of	 individual	 present-day	 Hadrami	women	 and	 the	 options	 available	 to	 them.	 	 The	 stories	 also	 point	 to	 the	importance	of	taking	the	wider	historical	and	translocal	contexts	into	account.	The	1999-2002	communal	conflicts	and	subsequent	resettlement	policies	have	had	different	 implications	 for	male	and	 female	Hadramis	 in	Ambon.	Also,	 the	ways	 that	 networks	 between	 diasporic	 Hadrami	 families	 living	 in	 different	areas	 are	 drawn	 on	 or	 developed	 create	 different	 situations	 for	 different	categories	of	women.	As	Lubna	Mauladawilah’s	story	 illustrates,	 the	renewed	translocal	 contacts	 of	 diasporic	 Hadramis	 with	 Hadramaut	 are	 yet	 another	factor	 that	 creates	 new	 opportunities	 for	women	 to	 develop	 themselves	 and	new	 views	 on	 gender	 relations.	 A	 discussion	 of	 translocal	 and	 transnational	
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relations	will	 recur	 in	 the	 next	 section,	which	 focuses	 on	 the	 engagement	 of	present-day	Hadramis	in	politics.			
5. Political	Engagement	
Taking	 involvement	 in	 local	politics	as	a	point	of	departure	 to	study	present-day	Hadrami	engagement	with	 a	broader	 local	 society,	 this	 section	examines	the	participation	of	Hadramis	in	Ambon	in	local	political	parties.	In	particular,	I	will	discuss	how	they	use	political	participation	as	a	means	to	seek	power	and	influence	 in	 the	 local	 society.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 their	 success	 in	 this	 regard	depends	 to	 a	 considerable	 extent	 on	 skills	 to	 adapt	 to	 changing	 political	contexts.	The	Hadramis	have	no	unified	political	 identity.	The	heterogeneous	character	 of	 diasporic	 Hadrami	 communities	 also	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 their	having	 different	 political	 affiliations.	 The	 multiplicity	 of	 political	 identities	among	Hadramis	shows	their	adaptability	 to	 local	politics	and	their	ability	 to	seek	legitimate	power	and	influence	through	different	political	vehicles.				
5.1 The	 Politics	 of	 Hadramis	 in	 Indonesia:	 Adaptability	 and	
Heterogeneity		The	 engagement	 of	 Hadramis	 in	 Indonesian	 politics	 started	 as	 early	 as	 the	establishment	of	modern	Indonesian	nationalist	organizations	in	the	beginning	of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 Around	 this	 period,	 some	 Hadramis	 joined	 an	organization	 called	 Sarekat	 Islam	 (SI),	 Islamic	 Union.	 The	 Sarekat	 Islam	was	founded	by	a	group	of	 former	Javanese	batik	traders	 in	the	Dutch	East	Indies	around	 1911/1912	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 empower	 local	 Muslim	 merchants,	especially	 in	 the	 Batik	 industry,	 and	 to	 promote	 Islamic	 modernism.	 It	 first	started	 as	 a	 social	 organization	 and	 later	 developed	 a	 political	 party	 and	became	 the	 first	 Islamic	 party	 in	 1921	 (Noer	 1973).	 Other	 Hadramis	 had	different	 affiliations.	 In	 the	 later	 period	 of	 overt	 struggle	 for	 Indonesia’s	independence,	 the	 political	 divide	 among	 Hadramis	 was	 more	 obvious.	 This	political	divide	centered	around	the	issue	of	a		‘homeland’	and	political	loyalty.		The	 struggle	 reached	 a	 peak	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Persatuan	 Arab	Indonesia,	the	Indonesia	Arab	Union	(PAI),	 in	the	mid-1930s.	The	PAI	was	an	organization	 set	 up	 by	 Hadramis	 born	 in	 Indonesia	 as	 a	 means	 to	 seek	recognition	 within	 Indonesian	 politics.	 	 The	 journalist	 Abdurrahman	Baswedan	became	PAI’s	 leader.36	Another	 central	 figure	 in	 the	 establishment	
                                                36	One	of	the	Abdurrahman	Baswedan’s	grand	children	called	Anies	Baswedan,	former	rector	 of	 Paramadina	 University	 of	 Jakarta,	 is	 currently	 active	 in	 local	 politics.	 Anies	Baswedan	has	become	governor	of	Jakarta	from	2017	up	to	present	after	defeating	the	other	 incumbent	 candidate,	 Basuki	 Cahaya	 Purnama,	 who	 is	 Christian	 from	 Chinese	descent,	 in	 the	2017	governor	election.	The	2017	governor	election	of	 Jakarta	gained	
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of	 PAI	 was	 a	 Hadrami	 from	 Ambon,	 named	 Muhammad	 Alamudi	 	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999,128-145).		Since	 gaining	 independence	 in	 1945,	 Indonesia	 has	 gone	 through	enormous	 political	 changes	 and	 shifts	 in	 state	 regimes.	 The	 historical	developments	 of	 Indonesia’s	 post-independence	 politics	 are	 categorized	 by	distinguishing	three	orders:	the	Old	Order	(1945-1968),	the	New	Order	(1966-1998),	 and	 the	 Reform	 Era	 (1998-	 at	 present).	 These	 three	 regimes	 have	different	political	systems,	ranging	from	authoritarian	to	democratic	systems.	Some	political	parties	were	active	throughout	all	three	regimes	and	were	used	to	 justify	 the	existing	 regime	and	 to	 accommodate	other	parties.	 	 Indonesian	citizens,	 thus,	 have	 always	 been	 mobilized	 for	 and	 integrated	 into	 changing	political	 systems.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 Indonesians	 have	 learned	 to	 live	with	 a	political	 divide	 between	 the	 elite	 and	 the	 mass	 population.	 Also,	 shifting	allegiance	from	one	party	to	another	is	considered	acceptable	behaviour.	Unfortunately,	Hadrami	participation	in	the	political	constellations	during	the	 three	 subsequent	 post-independence	 periods	 has	 not	 been	 studied	systematically.	Therefore,	to	understand	the	political	engagement	of	Hadramis	on	 the	 local	 scale	 of	 politics	 of	 Ambon,	 apart	 from	 a	 few	historical	 studies,	 I	must	rely	on	the	stories	of	my	informants.		
5.2 The	Hadramis	and	Politics	in	Ambon	Upon	Indonesia’s	independence,	the	majority	of	Hadramis	adopted	Indonesian	citizenship.	 The	 period	 during	 and	 immediately	 after	 the	 struggle	 for	Indonesian	independence	(1945-1949)	was	a	critical	period	for	local	politics	in	Ambon	 in	 particular	 and	 the	Maluku	 in	 general.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	Ambon	was	 one	 of	 the	 few	 regions	 in	 Indonesia	where	 local	 Dutch	 loyalists	were	 present.	 The	 Ambonese	 people	 were	 divided	 into	 two	 major	 factions;	those	loyal	to	the	Dutch	and	those	loyal	to	Indonesia’s	independence	fighters.	This	 divide	 ran	 predominantly	 along	 religious	 lines;	 Ambonese	 Christians	supported	 the	 Dutch,	 while	 the	 alliances	 of	 Muslims	 were	 with	 those	 who	struggled	 for	 Indonesia’s	 independence.	 	 In	Maluku,	 these	 two	 factions	were	represented	by	two	local	parties;	the	Republik	Maluku	Selatan	(the	Republic	of	South	Maluku,	 RMS)	 established	 on	 April	 25	 1950,	 and	 the	 Partai	 Indonesia	Maluku	(Indonesian	Maluku	Party,	PIM)	established	August	17,	1946.	The	RMS	
                                                                                                             much	attention	from	social	and	mass	media	(both	national	and	international)	because	of	several	Muslim	mass	protests	and	rallies	in	Jakarta	against	the	incumbent	Christian	governor.	These	mass	protests	demanded	the	 incumbent	governor	 to	be	arrested	and	put	 in	 jail	 because	 they	 accused	 him	 to	 have	 insulted	 Islam	 in	 one	 of	 his	 official	speeches	(see	Tehusijarana	2018).	
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aimed	 at	 establishing	 an	 independent	 state	 of	 South	 Maluku,	 while	 the	 PIM	wanted	Ambon	to	become	part	of	the	Republic	of	Indonesia.37			While	most	Hadramis	supported	the	PIM,	some	joined	the	RMS,	as	several	of	 my	 informants	 told	 me.	 The	 PIM	 was	 launched	 on	 August	 17,	 1946.	 The	board	of	the	party	consisted	of	eleven	members,	nine	of	whom	Christian,	two	Muslim.	 The	 surname	 of	 one	 of	 the	 two	 Muslim	 PIM	 board	 members	 was	‘Ambon’.38	Other	 influential	 Muslims	 that	 were	 active	 were,	 amongst	 others,	Hasan	 Bin	 Tahir	 and	 Said	 Bakhmid.	 The	 former	 was	 considered	 one	 of	 the	radical	activists	of	the	PIM,	and	the	latter	was	one	of	the	board	members	in	the	Badan	 Penolong	 RI	 Yogya,	 the	 committee	 of	 Indonesian	 State	 Aid	 that	 was	founded	 by	 the	 PIM	 leader	 (Pattikayhatu	 1991,	 50-71).	 According	 to	 Hadi	Basalamah,	a	sixty-nine-year-old	non-Sada	descendant	and	former	 lecturer	at	the	 IAIN,	 the	 family	name	of	 ‘Ambon’	was	originally	 an	Arab	 clan	which	was	transformed	into	a	 local	clan	 in	order	to	be	assimilated	 into	the	 local	society.	Basalamah	could	not	tell	me	the	original	Arab	name	for	the	‘Ambon	clan’.39	Should	Basalamah’s	 claim	be	 right,	H.	Ambon,	 one	of	 the	PIM	members,	was	an	Arab	descendant.	 	When	 I	 talked	 to	members	of	 the	Bin	Tahir	 family,	however,	 none	 of	 them	 knew	 about	 the	 above	 mentioned	 Hasan	 Bin	 Tahir,	although	 his	 surname	 indicates	 that	 he	 was	 from	 an	 Arab	 clan.	 An	 Arab	descendant	that	some	informants	did	mention	as	being	active	in	the	PIM	was	Said	Bakhmid.	My	informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri	(see	page	54)	is	a	nephew	of	Said	Bakhmid.	 He	 pointed	 out	 that	 his	 uncle	 was	 a	 political	 activist	 who	 fled	 to	Surabaya	 and	 died	 there.	 Al-Kathiri	 further	 said	 that	 Said	 Bahkmid’s	engagement	in	the	PIM	made	him	a	target	of	attacks	from	the	other	party	who	disliked	his	activism.	It	must	be	said,	however,	 that	even	the	relatives	of	Said	Bakhmid,	especially	Said	Bakhmid’s	daughter	whom	I	met	in	Jakarta,	have	only	very	limited	information	about	Bakhmid’s	political	activism.40	In	this	regard,	it	seems	that	most	Hadrami	descendants	today	have	very	little	knowledge	about	the	political	engagement	of	their	forefathers	in	Ambon.		
	
5.2.1 The	Period	of	Stability	(1950-1966)		After	 the	 revolutionary	 era	 that	 culminated	 in	 Indonesia’s	 independence	 in	1945,	 all	 political	 parties	 were	 nationalist	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 presented	themselves	as	serving	the	interests	of	the	Indonesian	state	first	and	foremost.	During	the	 last	 term	of	president	Sukarno	(1955-1966),	a	multi-party	system	
                                                37	The	divisive	 loyalties	based	on	religious	 lines	are	not	absolute,	as	 there	were	some	Muslims	joining	the	RMS,	and	some	Christians	joining	the	PIM	(see	Chauvel	1990).	38	They	 were	 E.Urbanus	 Pupellu,	 Y.	 Rehatta,	 Manuhuttu,	 Yan	 Taule,	 Tahitu,	 Wim	Reawaru,	 O.T.	 Pattiwaru,	 Hamid	 bin	 Hamid,	 and	 H.	 Ambon.	 Hamid	 bin	 Hamid	 and	 H	(Pattikayhatu	1991,	34).		39	Interview	with	Hadi	Basalamah,	December	14,	2014.	40	Interview	with	Tata,	January	12,	2015.		
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was	 adopted.	 Many	 parties	 were	 founded,	 ranging	 from	 secular	 to	 Islamic	parties.41 	One	 of	 the	 important	 parties	 that	 represented	 the	 interests	 of	Muslims	was	the	Majelis	Syuro	Muslimin	Indonesia	or	Masyumi	(Consultative	Council	 of	 Indonesian	 Muslims),	 which	 had	 been	 founded	 on	 November	 7,	1945.	 Initially	 it	 accommodated	 both	 modernist	 and	 traditionalist	 religious	organizations,	 mainly	 represented	 by	 the	 Muhammadiyah42	and	 Nahdlatul	Ulama	 (NU)43	respectively.	Later,	 the	NU	decided	 to	 leave	and	 set	up	 its	own	party	 to	 compete	 in	 the	 general	 election	 of	 1955	 with	 the	 Masyumi.	 The	Masyumi	was	 the	 biggest	 Islamic	 political	 party	 during	 this	 period.	 It	 ended	second	in	the	1955	election	right	behind	a	secular	party	called	PNI,	Indonesian	Nationalist	Party	(Noer	1973).	Some	 informants	 informed	 me	 that	 their	 fathers	 had	 been	 actively	involved	 in	 the	Masyumi,	while	 the	 fathers	 of	 others	were	 affiliated	 to	 other	parties,	such	as	the	NU.	Gaia,	a	non-Sada	Hadrami	of	68	years	old,	for	example,	stated:	My	father	was	involved	in	the	Masyumi.	He	was	the	party	secretary.	It	was	a	 good	party	because	 it	 really	 struggled	 for	 the	benefit	 of	 Islam.	But	we	cannot	find	this	kind	of	party	anymore	now.	All	of	the	parties	collaborate	with	 them	 (infidels,	 Istiqomah)	 even	 the	 so-called	 PKS	 (Partai	 Keadilan	Sejahtera,	 the	 Prosperous	 Justice	 Party) 44 	that	 claimed	 to	 be	representative	of	Muslim	community.45		








5.2.3 The	Period	of	Reform	(1998-now)		Since	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 New	Order	 in	 1998,	 Indonesia	 has	 entered	what	 is	called	a	reform	era.	The	emergence	of	the	reform	era	is	marked	by	changes	in	the	state’s	policy	concerning	people’s	political	participation	in	the	election,	and	by	a	return	to	a	multi-party	system.		Therefore,	 nowadays	 many	 political	 parties	 are	 able	 to	 take	 part	 in	parliamentary	elections:	48	 in	1999,	24	 in	2004,	and	38	 in	2014.	The	parties	have	 diverse	 outlooks,	 ranging	 from	 secular	 to	 religious	 ideologies.	 These	parties	 comprise	 three	 older	 parties,	 such	 as	 Golkar,	 PDI	 (which	 then	 has	become	 PDI-P,	 Indonesian	 Democratic	 Party-Struggle),	 and	 PPP,	 and	 newer	parties,	 such	 as	Demokrat	 (Democratic	Party),	Nasdem	 (National	Democratic	Party),	 Gerindra	 (Great	 Indonesia	 Movement	 Party),	 Hanura	 (People’s	Conscience	Party),	PKB	(National	Awakening	Party),	PAN	(National	Awakening	Party),	and	PKS	(Prosperous	Justice	Party).46		
Table	3.1:	Arab	Politicians	PARTIES	 SADA	 NON-SADA	GOLKAR	 Said	Assagaf		Abdurrahman	Assagaf	Muhammad	Assagaf	 Husain	Attamimy	PKS	 Said	Muzakir	Assagaf	Said	Azhar	Bin	Tahir	 Fahri	al-Kathiri	Saiful	Ali	al-Maskati	Ahmad	Bahwereis	PPP	 -	 Naser	Jamal	Bin	Talib	Ahmad	Ba’adilla	PKB	 -	 Usman	Attamimy	PAN	 -	 Vidad	Bahwerais	PBR-HANURA	 -	 Uceng	Mardas	DEMOKRAT	 Rahman	Bin	Tahir	 -	GERINDRA	 Mardas	al-Hamid	 -		Today,	many	Hadramis	are	affiliated	with	political	parties,	be	 they	secular	or	Islamic-based.	 Some	 even	 occupy	 important	 positions	 as	 table	 3.1	 shows.	However,	 many	 others	 are	 only	 passive	 members	 or	 supporters	 of	 certain	
                                                46	Among	 the	 secular	parties	are	Golkar,	PDI-P,	Demokrat,	Nasdem,	Gerindra,	Hanura,	while	 the	 Islamic	 parties	 are	 PPP,	 PKB,	 PAN,	 and	 PKS.	 Although	 each	 Islamic	 party	presents	 itself	 as	 an	 Islamic	 party,	 the	 PPP,	 PKB,	 PAN,	 and	 PKS	 have	 different	major	followers.	The	first	two	parties	(PPP	and	PKB)	are	dominated	by	those	of	traditionalist	orientation,	 while	 the	 last	 two	 parties	 have	 major	 followers	 from	 reformist	 Muslim	groups	 (see	 further	 Bulkin	 2013).	http://carniegeendowment.org/2013/10/24/Indonesia-s-political-parties-pub-53414.	Accessed		August	16,	2015.		
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parties.	Some	of	those	who	engage	in	politics	seem	to	be	loyal	to	one	party,	but	others	 change	 their	 loyalty	 from	 one	 party	 to	 another,	 sometimes	 switching	from	a	religious	to	a	secular	party	or	the	other	way	around.		If	we	 look	at	 the	 figures	of	 the	provincial	parliament	 seats	of	Maluku	 in	the	2009	election,	 the	PKS,	as	a	new	Islamic	party,	reached	the	fourth	 largest	number	 of	 seats,	 preceded	 by	 secular	 parties	 such	 as	 PDI-P,	 Demokrat,	 and	Golkar	as	indicated	in	the	table	below.		
Table	3.2:	The	2009	election	in	Maluku	NO	 PARTIES	 SEAT(S)	1.	 PDI-P	 9	2.	 DEMOKRAT	 8	3.	 GOLKAR	 7	4.	 PKS	 6	5.	 HANURA	 3	6.	 PPP	&	PAN	 2	7.	 PKB,	PBB,	PBR	 1	8.	 GERINDRA,	PNI,	PELOPOR,	PKPB,	PKPI,	PNBKI	 1		It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 some	Arab	descendants,	 among	whom	both	Sada	and	non-Sada	Hadramis,	play	an	important	role	in	the	PKS	party	as	can	be	seen	in	table	3.3.		The	PKS	was	the	result	of	the	transformation	of	PK	(Justice	Party)	which	was	founded	in	1998	but	could	not	meet	the	electoral	threshold	in	the	1999	 election.	 As	 a	 new	 Islamic	 party	 inspired	 by	 the	 Muslim	 Brotherhood	movement	 of	 Egypt,	 the	 PKS	 has	 gained	 much	 support	 from	 young	 Islamist	cadres	that	have	been	mostly	educated	in	secular	universities	(Ufen	2009,	160-168).		In	the	context	of	Maluku,	however,	some	of	its	eminent	members	of	Arab	origin	have	been	educated	 in	Arab	countries	such	as	Saudi	Arabia	and	Egypt,	such	as	 Said	Muzakkir	Assagaf,	 Fahri	 al-Kathiri	 and	Saiful	Ali	 al-Maskati	 (see	table	 3.1).	 At	 the	 time	 of	 my	 interviews,	 the	 first	 two	 were	 members	 of	parliament	 in	 the	 province	 and	 the	 last	 was	 a	 parliament	 member	 in	 the	district	of	Kota	Ambon.	The	first	one	is	of	Sada	descendant,	and	the	last	two	are	of	non-Sada	origin.	While	 the	 Golkar	 and	 PKS	 have	 both	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	adherents,	 only	 non-Sada	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 PPP.	 This	 configuration	 is	congruent	with	political	involvement	of	the	Arab	descendants	in	2009	election	as	indicated	in	table	3.3.				
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Table	3.3:	The	2009	Party	Elections	and	Arab	Voters	in	Ambon47	PARTIES	 SADA	 NON-SADA	GOLKAR	 6	 2	PDI-P	 1	 1	DEMOKRAT	 1	 1	PPP	 1	 8	PKS	 8	 1	PAN	 1	 1	PKB	 -	 1	PBR-HANURA	 -	 1	GOLKAR-PPP-DEMOKRAT	 -	 1	PKS-PPP	 1	 -	No	idea	 3	 4	Total	 23	 23		 Moreover,	we	should	not	exaggerate	the	gap	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	 that	 their	political	different	preferences	or	 the	 ideological	differences	of	 political	 parties	 seem	 to	 suggest.	 In	 2005,	 direct	 elections	 for	 local	government	 executives	 were	 launched.	 The	 elections,	 the	 first	 time	 that	Indonesians	directly	chose	their	own	local	officials,	complemented	the	success	of	 the	 implementation	 of	 direct	 presidential	 elections	 in	 2004.	 By	 extension,	since	 2005	 there	 have	 been	 two	 types	 of	 general	 elections.	 The	 first	 is	 on	 a	legislative	level	and	the	second	is	on	an	executive	level.	The	first	enables	each	political	party	to	fight	for	its	own	sake	while	the	second	requires	a	strategy	of	coalition	among	the	parties	to	secure	both	 individual	and	collective	 interests.	In	 this	 context,	 there	 is	 no	 real	 rivalry	 and	 enmity	 since	 the	 election	 system	opens	up	the	possibility	for	collaboration.	Both	 secular	 and	 religious	 parties	 are	 engaged	 in	 particular	 deals	 that	depend	on	the	local	circumstances	of	the	region	where	the	election	takes	place.	Certain	 secular	 and	 religious	parties	may	work	 together	 in	 some	 regions	but	not	 in	others.	Certain	parties	 formed	coalitions	with	other	parties	 in	 the	 first	election	 but	 did	 not	 do	 so	 in	 the	 next.	 Since	 there	 are	 a	 similar	 number	 of	secular	 parties	 and	 religious	 parties,	 one	 coalition	 can	 consist	 of	 several	parties	 that	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 their	 ideological	 platform	 (religious	versus	 secular).	 This	 pragmatic	 consideration	 should	 be	 understood	 on	 a	
                                                47	Two	months	before	 the	 regional	 election	 for	 electing	 governor	of	Maluku	 (June	11,	2013),	I	made	a	general	survey	on	the	Arab	political	behaviours	and	forty-six	persons	of	different	 clans	 were	 interviewed	 regarding	 political	 parties	 they	 elected	 in	 the	 2004	and	2009	elections.	As	there	are	about	forty	clans	in	Ambon,	on	this	survey	I	picked	up	every	clan	1	respondent,	except	the	following	clans:	3	respondents	in	each	of	al-Saqqaf	and	al-Kathiri	clans,	and	2	in	each	of	al-Hamid	and	al-Tamimy	clans.	This	consideration	is	because	the	biggest	population	within	the	Hadrami	descendants	come	from	al-Saqqaf	and	al-Kathiri,	followed	by	al-Hamid	and	al-Tamimy	clans	(see	section	2.2).		
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practical	level	in	order	not	to	exaggerate	different	political	blocks	that	come	at	surface.	The	illustration	below	will	give	a	better	picture	on	how	the	involvement	of	 Hadrami	 descendants	 and	 the	 ways	 coalitions	 were	 formed	 in	 the	 recent	local	executive	election	that	was	held	on	June	11,	2013.	
Case	1:		Elections	and	Party	Coalitions		Said	Assagaf	was	the	Governor	of	Maluku	for	a	period	of	2013-2018	elected	on	June	11,	2013	 (see	 table	3.1;	 figure	3.6).	 Said	Assagaf	 is	of	 Sada	origin	and	a	well-known	 bureaucrat	 who	 has	 been	 working	 in	 the	 local	 government	 for	about	 thirty	 years.	 	 He	 has	 been	 an	 important	 leader	 of	 the	 Golkar	 party	 in	Maluku	since	 the	 late	1980s.	He	was	elected	as	Deputy	Governor	 in	 the	 local	executive	 election	 in	 2008	 together	 with	 another	 candidate,	 the	 incumbent	Governor	Karel	Albert	Ralahalu.	Ralahalu	is	an	army	general	and	affiliated	with	the	PDI-P	party.	In	2013	the	joint	leadership	of	Assagaf	and	Ralahalu’s	came	to	an	 end.	 Since	 Ralahalu	 held	 the	 governorship	 for	 two	 periods,	 he	 was	 not	eligible	for	next	candidacy	but	his	Deputy	Governor,	Assagaf,	was	eligible.			
	Figure	3.6:	Poster	of	Said	Assagaf’s	candidacy	in	the	2013	election	in	Maluku	(photographed	by	the	author)		On	the	eleventh	of	June	2013,	Said	Assagaf	participated	in	the	local	election	to	become	 the	 next	 governor	 of	 Maluku.	 His	 running	 mate	 was	 a	 Christian	politician	who	 served	as	 a	Deputy	Governor.	After	 the	1999-2002	communal	conflicts,	 one	 of	 the	 agreements	 in	 the	 peace	 treatises	 in	 Malino	 II	 was	 the	implementation	 of	 a	 power	 balance	 between	 Christians	 and	 Muslims,	especially	in	the	highest	layers	of	bureaucratic	levels.	This	is	the	main	reason	
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why	a	Christian	member	in	the	Golkar	party	was	chosen	as	Assagaf’s	running	mate	for	the	Deputy	Governor	position.	Other	candidates	also	came	in	couples	with	Muslim	and	Christian	backgrounds.		Since	there	were	five	candidates	participating	in	this	election,	the	Golkar	party	formed	a	coalition	with	six	other	parties.	The	other	five	candidates	were,	in	 turn,	 supported	 by	 other	 political	 parties	 that	 had	 also	 formed	 coalitions.	PKS,	 PPP,	 and	 PAN	 that	 represent	 Islamic	 parties	 (with	 different	 ideological	platforms)	collaborated	with	secular	parties	such	as	Golkar,	PNI-Marhaenisme,	and	other	local	parties	for	the	candidacy	of	Said	Assagaf	and	his	running	mate.	This	resembles	the	situation	 in	the	2008	election,	when	Said	Assagaf	was	the	running	mate	 of	 Karel	 Albert	 Ralahalu,	 and	 his	 candidacy	was	 supported	 by	different	 parties.	 Although	 Assagaf	 was	 affiliated	 with	 Golkar,	 his	 party	(Golkar)	did	not	support	his	candidacy	in	the	2008	election.	PDI-P	was	one	of	the	supporting	parties	with	which	Karel	Ralahalu	was	affiliated.	The	PKS	and	PPP,	 which	 held	 many	 members	 of	 Arab	 descendant,	 did	 not	 back	 Said’s	candidacy	in	the	2008	either.	The	table	above	and	the	two	tables	here	below	of	the	 2008	 and	 2013	 Maluku	 executive	 elections	 demonstrate	 that	 pragmatic	considerations	 rather	 than	 ideological	 differences	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 most	important	 criterion	 in	 pursuing	 interests	 and	 deal-making	 for	 the	 political	parties.				
Table	3.4:	Candidates	of	the	2008	Maluku	Executive	Election	Names	of	Candidates	 Acronym	 Supporting	Parties	 Religious	Background	 Regional	Background	Karel	Ralahalu	&	Said	Assagaf	 RASA	 PDI-P,	PBR,	PDK,	PD,	PPNUI,	PKB,	PKPI,	PBB	 Protestant	&	Muslims	 Ambon	&	Banda/Ambon	Abdullah	Tuasikal	&	Septunus	Hematang	 TULUS	 PKS,	PAN,	PPD,	PKPB	 Muslim	&	Protestant	
Haruku	&	Western	Southeast	Maluku	Aziz	Samual	&	Lukas	Uwurutaw	 ASLI	 PPP,	PDS,	Pelopor	 Muslim	&	Protestant	




Table	3.5:	Candidates	of	the	2013	Maluku	Executive	Election	Names	of	Candidates	 Acronym	 Supporting	Parties	 Religious	Background	 Regional	Background	Abdullah	Tuasikal-Hendrik	Lewerissa	 TULUS	






Case	2:		Kinship	and	Voting		The	 political	 choices	 of	 individual	 Hadrami	 descendants	 provide	 additional	information	about	voting	patterns.	Two	months	before	the	election	in	June	11,	2013,	 I	conducted	a	general	survey	on	the	Arab	descendants’	preferences	 for	candidates	 running	 in	 the	 election,	 and	 during	 my	 fieldwork	 between	September	2014	and	May	2015	I	 interviewed	some	of	 them	again.	 	The	table	below	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 preferences	 stated	 before	 the	 election	 in	2013.		 	
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Table	3.5:	The	2013	Election	and	Arab	Voters	in	Kota	Ambon	Names	of	Candidates	 Sada	 Non-Sada	Abdullah	Tuasikal-Hendrik	Lewerissa	 	 	Jacobus	Puttileihalat-Arifin	Tapi	Oyihoe	 	 I	Abdullah	Vanath-Martin	Maspaitela	 	 	Herman	Koedoboen-Daud	Sangadji	 	 1	Said	Assagaf-Zeth	Sahurubua	 13	 6	CRITERIA	 10	 12	NO-IDEA	 2	 3		Interestingly,	 not	 all	 Hadrami	 descendants	 surveyed	 were	 forthcoming	 in	mentioning	 the	 names	 of	 candidates	 they	 intended	 to	 vote	 for.	 Instead	 they	provided	some	criteria	for	good	leadership	that	met	their	demands.	I	surmise	that	they	were	worried	that	I	might	be	a	supporter	of	one	of	the	candidates	or	at	 least	 have	 my	 own	 preferences.	 The	 most	 striking	 criteria	 that	 were	mentioned	by	informants	to	vote	for	a	certain	candidate	were	related	to	what	they	designated	as	‘morality’.	Morality	in	this	context	is	translated	into	certain	characteristics	 such	 as	 being	 just,	 capable,	 honest,	 sincere,	 empathic,	uncorrupt,	 and	having	 integrity.	Notably,	having	 the	 same	religion	 is	 another	important	aspect	that	most	interviewees	mentioned.	Fahira,	a	fifty-three-year-old	non-Sada	Hadrami,	for	instance,	stated:	“I	choose	a	person	whose	integrity	in	public	services	has	been	proven.	Also,	he	(Said	Assagaf,	Istiqomah)	does	not	belong	to	them	(Christians,	Istiqomah)”.48	This	 quotation	 illustrates	 the	 importance	 of	 strong	 social	 solidarity	 and	identification	with	the	broader	Muslim	community.	Another	significant	 factor	informing	 people’s	 voting	 practices	 is	 kinship	 ties.	 Many	 interviewees	mentioned	 that	 their	 preferences	 for	 certain	 candidates	 were	 influenced	 by	their	 family	 members’	 choices.	 The	 result	 of	 the	 survey	 indicates	 that	 Said	Assagaf	stood	out	as	the	most	popular	candidate	among	Hadrami	descendants.	Those	willing	to	state	their	preferences	belonged	to	the	Sada	group,	and	many	of	them	were	willing	to	reveal	their	preference	for	Said	Assagaf.	One	 of	 the	 main	 influencing	 factors	 contributing	 to	 people’s	 political	orientation	in	the	long	run	is	the	family	in	which	they	are	embedded.	Through	early	socialization	within	a	family,	children	acquire	a	certain	knowledge,	habits	and	value	orientations	from	their	parents,	as	the	following	statement	made	by	Dara,	a	twenty-three-year-old	Sada.	She	noted:	“We	(in	our	family,	Istiqomah)	voted	for	the	same	party	and	the	same	candidate	in	the	election.	I	just	followed	my	father	and	other	relatives”.49	
                                                48	Interview	with	Fahira,	May	23,	2015.		49	Interview	with	Dara,	February	1,	2015.		
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The	 popularity	 of	 Said	 Assagaf	 among	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 is	 not	 only	based	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 represents	 Muslim	 leadership,	 and	 that	 he	 is	 a	member	of	an	Arab	family	within	the	Sada	group.	What	also	counts	is	that	he	is	the	most	 familiar	candidate	since	he	 lives	 in	Ambon	himself.	He	 is	 thus	more	precisely	a	representative	of	Arab	Muslims	of	 the	Ambon	district	while	other	candidates	are	perceived	as	representatives	of	different	districts.	 In	this	case,	familiarity	 of	 the	 candidate	 is	 an	 important	 reason	 for	 political	 choices	 and	activities,	as	will	come	to	the	fore	even	more	clearly	in	the	next	case.	
Case	3:		Loyalty	and	its	Constraints	One	day	before	the	election	in	June	11,	2013,	I	went	to	Banda	Naira,	the	capital	of	 the	 Banda	 Islands,	 well	 known	 for	 their	 nutmeg	 plantations.	 This	 is	 also	where	Said	Assagaf	and	his	father	were	born.	It	took	me	about	eight	hours	by	ferry	to	travel	from	Ambon	to	Banda	Naira.	I	was	in	the	company	of	supporters	of	 Said	 Assagaf	who	were	 going	 to	 Banda	 to	 launch	 a	 political	 campaign	 for	him.	One	of	them	was	a	local	businessman	who	had	invested	a	large	amount	of	money	 in	this	election.	Apart	 from	this	businessman,	a	Christian	 lawyer	 from	Ambon	 was	 sent	 by	 the	 winning	 election	 team	 from	 the	 Golkar	 party	 to	monitor	 the	process	of	 the	election.	The	political	 supporters	of	Assagaf	were	very	 confident	 that	 they	 would	 win	 the	 votes	 in	 Banda	 Naira	 although	 they	realized	that	there	was	another	strong	candidate;	the	regent	of	central	Maluku.		As	it	turned	out,	the	majority	of	the	Bandanese	would	eventually	vote	for	this	regent.	 Hasna,	 a	 fifty-six-year-old	 non-Sada	 said:	 “Bib50	failed	 to	 get	 many	voters	in	Naira	because	he	was	not	consistent	in	his	speech.	He	told	us	that	he	came	from	Naira	but	in	Ambon	he	said	something	different”.	51		Some	 other	 Arab	 descendants	 did	 not	 vote	 for	 Assagaf	 because	 they	feared	losing	their	jobs.	An	Arab	woman	of	non-Sada	origin	(56	years	old)	who	ran	after	a	supporter	of	Said	Assagaf	apologized	to	him	and	stated,	“You	know	that	my	husband	is	a	school	master.	We	have	been	living	here	for	many	years.	He	 (the	 regent,	 Istiqomah)	 is	 a	 very	powerful	man.	Everybody	knows	 so.	My	husband	and	I	are	not	young	anymore.	You	should	understand	this”.	52	Apart	from	Said	Assagaf	and	the	regent,	other	candidates	were	executive	leaders	in	their	own	regions,	such	as	districts	of	West	Seram,	East	Seram,	and	South	 East	 Maluku.	 Therefore,	 none	 of	 the	 candidates	 was	 a	 newcomer	 in	politics.	The	control	over	a	district	in	this	election	was,	indeed,	in	the	hands	of	these	present	rulers	because	none	of	the	candidates	reached	less	than	50	%	of	
                                                50	Bib	is	an	abbreviation	of	habib,	a	popular	call	or	nickname	for	a	Sada	descendant,	in	this	 case	 Said	Assagaf.	 This	 abbreviation	 can	be	 seen	 further	 in	 chapter	4	 section	2.2	page	122.		51	Interview	with	Hasna,	June	13,	2013.			52	Interview	with	Saima,	June	13,	2013.	
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the	 voters	 in	 their	 own	districts.	The	political	mobilization	was	 addressed	at	every	 level	 of	 society	 especially	 to	 those	 were	 employed	 in	 the	 government	offices.	 Although	 civil	 servants	 were	 not	 forced	 to	 vote	 for	 a	 particular	candidate	or	a	party	as	was	the	case	in	the	New	Order	era,	their	position	was	vulnerable	 and	 susceptible	 to	 political	 games.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 common	practices	in	this	game	was	to	dispel	a	civil	servant	to	a	remote	area	or	another	island	 if	 the	election	results	proved	 to	be	disappointing.	 In	Banda,	 it	was	not	Assagaf	 who	 won	 over	 voters	 but	 one	 of	 his	 rivals,	 the	 regent	 of	 Central	Maluku,	 who	 apparently	 had	 more	 control	 on	 this	 constituency	 in	 his	 own	district	 than	 Assagaf.	 	 In	 this	 regard,	 political	 power	 in	 local	 politics	 is	distributed	over	many	different	 layers	of	 the	government	hierarchy,	 in	which	people	in	higher	positions	do	not	always	have	an	absolute	power	and	influence	on	the	lower.		
Case	4:		The	Internal	Conflicts	in	the	Hadrami	Organization	and	Politics	The	 al-Hilal	 foundation	 was	 established	 by	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	 the	middle	of	the	1940s	(see	further	chapter	5	section	3.2).	Recently,	a	dispute	in	this	 foundation	 erupted	 concerning	 its	 organization.	 Two	 parties	 were	involved	in	this	dispute,	namely	my	informants	Hadi	Basalamah	(see	page	82)	and	Umar	Attamimy	(see	chapter	2	pages	43-44).	Basalamah	had	been	general	president	 of	 the	 foundation	 from	 1999,	 while	 the	 executive	 leadership	 was	given	to	Attamimy.	Basalamah	and	the	advisory	board	forced	Attamimy	to	step	down	in	2012,	accusing	him	of	misusing	the	foundation	to	make	a	big	profit	for	his	own	sake	and	selling	one	of	the	assets	belonging	to	the	foundation	to	Tong	He,	 a	 Chinese	 businessman	 in	 Ambon.	 The	 property	was	 located	 next	 to	 the	office	of	the	foundation	in	Anthony	Rhebok	street.	According	to	my	informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	one	of	the	advisory	members	of	the	board	called	Salim	told	al-Kathiri	that	he	had	found	out	that	one	of	the	foundation’s	 properties	 was	 sold	 to	 Salim’s	 Chinese	 friend	 Tong	 He,	 who	owned	several	shops	and	supermarkets	in	Ambon.	Salim	explained	that	he	had	discovered	what	had	happened	when	he	met	Tong	He	in	Ambon	in	2012.	Salim	and	al-Kathiri	informed	Hadi	Basalamah	about	their	discovery.	Basalamah	and	other	 members	 of	 the	 board	 were	 convinced	 by	 Salim’s	 story	 because	 the	name	 of	 the	 foundation	 had	 been	 changed	 from	 Yayasan	 al-Hilal	 (al-Hilal	Foundation)	into	Yayasan	Wakaf	al-Hilal	(al-Hilal	Waqf	Foundation)	and	one	of	the	 consequences	 is	 that	 one	 of	 the	 foundation’s	 assets	 changed	 owner.	According	 to	 Hadi	 Basalamah,	 Attamimy	 had	 changed	 the	 name	 of	 the	foundation	from	al-Hilal	Foundation	into	al-Hilal	Waqf	Foundation	on	June	24,	2011	 in	 front	 of	 a	 public	 notary.	 Basalamah	 further	 said	 that	 Attamimy	 had	changed	 the	 name	 secretly	without	 discussing	 it	with	 other	members	 of	 the	board	 before	 selling	 the	 property.	 	 Having	 been	 betrayed	 by	 Attamimy,	
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Basalamah	 tried	 to	 undertake	 action	 by	 organizing	 several	 meetings	 and	discussing	 the	 matter	 with	 other	 members	 of	 the	 board.	 Attamimy	 never	attended	 these	 meetings,	 although	 Basalamah	 claimed	 that	 he	 had	 been	invited.	 Attamimy	 himself	 claimed	 never	 having	 received	 any	 invitation.	Furthermore,	Attamimy	stated	that	he	had	sold	the	foundation	to	allocate	the	money	 for	 operational	 expenses	 of	 the	 foundation’s	 schools.	 According	 to	Attamimy,	he	had	made	serious	attempts	to	reform	the	foundation.	The	board	decided	to	dismiss	Attamimy	from	his	position	and	bring	the	case	to	court.	Basalamah	and	the	advisory	board	undertook	a	legal	action	in	November	2012.	 Realizing	 that	 his	 transaction	 was	 taken	 to	 the	 court,	 Attamimy	proposed	to	dissolve	the	old	foundation	in	January	2013.		The	court	agreed	the	proposal	 later	 that	 month.	 The	 legal	 counter-action	 was	 then	 made	 by	Basalamah	 and	 his	 party	 to	 dissolve	 this	 court’s	 decree.	 The	 legal	 action	proposal	was	 signed	 by	 Salim	 and	 all	 other	members	 of	 the	 advisory	 board,	which	consisted	of	several	prominent	persons	such	as	Said	Assagaf,	who	was	Deputy	Governor	of	Maluku	at	that	time	(see	page	88),	and	Rusdi	Hasanusi,	the	religious	leader	of	the	main	mosque	Al-Fatah	of	Ambon,	and	a	few	others.	This	case	was	brought	 to	court	before	 the	 local	general	election	on	 June	11,	2013	in	which	one	of	the	most	prominent	advisory	members	of	the	board	Said	Assagaf	participated.	During	the	governorship	election,	it	transpired	that	Attamimy	would	not	vote	for	Said	Assagaf.	Rather	he	supported	the	regent	of	West	Southeast	Maluku,	Herman	Koedoboen,	who	has	a	Christian	background	(see	table	3.4).	The	 case	 above	 shows	 that	 the	 political	 choices	 of	 Hadramis	 are	 not	necessarily	or	exclusively	informed	by	communal	sentiments,	such	as	religious	difference	 or	 ethnic	 similarity,	 but	 that	 they	 are	 embedded	 in	 interpersonal	relationships	 between	 a	 voter	 and	 a	 candidate.	 Internal	 disputes	 among	 the	members	 of	 a	 Hadrami	 organization	 such	 as	 the	 one	 described	 above	 occur	regularly.	They	provide	 insights	 in	 the	dynamics	 among	members	 and	 in	 the	way	they	deal	with	such	problem	by	seeking	support	from	other	‘parties’	who	hold	more	power	and	influence,	whatever	their	origin	is.			
Case	 5:	 The	 involvement	 of	 ‘Ulama,	 Religious	 Rituals	 and	 Political	
Mobilization		Shortly	before	the	governor	election	in	2013,	a	colleague	at	the	IAIN	who	knew	about	my	 research	 among	 the	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	asked	me	about	 the	 term	
habib.	My	colleague	was	also	a	member	of	the	national	branch	of	the	MUI,	the	Indonesian	Ulama	Council,53	where	he	was	about	to	present	a	paper	on	‘Habib	
                                                53	MUI	 is	 the	 Indonesian	 main	 body	 of	 religious	 clerics	 and	 scholars.	 It	 functions	 to	produce	 fatwas	 or	 religious	 opinions,	 to	 give	 advise	 to	 the	 Muslims	 community	 on	particular	 issues,	 as	 well	 as	 issue	 halal	 (allowed)-certification	 for	 products,	 such	 as	
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and	 Arab	 migration’.	 The	 significance	 of	 this	 was	 considerable,	 as	 it	 was	related	 to	Said	Assagaf’s	 candidacy.	My	colleague	 told	me	 that	one	of	 the	big	issues	for	the	wider	Muslim	community	in	Ambon	that	would	be	discussed	at	the	 meeting	 was	 that	 leadership	 in	 Maluku	 should	 not	 be	 given	 to	 non-Ambonese.	 Being	 indigenous	 versus	 non-indigenous	 has	 been	 an	 important	political	 issue	after	the	1999-2002	communal	conflicts,	and	now	Said	Assagaf	was	attacked	by	his	political	rivals	as	being	non-indigenous.	Although	there	was	no	direct	indication	of	the	involvement	of	the	 ‘ulama	in	 the	political	mobilization,	 the	 idea	 to	 raise	 the	 issue	 in	 the	meeting	 shows	their	 awareness	 of	 political	 issues	 and	 also	 a	 big	 fear	 among	 them,	 at	 least	among	those	who	supported	Said	Assagaf,	 that	 the	 issue	of	 indigeneity	might	weaken	his	 legitimacy	as	 a	 candidate.	 In	 addition,	members	of	 the	MUI	were	politically	 divided	 along	 ethnic	 lines,	 an	 issue	 that	 should	 be	 taken	 into	consideration	 during	 the	 election.	 Since	 the	MUI	 consists	 of	 diverse	 (ethnic)	backgrounds	in	Maluku	and	represent	many	Muslim	groups	and	organizations,	my	colleague	needed	evidence	to	defend	his	claim	against	his	opposition.	Apart	 from	the	MUI	case	above,	on	Sunday	afternoon	on	May	23,	2013	I	attended	a	weekly	religious	ritual	in	the	Melati	al-Khairat	foundation	led	by	a	Sada	 woman,	 Rugaya	 Alatas	 (75	 years	 old).	 This	 prayer	 ritual	 was	 not	 only	chaired	 by	 the	 hostess,	 Rugaya	 Alatas,	 herself	 but	 also	 by	 imam	 Rusdi	Hasannusi	 of	 the	 main	 mosque	 al-Fatah.	 It	 turned	 out	 that	 the	 particular	meeting	I	attended	also	contained	elements	of	a	political	rally	to	stimulate	the	participants	 to	 vote	 for	 a	 particular	 candidate	 during	 the	 election.	 I	 had	learned	 about	 the	 meeting	 just	 before	 it	 took	 place	 through	 Sadiq,	 a	 non-Hadrami	 who	 was	 18	 years	 old	 when	 I	 met	 him	 and	 who	 was	 one	 of	 the	children	 living	 in	 this	 orphanage	 boarding	 house	 of	 the	 foundation.54	Sadiq	sent	me	a	message	a	few	hours	before	the	meeting	began	and	informed	me	that	
                                                                                                             food,	cosmetic,	pharmaceutical,	and	clothing.	Established	in	1975,	it	represents	several	Muslim	organizations,	such	as	Muhammadiyah,	NU,	and	others,	which	are	mainly	Sunni	organizations.	 Shi’ite	 and	 Ahmadiyya	 organizations	 are	 not	 included	 (Hosen	 2003;	Hasyim	2015;	Boy	2017).	54	I	met	Sadiq	at	the	first	time	at	the	Melati	al-Khairat	foundation	in	March	2013,	when	I	wanted	 to	meet	 Rugaya	 Alatas.	 On	 that	 occasion,	 I	 did	 not	 succeed	 in	 talking	 to	 her.	Since	then,	we	exchanged	phone	numbers	so	that	Sadiq	could	inform	me	about	the	time	schedule	of	the	regular	activities	including	whether	Rugaya	Alatas	would	come	or	not.	He	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 a	 trusted	 person	 by	 Rugaya	 Alatas	 and	 other	 foundation	managers.	 To	 my	 surprise,	 in	 February	 2015,	 I	 met	 Sadiq	 in	 a	 boarding	 school	 in	Hadramaut.	 He	 was	 among	 five	 students	 from	 Ambon	 sent	 by	 the	 ar-Rahmah	foundation,	led	by	my	Sada	informant,	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid	(see	pages	72-73),	to	study	there.	Sadiq	himself	has	no	Arab	roots.		Once	he	told	me	that	he	wanted	to	go	the	nursing	academy,	but	 I	 realized	he	changed	his	mind	when	 I	 saw	him	studying	 in	 the	school	of	Hadramaut.				
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there	would	be	 a	 special	 prayer	 ritual	 to	 celebrate	 a	Nisfu	 Sha’ban.55	When	 I	arrived	at	 the	meeting,	 a	 large	 crowd	of	 approximately	 two	hundred	women	had	already	gathered.	The	participants	were	of	various	backgrounds,	most	of	them	non-Arab.	Judging	them	by	their	physical	appearance,	clothes,	make-up,	accessories	and	jewelry,	I	surmise	that	many	of	them	came	from	middle	class	families.	 	 Although	 all	 women	 wore	 Islamic	 dress,	 their	 clothes	 were	 of	 the	latest	 fashion.	 I	 folded	 my	 legs	 and	 sat	 down	 on	 the	 rug	 like	 the	 other	participants.	I	waited	for	some	time	and	kept	wondering	why	the	ritual	had	not	been	 started	 yet	 although	 the	 hall	was	 already	 filled.	 Then	 the	 entrance	 of	 a	specific	woman	attracted	my	attention.	She	wore	a	long	purple	dress	combined	with	 a	 large	 headscarf	 in	 the	 same	 color.	 Unlike	 most	 women,	 she	 had	 not	attached	her	headscarf	with	a	safety	pin	so	that	some	of	her	hair	was	showing.	People	 came	 forward	 to	greet	her,	 including	 the	hostess.	 She	 then	 sat	on	 the	rug	 five	meters	 from	where	 I	was	sitting.	 I	did	not	recognize	her	until	an	old	lady	 sitting	next	 to	me	 told	me	 that	 she	was	 the	wife	 of	Deputy	Governor	of	Maluku.	 I	 had	not	 recognized	her	because	on	 the	photographs	on	banners	 in	the	 streets	 or	 in	 advertisements	 in	which	 she	 is	 shown	next	 to	her	husband,	she	never	wears	a	headscarf.		Apart	from	reciting	the	Fatiha	and	the	Yasin,	the	first	and	36th	suras	of	the	Qur’an,	we	also	recited	some	du’a	or	supplication	prayers	to	seek	forgiveness	for	both	the	living	and	the	deceased,	particulary	for	the	ancestors	of	the	Alatas	clan,	 to	 which	 Rugaya	 Alatas	 claims	 to	 belong.	 Particularly	 interesting	 in	relation	 to	 the	 topic	of	 this	 section	 is	 that	 throughout	 the	 ritual	both	Rugaya	Alatas	 and	 the	 imam	 kept	 requesting	 the	 participants	 to	 also	 pray	 for	 the	winning	of	Said	Assagaf	in	the	2013	general	election	because	the	result	of	the	first	round-election	was	being	counted	as	we	were	performing	the	ritual.	The	meeting	 ended	 by	 performing	 the	maghrib	 or	 sunset	 prayer	 together,	which	was	led	by	the	imam.		What	 the	 cases	 above	 reflect	 is	 how	 political	 support	 and	 legitimacy	 is	established	 through	 various	 channels,	 not	 in	 the	 least	 through	 religious	channels.	The	 ‘ulama	are	salient	actors	 in	 local	politics,	especially	 in	 terms	of	mobilizing	 local	 voters	 and	 providing	 political	 candidates	 with	 normative	legitimacy.	 Some	Hadramis	 engaging	 in	 local	 politics	 also	 use	 these	 religious	channels	 to	 seek	 and	maintain	 their	 power.	 The	 case	 studies	 also	 illustrate,	however,	that	ethnic	affiliation	may	crosscut	religious	affiliation	to	support	or	hamper	gaining	the	support	of	voters.	
                                                55	Nisfu	Sha’ban	 is	 the	 fifteenth	day	of	 the	month	of	 Sha’ban	 (the	eigth	month)	of	 the	Islamic	 calendar.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	 on	 this	 date,	 the	 Angels	 will	 deliver	 a	 person’s	record	of	deeds	conducted	in	the	previous	year	to	God.	Muslims	are	encouraged	to	pray	and	repent	as	much	as	possible	on	this	occasion	so	that	their	bad	deeds	will	be	removed	from	the	records	and	their	bad	conduct	will	be	forgiven.					
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The	 case	 studies	 that	 I	 discussed	 in	 this	 section	 of	 Hadramis	 who	 are	actively	engaged	in	politics	mainly	concerned	men	(see	table	3.1).	 	This	is	not	to	suggest,	however,	that	women	are	not	politically	active.	 	As	in	other	public	fields,	Hadrami	women	may	participate	 in	political	parties	as	well,	 especially	since	 in	 the	context	of	reform	era	 the	 Indonesian	government	has	opened	up	the	opportunity	for	women	to	participate	in	politics.	The	government	has	tried	to	 reduce	 the	 gender	 imbalance	 in	 the	 legislative	 membership	 by	 issuing	 a	policy	of	30%	quota	for	women	in	the	parliamentary	seats.		Although	women’s	participation	in	Indonesian	politics	is	growing,	the	30%	electoral	quota	has	not	yet	 been	 realized.	 According	 to	 the	 2018	 BPS	 report,	 male	 politicians	dominated	the	local	parliamentary	seats	in	Ambon	in	the	2013	general	election	(BPS	2018,	3-4).	Only	three	out	of	the	thirty-five	legislative	members	in	Ambon	are	women,	all	of	whom	from	non-Hadrami	families.	I	did,	however,	encounter	several	women	 in	Ambon,	 both	 of	Hadrami	 and	 other	 backgrounds,	who	 are	active	 members	 in	 political	 parties,	 although	 they	 have	 not	 yet	 gained	 any	parliamentary	 seats.	 One	 of	 few	 examples	 I	 can	mention	 here	 is	Dila,	 a	 fifty-three-year-non-Sada	 entrepreneur,	 who	 was	 an	 active	 member	 of	 a	 secular	party	 PDI-P	 during	 my	 fieldwork.	 Dira	 told	 me	 that	 she	 was	 very	 much	interested	 in	 joining	 the	party	because	of	 the	party’s	profile	and	openness	 to	female	 leadership.	 Besides,	 she	was	 engaged	 in	 the	 party	 in	 order	 to	 secure	and	 expand	 her	 commercial	 activities.56	Another	 example	 is	 a	 cousin	 of	 the	former	Governor	of	Maluku	Said	Assagaf.	Assagaf’s	cousin	has	been	involved	in	the	 Golkar	 party,	 the	 same	 party	 in	 which	 Assagaf	 was	 engaged.	 During	my	fieldwork	 she	 managed	 to	 obtain	 a	 position	 as	 treasurer	 in	 the	 party.	Unfortunately	I	did	not	manage	to	arrange	meeting	her	myself,	but	according	to	 my	 informants,	 Assagaf’s	 cousin	 never	 succeeded	 in	 winning	 a	 local	parliamentary	seat.	In	these	two	examples,	like	many	Hadrami	men	engaged	in	the	politics,	those	Hadrami	women	who	participate	in	politics	have	their	own	considerations	in	making	choices	that	serve	their	own	interest	best.		
5.3 Politics	and	Alliances	After	 the	 1999	 –	 2002	 communal	 conflicts,	 the	 general	 preconception	 about	the	 population	 of	 Ambon	 is	 that	 they	 are	 segregated	 into	 two	 different	religious	communities	of	Christians	and	Muslims.	 In	some	respects	this	 is	 the	case,	for	example	in	terms	of	residential	patterns.		However,	the	picture	seems	to	be	more	complicated	when	taking	into	consideration	another	aspect,	namely	ethnic	 group	 membership	 as	 it	 is	 played	 out	 in	 people’s	 daily	 lives.	Categorization	 takes	 place	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 several	 levels	 of	 ‘local’	 and	 ‘non-local’	groups,	or	‘indigenous’	versus	‘non-indigenous’	ethnic	groups.	
                                                56	Interview	with	Dila,	December	19,	2014.		
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In	 terms	 of	 local	 ethnic	 groups,	 the	 inhabitants	 of	 Ambon	 are	 generally	divided	 into	people	 from	Central	Maluku	and	people	 from	Southeast	Maluku.		People	tend	to	be	very	loyal	to	their	own	group.	Although	both	Central	Maluku	and	 Southeast	 Maluku	 consist	 of	 several	 islands,	 Central	 Maluku	 is	 usually	associated	 with	 the	 term	 Orang	 Ambon	 (People	 of	 Ambon)	 and	 Southeast	Maluku	 is	 associated	with	 the	 term	Orang	Tenggara	or	Orang	Kei	 (People	 of	Southeast	Maluku	or	People	of	Kei).	The	exception	is	people	from	Geser,	which	is	geographically	located	in	Central	Maluku,	but	its	people	have	had	an	alliance	with	people	from	the	Kei	group.	The	alliance	of	the	Geser	people	with	the	Kei	group	 is	 due	 to	 a	 historical	 alliance	 in	which	 the	 ancestors	 of	 Geser	made	 a	hard	 pela	 (political	 alliance)	 with	 Kei	 (Bartels	 1977).	 The	 alliance	 has	prevented	 the	 people	 of	 Geser	 and	 Kei	 from	 turning	 against	 each	 other	 in	 a	conflict.	This	pela	(political	alliance)	still	exists	today,	and	it	is	considered	to	be	part	of	 customary	 laws	 in	Maluku	and	used	as	a	means	of	 resolving	conflicts	between	disputing	parties.	People	from	the	Lease	Islands,	such	as	Haruku	and	Saparua,	usually	dominate	the	Central	Maluku	group.	 	Local	society	in	Ambon	is	 grouped	 into	 those	 of	 Geser-Kei	 origin	 and	 those	 of	 Haruku	 and	 Saparua	origin,	 a	 division	 which	 sometimes	 trigger	 clashes	 between	 the	 groups.57		 I	witnessed	several	occasions	of	riots	close	to	the	neighbourhood	where	I	lived	in	 Ambon	 in	 2012.	 Apart	 from	 this	 local	 general	 ethnic	 grouping,	 people	 in	Ambon	 have	 strong	 ties	 with	 their	 home-village.	 Riots	 between	 two	neighbouring	 negeris	 (villages)	 such	 Mamala-Morela	 (Leihitu	 Ambon),	 Hitu-Wakal	 (Leihitu	 Ambon),	 Luhu-Iha	 (West	 Seram),	 Porto-Haria	 (Saparua),	Pelauw-Ori	 (Haruku),	Mardika-Batumerah	 (Ambon)	occurred	often	both	 long	before	 and	 after	 the	 communal	 conflicts.	 The	 factors	 that	 trigger	 such	 riots	sometimes	seem	to	be	very	trivial,	such	as	a	quarrel	between	two	inhabitants	from	 different	 villages	 in	 a	 feast	 where	 both	 got	 drunk.	 Many	 cases	 of	 the	clashes	 between	 two	 neighbouring	 villages	 resulted	 in	 claims	 and	 counter-claims	 about	 disputed	 economic	 resources	 such	 as	 lands,	 water	 supply,	 or	plants.		In	this	context,	as	some	scholars	have	suggested,	communal	conflicts	in	Maluku	can	be	a	means	of	the	settling	of	long-term	disputes	concerning	access	to	 economic	 resources	 (Von	 Benda-Beckmann	 and	 Von	 Benda-Beckmann	2007;	Adam	2010a).	Outside	 the	 local	 groups	 are	 those	people	 from	Sulawesi,	 Java,	 Sumatra,	and	other	different	islands	of	Indonesia.	Although	the	1999	–	2002	communal	
                                                57	According	 to	 data	 from	 Lembaga	 Antar	 Iman	 Maluku	 (LAIM,	 Maluku	 inter-faith	institute),	there	were	about	112	small	incidents	between	2010-2012	in	Maluku.	These	incidents	were	 not	 only	 clashes	 between	 communities	 of	 different	 religions,	 but	 also	clashes	 between	 ethnic	 groups	 as	 well	 as	 clashes	 between	 neighbouring	 villages		(https://lembagaantarimanmaluku.wordpress.com).	 Another	 report	 from	 the	 Habibie	Center	similarly	suggest	that	conflicts	due	to	contest	on	identity	and	resource	in	Ambon	were	predominant	from	2002-2012	(Ansori	et.al	2014).		
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conflicts	 was	 framed	 into	 religious	 terms	 in	 an	 early	 phase,	 they	 are	 also	entangled	 with	 campaigns	 of	 people	 who	 want	 to	 dispel	 all	 non-indigenous	groups	 from	 Ambon	 (Gos	 2000;	 Bertrand	 2002;	 Van	 Klinken	 2007;	 Schulze	2017).	Some	Ambonese	consider	Hadramis,	although	born	 in	Ambon,	as	non-indigenous	 and	 thus	 classify	 them	 under	 the	 non-local	 ethnic	 groups.	 In	practice,	 this	 complex	 constellation	 of	 multi-level	 and	 multi-dimensional	classification	patterns	plays	out	differently	in	different	circumstances.	In	order	to	be	successful,	politicians	seeking	support	therefore	have	to	be	very	adroit	in	tapping	into	the	various	sources	on	which	loyalty	claims	can	be	based.	To	conclude,	in	Ambon’s	recent	political	history,	particularly	in	the	wake	of	 1999	 –	 2002	 conflicts,	 the	 tense	 relationship	 between	 Muslims	 and	Christians	 and	 their	 competition	 over	 political	 dominance	 continues	 to	 be	 a	very	 important	 issue	 in	Ambon.	At	 the	same	time,	however,	 the	discussion	 in	this	chapter	demonstrates	 that	religion	 is	only	one	of	 the	significant	markers	that	affects	the	political	preferences	of	the	Hadramis.	There	is	no	unified	body	of	 politics	 among	 Hadramis.	 Besides	 a	 shared	 ethnic	 background,	 another	marker	 that	 shapes	 their	 political	 activities	 and	 loyalties	 is	 kinship	 ties.	Although	kinship	ties	and	religion	play	a	significant	role	in	the	political	choices	and	 activities	 of	 Hadramis,	 the	 significance	 of	 shared	 religion	 and	 ethnicity	should	 not	 be	 overestimated.	 As	 demonstrated	 in	my	 discussion	 of	 five	 case	studies,	 the	diversity	of	 the	Hadramis’	political	activities	and	 loyalties	should	also	be	put	in	a	context	that	is	shaped	by	a	wide	range	of	individual	interests.			
6. Every	Day	Life	Practices:	Language,	Food,	and	Dress		
This	 section	 describes	 several	 cultural	 lived	 practices	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 in	relation	 to	 a	 broader	 Ambonese	 society.	 This	 discussion	 is	 aimed	 at	understanding	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	differentiate	 among	 themselves	 (Sada	and	non-Sada),	and	between	the	Hadramis	as	a	group	and	other	groups	in	the	local	society.	I	will	do	so	by	focusing	on	the	performance	of	a	specific	distinct	cultural	 Hadrami	 identity	 through	 language,	 food	 habits	 and	 sartorial	practices.	Today,	Hadramis	seem	to	be	integrated	into	the	local	culture	of	Ambonese	society.	 Their	 everyday	 practices	 to	 some	 extent	 obscure	 the	 distinction	between	 them	 and	 other	 Muslim	 communities	 and	 also	 between	 them	 and	non-Muslim	communities	 in	Ambon.	 	 For	example,	 they	do	not	 speak	Arabic.		All	of	them	use	the	Ambonese-Malay	language	in	their	daily	social	interaction.		Several	factors	may	account	for	the	fact	that	they	do	not	speak	Arabic,	such	as	being	 in	 a	 minority	 position,	 absence	 of	 residential	 separation	 from	 other	communities,	 and	 intermarriage	 practices.	 Another	 example	 is	 food.	 The	regular	 staple	 food	 in	 Ambonese	 society	 is	 seafish	 and	 sago,	 the	 extracted	
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starch	 from	 palm	 tree.	 	 Although	 sago	 has	 mostly	 been	 replaced	 by	 rice	nowadays,	it	continues	to	serve	as	an	alternative	staple	food	today.	As	seafish	is	part	of	the	daily	diet	of	Ambonese	people,	they	do	not	eat	sweet	water	fish.	Some	 informants	 who	 occasionally	 visit	 Java,	 for	 instance,	 expressed	 their	admiration	 for	 my	 natal	 island	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 complained	 about	 the	food.	 As	 one	 person	 confided:	 “It	 was	 nice	 to	 be	 there,	 but	 I	 suffered	 a	 lot	because	I	could	not	find	seafish”.	Interestingly,	I	found	two	general	Ambonese	food	products	that	my	informants	claimed	to	be	Arab	food.	These	are	asida,	a	cake	made	of	flour	mixed	with	palm	sugar,	coconut	milk,	and	butter,	and	nasi	




Marianne	 Hulsbosch	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 the	 bodily	 care	 and	 practices	 of	Ambonese	people	in	the	colonial	era	not	only	reflected	corporeal	demands	but	also	 located	 them	 into	a	 group	of	people	 in	 society	 in	 terms	of	 class,	 gender,	religion,	 politics,	 economy,	 others.	 In	 particular,	 sartorial	 practices	 were	important	 as	 a	 social	 identity	marker	 for	 the	Ambonese	population.	 Today,	 I	observed,	it	is	more	difficult	to	clearly	identify	members	of	different	groups	by	the	way	they	dress.	The	Hadramis	in	Ambon	wear	various	styles	of	clothing,	as	do	 many	 other	 Ambonese.	 Also	 more	 generally,	 ascribing	 the	 Hadramis	particular	practices	does	not	do	justice	to	them,	for	they	are	heterogeneous	in	their	 public	 performances.	Understanding	 embodied	 culture	 of	 the	Hadramis	should	therefore	be	approached	as	a	multiple	meaning	making	process	in	the	construction	of	personal	and	social	identity.	Particularly	 concerning	 the	 dresscode	 of	 men,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 easy	 to	differentiate	between	different	groups	of	people	in	Ambon,	except	for	religious	occasions	such	as	in	prayers.	Hadrami	men	wear	the	same	kind	of	attire	when	performing	 their	prayers	as	other	Muslim	men;	 they	wear	 long	 trousers	or	a	traditional	 lower	 garment	 called	 sarung	 (a	 large	 fabric	 wrapped	 around	 the	waist),	which	may	or	may	not	be	 combined	with	 a	headdress.	This	 sarung	 is	also	used	in	other	countries,	mainly	in	South	East	Asia,	some	of	the	Indian	sub-continent,	and	in	Yemen.	People	in	Hadramaut	even	use	the	same	word	sarung.	The	practice	of	wearing	this	sort	of	attire	results	from	regional	trade	relations	in	 former	 times,	 although	 the	occasions	 for	which	men	put	 on	 a	 sarung	 vary	between	different	regions.	During	my	short	 fieldtrip	 to	Hadramaut,	 I	noted	 that	many	Yemeni	men	wear	the	sarung	for	their	daily	activities,	not	necessarily	to	perform	prayers.	In	other	regions	of	Indonesia,	for	example	in	Java,	the	sarung	is	worn	more	often	by	people	 in	villages,	and	by	people	 in	traditional	boarding	schools.	Although	by	and	large	I	noticed	no	difference	between	Sada,	non-Sada	and	other	Muslim	men	in	Ambon,	on	specific	occasions	such	as	religious	feasts,	Sada	men	wear	a	white	turban	and	a	white	long	robe.		If	the	use	of	sarung	is	shared	by	both	Sada	and	non-Sada	and	other	Ambonese	Muslim	men	in	Ambon	and	even	by	people	of	 various	 countries	 especially	 Yemen	 and	 Indonesia,	 the	 white	 turban	 and	
thobe	 (a	 loose	 ankle-length	 attire	with	 long	 sleeves)	 are	 exclusively	worn	by	Sada	men.	One	of	my	informants,	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid	(see	pages	72-73)	wears	the	thobe.	He	told	me	the	following	about	the	meaning	of	the	garment	to	him:		Honestly,	when	 I	 arrived	 in	Hadramaut	 for	 first	 time	 (2008)	 I	 still	wore	trousers	 and	 a	 shirt.	 Then	 I	 learned	 there	how	 to	wear	 a	 thobe.	When	 I	went	back	to	 Indonesia,	 I	started	to	wear	this	 long	robe.	Actually	 I	got	a	position	 as	 a	 civil	 servant	 in	 the	 ministry	 of	 religious	 affairs	 after	 my	return	from	Hadramaut	but	I	decided	to	decline	it	because	I	was	asked	by	the	 officials	 to	wear	 trousers	 and	 a	 shirt.	With	 this	 kind	 of	 attire,	 I	will	
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always	 be	 reminded	 to	 behave	 carefully	 and	 to	 be	 a	 model	 of	 a	 good	Muslim.	When	I	completed	my	studies	in	Hadramaut,	I	received	this	white	turban	 from	 my	 teacher.	 It	 is	 kind	 of	 ijaza	 (certificate,	 Istiqomah)	 and	thus	I	should	maintain	it	in	any	situation.	I	will	never	sell	out	my	faith	for	worldly	affairs.	I	am	comfortable	with	dressing	this	way	and	I	should	not	be	afraid	of	losing	a	job	because	we	can	still	make	a	living	with	any	kind	of	halal	(permissible,	Istiqomah)	job.58	For	 Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 wearing	 the	 white	 turban	 and	 thobe	 is	 thus	related	 to	 the	 religious	 education	 he	 received	 in	 Hadramaut.	 From	 the	quotation	 it	 also	 transpires	 that	 besides	 being	 a	 bodily	 technique	 that	stimulates	 pious	 behavior,	 wearing	 this	 kind	 of	 attire	 also	 signifies	 to	 the	outside	world	his	status	as	a	man	of	religious	learning	and	prophetic	descent.	In	addition	 to	 specific	dress	habits	of	 Sada,	 to	a	 certain	extent,	 religious	distinction	 can	 also	 be	 recognized	 in	 the	 dress	 code	 of	 Muslim	 men	 with	 a	(neo)	Salafi	 identity.	Neo-Salafi	men	usually	wear	 trousers	or	a	sarung	 above	their	ankles	(lihya).	According	to	what	some	informants	told	me,	the	neo-Salafi	movement	 has	 been	 growing	 since	 the	 1999	 –	 2002	 communal	 conflicts.	Research	 seems	 to	 confirm	 this	 (see	 chapter	 5	 section	 3.3.1).	 My	 informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	 for	example,	acknowledged	 that	he	has	become	a	neo-Salafi	as	 a	 result	 of	 his	 interaction	with	 some	other	neo-Salafis.	 I	 could	 tell	 that	he	was	 influenced	by	 a	neo-Salafi	 ideology	 from	a	neo-Salafi	mosque	 in	 front	of	his	shop	 in	 the	market,	where	he	regularly	performed	his	prayers	during	 the	work	 by	 the	way	 he	wore	 trousers	 above	 his	 ankles.	 Also,	when	 he	was	 not	busy	 helping	 his	 customers,	 I	 noticed	 that	 he	 liked	 to	watch	 a	 neo-Salafi	 TV	channel	from	Java	in	his	shop.	The	 sartorial	 practices	 of	 a	 more	 traditionalist	 informant	 and	 that	 of	 a	neo-Salafi	 informant	 described	 above	 illustrate	 how	 various	 identifications	intersect	in	how	Hadramis	in	Ambon	dress.	Moreover,	the	examples	illustrate	how	they	engage	with	other	local	actors	in	religious	contestations	in	which	the	body	becomes	the	symbol	of	a	struggle	of	various	ideologies	and	a	vehicle	for	public	statements.	As	the	clothed	body	becomes	an	arena	of	struggle	for	‘social	identity’	including	religious	identity,	its	public	statement	visualizes	a	multiple	social	identity	(gender,	religion,	class,	etc),	the	meanings	of	which	are	open	to	contestation.	This	comes	even	more	clearly	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	variety	of	dresscodes	of	my	female	informants.	Some	Hadrami	women	wear	what	is	locally	identified	as	‘Islamic	 dress’	 while	 others	 do	 not.	 Those	 who	 wear	 Islamic	 dress	 differ	 in	their	 styles.	 Some	 wear	 stylish	 headscarves	 while	 others	 don	 plain,	 darker	coloured	veils.	Those	who	do	not	wear	 Islamic	dress	otherwise	do	not	differ	much	from	those	wearing	stylish	Islamic	dress.	The	only	difference	is	that	they	
                                                58	Interview	with	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid,	September	30,	2014.	
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do	not	cover	their	head.	The	rest	of	their	bodies	are	covered	in	the	same	way	as	those	of	the	women	wearing	stylish	Islamic	dress.	At	first	glance,	I	found	it	difficult	 to	 differentiate	 beween	 Hadramis	 or	 other	 Muslims	 and	 other	 non-Muslims.	How	dress	codes	may	be	played	out	in	practice	can	best	be	illustrated	by	providing	some	examples.		
Case	1:		Dress	and	Religious	Ideology				My	informant	Lubna	Mauladawilah	(see	page	77)	is	a	religious	preacher	from	a	Sada	 family.	 The	 first	 time	 I	met	 her	was	 in	 her	 shop	 on	 February	 11,	 2013	when	 her	 husband	 introduced	 me	 to	 her.	 Afterwards,	 I	 attended	 her	 study	group	 several	 times.	 On	 these	 occasions	 she	 always	 wore	 a	 loose	 robe	 and	colorful	headscarf.	In	May	2015,	I	met	her	at	a	ritual	meeting	of	the	Sada	group	Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya,	 and	 she	 wore	 a	 complete	 black	 niqab	 with	 a	 face	 veil.	Mauladawilah	 is	 not	 the	 first	 person	 who	 wears	 a	 niqab	 in	 Ambon.	 Other	women	 from	 the	 community	 of	 a	 neo-Salafi	 group	 of	 Java	 have	 used	 niqab	since	 they	settled	 in	a	particular	own	quarter	 in	Ambon	during	and	after	 the	1999-2002	conflicts.	During	my	stay	in	Ambon,	I	encountered	some	of	them	in	public	 places	 with	 or	 without	 the	 company	 of	 a	mahram	or	male	 custodian.	Occasionally	 I	 met	 them	 while	 using	 the	 public	 transport.	 Since	 Lubna	Mauladawilah	has	a	traditionalist	religious	background,	her	wearing	the	niqab	illustrates	 that	 this	garment	 is	no	 longer	a	distinctive	marker	 for	a	particular	religious	 ideology,	namely	neo-Salafism.	Similar	examples	can	be	seen	among	other	informants,	such	as	Gaia	(see	page	83).		Gaia	 is	 a	widow	 from	 a	 non-Sada	 family.	 She	 and	 her	 daughter’s	 family	live	in	her	small	house,	which	is	located	in	a	densely	populated	neighbourhood	near	the	harbor.	In	her	daily	activities,	Gaia	dresses	in	a	long	loose	dress	and	a	loosely	wrapped	headscarf.	After	having	seen	Gaia	at	several	meetings,	I	found	out	 that	she	 is	affiliated	with	a	neo-Salafi	 school	of	 thought.	She	 told	me	that	her	husband	was	a	member	of	an	Islamic	fighter	group	and	had	gone	missing	during	the	conflicts.	Contrary	to	her	mother,	Gaia’s	daughter	did	not	cover	her	head,	and	on	some	occasions	I	saw	her	wearing	a	short	shirt	or	short	trousers	when	going	out.	Although	Gaia	 is	a	neo-Salafi	oriented	believer,	 she	does	not	cover	her	face,	nor	does	she	force	her	daughter	to	dress	like	her.	This	plurality	of	 sartorial	 practices	 in	 one	 family	 is	 common	 and	 shows	 how	 different	religious	styles	can	live	side	by	side	in	one	family.		
Case	2:		Dress	and	Occupation	My	informant	Faiza	(see	page	53)	is	a	government	official	from	a	Sada	family.	I	met	her	several	times	wearing	her	outdoor	clothes.	She	was	well	and	elegantly	dressed	up	when	I	looked	her	up	once	in	her	work	office.	In	her	daily	activities	outside	 the	 office,	 she	 dressed	more	 simple	 but	 still	 she	 followed	 the	 latest	
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fashion.	When	 I	 complimented	 her	 once	 for	 her	 looks,	 she	 remarked,	 “Look,	honestly,	 I	 am	47	 years	 old”.59	Her	 position	 in	 the	 government	 is	 one	 among	other	reasons	why	she	pays	so	much	attention	to	her	appearance.	Her	clothes	express	 not	 merely	 her	 religious	 identity	 but	 also	 other	 dimensions	 of	 her	social	 identity,	 such	as	belonging	 to	a	certain	professional	group.	Faiza	 is	not	the	only	person	who	spends	her	money	for	decorating	her	body	with	luxurious	clothes.	Other	informants,	such	as	Niswa,	also	spend	much	money	and	time	for	her	body.		
Case	3:		Dress	and	Religious	Consumerism	Niswa	(45	years	old)	is	of	non-Sada	origin	and	works	as	a	lecturer	at	a	private	college.	Whenever	I	met	her,	she	always	wore	her	stylish	headscarf	combined	with	a	long	blouse	and	a	long	skirt	or	trousers.	She	told	me	that	every	time	she	went	to	Java	for	her	 job,	she	spent	time	shopping	for	clothes.	She	said,	“Here,	clothes	are	very	expensive	and	also	out	of	date…now	I	can	buy	what	I	like	but	once	I	am	married	I	won’t	have	time”.60	Niswa’s	case	show	how	Hadramis	do	not	 just	 orient	 themselves	 on	 the	 local	 Ambonese	 society,	 but	 also	 on	wider	cultural	 contexts	 in	 which	 global	 consumerism	 is	 part	 of	 the	 daily	 life	 of	religious	 community.	 Yet,	 dress	 is	 more	 than	 a	 sign	 of	 conspicuous	consumption,	it	can	also	be	a	symbol	of	resistance,	as	the	case	of	my	informant	Rafa	(see	page	76)	below	illustrates.		
Case	4:		Dress	and	Feminism		My	 informant	 Rafa	 is	 a	 journalist	 of	 mixed	 origin	 whom	 I	 met	 in	 some	occasions	during	my	fieldwork.	Her	father	is	of	Sada	origin,	and	her	mother	is	a	woman	of	 local	Ambonese	Christian	origin	who	has	converted	to	Islam.	I	was	introduced	to	Rafa	at	a	seminar	at	the	State	Islamic	Institute	(IAIN)	in	2012	by	a	colleague	who	knew	about	my	research.	 If	my	colleague	had	not	added	 the	information	 about	 Rafa’s	 background,	 I	 would	 never	 have	 guessed	 she	belonged	 to	 a	 Sada	 family.	 	 Rafa	 looked	 ‘local’,	 having	 no	 physical	 Arab	appearance.	Moreover,	 she	was	completely	dressed	 in	black;	wearing	a	 short	black	shirt,	black	trousers	 that	were	 full	of	holes,	casual	black	shoes,	and	she	had	 even	 painted	 her	 lips	 black.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 her	 appearance	 I	 concluded	that	Rafa	was	a	woman	who	liked	to	present	herself	as	rather	androgynous	if	not,	masculine.	I	was	quite	surprised	then,	when	I	visited	her	in	her	home,	and	noticed	 that	 she	 was	 wearing	 a	 more	 feminine	 type	 of	 dress.	 When	 I	commented	on	the	different	style	of	clothing,	Rafa	explained	that	she	does	not	resist	 a	 ‘feminine	 dress’	 as	 such,	 but	 that	 the	way	 she	 dresses	 in	 public	 is	 a	
                                                59	Interview	with	Faiza,	October	17,	2014.	60	Interview	with	Niswa,	December	15,	2014.	
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symbol	of	her	 resistance	against	a	patriarchal	 society,	which	 is	 characterized	by	 conceiving	 of	 masculinity	 and	 femininity	 in	 opposite	 terms,	 and	 in	 male	domination	over	women.	The	cases	above	demonstrate	that	through	particular	dress	habits	as	well	as	 through	 body	 modifications	 and	 deportment,	 people	 are	 engaged	 in	complex	processes	of	expressing	and	constructing	individual	and	social	group	identifications.	 Sartorial	 practices	 thus	 provide	 “a	 window	 to	 look	 at	 into	 a	culture	--	a	window	allows	a	viewer	to	look	in,	but	also	to	look	out”	(Hulsbosch	2014,	 6).	 	 In	 this	 regard,	 while	 reflecting	 both	 personal	 and	 various	 social	dimensions	 of	 identity,	 ‘reading’	 the	 corporeal	 performances	 of	 Hadramis	 of	Ambon	is	no	easy	matter	as	the	meanings	behind	them	are	fluid	and	complex.			
7. Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 sketched	 a	 general	 picture	 of	 the	 socio-economic,	political	and	cultural	practices	of	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	 in	 the	present-day	era.	The	Hadramis	 are	 a	 patrilineal	 descent-based	 community,	 claiming	 a	 shared	origin	from	Hadramaut.	However,	as	I	have	demonstrated	in	this	chapter,	they	are	 far	 from	 a	 homogenous	 group.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 divided	 into	 different	families/clans	as	well	as	into	a	broad	category	of	Sada	and	non-Sada.		All	these	heterogeneous	 classification	 and	 status	 claims	 show	 the	 persistence	 of	 some	traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 stratification	 patterns.	 The	 distinction	 between	Sada	and	non-Sada	categories	remains	dominant	as	a	marker	of	social	status	or	as	‘symbolic	capital’	rather	than	a	social	class.		What	transpires	from	the	case	studies	presented	in	the	different	sections	of	this	chapter	is	that	the	distinction	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	does	not	fully	prescribe	 the	 way	 the	 Hadramis	 act	 in	 the	 public	 sphere.	 Their	 status	 as	Hadramis	 is,	 in	fact,	 interlocked	in	wider	social	 fields	 in	the	 local	structure	of	Ambon.	In	this	context,	the	Hadramis	of	Ambon	have	proved	their	adaptability	to	changing	socio-cultural,	economic,	and	political	contexts.	The	 Hadramis’	 engagement	 in	 various	 professional	 occupations	 and	political	 affiliations	 shows	 that	 they	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 local	 socio-political	 structure	 and	 participate	 in	 seeking,	 exercising	 and	 maintaining	power	obtained	through	various	economic	and	political	resources,	in	ways	that	best	serves	their	personal	purposes.	The	relation	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	should	be	viewed	not	only	within	 the	wider	spectrum	of	 the	dynamic	power	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 both	 in	 the	 diaspora	 and	 the	homeland,	but	also	on	a	micro	scale	of	intra-	and	inter-personal	relationships	among	themselves	(see	marriage	patterns	in	chapter	4	section	3.1).	Female	members	of	diasporic	Hadrami	communties	are	often	neglected	in	research	projects	on	Hadramis.	The	section	on	women’s	economic	activities	in	
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The	chapter	discusses	the	relationship	between	kinship,	identity	construction,	and	gender	 relations	 in	 the	Hadrami	 community	 in	Ambon.	 It	 focuses	on	 the	ways	Hadramis	engage	in	situated	practices	of	kinship	relations	and	how	these	kinship	 practices	 affect	 gender	 relations,	 social	 reproduction	 and	 identity	construction.	 It	 examines	 how	 descent	 or	 genealogical	 reckoning	 is	 an	embodied	practice	of	social	reproduction	and	 identity	making	on	the	basis	of	gender	difference.	In	this	chapter,	I	employ	kinship	theories	as	a	framework	to	understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 kinship,	 identity	 making,	 and	 gender	relations.	The	first	part	of	the	chapter	sketches	the	specific	kinship	system	that	in	principle	governs	the	ways	the	Hadrami	community	of	Ambon	conceives	of	family	 relations.	 	 It	 covers	 fundamental	 elements	 that	 constitute	 a	 kinship	system	 in	 the	 community,	 and	 relationship	 between	 patrilineal	 descent,	 kin	terms,	genealogy	and	naming	system.	The	second	part	deals	with	the	ways	in	which	this	kinship	system	informs	marriage	practices.	It	will	address	marriage	patterns	of	 the	Sada	and	non-Sada,	 the	conception	on	kafa’a	 regulations,	and	its	impact	on	gender	relations.			
2. A	Kinship	System	among	the	Hadrami	Community	of	Ambon	
Kinship	 is	 generally	 defined	 as	 a	 web	 of	 social	 relationships	 between	categories	 of	 persons	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 descent	 and	 marriage	 that	 form	consanguine	and	affine	relations	 (Stone	1997,	5).	This	general	definition	was	predominantly	 central	 in	 early	 anthropological	 studies	 on	 kinship	 (Goody	1973;	 Peletz	 1995;	Holy	1996;	 Carsten	2004;	 Strathern	2005;	 Sahlins	 2011).	The	specific	approach	of	kinship	in	this	definition	has	been	criticized	as	being	ethnocentric,	 since	 it	 conceptualizes	of	kinship	 in	 terms	of	genealogical	grids	or	biological	ties	(blood	ties)	which	may	be	dominant	in	western	societies	but	less	 primarily	 so	 in	 many	 other	 societies.	 One	 of	 the	 leading	 critics	 in	 this	matter	 was	 Schneider	 (1984),	 who	 defines	 social	 bonds	 (kinship)	 as	 a	performatively	 constituted	 field	 of	 social	 relations	 which	 do	 not	 necessarily	entail	 genealogical	 (biological)	 connections.	 In	 other	 words,	 Schneider	 is	concerned	more	with	 forms	 of	 doing	 than	with	 forms	 of	 being,	 in	 aspects	 of	nurture	 rather	 than	 of	 nature.	 Since	 Schneider’s	 critique,	 more	 and	 more	scholars	have	approached	kinship	as	a	cultural	 construct	by	emphasizing	 the	interrelationship	between	nature	and	nurture	aspects,	between	the	biological	and	the	social,	and	between	real	and	fictive	kinship.		
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Today,	 the	 study	 of	 kinship	 has	 lost	 its	 centrality	 in	 contemporary	anthropological	 research,	 along	with	 the	 development	 of	medical	 technology	on	 social	 reproduction,	 LGBTQ+	 communities,	 and	 the	 decline	 in	 western	marriage	 institutions	(Read	2007,	329).	Also,	 the	 focus	of	kinship	studies	has	shifted	from	‘kinship’	as	a	terminological	system	and	as	a	symbolic	system	in	its	own	right	 towards	kinship	 in	 the	sense	of	 social	 relations	among	variably	situated	 actors	 engaged	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 social	 reproduction	 (Peletz	 1995,	366;	 Read	 2007,	 329).	 Likewise,	 current	 kinship	 studies	 focus	 less	 on	terminologies	as	such	but	on	linking	conceptions	of	kinship	with	other	aspects	such	as	economy,	power,	religion,	gender,	and	others	(Godelier	2011,	19).	This	is	how	I	approach	kinship	in	this	chapter.	Scholars	in	Hadrami	studies	seem	to	agree	that	Hadrami	migrants	actively	maintain	a	distinct	diasporic	 cultural	 identity.	 Syed	Farid	Alatas	 clearly	gives	reference	to	the	importance	of	kinship	as	he	states:			The	Hadhrami	migrants	 in	diaspora	had	 for	 centuries	married	 into	East	African,	South	 Indian	and	Malay-Indonesian	communities	without	 losing	the	 sense	 of	 Hadhrami	 identity,	 because	 such	 identity	 was	 neither	national	 nor	 ethnic,	 but	 was	 based	 on	 kinship.	 The	 locus	 of	 Hadhrami	identity	was	not	so	much	language	but	nasab	(lineage),	which	formed	the	basis	of	a	uniquely	Hadhrami	type	of	asabiyya	(Alatas	1997,	29).	This	statement	points	 to	 two	 themes:	kinship	and	group	 formation.	Although	intermarriage	 is	 a	 salient	 factor	 of	 kinship	 relations	 and	 functioned	 as	cementing	 ties	 between	 the	 Hadramis,	 hosting	 societies	 and	 other	 Hadrami	diaspora,	 the	Hadrami	 identity	 according	 to	 Alatas	was	 primarily	 formed	 on	the	 basis	 of	 genealogical	 connections	 (blood	 ties).	 His	 argument	 reminds	 us	about	 early	 anthropological	 debates	 on	 fundamental	 assumptions	 of	 kinship,	whether	 descent	 or	 alliance	 is	 a	 primordial	 axis	 constituting	 kinship,	 and	whether	 biological	 or	 social	 ties	 are	 elements	 of	 forming	 kinship	 (Godelier	2011).	 	 Alatas	 himself	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 kinship	 debates.	 The	 reason	 I	 quote	him	here	is	that	I	take	his	argument	as	a	starting	point	for	my	discussion	of	the	kinship	system	that	 is	 the	basic	point	of	 reference	 for	present-day	Hadramis’	kinship	 system.	 I	 will	 address	 what	 constitutes	 fundamental	 aspects	 of	 the	kinship	system	among	the	Hadramis,	how	kinship	is	related	to	(group)	identity	making,	and	how	the	kinship	system	is	maintained	over	generations.	By	analyzing	conceptions	of	kinship	among	today’s	Hadrami	descendants	of	Ambon,	rather	than	merely	assuming	real	genealogical	connections,	I	follow	scholars	 who	 define	 kinship	 as	 “a	 cultural	 construct	 expressed	 through	 a	kinship	terminology	constituted	as	an	interconnected	system	of	symbols,	with	persons	defined	as	kin	 to	one	another	 realized	 in	many	different	modalities”	(Read	 2007,	 331).	 This	 definition	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 actual	 flexible	 kinship	practices	of	Hadramis	in	which	descent	is	one	among	several	other	important	
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categories	 in	 forming	webs	 of	 social	 relations.	 Following	 Keesing	 (1975,	 17)	and	 Stone	 (1997,	 11)	 who	 contend	 that	 descent	 serves	 as	 a	 means	 of	constructing	 discrete,	 stable	 groups	 which	 persist	 over	 time,	 I	 argue	 that	genealogical	reckoning	is	a	symbolic	cultural	construct	that	the	Hadramis	use	in	 order	 to	 form	 group	 identities.	 How	 a	 specific	 cultural	 kinship	 construct	based	on	genealogical	ties	continues	to	inform	kinship	practices	among	today’s	Hadramis	in	Ambon	will	be	delineated	in	the	following	sections.		
2.1 Patrilineal	Descent	and	Kin	Terms	The	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	generally	adopt	a	patrilineal	descent	system,	tracing	lineage	 from	Hadramaut	 in	 southern	Arabian	peninsula	 through	shared	male	ancestors.	This	means	that	the	community	continues	the	Arab	system	from	the	country	of	origin.	This	agnatic	system	is	used	by	local	Ambonese	as	well,	who	differ	in	this	respect	from	most	ethnic	groups	in	Indonesian	society	who	tend	to	 adopt	 a	 bilateral	 descent	 system.	 Although	 the	 Hadrami	 community	inherited	an	agnatic	descent	system	from	Hadramaut,	its	members	do	not	use	an	 Arab	 kin	 pattern,	which	 is	 classified	 under	 the	 Sudanese	 system	 in	 a	 full	sense.61	Rather,	the	community	combines	Arab	kin	terms	from	Hadramaut	and	local	 terms	 in	 their	 daily	 activities	 (see	 a	 list	 of	 the	 kin	 terms	 in	 the	 table	below).		
Table	4.1:	A	List	of	Kin	Terms	Kin	Terms	 Arabic	 Ambonese	Father’s	father	 Jid,	Habib	 Tetek	Father’s	mother	 Jidda,	Hababa	 Nenek	Mother’s	father	 Jid,	Habib	 Tetek	Mother’s	mother	 	 Jidda,	Hababa	 Nenek	Father	 Abi,	Aba	 Papa	Mother	 Umi	 Mama	Father’s	brother	 Ami	 Om,	Paman	Father’s	sister	 	 Amati	 Bibi,	Tante	Mother’s	brother	 Khal	 Om,	Paman	Mother’s	sister	 Khalati	 Bibi,	Tante	Mother’s	sibling’s	children	 Ibn	Khal	 Sepupu,	Adik,	Kakak	Father’s	sibling’s	children	 Ibn	Ami	 Sepupu,	Adik,	Kakak		
                                                61	The	Sudanese	system	is	one	of	the	six	major	patterns	of	kinship	system	classified	by	L.H	Morgan	(1871),	and	it	 is	based	on	a	descriptive	model.	The	descriptive	model	 is	a	system	in	which	 it	gives	a	separate	definition	(term)	for	almost	each	one	of	Ego’s	kin,	based	 on	 their	 distance	 from	 Ego,	 their	 relation,	 and	 their	 gender.	 Ego’s	 Father	 is	differentiated	 from	Ego’s	Father’s	brother	and	 from	Ego’s	mother’s	brother.	Likewise,	Ego’s	 mother	 is	 distinguished	 from	 Ego’s	 sister	 and	 Ego’s	 mother’s	 sister.	 The	 Arab	society	is	under	a	category	of	this	pattern.		
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The	 list	above	reveals	 that	 there	are	mixed	 terms	of	address,	which	combine	Arabic,	 localized	 Dutch,62	and	 local	 words.	 In	 daily	 practice,	 I	 noted	 that	 the	Arab	descendants	rarely	use	jid	and	jidda.	They	rather	use	other	Arabic	terms	such	as	habib	and	hababa,	which	literally	mean	‘beloved’.	The	terms	of	address	for	maternal	grandparents	depend	on	their	lineage.	If	the	patrilineal	descent	of	maternal	 grandparents	 is	 from	 Hadramaut,	 they	 may	 be	 addressed	 and	referred	to	with	the	same	terms	habib	and	hababa.	Alternatively,	they	may	be	addressed	or	referred	to	with	the	Ambonese	terms	tetek	and	nenek.	The	terms	
habib	 and	hababa	 are	used	 to	 address	 (great)	 great	 grandparents	 as	well.	 In	practice,	 the	 terms	 habib	 and	 hababa	 are	 commonly	 used	 terms	 for	 elder	people.	In	addition,	there	are	different	terms	to	address	ego’s	mother’s	siblings	and	ego’s	 father’s	siblings	 in	Arabic.	Paternal	uncles	and	aunts	are	called	ami	and	amati,	while	maternal	uncles	and	aunts	are	called	khal	and	khalati.	I	noted	that	 in	 daily	 communication	 some	Hadramis	 use	 the	 terms	 khal	 and	 khalati,	but	 they	 do	 not	 use	 amati.	 This	 amati	 is	 replaced	 by	 Ambonese	 terms	 bibi,	
tante,	and	even	ibu,	which	literally	means	‘mother’	but	which	is	also	used	as	a	term	of	 respect	 for	 older	women.	 Likewise,	 the	 terms	ami	 and	khal	are	 only	used	by	some	descendants,	and	they	may	be	replaced	by	the	local	terms	om	or	
paman.	 	Many	Hadramis	also	replace	abi	and	umi	with	papa	and	mama,	while	many	others	prefer	abi-umi	terms,	and	some	of	them	combine	abi	or	aba	with	
mama.	Furthermore,	I	did	not	come	across	the	use	of	Arabic	terms	for	paternal	and	maternal	cousins,	although	the	Arabic	terms	ibn	ami	and	ibn	khal	are	used	to	address	paternal	cousin	and	maternal	cousin	consecutively.	In	other	words,	all	cousins,	whether	paternal	or	maternal,	parallel	or	cross,	bear	the	same	term	‘cousin’	in	local	terms.	Thus,	in	their	daily	encounters	today’s	Hadramis	in	Ambon	use	mixed	kin	terms	 rather	 than	 fully	 applying	 Arabic	 ones.	 In	 fact,	 they	 borrow	 from	different	 languages,	 blending	 local	 (or	 localized)	 and	 Hadramaut	 traditions.	Holton	 (2013)	 argues	 on	 local	 language	 extinction	 in	 eastern	 Indonesia	 that	kinship	terminology	is	the	first	semantic	domain	to	erode	under	conditions	of	language	shifts	due	to	intermarriage.	As	a	consequence	of	intermarriage,	some	original	 lexical	 terms	 may	 be	 retained	 but	 the	 kinship	 terms	 tend	 to	 shift	semantically.	In	the	case	of	the	Hadrami	community	of	Ambon,	both	lexical	and	semantic	 aspects	 of	 Arabic	 kin	 terms	 have	 shifted:	 some	 terms	 have	 been	changed,	 others	 have	 not.	 Also,	 some	 terms	 have	 been	 retained	 but	 have	acquired	a	different	meaning.	In	this	context,	 language	borrowing	reflected	in	the	 use	 of	 kinship	 terms	bears	witness	 of	 the	 historical	 developments	 of	 the	Hadrami	 community	 and	 its	 relations	 with	 the	 local	 population	 through	intermarriage	(see	further	in	the	section	of	marriage	patterns).		
                                                62	By	localized	Dutch,	I	mean	Dutch	words	(terms	of	address)	that	have	been	adopted	or	borrowed	by	local	Ambonese	and	other	Indonesians	as	an	influence	of	colonialism.		
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As	 illustrated	 above,	 there	 is	 both	 continuity	 and	 change	 in	 the	 use	 of	patrilineal	ancestors’	kin	 terms.	As	Bloch	(1971)	and	Evans-Pritchard	(1964)	argue,	 the	 categories	of	 kin	 terms	or	modes	of	 address	may	 constitute	 social	relations,	 including	 rights	 and	 obligations	 within	 the	 categories	 of	 persons	related	 to	 birth	 and	marriage,	 but	 they	 give	no	 adequate	 explanation	 for	 the	ways	 that	 boundaries	 between	 groups	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 Hadramis	 are	drawn.	The	use	of	some	Arabic	kin	terms	to	address	categories	of	people	that	one	is	related	to	through	birth	or	marriage	shows	that	the	Hadrami	community	is	 only	 partly	 influenced	 by	 its	 agnatic	 descent	 system	 inherited	 from	Hadramaut.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	delineate	how	a	patrilineal	descent	system	 is	 applied	 in	 the	 naming	 system	 as	 a	 boundary	 marker	 of	 a	 group	(social	identity)	formation,	and	thus	both	expresses	and	affects	social	relations,	including	gender	relations.			
2.2 Patrilineal	Descent	and	Naming	System		The	underlying	focus	in	this	section	is	on	delineating	naming	practices	among	the	Hadrami	community	in	relation	to	a	patrilineal	descent	system.	Names	and	naming	 practices	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 many	 anthropological	 works	 from	functionalism	 to	 structuralism	 approaches	 (see	 Vom	 Bruck	 and	 Bodernhorn	2006).	 In	 the	context	of	my	own	ethnographic	study,	 I	will	consider	personal	names	among	Hadramis	not	only	as	either	codes	(signifiers)	or	as	speech	acts,	but	as	an	entanglement	of	both.	In	other	words,	names	are	not	merely	a	code	(signifier)	rendering	information	about	individuals	in	their	collective	property	or	social	matrix	(classificatory	 labels),	but	they	are	also	a	way	of	constituting	social	relations	that	may	have	implications	for	defining	or	crossing	boundaries	(Vom	Bruck	and	Bodernhorn	2006,	25-26).		Today’s	 naming	 practices	 among	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 are	 very	 much	influenced	 by	 the	 community’s	 drawing	 on	 a	 patrilineal	 descent	 system	inherited	 from	 Hadramaut.	 The	 continued	 influence	 of	 Hadrami	 naming	traditions	does	not	mean	that	the	community	lacks	creativity	and	innovation	in	their	naming	practice	as	will	be	explained	further	in	detail	below.	The	 pattern	 of	 personal	 naming	 in	 general	 has	 two	 components:	 given	names	 and	 surnames.	 The	 first	 component,	 given	 names,	 usually	 consists	 of	one	 word	 such	 as	 Alwiyya	 or	 Alwi.	 One	 of	 the	 striking	 features	 in	 the	 first	component	is	that	most	of	the	common	names	for	both	male	and	female	names	are	 typically	 adopted	 from	Hadramaut.63	The	 second	 feature	 is	 that	many	 of	
                                                63	The	 most	 common	 female	 names	 are	 Amina,	 Khadija,	 Fatima,	 Fatma,	 Alwiyah,	Syechah,	 Feryal,	 Maryam,	 Rugaya,	 Aisya,	 Kalsum,	 Raguan,	 Gamar,	 Tsurayya,	 Shifa,	Muzna,	 Masni,	 Madina,	 Salma,	 Hamidah,	 Balqis,	 Farida,	 Lun,	 and	 Nur.	 	 The	 most	common	 male	 names	 are	 Abdullah,	 Muhammad,	 Ahmad,	 Ali,	 Hasan,	 Husain,	 Alwi,	
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the	 given	 names	 are	 repetitive	 of	 names	 from	 older	 generations.	 	When,	 for	example,	 I	asked	a	forty-two-year-old	Sada	descendant,	Aliya	how	she	named	her	children,	she	explained:		We	name	our	children	by	following	the	names	of	our	forefathers	because	otherwise	we	 lose	them…	the	names	of	my	four	children	 follow	those	of	my	 great	 grandfather,	 my	 father’s	 brother,	 my	 grandfather,	 and	 my	grandmother	respectively.	My	own	name	also	resembles	my	grandfather’s	sister’s	name.64		This	informant’s	statement	reflects	that	this	kind	of	repetitive	practice	is	a	way	to	easily	remember	their	older	family	members	and	to	keep	the	tradition	alive.	On	one	occasion,	I	was	invited	by	a	young	Hadrami	family	of	Sada	origin	to	 come	 to	 a	 name-giving	 ritual	 for	 their	 first	 new-born	 baby.	 The	 young	couple	told	me	that	they	were	very	glad	with	their	new-born	baby	for	they	had	waited	 two	years	 to	get	pregnant.	 In	 this	 ceremony,	 the	couple	 showed	 their	baby	 to	 their	 guests,	 a	 mixed	 group	 of	 relatives,	 neighbors	 and	 friends,	 and	shared	with	them	the	baby’s	name	and	their	expectations	and	reasons	of	giving	a	 particular	 name	 for	 the	 baby.	 In	 the	 name-giving	 ceremony,	 the	 parents	requested	prayers	from	the	guests	and	asked	blessings	from	older	members	of	the	 family	 for	 the	 new-born	 baby.	 The	 ritual	 included	 body	movements	 and	chants	of	religious	texts	like	those	recited	in	maulid	celebrations.	In	 this	 context,	 two	 kinds	 of	 collective	memory	 are	 involved.	 Keeping	 a	tradition	 alive	 through	 a	 repetitive	 act	 of	 naming	 involves	 what	 is	 called	‘episodic	 memory’.	 The	 	 name-giving	 ceremony	 itself	 involves	 ‘procedural	memory	 or	 implicit	 memory’,	 which	 includes	 ceremonial	 behaviors	 as	described	 by	 Paul	 Connerton	 (1984)	 in	 How	 societies	 remember. 65 		 This	practice	of	repeating	names	in	Hadrami	families,	whether	formally	celebrated	in	a	ritual	or	not,	is	aimed	at	easily	recalling	ancestors’	names	and	the	persons	attached	 to	 the	 names	 in	 people’s	 memory.	 This	 naming	 practice	 in	 oral	tradition	 is	 very	 important	 being	 able	 to	 preserve	 the	 lineage	 easily	 and	prevent	 losing	a	genealogical	 record,	especially	when	a	written	 tradition	 in	a	society	is	not	yet	developed.	
                                                                                                             Abdurrahman,	Muhsin,	Abu	Bakar,	Awadh,	 Salim,	Sahil,	Hasyim,	Hamid,	 Saggaf,	Tahir,	Abdul	Qadir,	Idrus,	Umar,	Agil,	Muhdar,	Syech,	Muthahar,	Saleh,	Hamzah,	and	Raqwan.	64		Interview	with	Aliya,	December	5,	2014.	65	David	 Manier	 and	 William	 Hirst	 identify	 three	 categories	 of	 collective	 memories,	namely	 episodic	 memory,	 semantic	 memory,	 and	 procedural	 memory.	 Episodic	memory	 is	 memory	 about	 events	 in	 the	 particular	 personal	 past	 of	 members	 of	 a	mnemonic	 community	 such	 as	 a	 group	 of	 friends	 or	 families;	 semantic	 memory	 is	memory	about	all	general	facts	that	people	learn,	and	is	divided	into	lived	memory	and	distant	 memory;	 procedural	 memory	 is	 memory	 about	 events	 stored	 through	commemorative	ceremonies	(Manier	and	Hirst	2008,	61).		
Chapter	4:	Kinship,	Marriage,	and	Gender	
113		
The	given	names	of	Hadramis	intersect	with	other	social	categories,	such	as	religion.	This	religious	dimension	relates	to	much	more	than	categorizing	a	person	in	terms	of	his	religious	affiliation;	 it	delivers	messages	about	who	an	individual	is	and	it	informs	the	named	individual	who	they	are	expected	to	be	(Arnold	1988,	53).	In	this	context,	names	convey	messages	on	the	conception	of	self	(identity)	in	several	ways;	by	locating	an	individual	into	a	social	matrix,	and	also	by	interpreting	the	lexical	meanings	of	the	names	hoped	for	qualities	of	 an	 individual	 (Arnold	1988,	 53).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	Hadrami	 Sada	 context,	 a	name	such	as	Shaikh	bears	three	different	connotations	that	touch	upon	both	literal	and	contextual	meanings	of	the	name.	Engseng	Ho	(2002)	analyzes	how	the	 name	 ‘Shaikh’	 in	 the	 biographical	 Sada	 text	 is	 used	 to	 connote	 three	aspects.	First,	as	a	person	who	lived	until	an	advanced	age;	second,	as	a	leader	of	esoteric	Sufis	of	his	age;	 third,	as	a	 teacher	of	students	 in	exoteric	science.	The	 first	 is	more	 in	a	 literal	 sense,	and	 the	 latter	 two	are	more	contextual	 in	regard	to	the	positions	of	the	person	who	bears	an	honorific	name	(Ho	2002,	222).	In	 the	 context	 of	 my	 informants	 too,	 some	 Islamic	 names	 may	 have	 a	psychological	 effect	 on	 a	 person	 because	when	 giving	 a	 name,	 parents	 hope	that	 their	 children	 will	 have	 good	 manners	 and	 behavior	 in	 their	 life	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 literal	 meanings	 of	 the	 words	 or	 the	 heroic	 activities	associated	with	 the	 names	 in	 Islamic	 history,	 such	 as	 Amina,	 Khadija,	 Aisha,	Fatima,	Abdullah,	Muhammad,	Umar,	Abu	Bakar,	Ali,	Hasan,	Husain,	 or	other	heroic	 names	 in	 a	 more	 contemporary	 era	 (Eickelman	 1989).	 A	 Sada	descendant,	 Shauqi	 (45	 years	 old),	 husband	 of	 my	 informant	 Aliya,	 for	instance,	 explained	why	 the	 name	 of	 his	 last	 child	 differs	 from	 the	 rest:	 “My	first	child’s	name	is	like	my	grandfather,	the	second	is	like	my	father’s	younger	brother,	the	third	is	like	my	father,	the	fourth	is	like	my	mother.	The	last	is	a	bit	different.	He	is	called	Sayyid	Shamil	Bashaib,	the	name	of	today’s	mujahidin”.66	He	continued	by	saying	that	he	and	his	wife	hope	their	 last	son	will	be	a	real	
mujahid	 (Islamic	 fighter).	 In	 this	 sense,	 a	 name	 is	 not	 just	 a	matter	 of	 word	choice.	 Arabic	 names	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 Islamic	 and	 therefore	 appropriate,	and	they	are	expected	to	 invoke	blessings.	Moreover,	a	name	may	points	to	a	role	model,	an	ideal	figure,	whose	manners,	attitude	and	aptitude	are	projected	on	a	person’s	child’s	future,	thus	illustrating	Levy-Bruhl’s	argument	that	names	are	 more	 than	 a	 simply	 code;	 they	 are	 potentially	 powerful	 things	 in	themselves	(Vom	Bruck	and	Bodernhorn	2006,	10).	As	 the	 Hadramis	 are	 not	 the	 only	 Muslim	 groups	 in	 Ambon,	 to	 some	extent	 they	 share	 given	 names	 with	 other	 Muslim	 communities.	 However,	 I	noticed	 that	 other	 Muslim	 communities	 of	 Ambon	 generally	 tend	 to	 use	popular	 Islamic	 names	 referring	 to	 well-known	 role	 models	 in	 Islamic	
                                                66	Interview	with	Shauqi,	December	5,	2014	
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historiography,	 such	 as	 Ali,	 Muhammad,	 Hasan,	 Husain,	 Amina,	 Fatima,	Khadija,	or	Kalsum,		rather	than	other	particular	names	such	as	Muhdar,	Alwi,	Saggaf,	 Shaikh,	 Alwiyya,	 Shaikha,	 Rugaya,	 which	 are	 mainly	 used	 by	 the	Hadramis.	Although	most	of	the	given	names	reflect	continuation	of	the	Hadramaut	tradition,	many	of	 today’s	young	 families	combine	several	names	 in	choosing	first	names	 for	 their	 children,	while	 still	 keeping	 the	most	 common	Hadrami	given	 names.	 Many	 informants	 had	 given	 their	 children	 more	 than	 three	names,	which	were	derived	from	several	traditions	(western,	local,	Arab),	thus	illustrating	that	naming	is	a	creative	action	that	may	serve	different	purposes	(Vom	Bruck	and	Bodernhorn	2006,	10).		In	this	creative	action,	Hadramis	may	share	 some	 names	 with	 other	 groups	 in	 Ambonese	 society	 and	 convey	personal	 and	 collective	 desires	 or	 orientations	 that	 transcend	 classificatory	labels,	such	as	religion,	nationality,	ethnicity,	and	others.	The	 second	 component	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 naming	 system	 is	 surnames.	 As	the	 Hadrami	 community	 adopts	 a	 patrilineal	 descent	 system,	 both	male	 and	female	members	 are	born	 into	 the	 group	of	male	 lineage,	 and	both	men	 and	women	inherit	 in	a	patriline	through	their	fathers.	This	means	that	both	sons	and	 daughters	 bear	 the	 names	 of	 their	 father’s	 lineage,	 but	 only	 sons	 can	transmit	it	to	their	offspring.	Although	the	status	of	daughters	is	fully	related	to	their	fathers’	 lineage,	their	status	may	change	to	their	husband’s	family	when	they	marry.	This	means	that	a	change	 in	daughter’s	status	after	her	marriage	may	 lead	 to	 change	 in	 her	 family	 name,	 by	 adopting	 her	 husband’s	 family	name.67	The	same	holds	true	for	women	who	come	from	outside	the	Hadrami	community;	 they	will	 bear	 their	 Hadrami	 husband’s	 patrilines	 as	 a	 result	 of	their	 marriage	 into	 the	 Hadrami	 community.	 An	 individual	 member	 of	 the	Hadrami	community	bears	their	surname	deriving	from	one	of	the	forty	apical	ancestors	which	are	largely	described	as	clans	(see	chapter	3	section	3.2.2).	In	this	 context,	 Hadrami	 surnames	 reflect	what	 anthropologists	 such	 as	Mauss,	Levi-Bruhl,	and	Levi-Strauss	called	the	coded	language	of	naming	patterns	(see	Vom	 Bruck	 and	 Bodernhorn	 2006,	 8-9),	 by	 classifying	 bearers	 of	 the	 names	into	a	social	matrix	of	ethnic	membership	as	Hadramis	or	Arabs	in	local	usage.	The	 Hadrami	 community	 is	 not	 only	 heterogeneous	 in	 terms	 of	 clan	membership	but	also	 in	 terms	of	 (claimed)	Sada	and	non-Sada	status	groups	(see	 chapter	 3	 section	3.2.1).	 There	hardly	 exists	 a	 distinction	between	 Sada	and	 non-Sada	 in	 terms	 of	 naming	 practices	 except	 for	 the	 specific	 Sada’s	construction	of	clan	classification	and	the	use	of	honorific	titles.	Arabic/Islamic	first	 names	 like	 Hasan	 for	 a	 man	 or	 Rugaya	 for	 a	 woman	 are	 shared	 by	 all	Hadramis,	regardless	their	Sada	or	non-Sada	background.	
                                                67	This	is	a	matter	of	choice,	however:	officially	women	keep	their	maiden	surname.	
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I	would	never	have	been	able	 to	differentiate	 and	get	 a	 full	 overview	of	the	forty	Arab	family	names	in	Ambon	without	the	help	of	my	Sada	informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	(see	chapter	2	page	43).	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	shared	a	list	of	the	family	names	(surnames)	in	Ambon	and	divided	them	into	two	 larger	 groups.	 This	 classification	 based	 on	 the	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	distinction	is	constructed	by	members	of	the	Sada	group	who	established	the	Rabitha	al-‘Alawiyya,	which	serves	as	a	 lineage	purification	 institution	within	the	 Sada	 community	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 prophetic	 lineage	 and	 preclude	abuse	of	 it.	Through	this	institution,	the	genealogical	records	of	the	Prophet’s	family	are	circulated	around	Indonesia	(see	section	4.2.3).			
Table	4.2:	Address	Terms	GENDER	 SADA	 NON-SADA	MALE	 Sayyid68	Abdullah	al-Hamid	 Hasan	al-Kathiri	FEMALE	 Sharifa69	Rugaya	al-Hamid	 Lun	al-Kathiri		The	 honorific	 titles	 mentioned	 in	 table	 4.2	 are	 mainly	 used	 in	 daily	conversation,	 rather	 than	 in	 official/formal	 names.	 When	 I	 asked	 Sasa	 (31	years	old),	who	is	from	a	Sada	family	of	the	al-Aydrus	clan	about	her	personal	name,	 she	 mentioned	 the	 title	 sharifa,	 but	 she	 said,	 “that	 depends	 on	 the	parents	…	 even	without	 putting	 the	 titles	 in	 the	written	 document,	 the	 titles	are	 still	 inherently	 attached	 to	 ourselves”.70	Her	 statement	 illustrates	 that	naming	as	a	speech	act	is	an	effective	way	to	communicate	a	social	attribute	to	an	 audience.	 Similar	 to	 Sasa,	 many	 of	 my	 Sada	 informants	 mentioned	 their	names	with	the	honorific	titles	or	referred	to	other	Sada	members	by	using	the	mode	of	reverence	address.	This	 style	 of	 in-group	 identification	 with	 honorific	 Sada	 titles	 is	 both	informative	 and	 assertive,	 and	 moreover	 symbolic,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 self-naming	 not	 only	 contains	 messages	 of	 status	 differences	 among	 the	 Arab	members,	but	also	constitutes	how	social	relations	are	enacted	by	expressing	symbolic	 acts	of	 reverence	 to	 the	members	of	 the	 Sada.	 For	 instance,	 kissing	the	hands	of	a	member	of	the	Sada	group	in	a	gathering	or	meeting	is	a	way	of	performing	hierarchical	differences	between	the	Sada	and	non-Sada.		This	 kind	 of	 symbolic	 reverence	 acts	 can	 be	 translated	 differently	 into	various	customs.	Liana	(37	years	old),	a	woman	of	Javanese	origin	whose	sister	married	into	a	Sada	Hadrami	family,	told	me	that	in	the	presence	of	a	sharifa	or	a	habib	 one	has	 to	pay	 respect	 to	 them	by	not	 sitting	 in	 the	 same	 chair	 they	used,	 not	 standing	 next	 to	 them,	 and	 several	 other	 rules	 of	 etiquette.	 I	 saw	
                                                68	Two	 equivalent	 titles	 to	 sayyid	 are	 habib	 and	 sharif,	 although	 the	 latter	 is	 not	commonly	used.		69	Another	title	equivalent	to	sharifa	is	sayyida	but	it	is	uncommon.	70	Interview	with	Sasa,	December	8,	2014.		
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these	 rules	 of	 respect	 being	 applied	 when	 I	 did	 fieldwork	 in	 Tarim	 in	Hadramaut.	In	everyday	life	in	Ambon,	however,	I	did	not	observe	any	special	treatment	of	 the	 Sada	 in	 general,	 except	when	a	person	had	 some	additional	qualities,	such	as	possessing	extraordinary	much	religious	knowledge.	The	 privilege	 of	 honorific	 titles	 the	 Sada	 group	 enjoys,	 and	 the	accompanying	symbolic	practices	of	reverence	to	descendants	of	 the	Prophet	Muhammad	have	been	subject	of	a	long	debate	among	Muslim	communities	in	general	 and	 in	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	 the	 diaspora	 in	 particular.	 Such	contestations	 have	 been	 described	 by	 Michael	 Gilsenan,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	disapproval	of	non-Sada	reformist	Muslims	of	the	custom	of	greeting	Sada	by	kissing	 their	 hand	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 respect.	 Gilsenan	 described	 situations	 where	hand-kissing	could	not	be	avoided	without	creating	an	open	conflict,	as	sort	of	“a	 show,	 but	 a	 show	 with	 diametrically	 opposed	 meanings	 for	 the	 actors”	(Gilsenan	 1982,	 11).	 After	 one	 such	 incident,	 for	 example,	 a	 non-Sada	informant	 would	 confide	 to	 Gilsenan	 that	 they	 were	 only	 going	 through	 the	motions	 and	 that	 before	 long,	 the	 Sada	would	 lose	 their	 privileged	 position.	Although	 being	 contested,	 the	 practices	 still	 persist	 among	 certain	 groups	 of	Muslims,	especially	among	traditionalist	Muslims	of	prophetic	descent.		Rather	 than	 through	 greeting	 etiquette,	 in	 my	 daily	 encounters	 with	community	 members	 and	 locals,	 I	 learned	 to	 recognize	 who	 belonged	 to	 a	particular	Sada	group	thanks	to	the	use	of	the	honorific	titles	used	also	by	non-Sada	 Hadramis	 and	 members	 of	 other	 local	 groups	 to	 address	 members	 of	Sada	families.	 In	popular	 local	usage,	habib	 is	abbreviated	 into	bib	and	sayyid	into	ye,	and	sharifa	into	ipah	or	ipeh.	For	many	local	people,	the	abbreviation	of	the	titles	are	more	recognizable	than	the	full	address	terms.	To	 summarize	 this	 subsection,	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	 naming	practices	 within	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 are	 both	 open	 and	 closed	 in	character.	On	the	one	hand,	given	names	seem	to	be	of	an	open	nature	in	terms	of	semantics,	as	 they	render	multiple	meanings	depending	on	givers’	choices,	tastes,	and	expectations.	In	this	regard,	the	given	names	seem	to	be	subjective	and	personal.	On	the	other	hand,	surnames	are	part	of	a	closed	code,	pointing	to	a	particular	dimension	of	social	origin	or	to	a	social	attribute.	In	this	respect,	to	 some	 extent	 naming	 practices	 within	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 signify	 a	social	 order	 within	 the	 Hadrami	 community. 71 	Hadrami	 patrilineage	 is	reflected	 in	 the	use	of	 family	names	and	 full	of	 symbolic	meaning,	 serving	as	boundary	markers	between	in-	and	out	groups	within	the	Hadrami	community	
                                                71	The	order,	however,	is	not	itself	unique.	Within	a	larger	social	order	of	the	Ambonese	society,	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 shares	 a	 kinship	 system	 based	 on	 patrilineage	reflected	in	the	use	of	family	names.		From	my	fieldwork	and	previous	stays,	I	learned	that	every	local	resident	in	Ambon	bears	a	family	name	which	points	to	their	origin	or	geographical	 location.	 In	 this	context,	we	may	differentiate	between	various	 local	and	non-local	family	names.	
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itself	and	between	in-	and	out-	groups	distinguishing	the	Hadrami	community	from	other	communities.	In	variation	to	scholars	who	point	out	that	‘the	power	of	names	lies	not	in	their	 linguistic	 meaning,	 but	 in	 the	 names	 themselves’	 (see	 Vom	 Bruck	 and	Bodernhorn	2006,	6),	in	the	following	section	I	will	argue	that	in	particular,	the	power	 of	 names	 among	 Hadramis	 lies	 in	 an	 enactment	 of	 gendered	 social	relations	embedded	 in	a	system	of	kinship	ties	and	marriage	relations.	 	 I	will	discuss	 how	 power-laden	 names	 are	 constructed	 within	 the	 Hadrami	community.			
2.3 Patrilineal	Descent	and	Genealogy		Descent	systems	can	function	to	 form	stable	groups	 in	a	society	(Stone	1997,	59).	 By	 adopting	 a	 patrilineal	 descent	 mode,	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 has	 a	means	 of	 establishing	 descent	 groups,	which	 in	 turn	 become	 fundamental	 to	the		social	organization	of	the	community	(Stone	1997,	61).	Having	adopted	a	patrilineal	 descent	 mode,	 Hadrami	 membership	 is	 passed	 on	 through	 male	members	 only.	 It	 is	 thus	 sons	 who	 transmit	 their	 lineage	 to	 their	 offspring,	while	 daughters’	 offspring	 belong	 to	 their	 husband’s	 groups.	 In	 order	 to	maintain	survival	of	the	groups,	sons	and	daughters	 in	Hadrami	families	thus	have	 different	 responsibilities	 and	 opportunities.	 As	 transmitters	 of	 the	lineage,	sons	have	more	freedom	of	marriage	partners	than	daughters.	Between	 the	 two	groups	of	Sada	and	non-Sada,	 there	are	 forty	Hadrami	clans	 that	 can	 be	 distinguished	 (see	 chapter	 3	 section	 2.2).	 As	 I	 mentioned	before,	 although	 both	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 groups	 adopt	 patrilineal	 descent	reckoning,	only	 the	Sada	have	a	systematized	genealogical	 record,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.	
2.3.1 A	Systematized	Genealogy	of	the	Sada			Systematization	 of	 prophetic	 genealogy	 of	 Hadrami	 origin	 began	 in	 the	seventeenth	 century	 (Ho	 2006,	 117).	 This	 prophetic	 genealogy	 appeared	 in	two	 different	 canonical	 texts:	 ‘Abd	 al-Qadir	 al-‘Aydarus’s	The	Traveling	Light	
Unveiled	and	Muhammad	al-Shilli’s	the	Irrigating	Fount:	Biographical	Virtues	of	
the	 ‘Alawi	Sayyids.	 In	The	Traveling	Light,	genealogy	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	 plural	world	of	 places,	 dates	 and	persons	 imbued	with	mystical,	 esoteric	ways.	The	
Irrigating	Fount,	on	the	other	hand,	contains	exoteric	knowledge	in	the	field	of	law	and	a	guide	of	moral	action.	As	law,	genealogy	draws	a	boundary	between	the	in	and	out-group,	determining	whom	a	member	can	or	cannot	marry,	and	defining	 rights	 and	 obligations	 between	 members,	 such	 as	 inheritance	 and	social	security	(Ho	2006,	152).	In	the	nineteenth	century,	a	Sada	scholar	of	Tarimi	descent	called	‘Abd	ar-Rahman	 al-Mashur	 wrote	 genealogies	 of	 the	 Sada	 Hadrami	 in	 his	 book	 as-
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Shams	az-Zahira	(Ho	2006,	177-178).	Al-Mashur’s	book	has	become	one	of	the	main	 references	 for	 Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya	 organization	 in	 Indonesia.72		 The	Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya	 was	 established	 in	 Jakarta	 in	 1928	 with	 the	 aim	 of	maintaining	and	improving	the	dignity	of	Islamic	community,	more	especially	the	 Sada	 (‘Alawi)	 groups,	 through	 social	 and	 religious	 activities	 in	 order	 to	cultivate	 moral	 values,	 build	 an	 Islamic	 brotherhood,	 and	 maintain	 national	unity.	The	Rabita	al-‘Alawiya	is	involved	in	providing	scholarships	to	children	of	Sada	families	from	an	elementary	school	to	a	higher	education	level,	and	it	is	also	active	in	health	care.73		The	 systematic	 genealogical	 ‘purification’	 as	 members	 of	 the	 Rabita	organization	in	Indonesia	call	it,	is	managed	under	a	special	department	called	al-Maktab	 ad-Daimi.	 Al-Maktab	 ad-Daimi	was	 established	 in	 Jakarta	 in	 1942,	and	 aims	 at	 maintaining	 the	 history	 and	 the	 lineage	 of	 Sada	 families.74	This	particular	department	is	the	only	institution	that	has	registered	its	members	in	Indonesia	 and	 has	 issued	 a	 member	 list.	 When	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Sada	 is	registered	in	the	organization,	he	is	granted	a	member	book,	which	looks	like	a	passport	with	a	signature	and	a	stamp	from	the	organization	(see	figure	4.1).	Only	men	can	be	registered	and	receive	a	genealogy	book.	The	al-Maktab	ad-Daimi	is	an	extension	of	the	role	of	the	munsib,	the	headman	of	the	clan,	who	is	responsible	 for	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 genealogical	 record	 of	 his	 own	 clan	members.	The	 result	of	 the	genealogy	 record	by	 the	munsib	 is	different	 from	the	record	issued	by	the	al-Maktab	(see	figure	4.1	and	4.2).		Figure	4.1	reflects	a	modern	printed	format	resulting	in	a	passport-like	pocket	book,	while	figure	4.2	 shows	 a	 one-page,	 handwritten	 genealogical	 account	 that	 as	 used	 by	
munsibs	in	former	times	to	write	down	the	genealogy	of	their	clan	members.		





                                                75	I	 photographed	 a	 passport-like	 genealogy	 book	 of	 a	 deceased	 Sada	man	 (d.	 2010)	with	 the	 permission	 from	 his	 wife,	 Muawana	 (55	 year-old	 Sada	 descendant),	 in	 her	house	 in	 Jakarta	 on	 January	 11,	 2015.	 	 Muawana	 herself	 did	 not	 have	 her	 official	genealogy	 book	 from	 the	Rabita,	 and	 I	was	 lucky	 to	 be	 allowed	 to	 see	 her	 husband’s	genealogy	and	to	take	pictures	of	it.			76	This	genealogical	 record	belongs	 to	Abdullah	Assagaf,	 the	grandfather	of	one	of	my	informants.	It	is	written	in	Jawi	(Arabic	script	and	Malay	language)	and	consists	of	only	one	page.	The	genealogical	record	contains	three	main	parts:	introduction,	lineage,	and	closing.	The	 first	part,	which	 is	 the	 first	 two	 lines	on	 the	 top	of	 the	page,	 includes	 the	
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	The	Maluku	branch	of	the	Rabita	was	established	in	2008.	The	first	head	of	the	Rabita	 in	 Maluku	 was	 Muhdar	 Assagaf	 (2008-2010).	 The	 organization	 is	currently	 headed	 by	 my	 informant	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar	 after	 the	previous	 leader	Muhdar	 Assagaf	moved	 to	 Jakarta	 in	 2010.77	The	 role	 of	 the	branch	 of	 the	 Rabita	 itself	 is	 to	 collect	 and	 register	 its	 members	 and	 their	genealogies.	 It	 does	 not	 issue	 a	 member	 book	 to	 the	 members.	 Before	 the	branch	 of	 Rabita	 in	 Maluku	 was	 established,	 a	 similar	 association	 with	 a	different	name	that	my	informants	could	not	recall	had	been	established	in	the	1990s	before	the	communal	conflicts.	The	former	secretary	of	the	association,	Feryal	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	(50	years	old),	who	is	also	a	cousin	of	my	informant	Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar,	 told	 me	 that	 the	 association	 ceased	 to	 be	 in	operation	when	 the	 communal	 conflicts	 erupted.	 She	 also	 explained	 that	 the	legal	documents	of	the	association’s	establishment	had	been	kept	in	the	Mayor	office,	which	was	burnt	during	the	conflicts.78	Therefore,	the	association	could	not	be	 revived	after	 the	 conflicts	 as	 the	 legal	documents	on	 the	association’s	establishment	had	gotten	lost.		Prophetic	 genealogy	 is	 considered	 sacred	 by	 Sada	 members,	 and	 this	sacredness	apparently	spills	over	to	the	material	genealogical	documents.		Due	to	 its	 sacredness,	 these	 genealogical	 records	 may	 not	 be	 shown	 to	 non-members.	For	example,	 although	my	Sada	 informants	 claimed	 that	 they	have	registered	 their	 genealogies	 at	 the	 branch	 of	 the	 Rabita,	 only	 one	 informant	was	willing	to	show	her	husband’s	record	book,	appearing	in	figure	4.1	above.		Most	 of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Sada	 group	 in	 Ambon,	 including	 my	 informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	 current	head	of	 the	Rabita	 refused	 to	 show	 their	genealogies	to	me.	They	claimed	that	there	was	a	potential	abuse	of	 the	Sada	genealogies	by	people	who	hoped	 to	benefit	 for	 their	own	 interests	 from	the	genealogical	 information.	 To	 explain	 how	 this	 might	 work	 they	 offered	 an	example	 of	 such	 abuse.	 According	 to	 my	 informant	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar,	 a	religious	 preacher	who	 lived	 in	 Jakarta	who	was	 a	 popular	 figure	 on	 the	 TV	screen,	falsely	used	a	particular	Sada	family	name	and	an	honorific	title.	Other	informants	 also	 told	 me	 that	 this	 preacher	 originally	 came	 from	 a	 local	Ambonese	family	and	used	the	Sada	name	to	boost	his	popularity	as	a	spiritual	
                                                                                                             name	of	 the	bearer	 of	 the	 genealogical	 record,	 then	 followed	by	 a	basmala	 verse,	 the	first	verse	of	every	chapter	in	the	Qur’an.	The	second	part	is	the	chain	of	lineage	from	the	bearer,	Abdullah	Assagaf,	up	to	the	Prophet.	The	last	part	contains	the	name	of	the	person	who	wrote	the	genealogical	record.	Contrary	to	his	grandfather,	my	 informant	himself	did	not	keep	his	own	genealogical	record,	but	he	claimed	that	his	own	lineage	was	stored	in	the	Rabita	al-Alawiyya.	When	I	asked	him	about	his	own	lineage,	he	could	only	remember	his	lineage	until	four	generations	up	(until	his	great	grandfather).		77	Interview	with	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	September	9,	2014.	78	Interview	with	Feryal	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	September	10,	2014.		
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guide	among	Muslims	of	middle-upper	class	 in	 Jakarta.	The	Rabita	 in	Ambon	gave	him	a	warning	by	 sending	an	official	 letter	 requesting	him	 to	withdraw	his	 honorific	 title	 and	 family	 name.	 	 Unfortunately,	 I	 could	 not	 meet	 the	preacher	myself	 to	 ask	how	he	 came	 to	 the	name	 and	how	he	 felt	 about	 the	Rabita’s	warning.	The	 case	 of	 the	 preacher	 and	 the	 Sada’s	 reluctance	 of	 sharing	 their	genealogical	 records	 show	 how	 names	 are	 not	 only	 signifiers	 of	 a	 person’s	identity	but	also	provide	symbolic	capital	which	becomes	a	potential	object	of	manipulation	 and	 restrictions.	 The	 passport-like	 book	 is	 thus	 used	 as	 a	preemptive	 device	 to	 avoid	 abuse	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 ‘illegitimate	 claim’	 of	 a	person	 who	 presents	 himself	 as	 a	 member	 of	 a	 certain	 Sada	 family.	 The	modern	 genealogical	 book	 authorized	 by	 the	 Sada	 organization	 serves	 as	 an	identity	card	that	may	function	as	a	license	to	guarantee	and	provide	security	for	 group	members.	 Likewise,	 this	modern	genealogical	 record	has	 created	a	boundary	between	in-	and	out-groups	materialized	in	a	piece	of	textual	words.	Texts	 like	 these	 can	 define	who	we	 are	 and	who	we	 are	 not	 as	well	 as	who	belongs	to	us	and	who	does	not.	Benedict	Anderson	(1991)	argues	that	thanks	to	printing	technology	modernity	has	permitted	the	circulation	of	texts	to	a	far	greater	extent	 than	before,	 thus	creating	what	he	called	nations	as	 ‘imagined	communities’.	 In	 line	with	 this,	 through	the	circulation	of	genealogy	texts	 the	Sada	 community	 has	 created	 an	 imagined	 transnational	 community.	 	 This	imagined	community	is	in	fact	gendered,	in	the	sense	that	Sada	male	members	enjoy	more	freedom	of	mixing	(marrying)	with	other	communities	than	female	members	(see	section	4.3).	The	genealogical	records	indicate	that	most	Sada	in	Ambon	descend	from	Husain,	one	of	the	two	sons	of	Fatima,	the	daughter	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad,	and	 her	 husband	 Ali.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 symbolic	 figures	 for	 the	Hadrami	Sada	is	Ahmad,	the	ninth-generation	descendant	of	the	Prophet	who	was	the	first	to	migrate	to	Hadramaut,	together	with	his	son,	Ubaidillah.		Based	on	 data	 from	 the	 Rabita	 of	 Maluku,	 the	 Sada	 descendants	 in	 Ambon	 and	Maluku	in	general	descend	from	fifty-five	Hadrami	migrants	as	can	be	seen	in	table	4.3.		 						
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Hasan Bin Syech Abubakar 	R.M	 :	Raden	Mas	(Javanese	title	for	Prince)	R.A	 :	Raden	Ayu	(Javanese	title	for	Princess)			The	 adoption	 of	 a	 patrilineal	 kinship	 system	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 Sada	ignore	 their	 matrilineal	 relations,	 especially	 when	 they	 are	 related	 to	prominent	members	 of	 society.	 The	 chart	 above	 shows	 kinship	 relations	 the	Sada	and	a	 royal	 family	 from	the	Sultanate	Yogyakarta	 in	 Java.	My	 informant	Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar,	 current	 head	 of	 the	 Rabita	 in	 Ambon,	 told	me	 a	story	of	 the	relationship	between	Prince	Diponegoro	and	the	Sada	 in	Ambon.	The	 relationship	 probably	 began	 during	 the	 Java	 War	 (1825-1830)	 led	 by	Prince	Diponegoro	against	the	Dutch	rule	in	Java.		The	defeat	of	Diponegoro	in	the	war	resulted	in	the	Dutch	sending	four	of	his	eighteen	children	into	exile	to	Ambon.	The	names	of	 these	 four	 sons	are	Abdul	Majid,	Adipati	Anom,	Hasan	and	Abdul	Aziz.	The	first	Sada	marrying	a	daughter	of	one	of	the	sons	of	Prince	Diponegoro	 is	 from	an	al-Mashur	 family.	Sayyid	Abdullah	bin	Alwi	al-Mashur	married	Raden	Ayu	Aminah,	daughter	of	Prince	Abdul	Aziz.	Sayyid	Abdullah	al-Mashur	is	said	to	have	returned	to	Hadramaut	and	never	to	have	come	back	to	Ambon.	Al-Mashur’s	daughter	was	married	with	Sayyid	Abu	Bakar	bin	Husain	al-Saqqaf.	Although	the	al-Mashur	family	can	no	longer	be	found	in	Ambon,	the	
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The	 authorization	 of	 being	 legitimate	 offspring	 of	 the	 royal	 family	 in	 the	Sultanate	of	Yogyakarta	has	been	given	by	an	official	document	 issued	by	the	authority	 in	 the	 Sultanate.	 This	 document	 is	 kept	 by	 the	 Rabita	 of	 Ambon,	where,	 thanks	 to	my	 informant	Hasan	Bin	 Syech	Abubakar,	 I	was	 allowed	 to	have	a	look	at	it.	Although	keeping	a	genealogical	record	of	one’s	maternal	side	is	an	ambiguous	practice	considering	 the	dominance	of	patrilineal	genealogy,	owning	 this	 official	written	 document	 on	 genealogy	 is	 very	 valuable	 since	 it	renders	validity	and	authenticity	of	additional	or	alternative	descent	claims	to	powerful	 families	 high	 up	 in	 the	 Indonesian	 hierarchy.	 The	 document	 is	therefore	 a	 form	 of	 cultural	 capital	 that	 allows	 one	 to	 strike	 alliances	 and	maintain	valuable	relations	with	local	nobility.	Another	materialization	of	maintaining	 this	 symbolic	 relationship	 to	 the	Sultanate	 of	 Yogyakarta	 is	 the	 special	 graveyard	 called	 Makam	 Anak	 Cucu	Diponegoro,	 or	 graveyard	 of	 Prince	 Diponegoro’s	 descendants,	 which	 is	reserved	exclusively	for	those	who	are	related	to	Prince	Diponegoro	in	Ambon.	Although	descendants	of	the	Prince	in	Ambon	are	not	only	related	to	the	Sada	but	also	have	other	local	origins,	the	graveyard	seems	to	be	mostly	filled	with	the	 descendants	 of	 the	 Prince	 from	 the	 Sada	 group.	 The	 restoration	 of	 the	graveyard	 started	 in	 2012,	 and	 during	 my	 last	 visit	 in	 2015	 it	 was	 not	 yet	finished.	According	to	my	informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	the	graveyard	has	 been	 renovated	 with	 donations	 from	 people	 related	 to	 the	 Prince,	especially	from	members	of	the	Sada	group.	A	large	sum	of	money	to	renovate	the	 graveyard	 has	 recently	 been	 received	 from	 Said	 Assagaf	 (Governor	 of	Maluku	 from	 2013-2018).	 The	money	was	 said	 to	 come	 from	 Said	 Assagaf’s	private	assets.	The	 practice	 of	 keeping	 a	 genealogical	 record	 of	 one’s	 maternal	 side	reflects	 an	 ambiguous	 practice	 of	 the	 Sada’s	 adoption	 of	 patrilineal	 descent	system.	 By	 recognizing	 both	 matrilineal	 and	 patrilineal	 descent	 instead	 of	 a	unilineal	 kinship	 system,	 the	 Sada,	 in	 fact,	 practice	what	Godelier	 (2011,	 90)	calls	 ‘double’	 or	 ‘dual	 descent’	 for	 particular	 purposes.	 Double	 descent	 is	applied	 by	 the	 Sada	 by	 affiliating	 its	 members	 with	 a	 group	 of	 patrilineal	kinsmen	for	some	purposes	and	with	a	group	of	matrilineal	kinsmen	for	other	purposes.	In	this	case,	the	recognition	of	matrilineal	ties	is	determined	by	the	status	 of	 the	 matrilineal	 kinsmen	 within	 society.	 Nobility	 is	 a	 main	characteristic	 of	 status.	 Affinity	 is	 considered	 of	 a	 great	 value	 only	 if	 it	 can	enhance	 the	 social	 status.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 alliance	 seems	 to	 be	 used	 for	pursuing	 certain	 interests	 as	 can	be	 illustrated	by	what	my	 informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	told	me	about	his	great-great	grandfather:	“Prof	dr.	Habib	Ali	Heyder	al-Hamid	died	in	1918	in	Ambon.	He	married	a	grand-daughter	of	Prince	Diponegoro,	Raden	Ayu	Kalsum.	He	studied	in	a	Dutch	school	and	he	did	
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not	have	to	pay	fee	in	the	school.	He	could	enter	the	school	easily	because	he	used	the	title	of	Prince”.79	The	way	my	informant	presents	his	 forefather	as	belonging	to	a	modern	educated	elite	not	only	positions	his	own	family	within	a	larger	society	but	also	places	the	Sada	to	which	he	belonged	in	a	wider	context.	It	is	likely	that	during	the	 colonial	 era,	 it	 was	 very	 difficult	 to	 find	 such	 a	 modern	 scholar	 as	 only	those	 who	 came	 from	 noble	 families	 attended	 Dutch	 schools.	 My	 informant	may	have	been	unaware	that	his	statement	can	spark	a	critical	remark	on	the	manipulation	 of	 the	 title	 by	 his	 forefather	 who	 used	 the	 title	 ‘Prince’	 just	because	his	wife	was	a	granddaughter	of	Prince	Diponegoro.	From	 this	 anecdote,	we	may	 deduce	 how	Dutch	 colonials	 applied	 social	stratification	 policies	 not	 only	 based	 on	 ethnicity	 and	 religion	 but	 that	 they	also	 classified	members	 of	 the	 local	 population	 based	 on	descent	 status	 (see	chapter	 2	 section	 2.3).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 purpose	 of	 marrying	 local	 nobility	seems	to	be	practical	but	also	highly	political,	especially	when	it	was	shaped	by		discriminative	 state	 policies	 concerning	 access	 to	 public	 facilities	 such	 as	education.	 Marrying	 local	 nobility	 is	 not	 easy	 for	 people	 who	 do	 not	 have	certain	 assets	 such	 as	 high	 social	 status.	 	 Sada	 migrants	 with	 their	 cultural	capital	through	their	claims	as	descendants	of	the	Prophet	could	enter	the	elite	in	their	new	homeland	in	a	relatively	smooth	way.	What	this	section	demonstrates	is	that	even	if	an	explicit	kinship	system	based	 on	 patrinileal	 descent	 exists,	 in	 practice	 kinship	 reckoning	 is	 not	 a	matter	of	simply	 following	rules,	but	of	active	appropriation	of	 these	rules	 to	apply	them	in	a	fashion	that	best	serves	one’s	purposes.	 	For	the	descendants	of	Hadrami	migrants	to	Indonesia,	 in	this	case	to	Ambon,	close	observance	of	patrilineal	descent	rules	 is	a	strategy	to	maintain	a	distinct	 identity	as	Arabs,	and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Sada	 as	 descendants	 of	 Prophet	Muhammad.	 At	 the	 same	time,	 adapting	 to	 the	 new	 circumstances	 by	marrying	 into	 local	 nobility	 and	hence	 integrating	 matrilineal	 descent	 into	 kinship	 reckoning	 may	 increase	one’s	opportunities	in	the	new	land	significantly.	As	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section,	 men	 and	 women	 are	 positioned	 differently	 in	 the	 safeguarding	 of	patrilineal	 descent	 whilst	 simultaneously	 integrating	 into	 the	 local	 social	hierarchy	through	matrilineal	descent.				
3. Patrilineal	Descent,	Marriage,	and	Gender		
This	 section	 describes	 the	 impact	 on	 gender	 relations	 of	 how	 a	 patrilineal	descent	 system	 and	 Islamic	 kafa’a	 regulations,	 that	 is,	 regulations	 about	 the	compatibility	of	marriage	partners	on	the	basis	of	social	hierarchy	status	(see	




3.1 Marriage	 Patterns:	 Endogamy	 vs	 Exogamy,	 and	 Polygamy	 vs	
Monogamy	Marriage	 in	 Muslim	 societies	 in	 general	 is	 regarded	 a	 religious	 duty,	 and	central	to	the	development	and	stability	of	the	basic	societal	unit	(Abudabbeh	2005,	 427-428).	 	 As	 Hadramis	 belong	 to	 the	 umma,	 the	 wider	 Muslim	community,	 commonality	 in	 religion	 still	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 their	 marriage	relations.	Apart	 from	religion,	similarity	based	on	ancestry	plays	a	significant	role	 in	 marriage	 relations.	 Marriage	 practices	 of	 both	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	follow	more	or	less	similar	patterns	as	will	be	shown	in	some	kinship	charts	of	some	families	below.	
Table	4.4:	A	List	of	Arab	Clans	in	Ambon80	NO	 SADA	 ABREVIA-TION	 NO	 NON-SADA	 ABREVI-ATION	1.	 al-Saqqaf		 Sq	 1.	 al-Kathiri	 Ktr	2.	 al-Hamid		 Hmd	 2.	 al-Tamimy		 Tmm	3.	 Bin	 Shaikh	 Abu	Bakr	 BSA	 3.	 al-Amudi	 Amd	4.	 al-‘Aydrus	 Ay	 4.	 Basalamah	 Bsm	5.	 Jamal	al-Lail	 JL	 5.	 Bamahri	 Bmr	6.	 Abu	Futaim	 AF	 6.	 Basharahel	 Bsh	7.	 al-Muhdar	 Md	 7.	 Bamatraf	 Bmt	8.	 Barakwan	 Brw	 8.	 Bahajay	 Bhj	9.	 Bin	Smith	 BS	 9.	 Mardas	 Mds	10.	 al-Attas	 Ats	 10.	 Shaban	 Sbn	11.	 Balfaqih	 Bfq	 11.	 Bin	Sheban	 BSb	12.	 al-Habshi	 Hbs	 12.	 Bahwereis	 Bwr	13.	 Bin	Yahya	 BY	 13.	 Bahasoan	 Bhs	14.	 Bin	Tahir	 BT	 14.	 Bakhmid	 Bmd	15.	 al-Shatri	 Ast	 15.	 Najar	 Njr	16.	 Bin	Agil	 BA	 16.	 Bahalwan	 Bhlw	17.	 al-Haddad	 Hdd	 17.	 Hamdun	 Hdn	18.	 al-Zawawi		 Zww	 18.	 Ba’adillah	 Bdl		 	 	 19.	 al-Zagladi	 Azg		 	 	 20.	 Bin	Talib	 BTb		 	 	 21.	 al-Asiri	 Asr		 	 	 22.	 Bamakhmid	 Bmm			




	Hdr	 :	Hadramaut		 	 	 		 :	Ego									 :	Female	(died)		 :	Male	(died)			=	 :	Marriage	Relation		Being	fourth	in	a	row	of	eight	children,	in	1975	my	informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	(BSA),		current	head	of	the	Rabita	al-‘Alawiyya	in	Maluku,	was	born	to	a	father	of	a	Sada	family	from	the	Bin	Shaikh	Abu	Bakr	clan,	and	to	a	mother	from	 a	 Sada	 family	 from	 the	 al-Hamid	 clan.	 In	 patrilineal	 terms,	 he	 is	 the	fourth-generation	 descendant	 of	 the	 migrant	 from	 the	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar	clan.	 In	 my	 conversations	 with	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar,	 he	 emphasized	 the	importance	 of	 both	 his	maternal	 and	paternal	 lineage	 since	 both	 his	 parents	are	descendants	of	the	Sada.		The	 chart	 of	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar’s	 kinship	 relations	 above	illustrate	that	marriages	patterns	of	the	first	and	later	generations	of	Hadrami	Sada	show	different	patterns.	The	first	migrants	married	local	women	of	either	Ambonese	 or	 Chinese	 origin,	 while	 later	 migrants	 married	 daughters	 of	 the	previous	migrants	of	both	Sada	and	non-Sada	origin.	For	example,	Hasan	Bin	Syech	 Abubakar’s	 father’s	 father‘s	 father	 (paternal	 great-grandfather)	 was	 a	Sada	 migrant	 who	married	 a	 daughter	 of	 another	 Sada	 migrant	 whose	 wife	was	 from	 a	 local	 clan,	while	 his	maternal	 great-grandfather	was	 also	 a	 Sada	migrant	who	married	a	daughter	of	a	Sada	migrant	whose	wife	was	of	Chinese	origin	from	Ternate.	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar’s	father’s	father’s	uncle	was	also	married	to	a	daughter	 of	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	migrant	 from	 Ba’adillah	 clan,	 and	 Hasan	 Bin	Syech	 Abubakar’s	 mother’s	 father’s	 sister	 was	 married	 to	 a	 son	 of	 Hadrami	migrant	 from	 al-Hamid	 clan,	 who	 took	 another	wife	 a	 daughter	 of	 non-Sada	
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Hadrami	migrant	from	Bashagub	(Bsg)	clan.81	The	Bashagub	clan	can	no	longer	be	 found	 in	 Ambon.	 In	 the	 next	 generations	 until	 the	 generation	 of	 my	informant	(‘Ego’),	migrants	no	longer	appear	in	the	chart.	The	descendants	of	earlier	 migrants	 tend	 to	 marry	 each	 other,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 uncommon	 to	 find	cross	 cousin	 marriages.	 For	 example,	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar’s	 father	married	 his	 mother’s	 brother’s	 daughter.	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar	 himself	 is	married	 to	 a	 daughter	 of	 a	 Sada	 family	 from	 the	 al-Haddad	 clan	 of	 Java,	 and	they	have	four	children.	The	chart	reveals	both	monogamous	and	polygamous	marriages.	 For	 example,	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar’s	mother’s	 father’s	 sister	was	a	wife	in	a	polygamous	marriage,	and	his	maternal	great-grandfather	(his	mother’s	 father’s	 father)	 had	 two	 wives.	 This	 polygamous	 marriage	 was	common	 among	 past	 generations,	 but	 it	 is	 rarely	 found	 among	 present	generations.	If	we	look	broader	at	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar’s	relatives	in	vertical	and	horizontal	lines,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	chart	below,	we	find	both	more	cross	and	parallel	 cousin	 marriages,	 marriages	 between	 uncles	 and	 nieces,	 and	polygamous	 marriages.	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar’s	 cousin,	 Feryal	 Bin	 Syech	Abubakar	 (F),	 is	married	 to	a	man	 from	a	Sada	 family	 that	belongs	 to	 the	al-Saqqaf	clan.	Feryal	Bin	Syech	Abubakar’s	husband’s	father’s	father’s	father	was	married	 to	 three	 women	 from	 the	 al-Atamimy,	 Najar,	 and	 Olong	 clans	respectively.	The	al-Tamimy	and	Najar	are	Arab	clans	of	non-Sada	origin,	while	Olong	 is	 a	 local	 Ambonese	 clan.	 In	 the	 example	 of	 an	 exogamous	 and	polygamous	 marriage	 of	 Feryal	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar’s	 husband’s	 paternal	great-grandparent,	 the	 Sada	 families	 are	 related	 to	 both	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	families	 and	 local	 Ambonese	 families.	 One	 of	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar’s	uncles	 is	 married	 to	 his	 niece	 and	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar’s	 maternal	second	cousins	married	each	other.	My	 informant	Muhammad	Rifki	 al-Hamid	 (MRA),	 a	member	 of	 the	 Sada	group	 who	 went	 to	 study	 in	 Hadramaut,	 is	 the	 son	 of	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	Abubakar’s	paternal	uncle’s	daughter	(see	chapter	3	pages	72-73).	As	we	can	see,	 the	pattern	of	marriage	within	 the	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	clan	 in	Ambon	 is	mixed,	 combining	 monogamous	 and	 polygamous,	 and	 endogamous	 and	exogamous	marriages.	Members	of	the	Sada	group	tend	to	be	endogamous	and	
                                                81	One	of	the	well-known	Sada	Hadramis	from	Bin	Shaikh	Abu	Bakr	clan	from	Maluku	is	Des	Alwi	Abubakar	or	popularly	called	Des	Alwi	(1927-2010).	Born	in	Banda	Naira	to	father	of	Bin	Shaikh	Abu	Bakr	family	and	to	a	wealthy	non-Sada	Hadrami	of	Ba’adillah	family,	Des	Alwi	was	not	only	historian	 interested	 in	 the	history	of	Maluku	 (see	Alwi	2005),	but	also	Indonesian	diplomat.	He	was	the	adopted	son	of	the	first	Vice	President	of	Indonesia,	Muhammad	Hatta,	and	another	nationalist	leader	Sutan	Syahrir	who	both	of	them	were	exiled	in	Banda	by	the	Dutch	colonial	regime	(see	Alwi	and	Harvey	2007).	My	 informant	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar	 mentioned	 Des	 Alwi	 when	 he	 told	 me	 his	paternal	and	maternal	relations	with	the	historian.				
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monogamous	 in	 the	 generations	 following	Hadrami	 first	migrants.	 	 Although	male	 members	 of	 the	 Sada	 group	 are	 allowed	 to	 marry	 out	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
kafa’a	regulations,	they	tend	to	marry	inside	the	group.		
		 :	Ego									 :	Female	(died)		 :	Male	(died)		 	 					=	 :	Marriage	Relation														 :	the	same	person	Another	example	of	the	kinship	chart	can	be	drawn	from	Alif	below.		
Case	2:		Alif	from	Bin	Smith	Clan		
	:	Ego									 :	Female	(died)		 :	Male	(died)						=	 :	Marriage	Relation		 	
HmdLating
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The	 fifty-seven-year-old	 Sada	 Alif	 (see	 chapter	 3	 page	 68)	 is	 a	 patrilineal	descendant	of	a	Sada	family	from	the	Bin	Smith	(BS)	clan.	His	mother	is	also	a	patrilineal	descendant	of	a	Sada	family	from	the	Assagaf	clan	in	Namlea	(N).	In	this	 chart,	 two	 Chinese	 clans	 are	 related	 to	 Alif,	 namely	 Kiat	 and	Niou,	 both	from	his	paternal	and	maternal	grandmothers.	Although	my	informant	Alif	was	not	 absolutely	 sure	 whether	 his	 paternal	 and	 maternal	 grandmothers	 were	Muslim	 converts	 or	 not,	 he	 believes	 that	 both	were	Muslim.82	Alif	 himself	 is	married	 to	a	daughter	of	a	Sada	 family	 from	the	al-Saqqaf	 clan	 from	Namlea,	Buru	 island.	Alif	 is	also	related	to	other	Sada	families	 from	the	al-Saqqaf	clan	from	Namlea	 and	 the	 Alatas	 clan	 from	 Johor	Malaysia	 through	 the	marriage	between	 Alif’s	 wife’s	 uncle	 of	 the	 al-Saqqaf	 clan	 and	 my	 informant	 Rugaya	Alatas	(R),	a	female	religious	preacher	among	the	Sada	in	Ambon	(see	page	95	and	 further	 chapter	 5	 section	 4.2).	 Another	 kinship	 tie	 between	 Alif’s	 father	lineage	 is	 with	 another	 Sada	 clan,	 al-Saqqaf,	 from	 Banda	 from	 which	 the	Governor	(G)	of	2013-2018	Maluku	Said	Assagaf	(see	chapter	3	section	5.2.3)	descends.			Like	 the	previous	example,	 the	chart	 indicates	a	 tendency	of	exogamous	marriages	 in	 the	 first	 diasporic	 generation	 of	 Sada	 Hadramis	 and	 of	endogamous	 marriages	 in	 later	 generations.	 Because	 of	 the	 pattern	 of	exogamous	marriages,	 the	 Sada	 families	 built	 kinship	 ties	 to	 various	 groups,	mixing	 with	 different	 origins,	 both	 local,	 and	 non-local,	 as	 well	 as	 crossing	geographical	territories	within	regional	and	transregional	borders.			The	 pattern	 of	 exogamy	 and	 endogamy	 that	 cross-cut	 different	generations	 is	not	 the	monopoly	of	 the	Sada	group,	but	 it	 also	occurs	among	the	 non-Sada.	 An	 example	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 family	 chart	 of	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri	below.		
	
Case	3:		Hasan	al-Kathiri			My	informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri	was	born	in	1946	(see	chapter	3	page	54).	He	is	the	eldest	son	of	a	non-Sada	 family	 from	the	Bin	Misfir	clan,	or	 the	al-Kathiri	clan.83		 Both	 paternally	 and	maternally	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri	 belongs	 to	 the	 third	generation	 of	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	 migrants.	 Al-Kathiri’s	 paternal	 grandfather	was	 married	 to	 a	 local	 woman	 from	 Fak-Fak	 (Papua),	 while	 his	 maternal	grandfather	was	married	with	a	local	woman	from	Maluku.	Al-Kathiri’s	father	had	 a	 polygamous	marriage.	 One	 of	 his	wives	was	 from	Hadramaut	 and	 the	




	Hdr	 :	Hadramaut		 	 	 		 :	Ego									 :	Female	(died)		 :	Male	(died)			=	 :	Marriage	Relation		In	the	chart	above,	we	can	see	both	exogamous	and	endogamous	marriages	in	Hasan	 al-Kathiri’s	 family.	 Exogamy	 occurs	 in	 the	 first	 generation,	 while	endogamy	in	the	next	generation.	The	al-Kathiri	clan	has	built	kinship	ties	with	both	local	and	non-Sada	Hadrami	clans.	Hasan	al-Kathiri	himself	is	married	to	a	 woman	 of	 the	 Kathiri	 clan	 from	 Tual	 in	 Southeast	 Maluku.	 According	 to	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	his	marriage	was	arranged	by	his	parents.		His	present	wife	is	his	 father’s	 close	 friend’s	 daughter.	 In	 his	 case	 and	 his	 parent’s	 generation,	endogamy	was	 the	 norm.	Al-Kathiri	 explained	 to	me	 that	 he	 realizes	 that	 he	can	 no	 longer	 force	 his	 children	 to	 obey	 this	 custom.	 Although	 he	 considers	endogamy	not	a	religious	obligation,	he	does	hold	the	view	that	endogamy	has	its	own	merits.	Among	his	six	children,	two	of	them	are	married	with	non-Sada	Arab	families.			From	the	kinship	charts	of	both	Sada	and	non-Sada	Hadrami	informants,	we	can	conclude	that	 there	seems	hardly	any	difference	of	marriage	patterns	between	the	two	groups.	Both	groups	conducted	exogamous	marriages	in	the	first	generation,	and	shifted	to	endogamous	marriages	in	the	next	generations.	They	 also	 practice	 both	 monogamous	 and	 polygamous	 marriages.	 These	marriage	patterns	should	be	understood	within	a	historical	context	of	Hadrami	
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male	migration	and	Hadrami	patrilineal	descent	system.	Historically,	only	men	came	 from	 Hadramaut	 and	 spread	 around	 the	 Malay	 Archipelago	 in	 the	nineteenth	 until	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 the	 twentieth	 centuries	 (Freitag	 2003;	Freitag	&	Clarence-Smith	1997;	Mobini-Kesheh	1999;	Abushouk	and	 Ibrahim	2009;	 Jacobsen	 2009).	 The	 migrants	 did	 not	 bring	 wives	 and	 thus	 had	 no	choice	 except	 marrying	 local	 women.	 Their	 exogamous	 marriages	 were	accepted	 because	 their	 mixing	 with	 an	 out-group	 did	 not	 have	 an	 effect	 on	their	 children’s	 lineage.	 A	 shifting	 trend	 to	 endogamous	 marriages,	 in	 fact,	indicates	demographic	changes	with	the	availability	of	female	offspring	in	the	diaspora	 and	 the	 need	 to	 keep	 them	 and	 their	 children	 in	 the	 same	 group	(rank).	These	 patterns,	 especially	 endogamy	 and	 exogamy,	 are	 mainly	constructed	and	justified	through	Islamic	rulings	on	kafa’a,	which	plays	a	role	in	various	marriage	patterns	by	the	Hadramis	in	building	kinship	relations.	In	this	 context,	 in	 relation	 with	 the	 patrilineal	 system	 and	 various	 patterns	 of	marriage	above,	kafa’a	can	function	as	a	marriage	strategy	that	represents	an	important	 aspect	 of	 the	 process	 of	 the	 group’s	 symbolic	 capital,	 not	 through	manifesting	 the	 actors’	 adherence	 to	 the	 proclaimed	 ideal,	 but	 because	 each	marriage	 becomes	 a	 symbolic	 expression	 of	 the	 recognition	 of	 agnatic	relationships	(Holy	1983,	93).	The	recognition	of	agnatic	relationships	is	very	powerful	 exactly	 because	 such	 relationships	 are	 imbued	 with	 religious	meanings	 and	 carry	 social	 hierarchy	 expressed	 through	 asymmetrical	marriages.84				
3.2 Hadramis’	Views	on	Kafa’a	The	 term	kafa’a	 comes	 from	the	Arabic	kufu’	which	means	suitable,	equal,	or	compatible.	In	dominant	Islamic	legal	thought,	which	is	said	to	be	patriarchally	and	 patrilineally	 biased	 (Mir-Hosseini	 2013),	 one	 of	 the	 main	 principles	 of	
kafa’a	is	that	men	should	be	of	equal	or	higher	rank	than	their	wives,	never	of	a	lower	 rank.	 Factors	 to	 determine	whether	 a	marriage	 between	 a	man	 and	 a	woman	is	considered	to	be	kufu’	or	compatible	vary	among	Muslim	jurists	and	are	 interpreted	 within	 a	 various	 range	 of	 criteria	 such	 as	 descent,	 religion,	wealth,	physical	appearance,	health,	profession,	liberty,	piety,	and	social	status	




(Ziadeh	1957,	509).85	F.J.	Ziadeh	(1957,	515)	 further	argues	 that	 the	doctrine	of	kafa’a	in	Islamic	law	is	the	basis	of	social	stratification	in	Muslim	society	and	regulates	 gender	 relations.	 The	 legal	 effect	 of	 the	 kafa’a	 rules	 is	 that	 a	male	guardian	can	dissolve	the	marriage	of	his	female	custodian	to	a	man	not	equal	in	social	standing	if	he	does	not	consent	to	the	marriage	(Ziadeh	1957,	510).	Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 today	 tend	 to	 have	 different	 views	 on	 kafa’a	 in	marriage.	Sada	members	commonly	agree	that	the	two	important	constituents	of	 kafa’a	 are	 religion	 and	 lineage.	 These	 two	 aspects	 are	 equally	 important.	According	to	members	of	the	Sada,	it	is	a	matter	of	whether	a	person	is	equal	in	 terms	 of	 descent,	 or	 more	 concretely	 whether	 a	 person	 belongs	 to	 the	Prophet’s	 lineage	or	not.	They	argue	 that	 the	prophetic	 lineage	 is	 the	highest	descent	 rank,	 and	 that	 those	who	 are	 not	members	 of	 the	 Sada	 are	 of	 lower	rank,	 irrespective	 of	 whether	 they	 are	 from	 Arab	 or	 local	 origins.	 In	 this	context,	as	a	member	of	the	Islamic	society	in	general,	it	is	not	only	the	shared	religion	that	matters	most,	similar	descent	plays	an	equally	 important	role	 in	the	selection	of	spouses.	Through	 adopting	 an	 agnatic	 system,	 Sada	 men	 are	 allowed	 to	 marry	women	 of	 any	 different	 social	 group	 because	 their	 offspring	will	 inherit	 the	father’s	 lineage	 and	 belong	 to	 his	 group.	 Meanwhile,	 Sada	 women	 are	 only	allowed	to	marry	men	of	their	own	group.	Kafa’a	in	this	case	is	applied	both	to	endogamous	 and	 exogamous	 marriages	 but	 there	 are	 gender	 differences.	While	men	can	practice	both	endogamy	and	exogamy,	women	are	only	allowed	to	 practice	 endogamy.	 Although	 exogamy	 is	 allowed	 for	 men,	 endogamy	 is	highly	recommended.	In	this	context,	the	Sada	group	is	a	wife	taker,	but	not	a	wife	 giver.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 will	 keep	 their	 own	 women	 for	 their	 own	group	 rather	 than	 giving	 to	 other	 (lower)	 groups.	 This	 means	 that	 the	superiority	of	the	Sada	lies	in	its	position	as	a	wife	taker.	For	the	non-Sada	group,	on	the	other	hand,	the	kafa’a	principle	is	applied	predominantly	on	the	basis	of	religious	similarity.	Only	in	very	few	cases	some	members	 prefer	 kafa’a	 based	 on	 lineage	 as	 well.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	descent	 is	 not	 important	 at	 all	 for	 non-Sada	 descendants.	 Due	 to	 a	 shifting	understanding	 of	 descent,	 descent	 is	 no	 longer	 determined	 on	 the	 basis	 of	common	 ancestry	 as	 invoked	 by	 the	 Sada	 group,	 but	 rather	 on	 a	 broader	category.	 For	 instance,	 many	 of	 my	 non-Sada	 informants	 often	 said	 about	 a	person	that	he	or	she	was	 from	a	 ‘good	 lineage’.	What	they	meant	by	a	 ‘good	lineage’	 is	not	necessarily	about	a	 concept	of	descent	by	birth	 in	a	particular	ethnic	 membership.	 Besides	 referring	 to	 religious	 affiliation,	 the	 criteria	 of	
                                                85	According	to	Ziadeh,	the	history	of	kafa’a	as	a	religious	regulation	was	a	reflection	of	Hanafi	 law	 that	 dealt	 much	 with	 practical	 matters	 and	 complex	 society	 during	 the	Abbasid	 period,	 and	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 the	 earliest	Maliki	 law,	 but	 later	 on	was	adopted	by	other	schools	of	thought	(Ziadeh	1957,	503-517)		
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‘good’	 here	 overlap	 with	 other	 factors,	 such	 as	 social	 status,	 occupation,	wealth,	and	also	one’s	family	(absent)	record	in	crime.	Non-Sada	descendants	mostly	 share	 this	 descent	 conception	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Muslim	population	in	Ambon	in	their	preference	and	practice	of	marriage.	It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 the	 kafa’a	 principle	 is,	 in	 fact,	 not	exclusively	 practiced	 by	 Sada	 members.	 Non-Sada	 members	 of	 the	 first	 and	second-generation	married	those	of	the	same	rank	of	lineage	as	illustrated	by	my	informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri	below:		My	parents	and	grandparents	did	not	marry	Indonesians	but	Arabs.	I	will	give	you	an	example:	 if	 I	have	a	daughter,	 she	 is	not	allowed	to	marry	a	man	of	non-Kathiri	descent	 such	as	 from	the	Basalamah	clan,	 like	Ustad	Hadi	 (my	 informant	 Hadi	 Basalamah,	 Istiqomah).	 Our	 elder	 people	forbade	us	to	do	so.	Another	example,	Munif	Bahasoan,	a	popular	singer	in	 the	 past,	 had	 a	 relationship	 with	 a	 woman	 of	 the	 Bin	 Talib.	 His	girlfriend’s	father	did	not	agree	with	his	daughter’s	relationship	with	the	Bahasoan	clan.	The	woman	of	the	Bin	Talib	clan	then	failed	to	get	married	with	 the	Bahasoan.	Another	example	 is	Lutfi	Mashabi	 (another	singer	 in	the	past)	who	wanted	 to	marry	a	woman	of	 the	Bin	Eli	 clan	but	did	not	manage	either…a	family	of	the	Bin	Eli	was	still	very	strict	then.	One	day	I	met	 my	 friend	 of	 the	 Bin	 Eli.	 We	 talked	 about	 our	 families.	 One	 of	 my	daughters	 got	married	with	 the	 Bin	 Jabir.	 He	 (Bin	 Eli)	 exclaimed,	 “This	would	not	never	have	happened	in	the	past”.86	In	 his	 statement	 above,	Hasan	 al-Kathiri	 explains	 that	 different	 ranks	 among	clans	 of	 the	 non-Sada	 group	 were	 behind	 prohibitions	 of	 intermarriage	between	 different	 clans	 within	 the	 non-Sada	 group.	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri	 also	classified	some	clans,	such	as	the	Bin	Talib	and	the	Bin	Eli	as	branches	of	the	Kathiri	 clan	 to	 which	 he	 himself	 belonged,	 and	 considered	 them	 to	 have	 a	higher	 rank	 than	 other	 clans.	 In	 the	 last	 sentence,	 he	 referred	 to	 his	 friend,	stating	 that	 the	 marriage	 of	 his	 daughter	 would	 be	 invalid	 according	 to	 his	group’s	 norm.	 His	 view	 resembles	 closely	 that	 forwarded	 	 by	 another	 non-Sada:		In	my	generation,	we	(our	clans,	 Istiqomah)	married	each	other	because	we	 lived	 in	 the	 same	neighbourhood.	Now	we	are	 scattered.	 I	 still	 think	that	it	(in-marriage,	Istiqomah)	is	good.	It	is	true	that	we	still	have	a	view	that	 our	 clan	 is	 higher	 than	 local	 clans.	 However,	 I	 cannot	 force	 my	daughters	to	do	what	we	want.	One	of	my	daughters	got	married	with	an	Arab	 descendant.	 Although	we	 introduced	 her	 to	 him,	we	 did	 not	 force	her.	We	only	said	that	it	was	good	for	her	and	she	understood.	The	other	daughter	 is	married	with	a	 local	man.	Now	the	 important	 thing	 for	us	 is	that	they	share	the	same	religion.87	
                                                86	Interview	with	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	January	11,	2015	87	Interview	with	Anisa,	January	17,	2015.	
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These	 two	quotations	above	of	non-Sada	 informants	reflect	how	a	process	of	creating	a	hierarchy	between	members	of	the	non-Sada	group	implies	a	power	relationship	in	which	the	dominant	clan	constructs	distinctiveness	of	its	group	members.	Claims	of	descent	status	are	thus	not	only	the	monopoly	of	the	Sada	group,	 but	 occur	 in	 the	 non-Sada	 group	 as	 well.	 Both	 my	 informants’	statements	also	reflect	a	shift	between	past	and	present	generations	regarding	social	 ranking	 among	 the	 non-Sada	 clans.	 Subsequent	 generations	 construct	different	understandings	on	the	conception	of	descent,	which	lead	to	different	marriage	practices.	Based	on	the	examples	from	both	groups	above,	it	can	be	concluded	that	genealogy	or	lineage	is	still	an	important	issue	in	today’s	Hadrami	community,	in	which	regulations	of	kafa’a	play	a	role	in	justifying	kinship	ties	and	marriage	relations.	However,	a	distinction	should	be	made	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	concerning	their	emphasizing	the	religious	underpinning	of	genealogy.	According	to	Engseng	Ho	(2002),	the	maintenance	of	genealogy	for	the	Sada	is	not	only	about	preserving	their	prophetic	mission	and	religious	authority,	but	also	about	a	symbolic	exchange	of	asymmetrical	marriage	relations	 	between	Hadramis	and	local	societies	(Ho	2002,	227).	Ho’s	argument	is,	to	some	extent,	still	 relevant	 in	 today’s	 practices	 of	 naming	 and	 genealogy.	 For	 example,	my	Sada	informant	Rugaya	Alatas	told	me	the	following:			It	 is	 not	 my	 business	 if	 sharifa	 (women	 of	 Sada	 Families,	 Istiqomah)	married	non-Sada	men.	It	is	up	to	them.	But	they	should	not	forget	what	God	stipulates.	That	should	not	be	violated.	The	Prophet	says:	from	Jabir	said	that	the	Prophet	said:	 indeed	God	has	created	descendants	of	every	prophet	in	their	genealogy	and	God	has	created	my	descendants	from	the	genealogy	of	Ali	bin	Abi	Thalib.88	The	Hadith,	 that	 is,	 the	account	of	a	saying	by	the	Prophet	Muhammad	about	prophetic	 genealogy	 cited	 by	 the	 informant	 above	 is	 commonly	 used	 to	anticipate	 criticism	 by	 other	 parties	 on	 the	 ambiguity	 inherent	 to	 the	patrilineal	 kinship	 system	within	 the	Sada	group.	 Likewise,	Asma,	 a	82	year-old	Sada	descendant,	emphasized	the	importance	of	Sada	groups	privileges	as	follows:	Our	silsila	(lineage,	Istiqomah)	is	really	maintained	by	God	because	this	is	
haqq	(truth,	 Istiqomah).	Thus,	we	 should	have	an	effort	 to	preserve	our	identity.	The	Prophet	says:	I	leave	two	things	for	you	namely	God’s	book	(the	Qur’an,	Istiqomah)	as	a	connecting	means	stretched	from	the	sky	to	the	 earth,	 and	my	 descendants.	 Indeed,	 both	will	 never	 be	 cut	 until	 the	Haudh	lake	comes	(Hadith	by	Tirmidzi,	Ahmad,	Ibn	Abi	Syaibah,	Abi	Ya’la,	etc,	Istiqomah).89	
                                                88	Interview	with	Rugaya	Alatas,	March	7,	2015	89	Interview	with	Asma,	November	6,	2014.		
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Based	on	the	statements	of	the	two	Sada	above,	rather	than	moving	from	one	narrative	to	another,	as	Ho	describes,	in	today’s	context	the	religious	narrative	validates	 the	 other	 narrative.	 In	 other	words,	 a	 universalizing	 narrative	 of	 a	religious	mission	is	used	by	the	Sada	group	to	justify	the	obligation	to	preserve	the	 prophetic	 lineage	 through	 asymmetrical	marriage	 relations.	 Yet,	 I	 would	contend	that	the	narrative	of	asymmetrical	marriage	is	not	only	about	alliance	and	reciprocal	exchange	in	Marcel	Mauss’	conception,	as	Ho	argues	(Ho	2002,	225).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 narrative	 about	 a	 taboo	 that	 constructs	 religious	prohibitions	 on	 marriage	 in	 terms	 of	 gender	 difference	 (see	 the	 section	 of	
kafa’a	and	religious	taboo).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 genealogy	 for	 the	 non-Sada	 is	 shaped	 primarily	 by	religious	conviction,	especially	on	the	principle	of	equality.	My	informant	Umar	Attamimy	stated:		Well,	 don’t	 we	 read	 in	 the	 Qur’an	 that	 we	 are	 all	 the	 same	 except	 our	behaviours	 that	will	 be	 judged	by	God…look	 again	 to	 the	 verse	 of	 13	 in	sura	49,	 “O	people,	we	created	you	 from	the	same	male	and	 female,	and	rendered	 you	 different	 people	 and	 tribes,	 that	 you	may	 recognize	 each	other.	The	best	among	you	in	the	sight	of	God	is	the	most	righteous”…see	what	the	verse	says?	90	The	 religious	 discourse	 on	 equality	 that	 my	 non-Sada	 informant	 refers	 to	above	 is	not	novel,	but,	 in	 fact,	rooted	 in	a	debate	about	kafa’a	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	 in	 the	diaspora	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1997,	241).	The	Irshadi	organization,	which	was	dominated	by	non-Sada,	tried	to	 challenge	 the	 privilege	 of	 the	 Sada	 by	 citing	 the	 religious	 principle	 of	
musawa,	the	equality	of	all	Muslims.	Both	groups	used	religious	texts	to	justify	their	 opinions	 and	 invited	 an	 Egyptian	 reformist	 scholar,	 Rashid	 Rida,	 to	release	 a	 fatwa,	 religious	 legal	 opinion	 on	 the	matter	 (Mobini-Kesheh	 1997,	241).	In	this	context,	the	difference	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	on	the	concept	of	 kafa’a	 to	 some	 extent	 overlaps	 with	 different	 religious	 ideologies	 that	predominate	in	each	group:	traditionalist	Shafi’i	among	the	Sada	and	reformist	Islam	 among	 the	 non-Sada	 (see	 chapter	 5	 section	 5.2	 and	 5.3),	 each	 having	different	implications	on	marriage	and	gender	relations.	Although	 not	 all	 Hadramis	 of	 Ambon	 are	 directly	 engaged	 in	 religious	discourses,	 their	 practices	 of	 kinship	 relations	 enacted	 through	marriage	 are	partly	 shaped	by	 Islamic	 doctrines	 that	 are	 open	 to	multiple	 interpretations.	The	 relatively	 loose	 concept	 of	kafa’a	 in	 Islamic	 legal	 thought,	which	 gives	 a	broad	 range	of	 criteria	not	necessarily	based	on	 lineage,	offers	many	choices	and	flexibility	for	the	believers,	particularly	to	members	of	the	non-Sada	group,	to	adjust	to	pragmatic	needs	in	changing	circumstances.	This	also	implies	that	shared	 religious	 affiliation	 is	 the	 most	 basic	 criterion	 that	 overrules	 other	
                                                90	Interview	with	Umar	Attamimy,	October	8,	2014.	
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aspects	of	equality	in	marriage.	This	has	allowed	the	less	wealthy	non-Sada	to	adapt	with	a	new	situation	and	integrate	into	a	broader	society	of	Muslims	on	Ambon.	As	 descent	 is	 a	 very	 important	 aspect	 of	 marriage	 relations	 among	 the	Sada,	 the	 members	 of	 this	 group	 have	 attempted	 to	 prevent	 their	 family	members	 from	violating	 the	kafa’a	principle.	This	means	 that	 the	regulations	affect	 female	 members	 more	 than	 male	 members	 since	 whomever	 a	 man	marries	 does	 not	 affect	 their	 offspring’s	 lineage,	 while	 women	marrying-out	would	cut	their	children’s	off	from	their	prophetic	lineage,	which	is	considered	sacred.	 In	 the	 following,	section,	 I	will	discuss	how	the	kafa’a	 regulations	are	related	 to	 taboo	concerning	women’s	behaviour,	particularly	among	the	Sada	group.			
3.3 Kafa’a	and	Religious	Taboo	The	 previous	 section	 described	 how	 religious	 beliefs	 concerning	 kafa’a	regulations	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 the	 construction	 of	marriage	within	 the	 Hadrami	descendants	of	both	Sada	and	non-Sada.	However,	the	application	of	the	kafa’a	principle	 by	 Sada	 has	most	 strongly	 affected	 gender	 inequality.	 I	 argue	 that	their	 conception	 on	 the	 strict	 application	 of	 kafa’a	 in	 marriage	 lies	 in	 the	concept	of	 taboo.	 In	this	regard,	 I	apply	Margaret	Mead’s	discussion	of	 taboo,	which	 she	 defined	 as	 “any	 prohibitions	which	 carry	 no	 penalties	 beyond	 the	anxiety	 and	 embarrassment	 arising	 from	 a	 breach	 of	 strongly	 entrenched	custom”	(Steiner	and	Bohannan	1967,	143).		This	definition	corresponds	with	the	beliefs	and	practices	of	Sada	families	who	consider	the	transgression	of	the	
kafa’a	regulations	in	marriage	in	terms	of	women	marrying	out	as	a	forbidden	act	or	 taboo.	This	 taboo	derives	 from	specific	beliefs	within	 the	group	which	are	 justified	 by	 religious	 decrees	 although	 not	 carrying	 any	 institutionalized	religious	penalities.	Rather,	the	penalties	concern	social	sanctions	from	family	members	 or	 the	 group,	 such	 as	 exclusion,	 isolation,	 losing	 a	 share	 of	 family	wealth,	 and	 others.	 Breaking	 the	 rules	 is	 also	 accompanied	 by	 fear	 of	 God’s	punishment	 of	 transgressors	 and	 their	 family	members	who	 have	 permitted	them	to	transgress.	In	this	context,	the	taboo	is	related	to	several	aspects,	such	as	religious	beliefs,	the	honor	code,	and	social	sanctions.	Like	 many	 other	 cultural	 taboos	 (Holden	 2001;	 Tetlock	 2003),	commitments	of	Sada	members	to	the	kafa’a	principle	are	considered	absolute	and	inviolable,	and	in	effect	sacred.	This	sacredness	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	members	believe	 in	the	sacredness	of	 the	prophetic	 lineage,	 the	maintenance	of	which	is	regarded	obligatory	since	commanded	by	God	and	his	Prophet.	 In	this	line,	my	informant	Rugaya	Alatas,	for	example,	shared	her	view:	How	could	 I	explain	 to	you	about	 this	 (kafa’a,	 Istiqomah).	The	Qur’an	 in	sura	 al-An’am	 verse	 87	 talks	 about	 prophetic	 descendants	 as	 being	 an	
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exceptionally	high	quality	of	human	beings,	and	the	Prophet	also	said	‘We,	the	Prophet	family,	are	not	comparable	to	anybody’.91	Not	 only	 is	 this	 religious	 text	 often	 cited,	 but	 several	 other	 texts	 are	 also	interpreted	by	the	Sada	as	supporting	the	maintenance	of	prophetic	genealogy	by	 domesticating	women	 in	 their	marriages.	 Breaking	 the	 kafa’a	principle	 is	thus	deemed	a	sinful	act,	and	such	a	transgression	is	believed	to	receive	God’s	punishment	 in	 the	 hereafter.	One	 Sada	descendant	 Fatma	 (44	 years	 old),	 for	instance,	told	me,	“I	heard	that	the	Prophet	would	not	greet	us	in	the	hereafter	if	we	break	the	 law…yes,	 I	would	fear	this	 if	 I	were	to	do	such	a	thing”.92	Her	statement	 indicates	 that	 she	 is	 not	 familiar	 with	 specific	 religious	 texts	 in	which	this	claim	is	stated,	but	rather	accepts	information	from	other	members	whose	 religious	 knowledge	 she	 considers	 authoritative.	 In	 fact,	 many	 other	informants	 similarly	 do	 not	 actively	 engage	 in	 religious	 discourse	 but	 rather	base	 their	 views	 on	 other	 people’s	 opinions.	 Another	 example	 is	 my	 Sada	informant	Sasa	 (see	 chapter	3	page	115),	who	noted:	 “I	 am	not	 sure,	 I	heard	from	 a	 sayyid	 that	 if	 a	 sharifa	 marries	 a	 non-sayyid	 she	 is	 committing	adultery…but	I	am	not	sure,	I	can	ask	him	directly	to	explain	to	you”.93	The	statement	above	reflects	an	extreme	view	on	the	sinfulness	of	a	union	between	a	Sada	woman	and	a	non-Sada	man;	in	Islamic	legal	thought,	adultery	is	 considered	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	 biggest	 sins	 and	 may	 result	 in	 capital	punishment,	 such	 as	 lapidation	 (Coulson	 1994;	 Bin	 Mohd	 Noor	 2010;	 Bello	2011).	This	 taboo	 is	 thus	 related	 to	 what	 Mary	 Douglas’s	 Purity	 and	Danger	calls	 sexual	dangers	 interpreted	as	 “symbols	of	 the	relation	between	parts	of	society,	 as	 mirroring	 designs	 of	 hierarchy	 or	 symmetry	 which	 apply	 in	 the	larger	 system”	 (Douglas	1966,	3).	 	 In	a	 similar	vein,	Holden	 (2001,	6)	argues	that	one	major	function	of	taboo	is	“social	control,	 to	maintain	the	status	quo	and	validate	the	authority	of	ruling	classes”.	As	a	mechanism	of	social	control,	
kafa’a	among	Sada	Hadramis	operates	to	protect	 the	hierarchy	of	 in-and	out-groups,	 and	 it	 works	 through	 a	 belief	 on	 the	 danger	 of	 the	 sexual	 union	between	women	from	the	in-group	and	men	from	out-groups.	Another	 concept	 related	 to	 the	 taboo	 on	 transgression	 of	 the	 kafa’a	principle	is	linked	to	the	conception	of	purification	of	the	prophetic	genealogy.	Holy	(1983,	93)	argued	that	“whenever	differences	in	status	or	power	between	groups	 in	 the	Middle	 East	 are	 perceived	 or	 acknowledged	 to	 exist,	 they	 are	legitimized	by	invoking	the	antiquity	of	the	descent	line	of	the	more	powerful	group	 of	 the	 purity	 of	 its	 agnatic	 descent”.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 purity	 of	 agnatic	descent	by	 imposing	marriage	 restrictions	on	women	can	be	 related	 to	Mary	Douglas’	concept	of	pollution	and	taboo.	Douglas	(1966,	123-4)	distinguished	
                                                91	Interview	with	Rugaya	Alatas,	March	7,	2015.	92	Interview	with	Fatma,	September	28,	2014.	93	Interview	with	Sasa,	December	8,	2014.	
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four	 kinds:	 “danger	 pressing	 on	 external	 boundaries;	 danger	 from	transgressing	 the	 internal	 lines	 of	 the	 system;	 danger	 in	 the	margins	 of	 the	lines;	and	danger	from	internal	contradiction”	.	Women’s	transgression	of	kafa’a	regulations	can	thus	be	seen	as	polluting	sacred	blood	by	 contaminating	 it	with	 that	of	 those	having	unsacred	 lineage.	Hence,	 marriage	 with	 non-Sada	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘danger’.	 	 Moreover,	 imposing	marriage	restrictions	on	women	is	a	way	to	create	a	distinction	similar	to	what	Bourdieu	 (1977,	57)	argues	about	 the	 case	of	patrilateral	 cousin	marriage	 in	that	 “it	 is	 likely	 to	be	 the	 tactic	of	groups	characterized	by	a	strong	desire	 to	assert	 their	 distinction	 by	 stricter	 observance	 of	 the	 tradition	 or	 by	 putting	oneself	in	line	with	the	rule”.	In	 addition	 to	 religious	 connotations,	 the	 taboo	 among	 the	 Sada	 also	carries	dimensions	of	a	cultural	code	related	to	honor	and	shame.	This	cultural	code	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.		
3.4 Kafa’a,	Honor	and	Shame	Every	society	has	 rules	of	 conduct,	which	are	sanctioned	by	rewarding	 those	who	conform	to	them	and	punishing	those	who	disobey.	Honor	and	shame	are	social	 evaluations	 that	 at	 the	 same	 time	 become	 part	 of	 social	 sanctions	(Peristiany	1966).	For	the	Sada,	honor	and	shame	are	two	opposite	poles	and	are	 related	 to	 ‘victory’	 and	 ‘loss’	 in	 the	 context	 of	 fulfillment	 of	 the	 ideal	marriage	for	its	female	members	on	the	basis	of	the	kafa’a	principle.		In	her	ethnographic	study	of	the	Egyptian	Awlad	‘Ali	Bedouins,	Lila	Abu-Lughod	 argues	 that	 patterns	 of	 emotional	 expression	 in	 situations	 of	 loss	should	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	set	of	culturally	specific	ideals,	which	in	her	case	study	are	those	entailed	by	the	honor	code,	the	moral	code	fundamental	to	 social	 life	 in	 Mediterranean	 societies	 on	 which	 the	 social	 order	 and	hierarchy	 in	 Bedouin	 society	 hinge	 (Abu-Lughod	 1985,	 246).	 She	 further	argues	 that	 these	 emotional	 sentiments	 of	 loss	 are	 expressed	 through	 two	different	forms	or	discourses:	and	ordinary	discourse	and	a	poetic	one,	which	are	contradictory	in	their	expressive	characteristics,	but	linked	to	each	other	in	everyday	 life.	 These	 two	 sentiments	 cover	 expressions	 of	 vulnerability	 (non-defensive)	and	invulnerability	(defensive),	in	which	the	former	is	represented	in	 ordinary	 discourse	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 and	 the	 latter	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	poetic	 form	 in	 the	 intimate	 private	 domain	 (Abu-Lughod	 1985,	 221-2).	 	 In	 a	somewhat	similar	fashion,	among	the	Sada	group	of	Ambon,	the	honor	code	is	reflected	 in	 emotional	 sentiments	 on	 the	 families’	 loss	 of	 their	 daughters	through	two	different	discourses:	a	public	and	a	private	discourse.	Unlike	the	Awlad	 ‘Ali,	 who	 use	 poems	 as	 a	medium	 of	 invulnerability	 sentiments,	 Sada	Hadramis	 express	 their	 sentiments	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 invulnerability	through	the	same	ordinary	discourse.	The	difference	here	lies	more	in	the	fact	
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that	the	discourse	on	vulnerability	is	articulated	in	a	more	private	domain	and	is	only	visible	to	members	of	a	family,	while	the	discourse	on	invulnerability	is	more	 public,	 and	 therefore	 also	 visible	 to	 non-members	 of	 a	 family.	 A	 few	examples	will	illustrate	this.			In	September	25,	2014,	I	went	to	see	Zainab,	a	widow	from	a	Sada	family.	She	 was	 58	 years	 old	 at	 the	 time.	 She	 lived	 in	 Batumerah	 Dalam,	 the	 most	crowded	 area	 of	 the	 Muslim	 neighbourhood	 in	 the	 town.	 I	 could	 not	immediately	find	her	house	so	I	asked	what	turned	out	to	be	her	neighbors	if	they	 knew	where	 Zainab	 lived.	 	 Apparently,	most	 of	 her	 neighbors	were	 not	familiar	with	her	full	name,	but	rather	addressed	her	or	referred	to	her	as	umi,	which	literally	means	mother.	Zainab	had	actually	been	reluctant	to	talk	about	her	family	matters	when	I	had	first	asked	her	to	be	one	of	my	informants.	As	was	the	case	with	many	other	informants	who	often	cancelled	appointments	at	a	late	notice,	it	was	also	difficult	to	set	a	fixed	schedule	to	interview	her.	It	was	late	 afternoon	when	 I	 visited	 her.	 Her	 house	was	 quite	 small,	 and	 the	 living	room	was	simultaneously	used	as	a	small	shop,	for	which	Zainab	had	installed	a	 glass	 showcase.	 The	 showcase	 was	 stuffed	 with	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 things,	among	which	 frankincense,	 a	 clay	 frankincense	 bowl,	 charcoal,	 and	perfume.	When	Zainab	asked	me	to	come	inside,	a	neighbor	came	to	buy	a	frankincense	bowl	and	charcoal.	When	I	asked	her	what	the	customer	would	use	these	items	for,	 she	 explained	 that	 it	was	 for	 a	 tahlilan,	a	kind	of	 a	 religious	 ritual.94	The	frankincense	 in	 the	showcase	reminded	me	of	 the	popularity	of	 frankincense	as	 a	 valuable	 commodity	 in	 the	 ancient	 times.	 	 The	 Arabian	 Peninsula,	especially	 Hadramaut,	 was	 one	 of	 the	 few	 fertile	 places	 in	 the	 world	 to	cultivate	 frankincense	 which	 was	 used	 for	 religious	 ceremonies	 in	 some	religions	 before	 the	 advent	 of	 Islam	 (Morley	 1949;	 Groom	 1981;	 Roberts	1998).	Both	 Zainab	 and	 her	 husband	 are	 from	 Namlea,	 Buru	 Island.	 Until	 his	death	in	2005,	Zainab’s	husband	worked	as	a	civil	servant	in	the	department	of	training	 and	 education.	 Zainab	 is	 the	 oldest	 of	 ten	 siblings.	 Both	 her	 parents	are	from	Sada	families	of	the	al-Hamid	clan.	Zainab	herself	has	five	children,	all	of	whom	daughters.	When	 asked	 about	 her	 children	 and	 their	marriage,	 her	facial	expression	changed.	She	 frowned	and	kept	silent	 for	a	while	as	 if	 I	had	posed	her	 an	 impertinent	or	painful	 question.	Then	 she	 replied	 that	 three	of	her	daughters	were	married.	When	I	asked	next	with	whom	they	got	married,	Zainab	 looked	 even	more	 upset.	 I	 could	 see	 tears	 in	 her	 eyes	 betraying	 her	sadness,	although	she	would	not	express	it	in	front	of	me,	a	stranger.	Just	when	I	wondered	 if	maybe	 I	 should	not	have	 asked	 this	question	 if	 it	 so	obviously	
                                                94	Tahlilan	is	a	form	of	tahlil	ritual.	Tahlil,	from	Arabic,	literally	means	a	form	of	dhikr	by	uttering	 la	 ilaha	 illa-llah	 or	 there	 is	 no	 deity	 but	God.	 In	 Indonesia	 the	 tahlil	 ritual	 is	common	among	traditionalist	Muslims.		
Chapter	4:	Kinship,	Marriage,	and	Gender	
142		
bothered	her,	one	of	Zainab’s	daughters	suddenly	entered	the	living	room.	She	interrupted	my	conversation	with	her	mother	by	saying:	“my	lineage	is	broken	because	 I	 am	 married	 with	 non-us”.	 Apparently,	 she	 had	 overheard	 my	conversation	with	her	mother.	This	might	be	due	to	the	size	of	the	house	which	was	not	spacious	so	that	people	could	hear	what	other	people	talked	about	in	another	room.	Of	the	three	married	daughters,	two	were	married	to	non-Sada	men	 without	 the	 presence	 or	 endorsement	 of	 their	 male	 guardian.	 In	 other	words,	 while	 a	 male	 guardian	 from	 the	 family	 is	 supposed	 to	 marry	 off	daughters,	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	marriages	of	 the	 two	daughters	 of	 Zainab’s,	 the	male	guardian	was	replaced	by	a	guardian	judge.	The	 changing	 expression	 on	 Zainab’s	 face,	 then,	 related	 to	 feelings	 of	shame.	 	 She	 felt	 that	 her	 family’s	 honor	 had	 been	 polluted	 by	 their	 two	daughters’	 spouses.	 Her	 daughters	 married	 inappropriate	 men,	 rather	 than	Sada	men	 from	 their	highly	 valued	own	descent	 group.	The	 shame	 that	 such	marriages	brings	should	remain	untold	and	silenced	as	soon	as	it	is	mentioned,	not	only	to	their	family	members	and	group,	but	also	to	strangers	like	me.	I	was	surprised	about	Zainab’s	daughter	interruption,	which	showed	that	she	was	aware	of	the	consequence	that	marrying	a	non-Sada	man	would	lead	to	her	exclusion	of	the	group	of	the	Sada	and	moreover	to	her	exclusion	from	her	 family.	 However,	 here	 she	was	 visiting	 her	mother,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	Zainab	 had	 made	 it	 clear	 that	 she	 was	 against	 her	 daughter’s	 marriage,	commenting:	“What	can	I	do,	it	has	happened	and	I	cannot	stop	it.	Their	father	has	died.	Maybe	if	he	were	still	alive,	I	am	sure	that	they	(Zainab’s	daughters,	Istiqomah)	would		never	be	able	to	enter	this	house”.95		Here	 we	 can	 see	 that	 Zainab	 faces	 a	 dilemma	 in	 dealing	 with	 her	 two	contradictory	 roles	 as	 a	 mother	 and	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Sada.	 When	 her	husband	 died	 she	 lost	 the	 strong	 support	 from	 the	 highest	 authority	 in	 her	family	 and	 unfortunately	 she	 does	 not	 have	 a	 son	 who	 could	 help	 her	 to	prevent	 her	 daughters	 from	 breaching	 the	 family	 code	 of	 honor.	 Zainab’s	daughter	confided	 to	me	 that	although	her	mother	had	been	upset	about	her	choice	 of	 partner,	 her	 feelings	 as	 a	 mother	 had	 called	 her	 to	 forgive	 her	daughters	 their	 violations,	 especially	 when	 her	 grandchildren	 were	 born.	Zainab’s	daughter	said,	“It	took	a	while	for	my	mother	to	allow	me	to	visit	her	and	I	have	been	able	to	come	to	her	house	especially	after	I	gave	birth”.		A	 few	months	 later,	 on	 January	24,	2015,	Zainab’s	 same	daughter	Zidna	(34	 years	 old)	 agreed	 to	 tell	more	 about	 the	 story	 of	 her	 bitter	 relationship	with	her	parents	after	choosing	a	local	man	as	her	husband:		When	I	had	a	boyfriend	who	 is	of	 local	origin,	 the	man	I	married	 later,	 I	did	not	 tell	 to	my	parents.	 I	hid	 that	 for	some	time.	But	our	 love	was	so	strong,	 and	 we	 decided	 to	 plan	 our	 marriage.	 Then,	 I	 tried	 to	 tell	 my	
                                                95	Interview	with	Zainab,	September	25,	2014.	
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parents.	At	that	time	my	father	was	still	alive.	The	first	response	I	got	was	that	my	father	was	furious	and	asked	me	to	choose	between	the	family	or	my	boyfriend.	At	that	time,	I	was	very	confused	who	to	choose,	my	family	or	my	boyfriend.	Of	course,	I	had	heard	similar	stories	like	mine,	but	I	had	not	thought	that	my	father’s	reaction	would	be	like	that.	After	a	few	days,	I	decided	to	leave	the	house	and	I	went	to	live	with	a	relative…	My	parents	did	 not	 come	 to	 my	 wedding	 ceremony,	 none	 of	 my	 father’s	 and	 my	mother’s	 family	 were	 present…	 That	 was	 sad,	 but	 that	 was	 the	consequence...	 Now	 I	 am	 happy	 because	 my	 mother	 accepts	 me	 and	allows	me	to	visit	her	with	my	kids.96	A	 similar	 example	 comes	 from	 another	 Sada	 family	 in	 Amantelu	 Batumerah	Atas,	 this	 time	 from	an	al-Aydrus	 family.	 	When	 I	 came	 to	visit	 this	 family	 in	December	3,	2014,	I	met	Fira,	who	was	then	64	years	old.	Fira	is	a	widow	of	a	Sada	descendant	who	died	in	1994	at	the	age	of	70.	Fira’s	husband	worked	as	a	civil	servant	in	the	department	of	land	tenure	in	Ambon.	Fira	herself	is	not	of	Sada	descent	but	from	Pakistani	origin.	She	has	three	daughters	and	six	sons.	None	of	her	daughters	are	married	to	Sada	men.	She	told	me:	My	husband	 and	 I	 had	 emphasized	 this	 thing	 (kafa’a,	 Istiqomah)	 to	 our	children	from	the	very	beginning.	When	my	husband	was	alive,	he	really	got	upset	with	my	daughters’	choices.	But	I	told	my	husband	“How	can	we	solve	 this	 thing,	 they	 are	 our	 own	 children.	 How	 long	 will	 you	 remain	upset?	 They	 will	 be	 still	 our	 own	 children	 forever.	 Will	 we	 follow	 our	parents	 or	 our	 children?	 If	 we	 follow	 our	 children	 whatever	 their	behaviour	-	either	good	or	bad	-	they	will	always	serve	us,	and	they	know	whether	we	are	happy	or	sad.”	They	could	have	done	worse	things	such	as	elopement	or	marrying	non-Muslims.97	From	 Fira’s	 narration,	 it	 transpires	 that	 a	 nuclear	 family	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	sources	for	social	security	for	parents.	Parents	will	ask	support	and	care	from	their	own	children	rather	 than	 from	other	relatives.	Children	are	expected	to	live	 longer	 than	 them	so	 that	 they	 can	 rely	on	 their	 children’s	 support	when	getting	 old	 and	weak.	 The	 fact	 that	 Fira	 did	 not	 live	 in	 her	 husband’s	 family	home	 or	 neighbourhood	 is	 another	 reason	why	 she	 eventually	 accepted	 her	children’s	marriage	transgression.	Most	family	members	of	Fira’s	husband	live	on	 the	 island	 of	 Sawai,	 Seram	 Utara.	When	 I	 visited	 Fira’s	 husband’s	 family	there	two	years	before	I	met	Fira	in	December	2014,	the	family	was	quite	poor	and	 even	 Fira’s	 husband’s	 nephews	were	 provided	 for	 by	 Fira’s	 daughter	 in	Ambon.	This	means	that	Fira	and	her	husband	are	relatively	better	off	than	her	husband’s	 siblings.	 In	 this	 case,	 social	pressure	 from	Fira’s	husband	 family	 is	less	significant	due	to	their	weak	economic	position.	
                                                96	Interview	with	Zidna,	January	24,	2015	97	Interview	with	Fira,	May	3,	2015.		
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This	 example	 demonstrates	 that	 economic	 power	 relations	 are	interconnected	with	 the	ways	people	 are	 able	 to	deal	with	external	pressure	such	as	that	coming	from	husband’s	family	members.		Fira’s	role	in	mediating	the	 tension	 between	 her	 husband	 and	 their	 daughters	 is	 significant.	 Her	mediation	might	 not	 have	 succeeded	had	 she	 been	 a	 descendant	 of	 the	 Sada	herself.	As	a	non-Sada	descendant,	she	was	not	raised	in	a	strict	family	with	a	strong	kafa’a	tradition	and	like	many	other	non-Sada	members	she	may	be	of	the	 view	 that	 an	 appropriate	 marriage	 is	 not	 necessarily	 based	 on	 shared	descent.	 	Apart	 from	that,	Fira’s	role	as	a	mediator,	as	 I	observed,	also	 lies	 in	her	personality:	 she	 is	 a	patient,	 soft,	 and	 calm	woman.	 For	her	what	 counts	most	 is	 that	 an	 appropriate	marriage	 should	 be	 always	 under	 one’s	 parents’	consent	and	that	one	should	 follow	the	proper	procedure	rather	 than	opt	 for	elopement.	 	 Religious	 identity	 is	 thus	 what	 matters	 most	 for	 her	 if	 other	requirements	cannot	be	fulfilled.	Alvina	from	the	al-Hamid	Sada	clan	was	38	years	old	when	I	met	her,	wife	of	a	man	from	the	Jamal	al-Lail	clan,	and	mother	of	four	little	children.	Alvina	told	me	the	story	of	her	negotiations	over	a	marriage	partner	with	her	father:		Why	are	we	not	allowed	to	marry	out?	My	father	said	“For	ahl	al-bayt	of	the	Prophet	it	is	forbidden	to	marry	out...”.	He	continued,	“Please	arrange	a	marriage	 to	your	daughters	so	 that	 they	will	not	 lose	 their	way.	 If	you	have	sons	you	should	not	give	them	away	to	ordinary	women	so	that	our	daughters,	 as	 sharifa	 (female	 Sada	 descendant,	 Istiqomah),	 can	 get	married	to	your	sons”.	Then	he	said	again…”if	you	marry	out,	please	get	out	from	the	house	now,	and	do	not	use	sharifa	as	a	title	because	you	just	make	us	ashamed”.98	Here	 we	 can	 see	 why	 it	 is	 that	 although	 Sada	 men	 can	 marry	 out,	 they	 are	highly	 recommended	 to	marry	 in.	 If	 Sada	men	marry	out,	 for	 Sada	women	 it	will	be	more	difficult	 to	 find	appropriate	husbands	 from	 the	 same	 lineage	or	from	 the	Sada	group	 in	general.	 In	 some	cases,	 Sada	women	remained	single	for	 their	entire	 life	because	 they	did	not	 find	appropriate	husbands	and	 they	were	 afraid	 of	 breaking	 the	 norm.	 Many	 of	 them	 also	 believed	 that	 such	 a	transgression	 may	 lead	 to	 God’s	 sanctions	 in	 the	 hereafter	 or	 that	 their	marriage	would	not	end	happily.	The	 statement	 above	 also	 emphasizes	 the	 significance	 of	 an	 arranged	marriage	as	 a	mechanism	 to	maintain	 the	unity	 and	 superiority	of	 the	group	and	protect	it	against	extinction.	Arranged	marriages	within	one’s	own	family	or	clan	was	very	common	among	the	Sada	group	among	the	 first	and	second	Hadrami	generation,	especially	between	immediate	cousins,	second	cousins	or	even	between	uncle	and	niece.	In	the	present	context,	arranged	marriages	are	rare,	and	many	young	Hadramis	select	their	partners	themselves.	As	there	are	
                                                98	Interview	with	Alvina	on	December	9,	2014.		
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now	more	choices	open	to	the	young	Sada	generation	of	both	men	and	women	to	select	a	spouse,	the	chances	to	marry	out	are	greater	in	the	present	context.	In	the	three	examples	above,	following	the	kafa’a	regulations	in	marriage	is	what	 Abu-Lughod	 calls	 part	 of	 the	 ‘honor	 code’,	 that	 is,	 a	moral	 code	 that	entails	 a	 set	 of	 culturally	 specific	 ideals	 (Abu-Lughod	1985).	The	honor	 code	carries	 cultural	 meanings	 about	 honor	 and	 pride	 which	 are	 symbolized	 in	marriage	ideals.	Breaking	the	kafa’a	regulations	brings	shame	to	the	family.	In	the	three	cases	above,	the	family	members	express	their	vulnerable	sentiments	as	non-defensive	responses,	such	as	sadness,	shame,	and	pain,	due	to	the	loss	of	 their	 female	members,	who	decided	 to	marry	men	of	a	 lower	rank.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 their	 vulnerable	 sentiments	 as	 non-defensive	 responses	 in	 the	private	sphere	of	the	house	are	in	contrast	with	their	invulnerable	sentiments	in	 public	 domains	 expressed	 in	more	 aggressive	manners	 such	 as	 anger	 and	resentment,	which	also	 reveal	 rejection	of	 transgressive	daughters	as	part	of	family	members	followed	by	all	kinds	of	sanctions.99	In	his	study	among	the	Bedouin	society	 in	Egypt	Abou	A.	M.	Zeid	argues	that	honor	and	shame	among	the	Bedouin	is	to	a	great	extent	about	aspects	of	bonds	 and	 values	 of	 kinship	 (1966,	 245-260).	 Zeid	 argues	 that	 in	 tribal	societies,	 the	 higher	 the	 status	 of	 the	 kin-group	 in	 the	 community,	 the	more	rigorous	and	binding	their	obligations	and	responsibilities	(1966,	245-260).	In	the	case	of	the	Sada	families	in	Ambon,	the	value	of	honor	is	partly	shaped	by	women’s	 behaviour,	 especially	 in	 their	 choice	 of	 marriage.	 In	 other	 words,	belonging	to	a	Sada	group	is	a	form	of	symbolic	capital	which	brings	pride	and	prestige	 for	both	men	and	women	of	 this	group,	but	maintaining	the	value	of	honor	 is	 imposed	on	women	by	restricting	 their	choice	of	marriage	partners.	Failing	 to	 comply	with	 the	binding	duties	of	marriage	 rules	brings	 shame	on	family	members	and	the	immediate	kinsmen	beyond	the	nuclear	family.	In	the	context	of	the	Sada	community,	the	concept	of	honor	is	not	merely	about	sexual	misconduct	or	criminal	 involvement,	but	 it	encompasses	certain	values	of	commitment	to	kafa’a	as	a	firm,	sacred	tradition	that	male	and	female	family	members	should	obey.	In	contra-distinction	to	honor,	shame	is	related	to	the	women’s	misconduct	in	terms	of	breaking	the	kafa’a	norm.	Transgression	 of	 the	 kafa’a	principle	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 shameful	 act	 that	can	diminish	 the	status	of	 the	 family,	which	 is	experienced	as	an	 insult	 to	all	Sada	 members	 of	 the	 family	 involved.	 	 I	 discovered	 that	 most	 of	 Sada	 felt	ashamed	when	 telling	 about	 members	 who	 had	married	 non-Sada	 partners,	and	more	often	than	not	they	were	reluctant	to	talk	about	this	transgression.	In	this	sense,	breaking	the	kafa’a	principle	means	a	decline	of	the	honor	of	the	family.	Although	men’s	exogamy	does	not	affect	the	honor	of	the	Sada	family,	their	 exogamous	 marriage	 choices	 should	 still	 meet	 some	 criteria	 that	 are	
                                                99	Also	see	the	next	subsection	on	social	sanctions.	
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related	 to	 descent	 as	 well.	 For	 example,	 Nadia,	 thirty-seven-year-old	 	 Sada	descendant	stated:	“Well,	men	can	marry	out,	of	course,	but	my	forefathers	did	not	 marry	 ordinary	 women	 (locals	 from	 a	 lower	 descent,	 Istiqomah).	 My	(great)	grandmothers	came	from	a	higher	rank”.100	Her	statement	reflects	that	the	Sada	have	a	subtle	range	of	honor	evaluations	to	judge	the	appropriateness	and	compatibility	of	marriage	partners.		These	criteria	work	out	differently	for	women	and	men.		
3.5 Kafa’a	and	Group’s	Sanctions		One	important	dimension	of	the	taboo	on	Sada	women	marrying	out	 is	social	punishment.	The	violation	of	the	taboo	has	led	to	various	kinds	of	punishments	of	 the	 transgressors	 by	 their	 family	 members,	 such	 as	 isolation,	 inheritance	cuts,	 marriage	 annulments,	 and	 other	 measures.	 Such	 social	 punishments	might	 function	 as	 creating	 a	 social	 order	 as	 what	 Douglas	 argues	 in	 her	analysis	of	taboo:	Ideas	 about	 separating,	 purifying,	 demarcating	 and	 punishing	transgressions	 have	 as	 their	 main	 function	 to	 impose	 system	 on	 an	inherently	 untidy	 experience.	 It	 is	 only	 by	 exaggerating	 the	 difference	between	within	and	without,	about	and	below,	male	and	female,	with	and	against,	that	a	semblance	of	order	is	created	(Douglas	1966,	4).		Douglas’	 argument	 about	 gender	 relations	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 taboo	 can	 be	understood	in	a	context	of	a	strong	patriarchal	cultural	order.	As	in	many	other	patriarchal	 communities,	 an	 important	 feature	 of	 Arab	 communities	 is	 the	style	 of	 communication,	 which	 is	 hierarchal,	 creating	 vertical	 as	 opposed	 to	horizontal	 communication	 between	 those	 in	 authority	 and	 those	 subservient	to	that	authority.	In	this	context,	men	are	holders	of	the	authority	in	the	family	(Peristiany	1966).	In	Sada	families,	this	can	partly	be	recognized,	especially	in	relation	to	daughters	deviating	from	the	marriage	norm.	Male	family	members,	such	 as	 grandfathers,	 fathers,	 sons,	 and	 uncles	 have	 the	 authority	 to	 decide	whether	 marriage	 candidates	 for	 their	 daughters,	 sisters,	 and	 aunts	 are	appropriate	or	not.	Since	men’s	choice	of	spouses	does	not	have	any	impact	on	the	 breaking	 of	 kafa’a,	 they	 function	 as	 guardians	 of	 their	 female	 family	members	in	a	broad	sense	and	are	expected	to	see	to	it	that	their	female	family	members	will	obey	the	rules.	Although	 the	 Sada	 also	 have	 a	 patrilineal	 kinship	 system,	 it	 is	 not	 only	men	of	 the	 paternal	 side	 hold	 the	 authority	 but	men	of	 the	maternal	 side	 as	well	if	both	father	and	mother	are	from	the	same	Sada	group.	If	only	the	father	is	 of	 Sada	descent,	 the	 control	 over	 the	 family	 is	 in	 the	hands	of	men	on	 the	paternal	 side.	 Although	men	 are	 higher	 in	 the	 family	 hierarchy	 than	women,	
                                                100	Interview	with	Nadia,	February	27,	2015.		
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this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 female	 family	members	 do	not	 hold	 authority	 at	 all.		Especially	 those	 who	 are	 regarded	 as	 senior	 members	 such	 as	 mothers,	paternal	grandmothers	and	aunts	enjoy	authority.	In	this	context,	hierarchy	in	Sada	 families	 is	 not	 exclusively	 based	 on	 gender,	 but	 gender	 intersects	with	age	differences.	The	 first	 stage	 of	 social	 punishment	 to	 women’s	 transgressions	 of	 the	
kafa’a	 principle	 	 is	 that	 their	 marriages	 are	 not	 endorsed.	 	 Rejection	 of	 a	woman’s	 marriage	 choice	 can	 become	 visible	 when	 during	 a	 wedding	ceremony	 the	male	 guardians	 of	 the	women	 and	 other	members	 are	 absent.		According	 to	 the	 national	 marriage	 act	 on	 Islamic	 marriages	 in	 Indonesia,	women	 should	 be	 married	 off	 by	 their	 guardians	 or	 by	 religious	 officials	(Cammack,	Young,	and	Heaton	1996).	The	guardians	of	 the	women	are	 those	male	members	in	the	family	with	whom	marriage	is	prohibited.	When	fathers	are	 no	 longer	 alive,	 another	 male	 member	 in	 the	 family	 such	 as	 a	 brother,	paternal	uncle	or	grandfather	acts	as	the	guardian	for	daughters.	In	the	case	of	absence	 of	 any	 family	 guardians,	 women	 are	 allowed	 to	 be	 married	 off	 by	religious	officials.	As	I	observed,	 in	most	cases	of	Sada	women	marrying	non-Sada	men,	the	bride’s	family	guardians	did	not	attend	the	marriage	ceremony.	Since	a	 father	 in	 the	Sada	 family	 is	a	 figure	of	much	authority,	 the	rest	of	 the	family	members,	 including	his	wife	 and	other	 children,	 should	obey	him.	 If	 a	female	 member	 in	 the	 family	 breaks	 the	 kafa’a	 norm,	 often	 her	 family	members	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 attend	 her	 wedding	 ceremony	 or	 to	 visit	 her	anymore.	 The	woman,	 in	 turn,	 is	 prohibited	 from	visiting	her	natal	 family.	 If	both	parents	are	of	Sada	descent,	the	treatment	of	the	female	members	can	be	even	 more	 severe	 because	 both	 her	 paternal	 and	 maternal	 relatives	 may	exclude	her.	It	 is	 not	 only	 the	 bride	 that	 is	 punished,	 but	 the	 social	 punishment	 also	psychologically	and	socially	affect	her	family	through	social	rumors	which	may	create	 fear	 and	worries.	Rumors	 about	 transgressors	 tend	 to	 spread	quickly.	Such	 stories	 are	 imbued	 by	 religious	 condemnation,	 and	 many	 Sada	descendants	 thus	 believe	 in	 the	 rumors	 and	 the	 religious	 sanctions.	 Fear	 for	the	 consequences	 of	 breaching	 kafa’a	 regulations	 thus	 keeps	 the	 religiously	inspired	taboo	alive	among	members.	Many	of	the	Sada	women	I	spoke	to,	for	example,	expressed	their	 fear	for	this	punishment,	and	believed	that	 fulfilling	
kafa’a	marriages	would	lead	to	a	happy	marriage	both	in	this	world	and	in	the	hereafter	 as	 it	 is	 in	 accordance	with	 God	 and	 his	 Prophet’s	 injunction.	 Some	people’s	 fear	 is	 aggravated	by	 collective	 stories	 about	women	who	ended	up	unhappy	 in	 their	 marriage,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 main	 cause	 of	 an	 unhappy	marriage	was	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 taboo.	 	 Another	 factor	 contributing	 to	 the	conception	of	unhappy	‘mixed’	marriages		is	the	high	value	attached	to	parents’	consent	in	marriage	choices.	The	central	problem	thus	lies	in	the	fact	that	most	Sada	 parents	 do	 not	 agree	 with	 their	 daughters’	 out-marriages.	 Because	 of	
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parents’	disagreement,	members	of	the	Sada	believe	that	children	would	never	be	happy	in	their	marriage	if	 their	parents	do	not	give	their	consent.	Shaikha	(35	years	old)	expressed	her	view	as	follows:		It	has	been	a	few	years	since	I	have	seen	my	family.	I	miss	them	a	lot,	but	my	parents	and	brother	do	not	want	 to	 talk	 to	me.	My	sister	 is	 the	only	one	whom	I	can	still	contact	and	who	is	kind	to	me…	I	have	two	kids	now.	I	don’t	know…but,	 I	am	happy	with	my	husband,	he	 is	a	 loving	person,	 I	still	 hope	 my	 parents	 will	 accept	 him	 even	 he	 is	 not	 from	 us	 (Sada,	Istiqomah)…Well,	I	know	the	reason	though.101				Shaikha	 is	 not	 the	 only	 person	 who	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 parental	social	 support	 and	 blessings	 and	 who	 hopes	 that	 her	 family	 will	 eventually	endorse	her	 choice.	That	 the	 consent	of	 parents	 is	 considered	 crucial	 for	 the	future	 happiness	 of	 the	 marriage,	 is	 because	 it	 is	 imbued	 with	 religious	meaning.	Some	informants,	 for	example,	stated:	“God’s	consent	 is	 in	the	hand	of	 parents’	 consent”.	 The	 belief	 of	 Sada	 members	 in	 the	 sacred	 nature	 of	parental	 consent	 finds	 its	 ‘proof’	 in	 failed	 marriages	 of	 family	 members,	 or	relatives	 or	 friends	 whose	 parents	 withheld	 their	 consent.	 Husna	 (50	 years	old),	a	Sada	from	the	al-Shatri	family	explained	to	me:	Look	what	happened	with	such…and	such…they	did	not	want	to	obey	our	elderly	 people.	 I	 just	 got	married	 a	 few	years	 ago.	 I	 don’t	 have	 children	myself	 but	my	husband	does	 have	 children	 from	his	 previous	marriage.	Don’t	you	notice	my	age,	I	was	already	old	when	I	got	married	(around	50	years	 old,	 Istiqomah).	 This	 is	 because	 I	 wanted	 to	 respect	 my	 parents’	wishes.102		The	 informant	above	 is	not	 the	only	one	who	married	at	a	 relatively	old	age.	Other	cases	are	even	more	extreme:	some	women	of	the	Sada	group	chose	to	remain	single	 for	 their	entire	 life,	 rather	 than	marrying	a	man	of	 lower	rank.	The	phenomenon	reflects	the	view	that	non-Sada	men	marrying	into	into	Sada	families	 will	 contaminate	 the	 Sada	 family’s	 blood,	 resulting	 in	 breaking	 the	prophetic	 lineage.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 reflects	 the	 view	 that	 the	 purity	 of	 the	blood,	in	terms	of	prophetic	descent	can	only	be	preserved	through	restricting	the	 conduct	 of	 female	 members.	 One	 of	 the	 informants	 even	 expressed	 his	joyful	feeling	when	telling	about	his	sister’s	divorce:		All	 of	 my	 sisters	 got	 married	 with	 men	 from	 Sada	 families	 except	 one.	First,	she	married	a	non-Sada	man.	At	that	time,	they	lived	in	Seram.	All	of	my	 family	members	 strongly	disagreed	with	her	 choice	and	we	 told	her	that	we	were	not	responsible	for	her	fate.	Almost	seven	years	we	did	not	
                                                101	Interview	with	Shaikha,	April	18,	2015.	102	Interview	with	Husna,	April	20,	2015.	
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want	to	talk	with	her	until	two	years	ago	when	she	got	divorced.	Now	she	is	married	again	with	our	cousin.103	The	statement	‘we	were	not	responsible	for	her	fate’	illustrates	how	strong	this	Sada	 family	 believes	 that	 a	 kafa’a	 transgressor	 will	 face	 punishment	 in	 the	Hereafter.	 This	 is	 an	 example	 of	 an	 extreme	 case,	 in	 which	 the	 family	attempted	to	annul	the	marriage	of	their	female	member.	Although	according	to	 the	 Sada	 divorce	 is	 disproved	 of	 by	 God,	 it	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 an	 act	 of	salvation	 for	 the	 female	member	who	 has	 transgressed	 the	kafa’a	 norm	 and	will	prevent	a	more	severe	punishment	in	the	Hereafter.		In	another	case,	the	marriage	of	parents	ended	in	a	divorce	because	they	responded	 differently	 to	 their	 daughter’s	 choice	 to	 marry	 a	 non-Sada.	 The	mother,	 Inaya	 (55	years	old)	 stated:	 “I	 only	have	one	daughter.	 I	wished	 she	could	marry	an	appropriate	man,	but	she	did	not.	But	she	is	still	my	daughter,	although	her	father	does	not	acknowledge	her	anymore…	hmmm,	he	divorced	me	 because	 he	 thought	 I	 supported	 my	 daughter’s	 decision”. 104 	Inaya’s	narration	reflects	her	feeling	of	hopelessness	in	negotiating	her	identities	as	a	member	of	a	larger	group,	the	Sada,	and	as	a	mother	to	her	daughter.	The	fact	that	 she	 decided	 to	 side	 with	 her	 daughter	 rather	 than	 with	 her	 husband	shows	that	her	relations	through	descent	(blood	ties)	are	more	significant	than	those	through	her	marriage.	For	her	ex-husband,	to	the	contrary,	keeping	the	Sada	lineage	pure	was	more	important	than	his	marriage	and	fatherhood.	The	 case	of	 Inaya’s	husband	and	 the	other	examples	 show	 that	 the	 idea	that	the	fulfillment	of	the	kafa’a	regulations	are	directly	connected	to	rewards	or	punishment	in	the	Hereafter’s	in	the	view	of	the	majority	of	the	Sada.	When	discussing	kinship,	 such	views	are	 expressed	 frequently	 in	 sayings	 like:	 “The	Prophet	will	not	give	any	shafa’a	(forgiveness)”	or	“we	have	our	own	law”	or	“This	is	our	destiny	as	descendants	of	the	Prophet”.	In	addition	to	social	exclusion,	a	woman	who	breaks	the	kafa’a	norm	will	be	punished	by	not	receiving	any	financial	aid	or	property	from	her	parents.	In	some	 cases	 she	 will	 not	 even	 inherit	 from	 her	 parents	 when	 they	 die.	 The	family	punishment	to	transgressors	is	strongly	kept	under	the	control	of	male	members,	such	as	a	 father,	uncles,	or	brothers,	and	the	rest	of	 the	 family	will	obey	them.	In	many	cases,	when	male	members	in	the	family	die,	particularly	if	
                                                103	Interview	with	Salim,	October	28,	2014.	104	Inaya	is	from	the	al-Saqqaf	clan	and	her	former	husband	is	from	the	al-Hamid	clan,	and	both	are	Sada	descendants.	Their	only	daughter	married	into	a	local	family,	who	is	related	to	a	rich	man	according	to	their	neighbors.	Inaya	and	her	daughter’s	family	live	in	the	same	house	in	Batumerah	Atas.	Inaya	is	my	former	landlord	in	Ambon.	I	rented	a	room	 in	her	house	 for	a	 few	months	 in	2011	before	 I	was	engaged	 in	 the	research	of	Arab	community.	In	fact,	the	first	time	I	learned	about	her	daughter’s	out-marriage	was	from	another	 informant,	who	 is	 from	a	non-Sada	 family	and	 related	 to	 Inaya	 through	her	marriage	with	Inaya’s	brother.	The	interview	with	Inaya	took	place	on	November	3,	2014.			
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the	 father	 of	 the	 transgressing	 woman	 dies,	 the	 family	 punishment	 to	 the	transgressors	is	loosened.	Preservation	 of	 the	 tradition	 of	 kafa’a	 marriages	 is	 not	 only	 the	responsibility	of	 the	Sada	members	but	also	members	of	 the	non-Sada	group	who	 are	 incorporated	 into	 the	 structure	 of	 a	 Sada	 family.	 From	 what	 I	observed,	 many	 non-Sada	 women	 who	 are	 married	 with	 Sada	 men	 became	incorporated	into	the	structure	and	culture	of	their	husband’s	families.	These	women	carried	the	same	responsibility	as	their	Sada	husbands	in	keeping	the	
kafa’a	as	a	customary	law.	In	some	cases,	these	wives	were	even	more	strict	in	relation	 to	 their	 daughters	 than	 their	 husbands.	 My	 informant	 Fathur	 (see	chapter	3	page	72),	 for	 example,	 told	me	about	 the	 relationship	between	his	sister	and	his	mother	and	the	rest	of	the	family:		My	father	is	a	sayyid,	and	he	passed	away	a	few	years	ago.	My	mother	is	of	local	origin	from	Ternate	and	a	second	wife	because	my	father’s	first	wife	could	not	have	children…	I	am	married	with	a	Buginese,	but	 I	am	a	man	you	 know…	 my	 younger	 sister	 is	 married	 with	 a	 man	 of	 local	 origin.		When	 she	 got	married,	my	mother	 did	 not	 come	 to	 her	wedding,	…	me	neither,	well	until	now	my	mother	has	not	talked	to	her	...	she	was	in	fact	firmer	than	my	deceased	father.105			This	 statement	 shows	 how	 non-Sada	 women	 tend	 to	 internalize	 particular	values,	doctrines,	and	practices	which	are,	 to	some	extent,	new	for	them.	The	obedience	of	wives	to	their	husband	by	accepting	his	values	and	practices	and	then	transmitting	them	to	the	following	generation	demonstrates	how	strong	patriarchy	is	in	the	Sada	families.	Fathur’s	statement	also	reflects	the	isolation	of	 violators	of	kafa’a	 can	be	 a	disciplinary	measure	 that	may	warn	 the	other	family	 members	 not	 to	 make	 the	 same	 mistake.	 Unfortunately,	 it	 is	 only	women	who	are	 thus	 restricted.	Female	 family	members	 learn	 from	an	early	age	 that	 they	 will	 face	 the	 same	 severe	 treatment	 if	 they	 breach	 the	 kafa’a	norm	as	female	family	members	who	refused	to	abide	the	rules.	Not	 all	 Sada	 women	 uncritically	 adopt	 the	 view	 on	 the	 sacredness	 of	
kafa’a	 regulations.	My	 informant	Rafa	 (see	page	104)	 expressed	her	 view	on	the	kafa’a	principle	as	follows:		Actually	I	am	fed	up	with	and	disgusted	with	this	kind	of	view	since	I	have	not	 found	any	strong	religious	ground	 (text,	 Istiqomah),	which	 instructs	the	 endogamy	 marriage	 and	 the	 superiority	 of	 one	 ethnic	 category	 to	another.	Although	I	am	not	a	religious	scholar,	I	like	to	read	books.	I	have	searched	to	find	information	about	this	matter	in	some	sources	including	in	 the	 Qur’anic	 verses.	 I	 would	 rather	 not	 ever	 get	 married	 than	 being	forced	to	marry	a	sayyid	man…	The	Qur’an	does	not	recognize	superiority	of	 one	 tribe	 over	 another.	 I	 know	 that	 this	 superior	 feeling	 is	 strongly	
                                                105	Interview	with	Fathur,	November	5,	2014.	
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emphasized	 in	 the	 Sada	 community.	 And	 I	 am	 very	 much	 against	 this	view.	 Men	 and	 women	 have	 an	 equal	 position.	 Women	 are	 not	 men’s	servants.	The	view	on	endogamy	marriage	is	due	to	a	patriarchal	system	that	 constructs	 this	 reality	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	 a	 primordial	 sense…	Sometimes	 I	 also	 do	 not	 understand	why	my	 family	 especially	 from	my	father’s	 lineage	 disagrees	 with	 me,	 because	 my	 mother	 is	 also	 an	Ambonese,	originally	from	Seram.106	Rafa’s	 statement	 reflects	 a	 feminist’s	 point	 of	 view	 that	 is	 very	 rare	 among	female	 Sada	 members	 in	 Ambon.	 Rafa’s	 self-proclaimed	 lack	 of	 religious	knowledge	 does	 not	 prevent	 her	 from	 critical	 reflection	 on	 the	 religious	ground	of	 the	kafa’a	 tradition.	 This	 highlights	 that	 religious	 authority	within	the	Sada	group	is	being	challenged	and	contested	through	the	same	normative	lens	 that	 is	 referred	 to	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 it	 with	 a	 legitimate	 foundation.	Rafa’s	mixed	background	of	both	Arab	and	local	origin,	and	the	social	networks	that	she	has	built	 through	her	career	as	a	 journalist	may	account	 for	the	way	she	openly	shared	her	disagreement	with	the	kafa’a	tradition.	Although	she	is	not	associated	with	any	Islamic	organization,	her	line	of	thought	is	very	much	inspired	by	a	reformist	idea	on	an	egalitarian	Islam.	Her	disapproval	of	kafa’a	practices	within	 her	 paternal	 family	 is	 based	 on	what	 she	 disapproves	 of	 as	harsh	treatment	by	her	father’s	family	towards	transgressors:		My	father	has	nine	siblings,	four	sisters	and	five	brothers…	only	one	of	his	sisters	is	married	to	a	Sada.	The	rest	of	his	sisters	are	married	with	locals	(from	Kei,	Ternate,	and	Buru,	Istiqomah).	All	of	his	sisters’	marriages	with	locals	were	rejected	by	the	family…	finally	they	could	accept	one	of	them	from	Buru	because	my	aunt	is	married	with	a	rich	man.107	Rafa’s	 statement	 reveals	 that	 in	 practice	 breaching	 the	 family	 honor	 code	by	transgressing	the	kafa’a	norm	is	not	always	met	with	the	same	response,	but	can	 vary	 depending	 on	 other	 elements	 at	 play.	 If	 the	 non-Sada	 husband	 of	 a	Sada	wife	 is	 in	 possession	 of	 significant	 economic	 capital	 this	may	 attenuate	the	shame	brought	to	the	family,	as	Rafa’s	anecdote	illustrates.	The	lack	of	religious	authority	of	female	clan	members	of	the	Sada	makes	it	very	difficult	for	those	who	challenge	the	kafa’a	tradition	and	demand	equal	rights	 to	 be	 heard.	 Religious	 texts	 thus	 have	 become	 an	 important	 tool	 to	justify	the	kafa’a	tradition,	since	knowledge	of	the	religious	texts	is	mainly	the	monopoly	 of	 men.	 	 Among	 the	 few	 female	 members	 who	 are	 considered	 to	have	religious	knowledge,	most	 support	 the	 tradition	of	kafa’a.	By	extension,	disagreement	with	the	kafa’a	norm	is	rare	compared	to	a	dominant	voice	that	accepts	the	kafa’a	rules.	Those	who	criticize	the	kafa’a	tradition,	such	as	Rafa,	
                                                106	Interview	with	Rafa,	September	13,	2014.	107	Interview	with	Rafa,	September	13,	2014.	
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have	 few	 female	 supporters,	 and	 are	 accused	 of	 denying	 their	 own	 identity,	their	roots,	and	their	forefathers’	practices.	While	 the	 majority	 of	 female	 Sada	 clan	 members	 accept	 the	 dominant	view	on	the	kafa’a	norm,	this	does	not	prevent	some	of	them	from	breaking	it.	I	found	 instances	 of	 violation	 in	 almost	 every	 Sada	 family	 (out	 of	 the	 twenty	Sada	 clans).	 	 In	 other	 words,	 many	 Sada	 women	 did	 not	 get	 married	 in	compliance	with	 the	kafa’a	 norm.	 I	 also	 discovered	 that	 the	main	 reason	 for	Sada	women’s	out-marriage	was	not	so	much	that	these	women	were	critical	about	 the	 tradition,	but,	 rather	 that	 there	was	only	a	 limited	number	of	Sada	men	 to	 choose	 from.	 As	 one	 female	 Sada	 put	 it,	 “Look,	 this	 is	 because	many	Sada	men	have	the	freedom	to	marry	outside.	As	a	result,	many	sharifa	(female	Sada	 descendants,	 Istiqomah)	 cannot	 get	 a	 suitable	 husband	 anymore”.	 Her	statement	 is	 confirmed	by	many	 other	 informants	who	 explained	 to	me	 that	they	were	 not	 against	 the	 kafa’a	 tradition	 as	 such.	 Rather,	 they	 point	 to	 the	shortage	of	the	Sada	men	and	state	that	they	did	not	want	to	remain	single	for	their	entire	life.	The	relative	 importance	of	the	kafa’a	norm	to	them	comes	to	the	fore	 in	the	 fact	 that	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 underscore	 its	 value,	 they	 still	 prefer	monogamous	marriages	with	non-Sada	men	over	entering	 into	a	polygamous	marriage	with	a	Sada	man.	They	are	even	fully	aware	of	certain	consequences	they	 face	by	breaching	the	kafa’a	regulations.	 	Altogether,	 it	was	only	a	small	number	 of	 Sada	 women	 who	 voiced	 outright	 criticism	 about	 the	 kafa’a.	Moreover,	these	women	would	only	do	so	in	a	private	conversation,	and	were	reluctant	to	pronounce	their	views	in	public.	This	demonstrates	that	the	taboo	about	breaking	kafa’a	rules	is	still	strong.	That	in	practice	breaching	the	kafa’a	norm	does	occur	is	not	only	due	to	the	shortage	of	Sada	men,	but	also	to	the	relatively	greater	freedom	of	present-day	 Sada	 women	 in	 the	 public	 sphere.	 In	 Ambon,	 the	 present	 young	 female	generation	of	Sada	membes	have	more	freedom	of	movement	than	women	of	older	generations	enjoyed	at	 their	age.	Referring	 to	her	parents	and	her	own	children,	my	informant	Rugaya	Alatas,	for	example,	told	me	the	following:		In	former	times,	we	(daughters)	stayed	at	home	with	our	parents,	and	our	marriages	 were	 arranged…	 now	 we	 could	 not	 force	 our	 daughters	anymore.	We	don’t	expect	anything	from	our	daughters,	they	are	allowed	to	 pursue	 a	 high	 education	 and	 a	 career,	 but	 they	 should	 not	 forget	 to	choose	 right	 persons	 (the	 Sada,	 Istiqomah)	 for	 their	 husbands.	 That	 is	what	our	great	hope.108			Alatas’s	 statement	 reflects	 a	 shift	 in	 women’s	 freedom	 to	 select	 spouses	between	 past	 and	 present	 generations.	 In	 former	 times,	 arranged	marriages	were	common	practice.	The	statement	of	Alatas	also	 implies	 that	 in	her	view	
                                                108	Interview	with	Rugaya	Alatas,	March	7,	2015.	
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women’s	 greater	 freedom	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 today	 may	 make	 them	vulnerable	to	selecting	inappropriate	husbands	and	engaging	in	unacceptable	relationships.	 However,	 other	 people	 pointed	 out	 that	 women’s	 greater	freedom	in	the	public	space,	especially	in	terms	of	education	and	employment,	also	 creates	 more	 opportunities	 for	 women	 to	 meet	 ‘appropriate’	 spouses.	Many	 informants	 told	 me	 that	 they	 met	 their	 husbands	 in	 their	 schools,	workplaces,	 and	 other	 social	 institutions.	 They	 even	 met	 their	 husbands	through	 social	 media.	 In	 this	 context,	 modern	 communication	 tools	 such	 as	online	 media	 have	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 shaping	 the	 ways	 the	 Sada	maintain	 their	kinship	relations.	 In	 this	 line,	Martin	Slama	(2014,	74)	asserts	that	online	forums	enable	female	Sada	members	to	considerably	enlarge	their	choices	in	preferential	marriage	spouses	in	resonance	with	parents’	wishes.	Although	 Sada	 families	 provide	 their	 daughters	with	more	 freedom	and	rights	in	terms	of	education	and	employment,	socialization	and	internalization	of	 the	 kafa’a	 norm	 continues	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 female	 members	 from	transgressing	 the	 traditional	marriage	 regulations.	 Thus,	 the	 kafa’a	 principle	continues	 to	 play	 a	 considerable	 role	 in	 shaping	 the	 way	 people	 perceive	themselves	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Sada	 group.	 This	 socialization	 process	 is	undertaken	at	two	levels:	that	of	the	family	and	that	of	the	Sada	group.	On	the	family	level,	parents	hold	authority	and	children	must	obey	them.	With	the	use	of	an	authoritarian	style,	children	are	raised	with	the	expectation	that	they	will	perpetuate	 the	 customs	 and	 traditions	 of	 the	 family.	 Parents	 teach	 their	children	 about	 their	 sacred	 lineage	 and	 their	marriage	 options,	 about	which	clans	should	be	avoided	and	why	they	should	be	avoided.	Children	thus	learn	from	their	parents	who	they	are	and	to	which	clan	they	belong.	On	a	group	level,	 the	process	 is	regulated	through	group	forums	such	as	regular	religious	forums	or	social	gathering	forums	that	meet	weekly,	monthly,	or	annually.	The	group	 forums	are	usually	 led	by	several	Sada	organizations,	such	as	the	Rabita	branch	of	Ambon,	Melati	al-Khairat,	and	ar-Rahmah.	While	religious	 forums	 tend	 to	be	open	 to	non-members,	 the	 inter-family	gathering	forums	 are	 exclusive	 to	members.	 The	 topics	 of	 religious	 forums	 are	 usually	general	 while	 those	 of	 the	 inter-family	 gathering	 forums	 are	 more	 specific,	focusing	on	kafa’a	and	other	dimensions	of	Sada	customs.	Through	 these	group	 forums,	 social	 rumors	on	 family	 affairs	 are	 spread	and	 in	 this	 way	 the	 forums	 serve	 the	 function	 of	 social	 sanctioning.	 My	informant	 Inaya	 (see	page	149),	 for	 instance,	 told	me	 that	 she	does	not	 visit	such	 forum	meetings	anymore.	 She	explained	 that	 she	was	ashamed	because	her	only	daughter	got	married	to	a	non-Sada	and	she	could	not	face	other	Sada	members’	gossip	and	criticism.	Similarly,	my	informant	Fathur	told	me,	“I	don’t	like	 this	 gossiping…	 the	 Arabs	 like	 to	 fudul	 (gossiping,	 Istiqomah).”109	His	
                                                109	Interview	with	Fathur,	November	5,	2014.		
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statement	about	gossiping	was,	in	fact,	related	to	his	mother’s	pain	about	how	she	 is	 treated	 by	 other	 Arab	 people,	 who	 accuse	 her	 of	 having	 failed	 as	 a	mother	to	prevent	her	daughter	from	marrying	a	non-Sada	man.	According	to	Fathur,	such	gossiping	usually	takes	place	during	meetings	of	the	pengajian	or	religious	 forum,	 and	 during	 an	 arisan,	a	 meeting	 of	 money	 saving	 circles.110	The	group	level	of	socialization	and	the	cultivation	of	values	is	thus	used	as	a	means	 to	 warn	 female	 members	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 transgressing	 the	group’s	cultural	code	by	breaching	the	kafa’a	norm,	and	at	the	same	time	it	is	used	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 social	 sanctions	 by	 spreading	 rumors	 and	 gossip	which	may	damage	a	person’s	honor	in	the	eyes	of	other	people.			
4. Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	examined	how	the	Hadrami	descendants	of	Ambon	construct	and	maintain	their	group	identities	as	heterogeneous	Hadrami	Arabs	through	a	patrilineal	 kinship	 system	 in	 the	 present-day	 context.	 I	 have	 approached	 the	kinship	 system	 first	 of	 all	 as	 a	 symbolic	 cultural	 construct	 that	 marks	boundaries	 and	 regulates	 social	 relations,	 including	 gender	 relations,	 among	the	Hadrami	community	members	and	between	the	Hadrami	community	and	other	 communities.	 This	 genealogical	 reckoning	 is	 a	 means	 of	 constructing	discrete	and	stable	group	 identities	or	diversely	 imagined	Hadrami	 identities	that	may	persist	over	time.		I	have	also	discussed	how	the	kafa’a	principle	works	on	the	ground.	The	research	findings	reveal	that	the	patrilineal	kinship	system	is	enacted	through	an	application	of	asymmetrical	marriage	tradition	justified	by	kafa’a	doctrines.	Marriage	patterns	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	are	relatively	similar	as	they	 both	 practice	 exogamous	 and	 endogamous	 marriages	 based	 on	 gender	difference.	 However,	 there	 is	 a	 shift	 of	 understanding	 on	 the	 conception	 of	
kafa’a	 among	 the	 non-Sada.	 This	 reflects	 the	 continuity	 of	 a	 dispute	 about	
kafa’a	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 groups	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	century	 in	 Indonesia	 and	 in	other	parts	of	 the	diaspora	 (see	Slama	2014).	 In	this	 context,	 religious	 ideologies,	 to	 some	 extent,	 play	 a	 role	 in	 different	understandings	of	both	groups	on	kafa’a	and	thus	result	in	differences	in	how	gender	relations	are	organized.	The	chapter	has	focused	in	particular	on	the	agency	of	Hadrami	women.	Approaching	women	as	actors	rather	than	passive	carriers	and	transmitters	of	tradition,	 the	 case	 studies	 discussed	 demonstrate	 that	 Hadrami	women	may	
                                                110	Arisan	is	a	form	of	social	gathering	in	which	a	certain	amount	money	of	the	members	or	 participants	 of	 the	 forum	 is	 collected	 as	 a	 way	 of	 saving,	 and	 each	 member	 gets	her/his	money	back	in	a	rotating	way.	During	the	period	of	arisan,	the	amount	money	paid	by	every	member	is	equal	to	the	amount	she/he	receives.		
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This	chapter	discusses	religious	developments	within	the	Hadrami	community	in	Ambon.	The	 focus	 is	on	continuity	and	change	concerning	religious	beliefs	and	practices.	The	chapter	is	divided	into	three	sections.	Before	zooming	in	on	the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	 Ambon,	 I	 will	 first	 provide	 a	 general	 picture	 of	religious	configurations	within	the	Hadrami	community	in	Indonesia	in	order	to	 grasp	 the	 impact	of	 locality	 (context)	 on	 religious	understandings	 and	 the	activities	and	membership	of	religious	organizations	from	one	place	or	region	to	another	in	the	diaspora.	Next,	I	examine	the	historical	and	present	religious	constellation	within	the	Hadrami	community	in	Ambon	in	order	to	understand	the	 dynamics	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 groups	 in	 terms	 of	 ideological	differences	and	struggle	over	religious	authority.	In	the	last	section	I	sketch	the	Hadramis’	engagement	in	Islamic	activities	in	Ambon.	I	will	shed	light	on	their	contribution	to	local	Islamic	developments	and	reflect	on	the	role	of	religion	as	an	 important	dimension	of	 social	 integration	within	 the	Hadrami	 community	itself	and	in	other	Muslim	communities	in	Ambon	in	general.				
2. Traditional	Religious	Authority	and	Its	Contestation		
In	 Hadramaut,	 religious	 authority	 was	 traditionally	 closely	 related	 to	 the	specific	 social	 stratification	 that	was	 discussed	 in	 previous	 chapters.	Divided	into	 three	 or	 four	 strata,	 Hadrami	 society	 positioned	 the	 Prophet’s	descendants,	Sada,	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy,	thereby	granting	them	a	special	societal	 role	 in	 religious	 authority	 (Bujra	 1971).	 In	 terms	 of	 beliefs	 and	practices,	 Hadramis	 followed	 the	 Shafi’i	 school	 of	 law	 and	 combined	 it	 with	Sufi	 teachings.	 By	 extension,	 they	 not	 only	 respected	 religious	 scholars,	 but	also	practiced	saint	veneration	and	paid	ziyara’s	or	visits	to	saint	shrines.		In	 Indonesia,	 this	 traditional	 religious	 authority	 in	 the	 Hadrami	community	 began	 to	 be	 contested	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 propagation	 of	 Islamic	reformism	 from	 the	 Middle	 East.	 This	 reformism	 came	 in	 tandem	 with	Hadrami	nahda	(awakening,	resurgence,	renaissance)	in	Indonesia	in	the	early	twentieth	 century.	This	nahda	was	 embodied	 in	 three	distinct	 forms,	 namely	voluntary	associations,	modern-type	schools,	and	publications	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	34	&	52;	Ulrike	Freitag	2003,	227).	The	 earliest	 modern-style	 organization	 initiated	 by	 Hadramis	 in	Indonesia	was	 Jam’iyya	Khair	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	36).	 Founded	 in	Batavia	(now	Jakarta)	 in	1901,	 Jam’iyya	Khair	was	officially	registered	 in	1905.	 In	 its	
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early	establishment,	Jam’iyya	Khair’s	membership	included	both	Sada	and	non-Sada	 elite.	 As	 a	 modern-style	 organization,	 the	 Jam’iyya	 Khair	 operated	 in	resonance	 with	 western	 conventions	 and	 was	 concerned	 with	 modern	education	 as	 an	 essential	 way	 for	 Hadramis	 to	 realize	 progress	 without	abandoning	 their	Arab-Islamic	 identity.	Therefore,	 their	curriculum	consisted	of	 western	 sciences	 and	 languages	 as	 well	 as	 traditional	 religious	 subjects	(Slama	2011,	333).		To	 develop	 its	 educational	 programmes,	 in	 1911	 the	 Jam’iyya	 Khair	invited	 a	 Sudanese	 reformist	 minded-scholar,	 Ahmad	 Surkati. 111 	Although	Hadramis	 had	 access	 to	 Islamic	 reformist	 ideas	 from	 the	 late	 nineteenth	century	onwards	through	the	circulation	of	the	reformist	journals	al-‘Urwa	al-
Wusta	and	 al-Manar,	 the	 reformist	 movement	 only	 gained	momentum	 upon	the	 arrival	 of	 a	 group	 of	 reform-minded	 teachers	 to	 Indonesia	 from	 Middle	East,	among	whom	Surkati	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	54).	Surkati’s	influence	on	the	organization	and	his	reformist-minded	thinking	on	 egalitarianism	 soon	 became	 a	 source	 of	 tension	 among	 its	 members.	 In	1914	this	 led	to	the	resignation	of	Surkati	and	many	Hadrami	members	from	non-Sada	families.	The	tension	was	related	to	implications	of	Surkati’s	view	on	egalitarian	 Islam	 when	 he	 issued	 a	 fatwa	 allowing	 a	 marriage	 between	 a	daughter	 of	 Sada	 origin	with	 a	 Chinese	man	 in	 Java.	 	 By	 extension	 the	 fatwa	approved	 of	 marriage	 between	 Sada	 women	 and	 men	 of	 non-Sada	 origin,	which,	 as	 was	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 in	 the	 view	 of	 Sada	 was	 forbidden	since	 not	 in	 line	 with	 the	 kafa’a	 principle	 according	 to	 which	 Sada	 women	should	not	‘marry	down’.	After	 resigning	 from	 the	 Jam’iyya	 Khair,	 around	 1913/4	 Surkati	established	his	own	organization:	al-Jam’iyya	al-Islah	wa	al-Irshad	al-‘Arabiyya	(Arab	Association	for	Reform	and	Guidance)	or	later	popularly	abbreviated	to	al-Irshad	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	56).	The	main	objectives	of	the	establishment	of	al-Irshad	resonated	the	voice	of	Islamic	reformism	of	Egyptian	scholars	like	al-Afghani,	Abduh,	and	Ridha,	who	were	concerned	with	what	they	perceived	of	 as	 the	decay	of	 Islamic	 society	and	 the	 superiority	of	Western	 (European)	people	 in	 science	 and	 technology.	 The	 scholars	 argued	 that	 the	 plight	 of	Muslim	society	around	the	world	was	a	result	of	Muslims’	 failure	to	correctly	interpret	 and	 implement	 the	 Islamic	 teachings.	 To	 solve	 this	 problem,	 these	intellectuals	 aimed	 to	 purify	 the	 faith	 from	 foreign	 elements,	 such	 as	
                                                111	Born	on	the	Arqu	Island	in	1875/6,	Surkati	came	from	an	educated	family;	both	his	father	 and	 grandfather	 were	 graduates	 from	 Egypt.	 Surkati	 obtained	 his	 earliest	education	 from	 his	 father	 and	 was	 able	 to	 memorize	 the	 Qur’an	 at	 a	 young	 age.	 He	received	 his	 basic	 Islamic	 education	 in	 Sudan.	 When	 he	 went	 on	 hajj	 to	 Mecca	 he	remained	 in	 the	 Hijaz	 for	 fifteen	 years	 to	 learn	 Islamic	 subjects.	 With	 his	 Islamic	knowledge,	he	was	awarded	a	distinguished	teaching	post	and	scholar	in	Mecca.	He	was	also	exposed	to	the	modernist	movement	in	Egypt	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	54).				
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superstitions	and	innovations,	by	returning	to	the	two	basic	sources	of	Islam:	the	Qur’an	and	the	Sunna,	 that	 is,	 the	 tradition	of	 the	Prophet	Muhammad	as	documented	 in	 the	 Hadith,	 the	 stories	 about	 the	 deeds	 and	 sayings	 of	 the	Prophet.	 Apart	 from	 this	 purification,	 they	 considered	 it	 necessary	 that	Muslims	study	modern	sciences	in	order	to	achieve	strength	and	welfare.		The	al-Irshad,	 following	 these	 reformist	 ideas	 by	 encouraging	 the	 Hadramis	 to	embrace	progress,	develop	themselves	and	purify	religious	practices	from	any	foreign	 elements	 (see	Rippin	 2012,	 235-262).	 Al-Irshad	 soon	 gained	 support	and	followers,	mostly	among	the	Arabs	from	non-Sada	background	established	branches	of	 the	al-Irshad	around	 the	archipelago	and	 the	homeland	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999;	Freitag	2003).	The	 Jam’iyya	 Khair	 and	 al-Irshad	 were	 the	 two	 first	 modern-style	Hadrami	 associations	 in	 the	 Indonesian	 diaspora	 that	 engaged	 in	 voluntary	Islamic	 activism.	 This	 activism	 focused	 on	 education,	 publications	 and	 social	activities	 as	 part	 of	 reform	 programmes,	which	 addressed	Hadramis	 both	 in	the	 diaspora	 (Indonesia)	 and	 in	 the	 homeland	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999;	 Freitag	2003).	The	 Jam’iyya	Khair	and	al-Irshad	differed	 in	 the	sense	that	 the	 former	tried	 to	 maintain	 the	 traditional	 social	 hierarchy	 and	 continued	 to	 respect	symbolic	 reverent	 acts	 to	 the	Sada	 such	as	kissing	Sada’s	hands,	 giving	 them	their	 proper	 seating	 during	 the	 gathering,	 and	 maintaining	 kafa’a	 marriage	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	52-53).	Al-Irshad	rejected	such	preferential	etiquette.	In	this	 way,	 Islamic	 reformism	 paved	 a	 way	 for	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora	 to	deconstruct	and	reconstruct	their	traditional	Hadrami	social	hierarchy.	To	understand	how	the	introduction	of	Islamic	reformism	in	the	Hadrami	community	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 enhanced	 religious	 divides	 to	 the	point	of	polarization	in	the	community	in	Indonesia,	three	interlinked	contexts	must	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 larger	 context	 of	 global	trends	 in	 intellectualism	that	occurred	at	 the	 time	 in	many	centres	of	 Islamic	learning,	 a	 trend	 that	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 expansion	 of	 European	powers	to	many	parts	of	the	Muslim	world.	As	argued	by	Ulrike	Freitag	(2003),	intellectual	trends	in	the	Middle	East	and	elsewhere	contributed	to	intellectual	developments	among	Muslims	around	the	world	and	shaped	early	nationalism	and	 modernist	 reform	 in	 South	 East	 Asia.	 Muslims	 were	 exposed	 to	 new	interpretations	 of	 Islam,	 namely	 revivalist	 teachings	 of	 a	 both	moderate	 and	conservative	nature	aiming	to	‘purify’	Islam.	This	 exposure	 took	 shape	 through	 increased	Muslims’	mobility	 to	 other	Islamic	 centres	 as	 a	 result	 of	modern	means	 of	 transportation.	 One	 example	was	through	the	experiences	of	South	East	Asian	Muslims	during	the	hajj,	 the	pilgrimage	 to	 Mecca.	 In	 Mecca,	 the	 pilgrims	 were	 exposed	 to	 Ottoman	 pan-Islamism	and	 learned	 about	 the	 Sudanese	Mahdi,	 the	 Indian	Mutiny,	 and	 the	expansion	 of	 European	 powers	 in	 the	 Muslim	 world.	 The	 Hadramis	 in	 the	Malay	diaspora	were	also	 integrated	 into	Malay-Muslim	developments,	at	 the	
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same	 time	as	European	 interference	with	 the	 internal	 economic	and	political	structures	of	Malay	regions,	both	by	the	British	on	the	Malay	Peninsula	and	the	Dutch	in	Indonesia,	was	increasing.	Due	to	their	international	networking	and	high	 mobility	 as	 merchants,	 scholars	 or	 statesmen,	 the	 Hadramis	 were	furthermore	 among	 the	 important	 players	 who	 were	 exposed	 to	 global	intellectual	trends.	This	exposure	to	global	developments	enticed	Hadramis	in	the	 diaspora	 to	 initiate	 reform	 programmes	 with	 the	 aim	 to	 modernize	administrative	forms,	education,	infrastructure,	and	political	structures	both	in	the	homeland	and	diaspora	(Freitag	2003,	226-227).	The	 second	 context	 that	 helped	 to	 shape	 the	 new	 ideas	 and	 desires	 of	Indonesian	 Hadramis	 concerns	 the	 socio-political	 situation	 during	 the	 last	phase	 of	 colonialism.	 In	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 Indonesian	movements	arose	 that	 opposed	 colonialism	and	 created	 awareness	 among	 inhabitants	 in	the	 Indonesian	 Archipelago	 about	 sharing	 one	 national	 identity.	 Around	 this	period,	 the	 political	 movements	 Budi	 Utomo112	and	 Sarekat	 Islam	 (SI)	 were	founded	 in	 1908	 and	 1911/1912	 respectively	 (Noer	 1973;	 Ricklefs	 2008;	Vickers	2012;	Kahin	and	Anderson	2018).	These	two	organizations	were	soon	followed	 by	 the	 reformist	 Muhammadiyah	 organization	 in	 1912	 and	 the	traditionalist	 organization	Nahdhatul	Ulama	 (NU)	 in	1926	as	 representatives	of	 the	 two	 biggest	 national	 Muslim	 organizations	 in	 Indonesia	 (see	 Peacock	1978;	 Bush	 2009).	 Within	 this	 context,	 both	 Jam’iyya	 Khair	 and	 al-Irshad	represented	 the	 earliest	 main	 religious	 organizations	 in	 Indonesia	 with	 an	ethnic	character	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	38-41).	The	third	context	that	must	be	taken	into	account	to	understand	religious	and	 organizational	 developments	 among	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 Indonesia	 was	related	 to	 internal	 developments	 in	 the	 Hadrami	 community,	 especially	 the	dynamics	of	 the	 relations	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	 (Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	52-53).	 The	 traditional	 social	 stratification,	 based	 on	 heredity	 which	positioned	 the	 Sada	 group	 at	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy,	 was	 challenged	 in	 the	diaspora	by	a	newly	emergent	elite	originating	from	groups	of	non-Sada	lower	strata,	who	 had	 economically	 succeeded	 in	 collecting	 considerable	wealth	 in	the	diaspora.	Some	of	 the	non-Sada	even	rose	 to	become	part	of	 the	political	elite	 in	 the	 Dutch	 colonial	 administration.	 In	 some	 respects,	 this	 gave	 them	authority	over	 the	Sada	group	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	27-28).	 	 In	 this	context,	the	changing	power	relationship	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	 in	 the	diaspora	resulted	 in	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 hierarchy,	
                                                112	Budi	Utomo	(literally	 ‘prime	philosophy’)	was	established	on	May	20,	1908,	and	 is	considered	the	first	native	political	society	in	the	Dutch	East	Indies	(now	Indonesia)	as	a	result	of	the	Dutch	Ethical	Policy,	which	emphasized	the	significance	of	improving	the	welfare	of	the	people	especially	in	education	and	culture.		
Chapter	5:	Religious	Developments	within	the	Hadrami	Community	of	Ambon	
160		
increasing	the	appeal	of	Islamic	reformism	that	offered	an	egalitarian	Islam	to	those	who	contested	the	superiority	of	Sada.	With	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 first	 era	 of	 Indonesia’s	 independence	 (Sukarno	regime,	 1945-1967),	 both	 Jam’iyya	 Khair	 and	 al-Irshad	 maintained	 their	character	 as	 traditionalist	 and	 reformist	 organizations	 respectively.	 While	neither	organization	was	exclusively	Hadrami,	leading	positions	had	until	then	always	 been	 held	 by	Hadramis,	 but	 now	 both	 organizations	 opened	 up	 such	positions	 to	 Muslims	 of	 any	 origin	 as	 a	 way	 of	 a	 greater	 integration	 to	Indonesian	 society.	 Traditionalist	 Sada	 remained	 dominant	 in	 the	 Jam’iyya	Khair,	however,	while	reformist	non-Sada	members	continued	to	dominate	the	al-Irshad.		In	this	regard,	one	can	conclude	that	the	early	religious	polarization	within	the	Hadrami	community	was	more	 influenced	by	different	 interests	 in	reforming	 the	 traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 stratification	 than	 by	 different	interests	 in	 reforming	 Islamic	 educational	 institutions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	however,	it	must	be	noted	that	some	Hadramis	were	not	only	active	in	one	of	these	 two	 Hadrami	 dominated	 organizations,	 but	 were	 also	 engaged	 in	religious	 organizations	 with	 a	 broader	 national	 scope,	 such	 as	 NU	 and	Muhammadiyah.	Religious	transformations	within	the	Hadrami	community	acccelerated	in	the	course	of	the	New	Order	Era	(1968-1998).	During	the	New	Order	era,	the	state	restricted	and	controlled	Islamic	activism	in	public	arenas.	This	does	not	mean	that	there	was	no	Islamic	activism	on	the	ground	at	all.	The	dynamics	of	Islamic	activism	during	 the	New	Order	 regime	became	more	variegated	with	an	influence	of	global	Islamic	movements,	particularly	Wahhabism	and	Shi’ism.	Saudi	 versions	 of	 Salafi	 Islam	 (Wahhabism,	 neo-Salafism)	 started	 to	 exert	 its	globalized	 influence	 in	 tandem	 with	 the	 oil	 boom	 of	 Saudi	 kingdom	 in	 the	1970s.	At	the	same	time,	as	an	effect	of	the	Iranian	revolution	in	1979,	across	the	 globe	 Twelver	 version	 of	 Shi’a	 Islam	 spread.	 Both	 ideologies	 gained	significant	followers	among	Indonesian	Muslims	from	the	1970s	onwards.	The	Saudi	 version	 of	 Salafi	 Islam	 attracted	many	Hadramis,	 especially	 from	 non-Sada	 background,	 who,	 together	 with	 other	 Muslims	 of	 non-Hadrami	 origin,	formed	 some	 Islamic	 organizations.	 Wahhabism	 also	 influenced	 the	 existing	reformist	 Hadrami	 organization	 al-Irshad,	 resulting	 in	 an	 internal	 friction	between	 members	 with	 a	 reformist-modernist	 orientation	 and	 those	 with	 a	more	conservative	(fundamentalist)	orientation	(Rijal	2017).	At	the	same	time,	a	significant	number	of	Hadramis,	especially	those	of	Sada	origin,	converted	to	Twelver	 Shi’a	 and	 formed	 organizations,	 which	 have	 become	 effective	 only	after	 1998.	 	 This	 conversion	 will	 be	 explained	 further	 in	 section	 3.3.2.		Although	 Saudi	Wahhabism	 and	 Iranian	 Shi’ism	 have	 become	widely	 spread	among	 the	 Indonesian	Muslims	 since	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 Suharto	 regime,	their	overt	 activism	 in	 the	public	domain	only	became	more	prominent	after	the	fall	of	the	New	Order	regime	in	1998.	
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The	 collapse	 of	 the	 New	 Order	 regime	 in	 1998	 has	 had	 an	 impact	 on	religious	 changes	 and	 constellations	 in	 Indonesia	 in	 several	 ways.	 The	 first	change	 concerned	 the	political	 structure,	which	 from	 then	 on	 allowed	public	participation	in	politics	(democratization),	resulting	in	the	emergence	of	many	Islamic-based	parties.	The	second	change	is	the	visibility	of	Islamic	revivalism,	including	Wahhabism	 and	 Shi’ism,	 in	 the	 public	 sphere.	 Diversity	 of	 Islamic	activism,	movements	and	publications	has	 flourished	 in	 resonance	with	 their	different	 ideologies.	 The	 diversity	 of	 Islamic	 activism	 is	 not	 only	 a	 result	 of	global	flows	of	ideas	injected	from	Middle	Eastern	countries,	but	also	of	those	from	western	countries,	namely	ideas	on	secularism,	pluralism	and	liberalism	leading	 to	 transforming	 activism	 among	Muslim	 intellectuals	 and	 activists	 as	well.	In	this	way,	liberalism	and	fundamentalism	(Islamism)	have	added	more	flavors	 to	 Indonesian	 Islam	 (Kersten	 2016).	 Despite	 the	 diversity	 of	 Islamic	movements	 and	 organizations,	 Indonesia	 is	 still	 home	 to	 two	 mainstream	Islam	orientations;	the	more	traditionalist	and	the	more	modernist	one,	which	have	 persisted	 among	 the	 majority	 of	 Indonesian	 Muslims	 (Van	 Bruinessen	2013).	Having	been	part	of	the	larger	community	of	Indonesian	Muslims	since	their	arrival,	this	is	also	the	case	among	Hadramis.	Along	 with	 the	 above	 mentioned	 transformations,	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Suharto	 regime	 has	 also	 influenced	 diasporic	 movements	 of	 the	 Indonesian	Hadramis.	 After	 unification	 of	 the	 two	 Yemeni	 states	 in	 1990	 and	 the	breakdown	 of	 the	 New	 Order	 regime	 in	 Indonesia	 in	 1998,	 the	 Hadrami	community	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 been	 reconnected	 with	 their	 forefathers’	homeland,	 thanks	 to	 the	 development	 of	 new	 technologies	 in	 transportation	and	 telecommunication,	 facilitating	 the	contemporary	Hadrami	mobility	back	and	 forth	 between	 Indonesia	 and	 Hadramaut	 (Knysh	 2001;	 Ho	 2006;	 Alatas	2016b).	 In	 both	 the	 homeland	 and	 diaspora	 this	 renewed	 connection	 has	contributed	 to	 the	 revitalization	 of	 traditionalist	 Islam	 and	 the	 Sufi	 order	Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya,113	as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 revitalization	 of	 particular	 traditional	gender	roles	(see	further	chapter	6	section	3).	Looking	at	 this	broader	picture,	 I	would	next	 like	 to	sketch	the	religious	developments	within	the	smaller	scope	of	 the	Hadrami	community	of	Ambon	as	 there	has	hardly	been	any	scholarly	attention	to	developments	concerning	this	issue	in	Ambon	so	far.	The	following	section	will	discuss	the	contestation	of	 religious	 authority	 within	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	 Ambon	 in	 past	 and	present	contexts	in	order	to	understand	the	community’s	beliefs	and	practices	
                                                113	A	Sufi	path	which	is	ascribed	to	‘Alawi,	a	term	denoting	descendants	of	the	Prophet	from	 the	 Hadramaut.	 The	 institution	 of	 the	 Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya	 was	 developed	 by	Muhammad	b.	Ali	or	called	the	First	 Jurist	(al-Faqih	al-Muqaddam,	d.1255)	who	is	 the	eighth-generation	 descendant	 of	 the	 first	 Prophet’s	 offspring	 migrating	 to	 the	Hadramaut	valley,	Ahmad	b.’Isa	al-Muhajir	(Ho	2006,	37-41;	Alatas	2011,	47).			
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as	 well	 as	 to	 see	 whether	 the	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 distinction	 is	 related	 to	ideological	differences	and	power	struggle	over	religious	authority.				
3. Religious	 Authority	 and	 Contestations	 within	 the	 Hadrami	
Community	in	Ambon	
3.1 Traditional	Islam	Versus	Islamic	Reformism		Traditionalist	notions	characterize	most	adequately	the	oldest	ways	Islam	was	practiced	 in	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 of	 Ambon.	 The	 term	 tradition	 in	 the	concept	 traditionalism	 here	 relates	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 three	 interrelated	concepts:	 Sunna,	 Hadith,	 and	 adat	 (Van	 Bruinessen	 1999,	 163-189).	Traditionalist	 Muslims	 are	 viewed	 by	 reformists	 as	 those	 whose	 religious	practice	is	pervaded	with	local	practices	of	non-Islamic	origin	(adat)	or	even	in	contradiction	 with	 the	 Shari’a	 or	 without	 precedence	 in	 Islamic	 doctrine	(bid’a),	 such	as	 tahlil	 (repetition	of	 the	name	of	God),	ziyarah	kubur	 (visiting	the	graves	of	ancestors	and	teachers),	 reciting	certain	prayer	 formula	(ratib),	reciting	shalawat	(invocations	of	divine	blessing	on	behalf	of	the	Prophet	and	his	 family,	 beliefs	 in	 miracles	 of	 saints	 and	 intercession).	 In	 addition,	traditionalist	 Muslims	 are	 also	 considered	 to	 adhere	 to	 one	 of	 the	 orthodox	
madhabs	or	 schools	 of	 law	 and	 practise	 taqlid,	 i.e.	 follow	 the	 rulings	 of	 the	founding	 father	 and	 other	major	 scholars	 of	 this	 school	 as	 they	 are	 found	 in	standard	fiqh	works.	Many	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon	 practise	 traditionalist	 Islam	 and	observe	 	 Islamic	 traditions	 from	Hadramaut	by	 following	the	Shafi’i	school	of	thought	 and	 Sufi	 teachings.	 Like	 other	 traditionalist	 Muslims,	 traditionalist	Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 conduct	 certain	 religious	 rituals	 collectively.	 Among	 the	rituals	 are	 reciting	 certain	 prayers	 or	 formula	 (such	 as	 tahlil,	 ratib),	 visiting	graveyards	 (ziyarah	 kubur),	 and	 commemorating	 deceased	 persons	 (haul).	Traditionalists	also	celebrate	annual	festivities,	such	as	‘ashura	(mourning	day	to	commemorate	Husain’s	martyrdom	in	Karbala	Iraq)		and	maulid	al-nabi	(the	Prophet’s	birthday).	In	chanting	specific	texts,	such	as	shalawat,	invocations	of	divine	blessing	 on	behalf	 of	 the	Prophet	 and	his	 family,	 	traditionalists	 use	 a	traditional	 musical	 instrument;	 the	 tambourine.	 Sometimes,	 they	 also	 burn	incense	during	the	rituals.	The	 organization	 of	 these	 rituals	 is	 usually	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	group’s	leaders.	For	instance,	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	head	of	the	branch	of	Rabita	 al-’Alawiyya	 of	Ambon	 (see	 chapter	4	 section	2.3)	 and	Rugaya	Alatas,	head	of	the	orphanage	foundation	of	Melati	al-Khairat	(see	further	on	chapter	
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5	section	4.2)114,	regularly	arrange	religious	rituals	for		their	members.	During	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 participate	 in	 “Majelis	 al-Husaini”,	 a	 weekly	religious	 gathering	 to	 recite	 texts	 of	 maulid	 al-Habshi	 or	 simt	 al-durar	115	conducted	 by	 the	 Rabita	 several	 times.	 My	 informant	 Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	Abubakar	 told	 me	 that	 this	 Majelis	 al-Husaini	 meeting	 was	 launched	 in	 the	month	 of	 Ramadan	 in	 2007,	 one	 year	 before	 the	 legal	 establishment	 of	 the	branch	of	Rabita	al-‘Alawiyya	 in	Maluku.	The	Majelis	al-Husaini	was	 initiated	by	nine	people	consisting	of	eight	Sada	and	one	non-Arab.	Its	name	was	given	by	a	religious	preacher	of	Sada	origin	from	Jakarta.116		The	 Majelis	 al-Husaini	 ritual	 is	 usually	 held	 after	 the	 isha	 or	 evening	prayer	on	Thursday	night,	 and	 takes	 about	 two	hours.	This	 ritual	 is	 to	 chant	religious	texts	called	simt	al-durar.	When	I	attended	the	ritual	for	the	first	time	on	 March	 28,	 2015,	 it	 started	 at	 9	 p.m.	 As	 it	 was	 held	 in	 the	 orphanage	foundation,	Melati	al-Khairat,	all	of	the	orphans	staying	in	the	Melati	al-Khairat	participated	in	the	ritual.	Apart	from	the	orphans	and	the	leader	of	the	Rabita,	I	saw	 two	 other	 attendants;	 Kamil,	 a	 manager	 of	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat,	 and	Hasanusi,	an	 imam	of	the	grand-mosque,	al-Fatah,	and	another	person.	Hasan	Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar,	 Kamil,	 and	 Hasanusi	 wore	 neat	 (religious)	 attires	combining	headdress	(white	and	black	colors),	white,	long	sleeve	upper	shirts	and	 long	 trousers.	 I	 sat	 on	 the	 rug	 in	 the	 female	 line,	 together	 with	 female	orphans.	The	chanting	began	with	reciting	al-fatiha,	an	opening	chapter	of	the	Qur’an,	 and	 chants	 dedicated	 to	 the	 Prophet,	 his	 family	 the	 ahl	 al-bayt,	 the	Prophet’s	descendants,	 the	author	of	simt	al-durar	texts,	and	some	saints	and	religious	 imams.	 Each	 participant	 recited	 one	 line	 of	 the	 text,	 starting	 with	Hasanusi,	followed	by	my	informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	Kamil,	and	the	others.	 In	 the	middle	of	 the	recital	 indicated	by	 the	 text	 ‘mahal	al-qiyam’,	 the	participants	stood	up	and	some	male	orphans	played	the	rebana,	a	traditional	kind	of	 tambourine,	while	 the	 rest	were	 reciting.	While	we	were	 reciting	 the	
simt	 al-durar	 accompanied	 by	 the	 rebana,	 one	 of	 the	 participants	 sprinkled	perfume	on	the	hand	palms	of	each	participant.		After	standing	for	ten	minutes,	we	sat	on	the	rug	again	and	continued	reciting.	The	ritual	was	then	closed	by	reciting	the	al-fatiha	(the	first	chapter	in	the	Qur’an)	again.	
                                                114	Melati	al-Khairat	is	one	of	the	dar	al-aytam,	orphanage	foundations,	in	Ambon.	It	 is	probably	the	first	led	by	a	woman	from	Sada	background.		115	Simt	 al-durar	 literally	 means	 string	 of	 pearls.	 It	 is	 a	 text	 containing	 poetry	 and	compliments	on	the	Prophet’s	life	or	well-known	as	a	maulid	text.	The	text	is	taken	from	the	book	entitled	Simt	al-Durar	fi	Akhbar	Maulid	Khair	al-Bashr	min	Akhlaq	wa	Aushafi	
wa	Siyar.	This	text	is	well-known	as	an	al-Habshi	maulid	as	it	refers	to	its	author,	Ali	bin	Muhammad	 al-Habshi	 (1839-1913),	 a	 religious	 scholar	 from	 Tarim,	 Hadramaut	 (Al-Habsyi	1992).		116	Interview	with	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	October	4,	2014.		
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On	 many	 occasions	 the	 Rabita	 and	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 conduct	 these	kind	 of	 religious	 rituals	 together	 as	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 Rabita	 and	 Melati	 al-Khairat	are	related	each	other,	both	being	from	Sada	families.	In	this	regard,	a	substantial	 number	 of	 the	 traditionalist	 adherents	 have	 a	 Sada	background.	This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 traditionalist	 Islam	 has	 no	 followers	 at	 all	 among	Hadramis	of	non-Sada	origin	and	other	Muslim	backgrounds.	Yet,	Hadramis	of	non-Sada	background	are	more	active	in	activities	related	to	reformist	Islam.	Traditionalist	 Islam	 among	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 was	 challenged	 by	Salafism	 in	 its	 reformist-modernist	 sense	 since	 early	 twentieth	 century.	Salafism	 itself	 comes	 from	 the	Arabic	 term	 salaf	 that	 refers	 to	 the	 first	 three	generations	 of	 scholars	 after	 the	 Prophet	 Muhammad.	 Salafism,	 thus,	advocates	a	return	to	the	traditions	of	the	salaf,	which	are	based	on	the	Qur’an	and	Hadith.	Centered	around	 the	concept	of	 returning	 to	 the	path	of	 the	 first	three	generations	after	 the	Prophet,	 the	Salafi	doctrine	rejects	bid’a,	 religious	innovation,	 and	 taqlid,	 adherence	 to	 certain	 schools	 of	 thought.	 It	 also	advocates	 the	 application	 of	 Shari’a	 (Islamic	 law).	 Scholars	 classify	 Salafism	into	 two	 categories:	 classical	 Salafism,	 which	 is	 characterized	 by	 reformist-modernist	 notions,	 and	 neo-Salafism,	 which	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	Wahhabism	or	the	Saudi	version	of	Salafism.		Scholars	use	the	term	‘classical	Salafism’	as	a	school	of	thought	that	rose	in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 as	 a	 response	 toward	 western	(European)	 hegemony	 in	 search	 for	 the	 roots	 of	 modernity	 within	 Muslim	civilization.	 Muslim	 thinkers	 such	 as	 Muhammad	 Abduh,	 Jamal	 al-Din	 al-Afghani,	 and	 Rashid	 Rida	 proclaimed	 this	 school	 of	 thought.	 However,	 some	contemporary	 Salafis	 reject	 the	 aim	 to	 reconcile	 what	 they	 conceive	 of	 as	specifically	 Islamic	social	norms	with	modernity.	 	Their	objective	 is	 to	 follow	literal	interpretations	of	the	holy	texts.	They	are	sometimes	also	called	a	form	of	 reconstituted	 Wahhabism,	 due	 to	 the	 determination	 of	 its	 proponents	 to	more	 systematically	 introduce	 the	 thoughts	 formulated	 by	 the	 three	 main	classical	 references	 among	 Wahhabis,	 namely	 Ahmad	 ibn	 Taymiyya	 (1263-1328)117,	 Muhammad	 ibn	 Qayyim	 al-Jawziyya	 (1291-1350)	 and	 Muhammad	ibn	 ‘Abd	 al-Wahhab	 (1703-1792).	 Followers	 also	 often	 refer	 to	 the	 fatwas	issued	by	contemporary	Wahhabi	authorities,	such	as	 ‘Abd	al-‘Aziz	 ‘Abd	Allah	ibn	 Baz	 (d.	 1999)	 and	 Muhammad	 Nasir	 al-Din	 al-Albani	 (d.	 1999).	 This	movement	 has	 anti-West	 sentiments,	 which	 inspired	 the	 birth	 of	 twentieth	century	Islamist	movement,	such	as	Ikhwan	al-Muslimin	and	Jama’at	al-Islami	(Hasan	2001,	25).	Similar	to	other	diaspora	Hadrami	communities	such	as	in	Java,	the	wave	of	 Islamic	 reformism	 from	 the	 Middle	 East	 that	 influenced	 the	 Hadrami	community	 in	 Ambon	 inspired	 some	 of	 its	 elite	 members	 to	 found	 modern	
                                                117	All	historical	dates	mentioned	in	this	study	are	Common	Era.	
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Islamic	schools.	The	Hadramis’	early	involvement	in	modern	Islamic	education,	however,	 still	 needs	 further	 investigation.	 As	 there	 has	 been	 no	 historical	research	on	Hadramis’	early	role	in	Islamic	education	in	Ambon,	I	must	rely	on	my	informants’	stories.	Many	present-day	Hadrami	descendants,	both	Sada	and	non-Sada,	 claim	that	 their	 forefathers	 have	 contributed	 to	 Islamic	 education	 in	 Ambon.	Informants	who	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 Islamic	 education	 contended	 that	 the	earliest	modern	Hadrami-initiated	 an	 Islamic	 school	was	 established	 around	the	 1920s.	 In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 there	were	 about	 three	Hadrami-initiated	 Islamic	 schools,	 namely	 Raudat	 al-Adab,	 Ma’ahid	 al-Huda,	and	Mahasin	 al-Akhlaq.118	These	 three	 schools	were	 said	 to	 have	 introduced	Islamic	curricula	combining	general	and	Islamic	sciences,	and	to	have	provided	equal	opportunities	to	boys	and	girls.	All	three	schools,	which	appear	to	have	been	 reformist-modernist	 in	 character,	 lasted	 only	 shortly.	 The	 last	 school,	Mahasin	 al-Akhlaq	 continued	 its	 educational	 activities	 until	 just	 before	Indonesian	independence	(1945).	My	informant	Hadi	Basalamah	(see	chapter	3	page	82)	told	me	that	after	the	independence	some	graduates	of	these	three	schools	continued	their	commitment	to	provide	Islamic	education	by	forming	a	
                                                118	Raudat	 al-Adab	was	 established	 by	 Shaikh	 Bakhmid.	 The	 school	 used	 Arabic	 and	Malay	 as	 languages	 of	 instruction,	 and	 most	 of	 the	 subject	 matters	 were	 Islamic	subjects,	 such	 as	 fiqh	 (Islamic	 jurisprudence),	 tauhid	 (theology),	 tafsir	 (Qur’anic	exegesis),	and	 akhlaq	 (akhlak	 in	Malay)	 (Islamic	 ethics).	 Students	 of	 the	 school	were	obliged	to	wear	Islamic	dress,	pantalon	for	males,	and	kerudung	(a	loosely	draped	scarf	to	cover	half	of	 the	women’s	hairs)	 for	 females.	Ma’ahid	al-Huda	was	 founded	by	 two	brothers	 of	 Bahwereis	 family,	 Said	 and	 Muhammad.	 Like	 the	 Raudat	 al-Adab,	 the	Ma’ahid	al-Huda	used	Arabic	and	Malay	as	languages	of	instruction.	Apart	from	Islamic	subjects,	 extra	 topics	 such	 as	 scouting	were	 taught.	 The	 school	 succeeded	 in	 training	Muslims,	not	necessarily	from	Hadrami	origin,	as	religious	preachers	in	Ambon.	This	is	a	 list	of	 the	 local	 clerics	 (e.g	Abdurrahaman	Assagaf,	Ahmad	Alhamid,	Awad	Bamahri,	Abu	Bakar	Bin	Yahya,	Hasan	Bin	Galib,	 Ari	 Lestaluhu,	Abdulkadir	Abduljabbar,	 Abdul	Gani	Tangke,	Ahmad	Bantan,	Ali	Fauzi,	Muhammad	Ambon,	and	Ismail	Tanke).		Mahasin	al-Akhlaq	was	established	by	Abdurrazak	Alamudi.	After	finishing	his	study	in	al-Azhar	University	around	the	1930s,	Abdurrazak	returned	to	Ambon	and	initiated	the	school.	The	board	of	the	school	management	consisted	of	those	who	graduated	from	the	two	previous	schools,	the	Raudat	al-Adab	and	the	Ma’ahid	al-Huda,	such	as	Husain	Bin	Shaikh	Abubakar,	 Ahmad	Hatala,	 Abdulkadir	 Liem,	 Abdulkadir	 Drahman,	Muhammad	Hatala,	 and	 Abdurrazzaq	 Alamudi’s	 brother,	 Husain	 Alamudi.	 Graduating	 from	 an	Islamic	university	abroad,	Abdurrazaq	was	said	to	be	a	respected	scholar,	who	brought	with	him	modern	ideas	of	Islam	in	the	school.	He	was	said	to	combine	European	outfits,	such	 as	 coat	 and	 tie,	 and	 Egyptian	 headdress.	 On	 Fridays,	 he	 dressed	 like	 a	 religious	scholar	 from	 al-Azhar	University.	 The	 students	 of	 this	 school	were	 obliged	 to	wear	 a	
kopiah,	black	headdress	for	men,	and	kerudung	for	women.	As	the	two	previous	schools,	Arabic	 and	 Malay	 were	 languages	 of	 the	 school’s	 instruction.	 Extra	 musical	 lessons	using	 traditional	 music	 instruments	 such	 as	 seruling	 (wooden	 flute),	 tambur	 (small	drum),	 genderang	 (large	 drum)	were	 also	 taught.	 The	 students	 usually	 showed	 their	public	 music	 performance	 on	 the	 streets	 of	 Ambon	 town.	 Interview	 with	 Hadi	Basalamah,	December	14,	2014.		
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modern-style	 foundation	 called	al-Hilal.119	Hadi	Basalamah	 is	 current	head	of	the	al-Hilal.	According	to	Ch.F.	van	Fraasen,	from	the	nineteenth	century	until	the	first	half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 there	 was	 no	 such	 formal	 Islamic	 school	established	 in	 Ambon	 (Central	 Maluku),	 but	 a	 few	 Muslims	 such	 as	 from	Kailolo,	Tehoru	in	Seram	were	reported	to	go	to	study	in	Mecca	and	al-Azhar	university	of	Egypt.	Besides,	in	the	1920s,	a	Muslim	from	Malay	region	of	Johor	came	to	Tulehu	Ambon	to	teach	the	tenets	of	mystical	Islam	(tasawwuf)	to	his	students.	 Although	 there	 was	 no	 such	 formal	 Islamic	 school,	 every	 Muslim	village	(negeri)	had	a	religious	teacher	who	would	teach	children	how	to	recite	the	Qur’an,	although	not	all	of	them	had	command	of	the	Arabic	language	(Van	Fraassen	 1972b,	 323-328).	 Albeit	 ever	 so	 shortly,	 al-Hilal	 was	 mentioned	briefly	 in	 Fraasen’s	 report	 (Van	 Fraassen	 1972b,	 323-328),	 so	 that	 there	 is	some	 textual	 evidence	 to	 confirm	 the	 claim	 of	my	 Hadrami	 informants.	 It	 is	likely	 that	 the	 foundation	 of	 al-Hilal	 played	 a	 role	 in	 unifying	 the	 Hadrami	community	in	Ambon	regardless	of	differences	in	religious	understandings.	It	thus	functioned	as	an	umbrella	organization	of	the	Hadrami	community,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	subsection.			
3.2 Al-Hilal	as	a	Unified	Organization	of	the	Hadrami	Community	Al-Hilal	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 oldest	 Hadrami-initiated	 modern-style	 Islamic	foundation	 in	 Ambon.	 Although	 some	 modern-Islamic	 schools	 may	 have	existed	earlier,	the	al-Hilal	is	the	first	Hadrami	foundation	that	began	to	exert	its	educational	influence	on	the	Hadrami	community	around	Maluku	Islands	or	what	 Martin	 Slama	 (2011)	 characterized	 as	 “the	 institutionalization	 of	 the	diaspora	in	formal	organization”.			The	al-Hilal	was	established	on	May	2,	1946	and	given	the	name	‘Islamic	Unity	of	al-Hilal’	by	wealthy	Arab	merchants	in	Ambon.	Born	in	a	revolutionary	era,	initially	engaged	it	two	main	activities	were	sports	and	informal	religious	education.	 Its	 main	 target	 was	 the	 young	 Muslim	 generation.	 My	 informant	Hadi	 Basalamah	 explained	 to	 me	 that	 the	 al-Hilal	 initially	 functioned	 as	 a	platform	 to	guide	Muslim	youth	 to	good	conduct.	This	grew	out	of	a	 concern	about	 religiously	 forbidden	 practices,	 such	 as	 drinking	 alcohol,	 that	 were	prevalent	 among	 the	 youths	 after	 World	 War	 Two.	 The	 founders’	 concern	about	young	Muslims’	morality	thus	urged	them	to	establish	the	al-Hilal	forum.	Another	 reason	of	 its	 establishment	was	 related	 to	 fear	 concerning	Christian	missionary	work.			
                                                119	Interview	with	Hadi	Basalamah,	December	14,	2014.		
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	Figure	5.1:	Headquarter	of	the	al-Hilal	in	Ambon		(photographed	by	the	author)		On	 December	 23,	 1952,	 the	 al-Hilal	 began	 to	 offer	 its	 first	 formal	 Islamic	education.	 Around	 this	 time,	 it	 established	 two	 elementary	 schools	 as	 an	Islamic	education	channel	for	young	Muslim	generation	in	Ambon.	Since	then,	the	al-Hilal	has	opened	many	schools	around	the	Maluku	province	and	reached	its	heyday	during	the	third	leadership.	The	2014	profile	of	the	al-Hilal	indicates	that	the	central	foundation	of	al-Hilal	has	been	mostly	led	by	Hadramis	of	non-Sada	 origin,	 that	 is:	 	 Ali	 Bahasoan	 (1946-1950),	 Sayyid	 Abubakar	 bin	 Yahya	(1950-1954),	A.Z.	Basalamah	(1954-1992),	Ahmad	Badarudin	(1992-1997),	M.	Ekan	Alatas	(1997-1999),	and	Hadi	Basalamah	(1999-present).	My	 informant	 Hadi	 Basalamah	 told	me	 that	 Abdullah	 Basalamah	 was	 a	leading	 Hadrami	 figure	 who	 made	 the	 foundation	 successful	 and	 led	 its	management	 for	 almost	 four	 decades	 (1954-1992). 120 	Hadi	 Basalamah	depicted	 the	 second	 leader	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	 Abdullah	 Basalamah	 as	 a	 modern	educated	person	who	graduated	from	a	Dutch	school	and	had	broad	networks.	During	 Abdullah	 Basalamah’s	 leadership,	 the	 al-Hilal	 received	much	 support	not	only	 from	 its	members	but	 also	 from	 the	 local	 elite	 and	government.	His	educational	and	social	background	helped	Abdullah	Basalamah	to	develop	the	foundation	 and	 expand	 its	 schools	 outside	 Ambon.	 Before	 the	 communal	conflicts	 between	 1999	 and	 2002,	 the	 al-Hilal	 had	 many	 branches	 and	established	around	200	schools	spread	both	in	southern	and	northern	parts	of	
                                                120	Ch.F.van	Fraassen	in	his	report	on	Ambon	also	reports	briefly	on	the	al-Hilal	 in	the	1970s,	 which	 ran	 a	 madrasa	 (elementary	 Islamic	 school)	 that	 offered	 Islamic	knowledge.	This	school	was	both	for	female	and	male	students.	The	school	was	called	the	 beginner’s	 religious	 education	 (PGAP)	 or	 equivalent	 to	 junior	 high	 school	 and	advanced	 religious	 education	 (PGAA)	 equivalent	 to	 senior	 high	 school	 (Van	 Fraassen	1972b,	323-328).		
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the	 Maluku	 Islands.	 After	 the	 conflicts,	 the	 al-Hilal	 no	 longer	 managed	 the	schools	in	the	northern	part	of	Maluku	Islands.	During	the	second	leadership,	the	al-Hilal	hired	professional	teachers	and	staff	of	Christian	affiliation.	In	this	sense,	 the	 al-Hilal	 resembles	 the	 al-Khairat	 foundation	 in	 Palu,	 central	Sulawesi,	 which	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 biggest	 Hadrami-initiated	 Islamic	organization	in	Eastern	Indonesia	(Slama	2011,	334).121	Through	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 al-Hilal,	 Islamic	 modernism	(reformism)	was	 founded	 in	 Ambon	 by	 Hadramis	 of	mainly	 non-Sada	 origin	who	 gained	 economic	 and	 political	 power	 during	 the	 colonial	 era,	 similar	 to	developments	 in	 Java	 (see	 Mobini-Kesheh	 1999).	 These	 changing	 economic	and	 political	 positions	 in	 the	 diaspora	 would	 become	 the	 main	 tool	 of	reforming	traditional	Hadrami	social	stratification	from	an	Islamic	perspective,	and	 this	 thus	 changed	 the	 power	 relationship	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora,	 especially	 in	 Ambon.	 Three	 periods	 of	 Arab	captainship	 in	 Ambon,	 for	 instance,	 were	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 non-Sada,	 two	 of	whom	 set	 up	 the	 al-Hilal.122	Similarly,	 according	 to	 my	 informant	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri	 (see	 chapter	 4	 pages	 131-132)	 many	 rich	 Hadrami	 merchants	 in	Ambon	of	non-Sada	background	donated	their	land	as	waqf123to	build	schools,	mosques,	 and	 other	 assets	 for	 the	 al-Hilal.124		Most	 of	 the	 al-Hilal’s	 buildings	(such	 as	 schools,	 offices,	 and	 mosques)	 have	 been	 designed	 using	 local	architecture.	An	exception	 is	An-Nur	mosque	(see	 figure	5.2).	 	Looking	at	 the	architecture	 of	 this	 mosque,	 which	 is	 rather	 different	 from	 that	 of	 local	mosques	in	Ambon,	we	can	see	that	its	design	is	partly	influenced	by	mosque	architecture	in	the	Middle	East,	especially	Yemen.	In	line	with	the	argument	by	Bruneau	 (2010,	 39),	 this	 construction	 illustrates	 how	Yemeni	 architecture	 is	used	 to	 reproduce	 cultural	 memory	 in	 order	 to	 re-root	 the	 diasporic	community	in	the	host	society.			
                                                121	Although	 the	 al-Khairat	 has	 branches	 in	most	 of	 the	 eastern	 regions	 of	 Indonesia,	including	Maluku,	it	has	less	influence	on	the	southern	part	of	Maluku.		122	Arab	 captainship	 is	 a	position	appointed	by	 the	Dutch	 colonials	 to	Arab	 leaders	 in	order	 to	 manage	 affairs	 of	 Arab	 community.	 This	 position	 was	 regulated	 within	 the	Dutch	 policies	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 social	 segregation,	 by	 classifying	 people	 into	 three	different	social	groupings:	the	Europeans,	Foreign	Oriental,	and	natives	(see	chapter	2).	The	Arab	community	 in	Ambon	during	 the	colonial	period	was	 led	by	 three	non-Sada	Hadramis,	namely	Shaikh	Hadi	b.	Salim	Basalamah,	Shaikh	Muhammad	b.	Muhammad	al-Zagladi,	Shaikh	Awadh	Bahasoan	respectively	(Bahadullah	2010,	190).				123	Waqf	 is	an	Islamic	endowment,	usually	by	donating	properties	(buildings,	lands)	to	Muslims	 for	 a	 charitable	 or	 religious	 purpose	 without	 any	 intention	 to	 reclaim	 the	assets.	124	The	 al-Hilal	was	 initially	 funded	by	donations	 from	 rich	merchants,	 such	 as	Abdul	Qadir	Najjar,	Ahmad	Bamahri,	and	Abdullah	Hamdun.	Besides,	some	pioneers	(e.g	Zain	Basalamah)	 initiated	 an	 Islamic	 trade	 company	 aiming	 at	 supporting	 the	 al-Hilal,	although	the	company	lasted	shortly.	Interview	with	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	January	11,	2015.			
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	Figure	5.2:	An-Nur	Mosque	in	Ambon	(photographed	by	the	author)		Although	 the	 al-Hilal	 is	 a	 reformist-modernist	 foundation,	 the	ways	 in	which	Islamic	 reformism	 was	 propagated	 differed	 from	 the	 al-Irshad	 in	 Java.	 The	foundation’s	 Islamic	 missionary	 activities	 avoided	 controversy	 by	 not	challenging	certain	traditionalist	practices,	such	as	maulid	celebrations,	kissing	the	hands	of	the	Sada,	and	kafa’a	marriage.	This	strategy	of	tolerating	certain	practices	 was	 adopted	 to	 keep	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 from	 different	ideological	 background	 united	 and	 to	 integrate	 the	 Hadrami	 groups	 into	broader	Muslim	 communities	 in	 Ambon.	 This	 is	 as	 the	Hadramis	 considered	themselves	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 umma,	 Islamic	 community	 as	 other	Ambonese	Muslims,	sharing	with	them	the	minority	position	in	relation	to	the	Christian	majority.	It	 is	 in	this	context,	that	al-Hilal’s	opening	up	membership	to	 Muslims	 of	 any	 origin	 and	 ideological	 background	 must	 be	 understood,	although	it	must	be	added	that	most	key	leading	figures	in	the	central	board	of	management	continue	to	be	those	non-Sada	Hadramis.125	
                                                125	The	2014	profile	of	the	al-Hilal	states	that	the	central	foundation	of	al-Hilal	has	been	mostly	 led	 by	 Hadramis	 of	 non-Sada	 origin,	 as	 follows:	 	 Ali	 Bahasoan	 (1946-1950),	Sayyid	 Abubakar	 bin	 Yahya	 (1950-1954),	 A.Z.	 Basalamah	 (1954-1992),	 Ahmad	Badarudin	(1992-1997),	M.	Ekan	Alatas	(1997-1999),	and	Hadi	Basalamah	(1999-now).	When	 I	 visited	 two	 other	 branches	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	 outside	 Ambon,	 namely	 in	 Namlea	town,	 capital	 of	 northern	Buru	 Island,	 on	April	 2015,	 and	Tual,	 capital	 of	Kei	 Islands,	their	 leaders	 told	 me	 that	 the	 management	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	 distinguishes	 for	 its	management	between	the	foundation	and	the	schools.	The	foundation	is	superintended	by	 those	with	 a	 kin	 connection,	while	 the	 schools	 are	 handled	more	by	professionals	who	 may	 come	 from	 any	 origin.	 In	 Namlea,	 for	 instance,	 the	 foundation	 is	 led	 by	 a	Hadrami	of	Sada	origin	from	al-Hamid	clan,	while	in	Tual	it	is	led	by	a	non-Hadrami.			
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Today,	 the	 al-Hilal	 continues	 to	 focus	 on	 Islamic	 education	 and	 Islamic	programmes.126	It	 still	 has	 several	 branches	 and	manages	 about	 174	 schools	around	the	South	Maluku	Islands	(see	figure	5.3).	However,	the	role	of	the	al-Hilal	 in	 providing	 basic	 Islamic	 education	 for	 the	 Muslim	 communities	 in	Ambon	and	the	Hadrami	community	in	particular,	as	well	as	in	integrating	the	Arab	members	is	decreasing.	This	is	due	to	several	factors.			
	Figure	5.3:	An	al-Hilal	school	in	Namlea,	Buru	(photographed	by	the	author)	One	 of	 the	 main	 reasons	 is	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 communal	 conflicts	 between	Muslim	 and	 Christian	 communities	 in	 1999-2002.	 The	 conflicts	 marked	 the	loss	 of	 the	 al-Hilal’s	 control	 over	 many	 schools	 as	 well	 as	 the	 end	 of	 hiring	Christian	 teachers	 and	 staff.	 Having	 to	 run	 and	 develop	 the	 foundation	 after	the	conflicts,	my	informant	Hadi	Basalamah,	the	current	general	chief	of	the	al-Hilal,	perceived	himself	to	be	in	a	difficult	situation.	During	the	conflicts,	many	of	 al-Hilal’s	 assets,	 such	 as	 the	 office,	 school,	 vehicle,	 and	 mosque	 were	attacked	 and	 burned	 down	 several	 times.	 After	 the	 conflicts,	 many	 schools	have	 been	 taken	 over	 by	 the	 local	 government.	 Furthermore,	 the	 communal	conflicts	 have	 opened	 up	 opportunities	 for	 other	 Islamic	 ideologies	 to	 exert	their	influence	on	the	community	and	for	new	religious	elites	to	emerge.	These	
                                                126	In	 terms	 of	 education,	 the	 al-Hilal	 has	 provided	 basic	 and	 secondary	 schools	 by	establishing	modern	 Islamic	schools,	 integrating	 Islamic	and	general	sciences.	Around	2010,	 the	al-Hilal	 established	a	university,	which,	however,	 lasted	only	 shortly	 (a	 few	years)	due	to	a	dispute	between	internal	members	of	the	al-Hilal	management	board.	In	terms	 of	 social	 aspects,	 the	 foundation	 has	 set	 up	 various	 programmes,	 such	 as	supporting	 poor	 people	 and	 providing	 scholarship	 for	 poor	 students.	 In	 terms	 of	religious	aspects,	 the	 foundation	has	also	 set	up	some	programmes,	 such	as	 initiating	public	 preaching	 and	 sermons.	 Profile	 of	 2014	 al-Hilal,	 and	 Interview	 with	 Umar	Attamimy,	September	29,	2014.			
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new	 ideologies,	 which	 include	 neo-Salafism,	 Shi’ism,	 and	 neo-traditionalism,	have	contested	older	conceptions	of	Islam	and	have	challenged	the	existence	of	the	al-Hilal	as	the	only	legitimate	Hadrami	organization.		At	the	same	time,	the	al-Hilal	has	lost	its	influence	on	education.	Based	on	what	 I	 have	 been	 told	 during	 interviews,	 most	 of	 the	 older	 Hadrami	generations	 in	 Ambon	went	 to	 the	 al-Hilal	 schools,	 while	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	today’s	Hadrami	children	are	sent	to	some	other	schools	than	those	run	by	the	al-Hilal.	 Indeed,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1999-2002	 conflicts	 marked	 a	 significant	increase	of	 Islamic	schools	 initiated	by	Muslims	of	non-Hadrami	origin.	From	what	 I	 observed,	 these	 newly	 established	 schools,	 such	 as	 al-Fatah,	 al-Manshurah,	as-Salam,	Hidayatulah,	Ishaka,	and	others,	succeeded	in	attracting	a	 significant	 number	 of	 Ambonese	 Muslim	 students.	 Unlike	 the	 al-Hilal’s	headquarter	 and	 schools,	 most	 of	 other	 new	 Islamic	 schools	 are	 located	 in	Muslim	 areas.	 Being	 traumatized	 by	 the	 communal	 conflicts,	 many	 Muslims	send	their	children	to	the	schools	located	in	the	Muslim	neighbourhood.	In	 addition	 to	 the	 communal	 conflicts	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 newly	 emergent	religious	 groups,	 the	 al-Hilal	 has	 recently	 faced	 internal	 frictions	 among	 its	leaders	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 disagreement	 over	 the	 management	 of	 the	foundation.127	The	dispute	between	the	leaders	over	the	al-Hilal’s	management	culminated	 in	 their	 taking	 different	 political	 stances	 during	 the	 local	governor’s	election	of	the	2013	(see	chapter	3	pages	92-93).	Despite	 its	reformist-modernist	character,	 the	al-Hilal	 is	the	only	Islamic	foundation	 that	 has	 functioned	 as	 an	 umbrella	 organization	 for	 the	Hadrami	community	as	a	whole.	Although	the	al-Hilal	can	be	compared	to	the	al-Irshad	in	Java	in	terms	of	its	reformist-modernist	character,	the	al-Hilal	is	not	so	much	concerned	with	modernist	publications.	I	could	not	find	any	publication	issued	by	 the	 foundation.	 I	 assume	 that	 this	may	be	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	al-Hilal	was	 established	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 1940s	 or	 much	 later	 than	 the	 al-Irshad,	in	which	an	awareness	of	national	identity	was	much	less	disputed.					
3.3 New	Developments	in	Post-Communal	Conflict	Ambon	Today,	 Islamic	 affiliations	 among	 Ambonese	 Muslims	 are	 very	 diverse.	Traditionalist	 and	 reformist-modernist	 notions	 of	 Islam	 have	 come	 to	 be	contested	 by	 other	 Islamic	 views,	 especially	 after	 the	 recent	 communal	conflicts	between	Muslims	and	Christians	in	1999-2002.		At	the	basis	of	the	conflicts	lies	the	resurgence	of	Islamic	fundamentalism	and	communal	violence	around	Indonesia,	including	Ambon,	during	the	period	of	 transition	 from	 authoritarianism	 to	 democracy	 after	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 New	Order	 regime	 in	 May	 1998.	 The	 fall	 of	 the	 Suharto	 regime	 provided	
                                                127	Interview	with	Hasan	al-Kathiri,	 January	11,	2015;	 interview	with	Hadi	Basalamah,	October	15,	2014;	interview	with	Umar	Attamimy,	September	29,	2014.		
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opportunities	to	different	people	and	groups	to	get	access	to	the	state:	for	local	communities	 this	 opened	 up	 chances	 to	 reshape	 local	 socio-political	 and	economic	 configurations;	 businessmen,	 politicians,	 and	 military	 officers	manipulated	 these	 conflicts	 for	 their	 own	 goals,	 and	 radicalists/Islamists	jumped	to	the	opportunity	to	challenge	the	state’s	ideology	(Van	Klinken	2001;	Bertrand	 2002[2004];	 Sidel	 2006[2008];	 Schulze	 2017).	 In	 this	 context,	religion	 as	 a	 cultural	 marker	 for	 Ambonese	 identities	 became	 further	politicized,	building	on	a	long-term	politization	during	the	colonial	era,	which	had	 continued	 during	 the	 post-colonial	 period	 (Adam	 2010b,	 28),	 while	 still	playing	a	role	in	the	present-day.	Bringing	 new	 ideologies	 into	 the	 community,	 the	 communal	 conflicts	between	Muslims	and	Christians	in	Ambon	have	left	their	marks,	especially	in	terms	 of	 the	 religious	 views,	 practices	 and	 affiliations	 among	 Ambonese	Muslims	 in	 general	 and	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	 particular.	 In	 the	 post-conflict	 situation,	 contestation	 over	 religious	 authority	 is	 more	 pronounced,	contributing	to	the	breakdown	of	the	community	building	of	Hadramis,	which	was	previously	more	or	less	held	together	under	the	umbrella	organization	of	al-Hilal.	 By	 extension,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	 for	 the	 Hadrami	 community	 in	Ambon	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 now	 considerably	 less	 influential	 than	 before,	 and	 the	position	 of	Hadramis	 and	 their	 authority	 has	 been	 challenged	 by	Muslims	 of	various	 branches	 of	 Islam.	 	 This	 is	 due	 in	 particular	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	religious	 elites	 affiliated	 with	 neo-Salafism,	 Shi’ism	 and	 neo-traditionalism.	The	Hadrami	community	is	thus	divided	into	several	religious	groups.	To	some	extent,	 the	 Sada	 and	non-Sada	distinction	plays	 a	 role	 in	people’s	 ideological	preferences;	 the	 trend	 among	 non-Sada	Hadramis	 is	 to	 be	more	 attracted	 to	either	modernist	 or	 fundamentalist	 puritan	 ideologies,	 while	 Sada	 Hadramis	tend	to	be	more	attracted	to	traditionalist	Sunnism	and	Shi’ism.		
3.3.1 Neo-Salafism	As	has	been	described	in	the	previous	section,	Salafism	was	spread	in	the	late	nineteenth	 century	 and	 beginning	 of	 twentieth	 century.	 	 It	 also	 influenced	Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora	 (Indonesia),	 thus	 contesting	 traditional	 religious	authority	within	the	Hadrami	community.		The	expansion	of	neo-Salafism	and	Wahhabism	in	Indonesia	started	in	the	mid-1980s	when	Salafi	adherents	became	more	assertive,	demonstrating	their	affiliations	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,	 amongst	 others,	 through	 their	 choice	 of	clothes.	This	can	be	noted,	for	example,	in	the	appearance	of	men	wearing	long	flowing	 robes	 (jalabiyya),	 turbans	 (imama),	 trousers	 to	 right	 above	 their	ankles	 (isbal)	 and	 long	 beards	 (lihya),	 and	 women	 wearing	 a	 form	 of	enveloping	black	veil	(niqab)	 in	public	places	(Hasan	2001,	23).	Although	the	neo-Salafi	 communities	 display	 their	 distinctive	 identity,	 overall	 they	 have	
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adopted	a	stance	of	apolitical	quietism	(Hasan	2001,	23;	Roy	1996,	25).	Their	main	 concern	 is	 the	 question	 of	 safeguarding	 tauhid,	 that	 is,	 the	 oneness	 of	God,	and	a	number	of	other	issues	which	concentrate	on	the	call	for	a	return	to	strict	 religious	 practices	 and	 an	 emphasis	 on	 individual	 moral	 integrity.	Sartorial	pracices	such	as	wearing	the	 jalabiyya,	imama,	lihya,	isbal	and	niqab,	have	 become	 the	 main	 topics	 in	 their	 day-to-day	 discussions	 and	 have	acquired	significant	 symbolic	power.	A	 commitment	 to	wear	 the	 jalabiyya	 by	men	 and	 the	 niqab	 by	 women,	 for	 instance,	 is	 considered	 much	 more	important	 than	 participating	 in	 political	 activities.	 Adherents	 generally	 have	the	 view	 that	 the	 Muslim	 society	 must	 first	 be	 Islamized	 through	 a	 gradual	evolutionary	 process	 that	 includes	 education	 (tarbiya)	 and	 purification	(tasfiya)	before	the	comprehensive	implementation	of	Shari’a	can	be	realized.	To	 reach	 this	 goal,	 adherents	 of	 Salafi	 movements	 have	 been	 committed	 to	
da’wa	 or	 proselytization	 activities	 by	 participating	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	
halqa	(literally	 circle)	 and	daura	 (literally	 turns).	 	A	halqa	 is	 a	 forum	 for	 the	study	 of	 Islamic	 sciences	 in	 which	 a	 teacher	 gives	 lessons	 on	 the	 basis	 of	certain	books	while	his	participants	sit	around	him	to	hear	and	scrutinize	his	lessons.	A	daura	is	a	type	of	workshop	that	is	held	for	a	period	of	time	ranging	from	days	or	weeks	or	months,	during	which	participants	gather	and	 stay	 in	one	place	and	follow	a	specific	programme	(Hasan	2001,	24).	Contemporary	Salafism	can	be	classified	into	three	categories:	the	largest	group	are	the	purists	(quietists),	who	are	followers	of	political	abstinence;	the	second	largest	group	are	the	activists,	who	are	engaged	in	politics;	the	smallest	group	are	jihadists,	who	are	willing	to	exert	violence	in	order	to	fight	for	what	they	 consider	 the	 just	 cause.	 Salafis	 are	 divided	 into	 those	 who	 reject	 strict	adherence	 (taqlid)	 to	 the	 four	 Sunni	 schools	 of	 law,	 and	 others	who	 remain	faithful	to	these	(Hasan	2001,	23;	Roy	1996,	25).	In	 the	 context	 of	 Ambon,	 there	 is	 not	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 a	 local	 Hadrami-initiated	neo-Salafi	organization.	The	neo-Salafism	that	was	intensively	spread	after	the	communal	conflicts	was	propagated	by	neo-Salafi	followers	from	Java.	Two	 national	 neo-Salafi	 organizations	 that	 attracted	 Hadrami	 followers	 in	Ambon	are	the	paramilitary	MMI	(Majelis	Mujahidin	Indonesia,	the	Indonesian	Holy	 Warrior	 Assembly),	 and	 the	 Laskar	 Jihad	 (the	 Warriors	 of	 the	 Holy	Struggle).	The	MMI	was	launched	in	Yogyakarta	in	August	in	2000	after	it	held	its	 first	 national	 congress	 of	mujahidin,	 Islamic	 fighters	 (Hasan	 2005,	 8).128	
                                                128	The	purpose	of	the	establishment	of	the	MMI	was	to	enforce	Shari’a	as	a	necessary	means	 to	 curb	problems	 and	disasters	 in	 Indonesia.	 	 As	 the	 organization	 is	 based	 on	Islam	 as	 an	 ideology,	 other	 ideologies	 in	 contradiction	 with	 Islam	 are	 rejected.	 The	organization	 also	 bases	 its	 main	 doctrine	 on	 jihad	 in	 order	 to	 uphold	 the	 dignity	 of	Islam.	The	MMI,	as	argued	by	Noorhaidi	Hasan	(2005,	8),	is	a	continuation	of	the	older	underground	movement	called	Negara	Islam	Indonesia	(NII),	which	was	established	on	
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Many	leading	figures	from	different	Islamic	organizations	and	political	parties	were	recruited.	These	leading	figures	 included	a	non-Sada	Hadrami	preacher,	Abu	 Bakar	 Ba’ashir,	 founder	 of	 the	 pesantren	 or	 boarding	 school	 Ngruki	 of	Solo,	who	was	jailed	after	he	was	suspected	to	be	involved	in	the	Bali	bombing	attack	in	October	2002	(Sholeh	2008,	94).	The	MMI	gained	momentum	in	the	communal	conflicts	 in	Maluku	and	 thus	called	 its	members	 for	 jihad	(war)	 to	Maluku	(Hasan	2005,	9).	The	branch	of	the	MMI	was	established	in	Ambon	in	2001	 during	 the	 communal	 conflicts.	 The	 MMI	 members	 in	 Ambon	 were,	according	 to	 Sholeh	 (2008,	 95),	 to	 some	 extent	 members	 of	 another	fundamentalist	 organization	 based	 in	 Java	 called	 Dewan	 Dakwah	 Islamiyah	Indonesia	(DDII,	Indonesian	Council	for	Islamic	Propagation),	an	organization	established	by	Masyumi	 leaders	 in	1967.	During	 the	 conflicts,	MMI	members	were	 said	 to	 have	 been	 responsible	 for	 igniting	 violence	 and	 provoking	 the	Muslims	 on	 Ambon	 to	 perform	 jihad	 after	 the	 peace	 agreement	 between	Muslims	 and	 Christians	 in	 2002.	 Members	 of	 the	 MMI	 were	 then	 jailed	 for	attacking	some	government	forces	(Sholeh	2008,	95).	My	informant	Gaia	(see	chapter	3	page	105)	confirmed	the	involvement	of	her	husband	as	a	member	of	the	MMI.	She	told	me	that	many	former	members	of	 the	 MMI	 have	 been	 jailed.	 She	 further	 claimed	 that	 her	 husband	 went	missing	 during	 the	 conflicts.	 	 He	 is	 believed	 to	 have	 been	 kidnapped	 and	murdered	by	the	army	forces.	After	the	conflicts,	the	activities	of	the	MMI	have	been	 focused	 on	 proselytizing	 religious	 doctrines	 to	 counter	 Christian	missionary	activities	as	part	of	their	new	jihad	strategy.	Similar	to	the	MMI	with	its	jihad	ideology,	the	Laskar	Jihad	was	present	in	Ambon	 during	 the	 communal	 conflicts	 in	 response	 to	 the	 government’s	inability	 to	 settle	 the	 conflicts	 and	 protect	 Ambon’s	 Muslims	 from	 Christian	attacks	(Schulze	2002,	58).	Being	a	paramilitary	group	identifying	themselves	as	Salafis,	 the	Laskar	 Jihad	was	 launched	 in	Yogyakarta	 in	 January	2000,	and	was	 initiated	by	 Ja’far	Umar	Talib	(b.	1961),	a	non-Sada	Hadrami	origin	 from	East	Java	(Hasan	2005,	5).	During	the	conflicts,	the	Laskar	Jihad	was	said	to	be	the	 largest	 and	 best	 organized	 group	 sending	 voluntary	 jihad	 fighters	 to	Maluku	 (Hasan	 2005,	 5).	 	 Allegedly	 it	 had	 links	 with	 international	 jihadi	groups,	 such	 as	 the	 Taliban	 and	 Abu	 Sayyaf	 (Schulze	 2002,	 69).	 The	 Laskar	Jihad	was	later	banned	by	the	government,	and	it	dissolved	itself	following	the	peace	 agreement	 between	Muslims	 and	 Christians,	Malino	 II	 treaty,	 in	 2002,	although	 FKAWJ	 (Forum	 Komunikasi	 AhlusSunnah	 Wal	 Jamaah,	 Forum	 for	Followers	 of	 the	 Sunna	 and	 the	 Community	 of	 the	 Prophet)	 as	 its	 umbrella	organization	continues	to	exist	(Gos	2000,	9).	
                                                                                                              the	same	date	with	the	launching	of	the	MMI,	and	the	fact	that	many	former	members	of	the	NII	were	active	in	the	process	of	the	establishment	of	the	MMI.	
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During	 the	 conflicts	 members	 of	 the	 Laskar	 Jihad	 present	 in	 Ambon	originated	 mainly	 from	 outside	 Ambon,	 such	 as	 Java	 and	 Sulawesi.	 Its	 ex-members	 continue	 to	 live	 in	Ambon,	 having	 transformed	 to	 quietist	 Salafism	after	 the	 conflicts.	 These	 ex-members	 who	 decided	 to	 stay	 in	 Ambon	 have	formed	 an	 Islamic	 Arabian	 residential	 quarter	 in	 Batumerah	 Atas.	 They	brought	their	family	members	and	turned	the	former	Christian	neighbourhood	into	 an	 Arabian-like	 hamlet	 with	 its	 own	 mosque	 and	 home-shops	 with	merchandise	like	perfume,	herbal	medicine,	Islamic	clothes,	traditional	Islamic	medications	and	so	on.	The	female	adult	members	wear	a	niqab	and	the	men	wear	 lihya	and	keep	beards.	Mapping	 this	quarter	 for	my	research,	 I	 counted	about	 50	 households,	 in	 which	 the	 adult	 men	 mainly	 worked	 as	 small	entrepreneurs	 (e.g	 shop	 owners)	 and	 the	 women	 as	 housewives.	 The	 ex-members	 of	 the	 Laskar	 Jihad	 have	 established	 a	 foundation	 called	 al-Manshurah	 in	 their	 living	 quarter,	which	 runs	 a	 primary	 Islamic	 school	 that	has	 its	own	curriculum	and	school	uniform,	 including	a	 face	cover	for	 female	students.	As	the	school	does	not	follow	the	state	school	curriculum,	it	relies	on	private	donations	and	school	fees.	This	school	has	recently	gained	a	significant	number	 of	 Muslim	 students	 from	 middle	 class	 families,	 especially	 in	 the	Muslim	area	of	Batumerah	Atas.	For	example,	some	of	my	university	colleagues	with	 a	 Salafi-oriented	 ideology,	 among	 whom	 both	 modernist	 oriented	 and	neo-Salafis,	in	the	IAIN	have	sent	their	children	to	study	at	the	school.	Although	the	Laskar	Jihad	was	initiated	by	the	Javanese	Hadrami	preacher,	many	Laskar	Jihad	followers	in	Ambon	are	new	migrants	of	non-Hadrami	origin,	who	have	taken	a	dominant	role	in	proselytizing	neo-Salafi	teachings.			
3.3.2 Shi’ism		The	 history	 of	 Shi’ite	 Islam	 in	 Indonesia	 is	 far	 from	 clear.	 Yet,	 Shi’ite	 Islam,	especially	 specific	 elements	 such	 as	 rituals	 devoted	 to	 the	 Prophet	 and	 his	descendants,	ahl	al-bayt,	 festivals,	 and	philosophical	 Sufism,	 are	 said	 to	 have	been	historically	present	in	the	archipelago	for	a	long	time	–	perhaps	from	the	beginning	 of	 Islamization.	 They	 have	 even	 been	 practiced	 by	 Sunni	Muslims,	especially	among	those	from	a	traditionalist	background	(Marcinkowski	2008,	50;	Zulkifli	2013,	3;	Formichi	2014a).	The	contemporary	presence	of	Shi’ism	in	Indonesia,	which	denotes	to	adherence	to	Shi’ite	jurisprudence,	is,	however,	a	recent	phenomenon	(Marcinkowski	2008;	Formichi	and	Feener	2015).	Shi’ism	in	 this	 context	 is	 still	 small	 compared	 to	 Sunnism,	 which	 is	 the	 major	denomination	among	Indonesian	Muslims.	As	Indonesia	has	adopted	a	form	of	‘delimited	 pluralism’,	 in	 which	 only	 specific	 set	 of	 religions	 are	 officially	recognized,	there	is	no	available	Indonesian	census	that	provides	information	on	 different	 Islamic	 denominations	 (Formichi	 2014,	 103).	 The	 National	Statistic	 Bureau	 (BPS)	 recorded	 in	 2010	 that	 87.2	%	 of	 the	 total	 Indonesian	
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population	consists	of	Indonesian	Muslims,	that	is	about	225	million	people.	In	this	official	 figure,	Sunni	and	Shi’ite	adherents	are	 lumped	together	as	having	the	 same	 religious	 affiliation.	 Thus,	 the	 number	 of	 Shi’ite	 followers	 in	Indonesia	 cannot	 be	 presicely	 estimated	 (Marcinkowski	 2008,	 50;	 Zulkifli	2013,	 15).	 Non-official	 reports,	 however,	 have	 tried	 to	 give	 some	 estimates.	According	 to	 2005	 online	 Asia	 Times,	 the	 number	 of	 the	 Shi’ite	 followers	 in	Southeast	Asia	was	estimated	to	be	around	3	to	4	million,	and	it	is	around	1	to	3	million	in	Indonesia	based	on	2005	US	state	department	on	its	annual	report	of	 International	 Religious	 Freedom	 (Marcinkowski	 2008,	 50).	 Some	 Shi’ite	themselves	 also	 attempted	 to	 provide	 an	 estimation	 of	 the	 Shi’ites,	 ranging	from	20,000	to	2,5	million	adherents	(Zulkifli	2013,	15).		The	majority	 of	 contemporary	 Shi’ite	 followers	 in	 Indonesia	 adopts	 the	Ithna	 ’Ashariyya,	 the	 Twelver	 Shi’a,	 the	 main	 branch	 of	 Shi’ite	 Islam	(Marcinkowski	 2008;	 Zulkifli	 2013;	 Formichi	 and	 Feener	 2015).	 The	 early	propagation	of	Twelver	Shi’ism	in	what	is	now	Indonesia	is	said	to	date	back	to	the	nineteenth	century,	a	period	of	intensive	contacts	between	Hadramaut	and	the	Malay-Indonesian	world	(Zulkifli	2013,	16).	Hadramis,	especially	 those	of	Sada	 background,	 were	 among	 the	 earliest	 Shi’iite	 followers	 who	 played	 a	major	 role	 in	 the	 propagation	 of	 Shi’ism	 in	 Indonesia	 (Zulkifli	 2013,	 15-27).	The	 earliest	 prominent	 Shi’ite	 figures	 of	 Sada	 origin	 were	 Muhammad	 bin	Ahmad	 al-Muhdar	 (1861-1926),	 Ali	 bin	 Shahab	 (1865-1944),	 Aqil	 bin	 Zainal	Abidin	 al-Jufri	 (1870-1952).	 These	 figures	 were	 all	 dedicated	 to	 Islamic	education	 and	 involved	 in	 branches	 of	 the	 Jam’iyya	Khair,	 the	 first	Hadrami-initiated	 Islamic	 school	 in	 Indonesia.	 They	 also	 built	 Islamic	 networks	 with	other	 Shi’ite	 Hadrami	 scholars,	 such	 as	 Abu	 Bakr	 bin	 Shahab	 (1846-1922),	Muhammad	 bin	 Aqil	 bin	 Yahya	 (1862-1931).	 Although	 these	 Shi’ite	 figures	dedicated	 their	 lives	 to	 Islamic	 education,	 their	 Shi’ism	 proselitization	 was	limited	 to	 their	 own	 family	 members	 and	 close	 relatives.	 Journalists	 and	writers	such	as	Muhammad	Dhiya	Shahab	(d.1986)	and	Muhammad	Ali	Shahab	(d.2001)	are,	for	instance,	sons	of	aforementioned	Ali	bin	Shahab	who	followed	their	 father’s	 path	 in	 Islamic	 learning	 and	 Shi’ite	 orientation.	 In	 this	 regard,	kinship	 played	 a	 main	 role	 in	 diasporization	 of	 Shi’ism	 in	 the	 early	 period,	especially	among	Sada	Hadramis	(Zulkifli	2013,	15-27).	The	current	revival	of	Twelver	Shi’ism,	however,	must	be	understood	 in	relation	to	the	Iranian	Revolution	in	1979	(Marcinkowski	2008;	Zulkifli	2013;	Formichi	 2014;	 Formichi	 and	 Feener	 2015).	 The	 success	 of	 the	 Iranian	Revolution	 impressed	 the	 whole	 world.	 In	 Indonesia,	 it	 functioned	 as	 a	milestone	 that	marked	a	 transformation	 in	Shi’ism	propagation.	 In	 the	1980s	and	1990s,	a	significant	number	of	young	Sunni	Muslims	began	to	convert	 to	Twelver	Shi’ism.	Before	the	revolution,	Shi’ism	conversion	and	its	propagation	were	limited	to	a	few	people,	especially	those	from	Sada	families,	as	has	been	mentioned	 earlier.	 	 After	 the	 revolution,	 Shi’ite	 converts	 came	not	 only	 from	
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Hadrami	Sada	but	also	from	Muslims	of	non-Hadrami	backgrounds,	especially	among	 members	 of	 several	 university	 campuses	 (Zulkifli	 2013,	 15-48).	 The	conversion	of	Muslims	of	non-Hadrami	backgrounds	was	related	to	the	success	of	the	Iranian	revolution	led	by	a	charismatic	figure,	Ayatolllah	Khomeini,	and	their	interest	about	the	ideology	underpinned	the	success	of	the	revolution.	As	for	converts	of	Sada	origin,	apart	from	the	leading	figure	in	the	revolution	who	is	 of	 Sada	 background	 himself	 and	 thus	 familiar	 with	 a	 similar	 kind	 of	genealogical	reckoning	that	characterizes	Shi’a	 leadership,	another	reason	for	Sada	conversion	to	Shi’ism	is	the	lack	of	‘ulama	from	Hadramaut	who	could	act	as	a	religious	model	for	young	Sada	in	Indonesia	(Rijal	2017,	9).	Besides	resulting	in	a	remarkable	number	of	converts,	another	impact	of	the	 Iranian	 revolution	was	 the	 intensification	of	 relations	between	 Indonesia	and	 Iran.	 For	 example,	 exchange	 visits	 were	 organized	 of	 Iranian	 Shi’ite	scholars	to	Indonesia	while	Indonesians	were	sent	to	study	in	Iran,	especially	to	the	Islamic	learning	centre	in	Qum	(Zulkifli	2013,	27-34).	In	this	context,	the	role	of	Hadramis	of	Sada	background	in	building	networks	between	Indonesia	and	Iran	in	terms	of	Islamic	education	has	been	very	important.	Sada	Hadramis	pioneered	 in	 sending	 students	 to	 Qum,	 who	 after	 their	 return	 to	 Indonesia	became	 Shi’ite	 preachers	 and	 leaders	 across	 the	 country.	 Husain	 al-Habshi	(1921-1994),	founder	of	YAPI	(Yayasan	Pesantren	Islam,	Foundation	of	Islamic	Pesantren)	 in	Bangil	 East	 Java,	 for	 example,	was	one	 among	 several	 eminent	Shi’ite	 leaders	 in	 Indonesia	 who	 had	 a	 special	 recommendation	 to	 send	students	 to	Qum.	Besides,	he	played	a	major	 role	 in	 the	early	propagation	of	Twelver	Shi’ism	in	eastern	Indonesian	regions,	namely	Maluku	(Zulkifli	2013,	56).	 Shi’ite	proliferation	occurred	primarily	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	Yet,	during	 the	New	Order	regime	(1966-1998)	Shi’ite	activists	were	 forced	 to	go	underground	 and	 practice	 taqiyya	 (concealment)	 due	 to	 the	 state’s	suppression	 of	 Islamic	 activism	 (Marcinkowski	 2008,	 51).	 Shi’ism	 and	 other	minority	groups	gained	momentum	after	the	fall	of	the	regime,	paving	the	way	for	overt	 Islamic	activism	in	the	public	sphere.	The	growth	of	Shi’ite	activism	can	 be	 discerned	 among	 a	 middle	 upper	 class	 of	 society	 and	 through	 the	establishment	 of	 Shi’ite	 affiliated	 institutions,	 such	 as	 publishing	 companies,	social	 foundations,	 Islamic	 schools,	 and	 also	 higher	 education	 around	Indonesia	(Assegaf	201	5,	251-252).		Shi’ite	followers	in	Indonesia	can	be	categorized	into	two	groups	(Zulkifli	2013,	49-52;	Assegaf	2015,	250-68).	The	 first	 consists	mainly	of	 intellectuals	with	 educational	 background	 in	 various	 fields	 of	 non-religious	 sciences	 on	mainly	secular	university	campuses.	Although	they	can	be	engaged	 in	 Islamic	education	and	da’wa,	they	are	not	religious	teachers	by	formal	profession.	The	second	group	consists	of	ustadh,	religious	teachers,	who	have	an	education	in	
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traditional	Islamic	learning	in	Islamic	schools	and/or	pesantrens,	and	dedicate	themselves	professionally	to	fields	of	da’wa	and	Islamic	education.	For	a	while,	the	two	Shi’ite	groups	tried	to	unite	themselves	as	part	of	the	Indonesian	 Shi’ite	 followers,	 especially	 before	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 New	Order	 era,	establishing	 an	 organization	 called	 MAHDI	 (Majlis	 Ahlulbait	 di	 Indonesia,	Indonesian	Ahl	 al-Bayt	Council)	 in	 the	early	1990s.	 It	was	 represented	by	all	Shi’ite	prominent	leaders	in	Indonesia	of	both	groups,	with	a	chairmain	from	a	Sada	 family;	 Ahmad	Baraqbah.	 The	MAHDI	 lasted	 only	 shortly	 as	 it	 failed	 to	unite	 the	members,	 a	 failure	which	 is	 said	 to	 be	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	MAHDI	 gained	 no	 legal	 recognition	 from	 the	 government.	 Moreover,	 the	different	 socio-political	 backgrounds	 of	 those	 representing	 the	 campus	 circle	and	 the	 ustadh	 group	 proved	 to	 be	 too	 difficult	 to	 make	 close	 cooperation	possible.	(Assegaf	2015	in	Formichi	and	Feener	2015,	257-258).	The	 internal	 friction	within	 the	 Shi’ite	 community	 became	more	 visible	after	 May	 1998,	 when	 those	 representing	 moderate	 and	 conservative	affiliations	 established	 their	 own	 associations	 (Zulkifli	 2013;	 Formichi	 2014;	Assegaf	2015).	The	campus	circle	established	 the	 IJABI	 (Ikatan	 Jama‘ah	Ahlul	Bait	 Indonesia,	 the	all-Indonesia	Assembly	of	Ahl	al-Bayt	Associations)	which	was	 launched	 in	 1	 July	 2000,	 and	 is	 said	 to	 have	 145	 branch	 offices	 around	Indonesia.	Considered	the	first	national	Shi’ite	organization	recognized	by	the	State,	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 Jalaluddin	 Rahkmat	 the	 IJABI	 tried	 to	accommodate	all	Shi’ite	members	in	Indonesia,	but	soon	failed	as	those	of	the	
ustadh	 circle	 disagreed	 with	 the	 IJABI’s	 leadership	 and	 the	 application	 of	Twelver	Shi’ism	and	its	basic	tenets	(Assegaf	2015,	258-260).	For	instance,	the	campus	 circle	 is	 accused	 of	 partially	 implementing	 the	 teaching	 of	 the	 Ja’fari	school	of	 law	as	 it	 is	oriented	 towards	a	more	 inclusive	 Islamic	 teaching	 in	a	pluralistic	 setting.	 	 Another	 instance	 is	 that	 through	 the	 IJABI,	 the	 campus	circle	does	not	have	to	follow	the	concept	of	wilayat	al-faqih	(guardianship	of	Islamic	jurist)	in	order	to	be	an	independent,	democratic	social	organization,	in	which	 its	 leadership	 is	 determined	 through	 a	 congress.	 Before	 the	establishment	 of	 ABI	 (Ikatan	 Ahlulbait	 Indonesia,	 Indonesian	 Association	 of	Ahl	 al-Bayt)	 on	 June	 15,	 2011,	 those	 of	 the	 ustadh	 circle	 were	 affiliated	 to	several	 Shi’ite	 organizations	 and	 foundations	whose	 scope	 is	 limited	 to	 local	areas	(districts/provinces).129	The	ABI	was	established	as	an	umbrella	to	unify	
                                                129	The	Shi’ite	organizations	and	foundations	established	by	the	Ustadh	circle	are	FAJAR	(Forum	Ahlubait	 Jawa	Timur,	 Forum	of	East	 Java	Ahl	 al-Bayt	Congregations),	KIBLAT	(Komunitas	Ahlul	Bait	Jawa	Barat,	West	Java	Ahl	al-Bayt	Community),	Madinatul	Ilmi	in	Depok,	 al-Hujjah	Foundation	 in	 Jember,	Al-Hadi	 foundation,	 al-Wahdah	Foundation	 in	Solo,	ath-Thohir	Foundation	in	Surabaya,	al-Kautsar	Foundation	in	Malang	(East	Java),	al-Jawad	Foundation	 in	Bandung,	Ahlul	Bayt	Youth	Association	 (Ikatan	Pemuda	Ahlul	Bait	 Indonesia	 or	 IPABI)	 in	Bogor,	 al-Mujtaba	Foundation	 in	Purwakarta	 (West	 Java),	and	Amirul	Mukminin	Foundation	in	Pontianak	(West	Kalimantan).	
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all	members	of	Shi’ite	followers	from	the	ustadh	circle	in	Indonesia	who	were	not	in	favor	of	the	IJABI.	The	ABI	is	characterized	by	its	strict	application	of	the	Ja’fari	 school	 of	 thought	 and	 its	 orientation	 towards	 legitimation	 from	 Iran	(Formichi	 2014,	 114).	 In	 this	 regard,	 Hadramis	 from	 Sada	 origin,	 and	 also	those	of	Qum	graduates	have	a	dominant	role	in	the	organization	of	ABI.		
a. Early	Shi’ite	Conversion	in	Ambon		We	 have	 no	 sources	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 Shi’ism	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	Maluku	and	therefore	do	not	know	if	it	existed	at	the	time.	However,	according	to	 Dieter	 Bartels	 (1994),	 it	 is	 not	 unlikely	 that	 Shi’ite	 elements	 may	 have	influenced	 the	 region	during	 the	early	 Islamization	process.	Bartels	points	 to	some	 traditions	 such	 as	 gabus	 (art	 performance)	 in	 East	 Seram,	and	 Islamic	rituals	 in	 Central	 Maluku	 (especially	 two	 villages	 Rohomoni	 and	 Kaibobo,	Haruku	Island),	which	may	have	been	influenced	by	Shi’ite	elements.		The	propagation	of	contemporary	Shi’ism	in	Maluku,	especially	Ambon,	is	part	 of	 the	 larger	 trend	 of	 formation	 of	 the	 Indonesian	Twelver	 Shi’ism.	 The	position	 of	 Twelver	 Shi’ism	 is	 small	 compared	 to	 Shafi’ite	 Sunnism,	which	 is	the	 major	 denomination	 among	 Ambonese	 Muslims	 although	 there	 is	 no	official	 estimated	 number.	 In	 line	with	what	 Formichi	 (2015)	 suggested,	my	fieldwork	observations	confirm	that	the	Shi’ite	ideology	among	Shi’ite	Hadrami	followers	in	Ambon	is	apolitical	or	non-revolutionary	in	character,	in	the	sense	that	 their	 activities	 are	 concerned	 primarily	 with	 Islamic	 education	 and	religious	activities.	Added	to	this,	the	conversion	of	Sunni	Muslims	Ambon	to	Twelver	Shi’ism	is	related	to	a	significant	contribution	of	the	aforementioned	Indonesian	Shi’ite	figure	 from	 Sada	 background,	 Husain	 al-Habshi	 (1921-1994),	 founder	 of	 the	YAPI	 in	 Bangil	 East	 Java.	 Husain’s	 al-Habshi’s	 contribution	 to	 Shi’ite	propagation	 in	 Maluku	 occurred	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 (Zulkifli	 2013,	 56).	According	to	my	informant	Umar	Attamimy,	a	non-Sada	Hadrami	(see	chapter	2	 pages	 43-44),	 Husain	 al-Habshi	 came	 to	 Maluku	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 as	 a	religious	missionary.	Umar	Attamimy	met	al-Habshi	for	the	first	time	on	a	boat	on	 their	 way	 to	 Ambon	 around	 1987/88.	 	 In	 Ambon	 Husain	 al-Habshi	 was	introduced	 to	 Umar	 Attamimy’s	 brother,	 Muhammad	 Attamimy,	 who	 soon	became	 al-Habshi’s	 student	 and	 advocate	 of	 his	 teachings.	 Husain	 al-Habshi,	together	with	these	two	Attamimy	brothers	(Umar	and	Muhammad)	and	other	Ambonese	 of	 local	 origin,	 pioneered	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 Islamic	boarding	school,	madrasa	 in	Arabic	or	pesantren	in	Indonesian,	in	Hila	village	as	a	branch	of	the	YAPI	school	in	Bangil,	called	Nurul	Tsaqalain130,	in	1988/89	




	Figure	5.4:	Nurul	Tsaqalain	Pesantren,	Hila	Ambon	(photographed	by	the	author)		The	 Attamimy	 brothers	 and	 local	 members	 who	 pioneered	 in	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 pesantren	 were	 most	 probably	 early	 Shi’ite	 converts.	Jamaludin	 Bugis,	 leader	 of	 the	 present	 pesantren,	 confirmed	 that	 local	members,	including	his	own	parents-in-law,	were	Shi’ite	converts.	When	I	met	sixty-eight-year-old	Amar	(non-Sada),	a	cousin	of	 the	 two	Attamimy	brothers	from	Fak-Fak	Papua	in	his	shop,	he	told	me	that	he	did	not	want	to	talk	with	Muhammad	Attamimy	 anymore	 as	 he	 believed	 that	 Attamimy	 had	 become	 a	Shi’ite	 convert,	which	he	deduced	 from	the	 fact	 that	Attamimy	studied	 in	 the	YAPI	 school,	 Bangil	 East	 Java.132	Yet,	when	 I	 interviewed	Umar	Attamimy,	 he	rejected	 the	 suggestion	 that	 he	 and	 his	 brother	 identified	 as	 Shi’ites.	 He	indicated	 that	 he	 prefers	 being	 called	 a	Muslim	who	 takes	 a	middle	 position	(between	Shi’a	and	Sunni).133		The	 establishment	 of	 the	 Nurul	 Tsaqalain	 in	 Ambon	 marked	 an	 early	Twelver	 Shi’ism	 presence	 in	 Ambon	 on	 an	 educational	 level.	 However,	 the	
                                                                                                              popular,	 disputed	 Hadith	 text,	 or	 well-known	 Hadith	 al-Thaqalayn.	 This	 Hadith	 al-Thaqalayn	contains	an	information	on	two	sources	as	guidance	after	the	Prophet	died.	These	 two	sources	are	 the	Qur’an	and	 the	ahl	al-bayt,	which	becomes	a	 reference	 for	Shi’ites	 to	 the	 claim	 of	 the	 Prophet’s	 descendants	 in	 leadership	 succession	 after	 the	death	of	the	Prophet.		131	Interview	with	Umar	Attamimy,	September	29,	2014.	132	Amar	himself	is	a	neo-Salafi	advocate.	Interview	with	Amar,	November	13,	2014.	133	Interview	with	Umar	Attamimy,	September	29,	2014.	
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existence	 of	 the	 pesantren	 seems	 to	 have	 influenced	 Ambonese	 Muslims	 of	local	 orgin	more	 than	 those	with	 a	Hadrami	 background.	When	 I	 visited	 the	school,	 most	 of	 the	 students	 were	 non-Hadrami.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 due	 to	 the	location	of	the	school	which	is	far	from	the	part	of	town	where	the	majority	of	Hadramis	 live.	 Another	 reason	 may	 be	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 Shi’ite	 figures	 and	teachers	of	Hadrami	background	in	the	management	of	the	school.	This	is	much	related	to	the	dispute	over	the	management	of	the	pesantren	between	 the	 Attamimy	 brothers	 and	 local	 villagers	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	communal	 conflicts	 in	 Ambon.	 The	 dispute	 was	 taken	 to	 court,	 and	 the	founders	of	the	village,	notably	those	who	had	given	a	land	endowment	(waqf)	to	the	pesantren,	have	won	the	case	and	have	taken	over	its	management.	The	conflicts	 changed	both	 the	management	and	 the	 curriculum	of	 the	pesantren.	My	 informant	 Umar	 Attamimy	 told	 me	 that	 the	 pesantren	 was	 initially	managed	 under	 his	 foundation	 called	 Jembatan	 Jasa,	 which	 was	 established	around	1978,	but	then	it	was	taken	over	by	the	local	founders	in	Hila	village.134	The	 take-over	 of	 the	 pesantren’s	 management	 after	 the	 conflicts	 has	resulted	 in	 the	 change	 of	 school	 curriculum	 from	 exclusively	 Islamic	 subject	matters	into	a	combined	curriculum	of	state	and	Islamic	subjects.	According	to	my	informant	Jamaludin	Bugis,	 in	the	early	years	of	the	school,	that	is,	before	the	conflicts,	many	teachers	with	a	Hadrami	Sada	background	were	imported	from	 the	 YAPI	 in	 East	 Java	 to	work	 in	 the	 school,	 and	 the	 school	 curriculum	was	initially	restricted	to	the	kind	of	Islamic	subjects	adopted	that	were	taught	at	the	YAPI	school.	Bugis	pointed	out	that	today	the	teachers	of	the	pesantren	are	 locals	 and	 the	 school	 only	 teaches	 the	 Shi’ite	 subject	 matters	 in	 the	afternoon,	teaching	state	subject	matters	in	the	morning.	 In	Bugis’s	view,	this	school	restructurization	was	necessary	in	order	to	be	adaptive	to	the	needs	of	the	students	and	also	to	gain	a	more	financial	support	from	some	instititutions	and	 the	 state.	 The	 combination	 of	 the	 state	 and	 religious	 curricula	 has	attracted	more	students,	thus	facilitating	the	spreading	Shi’ite	teachings	among	students	 and	 the	 people,	 especially	 those	 who	 live	 in	 the	 vicinity	 of	 the	school.135				
b. The	Contribution	of	Sada	to	the	Propagation	of	Shi’ism		The	 establishment	 of	 the	Nurul	 Tsaqalain	 school	 in	 1988/89	was	 one	 of	 the	earliest	markers	of	the	presence	and	institutionalization	of	Shi’ite	converts	 in	Ambon.	 Apart	 from	 this	 institutionalized	 platform,	 before	 the	 1999-2002	conflicts	the	conversion	from	Sunni	to	Shi’ite	within	the	Hadrami	community,	especially	 those	of	 Sada	origin,	 in	Ambon	also	occurred	on	an	 individual	 and	family	level.	Hanna	from	a	Sada	family	of	al-Saqqaf	clan	(64	years	old)	told	me	
                                                134	Interview	with	Umar	Attamimy,	September	29,	2014.	135	Interview	with	Jamaludin	Bugis,	March	12,	2015.		
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that	she	became	a	Shi’ite	follower	in	1995.	She	decided	to	convert	to	Shi’ism	as	she	 learned	Shi’ite	 teachings	 from	her	elder	brother	who	 lives	 in	 Jakarta	and	who	 had	 converted	 to	 Shi’ism	 earlier.	 Through	 her	 discussions	 with	 her	brother	she	learned	how	the	Prophet’s	family	was	betrayed,	killed	and	hunted.	Hanna	 told	me	 that	 this	bitter	 story	about	her	ancestor,	 the	Prophet’s	 son-in	law,	Ali	 b.	Abu	Talib,	 had	 touched	her	heart	 and	 convinced	her	 to	 convert	 to	Shi’ism.136		Two	 years	 prior	 to	 Hanna’s	 conversion,	 her	 nephew,	 Hasyim	 (45	 years	old),	 also	 from	 a	 Sada	 family	 had	 converted	 to	 Shi’ism.	 Hasyim	 became	interested	 in	 Shi’ism	 when	 his	 uncle	 asked	 him	 to	 join	 a	 religious	 learning	forum	 in	 Jakarta	 in	 1993.	 Hasyim	 claimed	 that	 his	 conversion	 was	 a	 true	conversion	from	his	heart	and	not	the	result	of	merely	following	other	people’s	opinion.137	Two	years	 later,	Hasyim’s	cousin,	 Jailani	 (36	years	old),	 converted	to	Shi’ite	as	well,138	and	in	2006	Jailani’s	eldest	brother,	Sahid,	followed	suit.139.	As	these	examples	ilustrate,	conversion	to	Shi’ism	already	occured	before	the	1999-2002	conflicts.	However,	the	conflicts	became	an	important	moment	of	 conversion	 of	 greater	 numbers	 of	 Sunni	 Muslims	 of	 Ambon,	 especially	among	 those	 of	 Hadrami	 Sada	 origin.	 Besides	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 conflicts	themselves,	what	was	also	important	 in	this	respect	was	that	they	occured	in	the	same	period	of	transition	in	Indonesia	 from	the	New	Order	regime	to	the	reform	era,	which	allowed	open	Islamic	activism	in	the	public	sphere.	After	the	conflicts,	 Muslims	 in	 Ambon	 therefore	 came	 into	 contact	 with	 Wahhabism,	Shi’ism,	and	other	branches	of	Islamic	thought.	The	regime	change	allowed	the	establishment	 of	 Shi’ite	 institutions,	 be	 they	 local	 initiates	 or	 branches	 of	national	 organizations.	 Some	 Shi’ite	 converts	 no	 longer	 denied	 their	 Shi’ite	identity	 when	 I	 asked	 them,	 and	 claimed	 that	 they	 do	 not	 hide	 it,	 although	others	might	still	do	so.		The	leader	of	the	ABI	branch	in	Ambon,	my	Sada	informant	Abdurrahman	Assagaf	(see	chapter	2	pages	46-47)	claimed	that	he	was	much	inspired	by	the	Shi’ite	 teachings	 of	 his	 uncle,	 Ali	 Assagaf	 (d.2010),	who	was	 among	 the	 first	Shi’ite	 converts	 in	 Ambon.	 According	 to	 Abdurrahman	Assagaf	 his	 uncle	 had	become	a	Shi’ite	convert	together	with	his	relative	of	an	al-Hamid	family	when	they	went	 to	 Java	 (Jakarta)	 in	 the	beginning	of	 the	1990s.	Unlike	his	 relative	who	 decided	 to	 stay	 in	 Jakarta	 permanently,	 Abdurrahman	 Assagaf’s	 uncle	came	 back	 to	Ambon	 to	 preach	 Shi’ism	 to	 his	 family	members	 and	 relatives.	Abdurrahman	Assagaf’s	uncle	first	kept	his	Shi’ite	identity	secret,	but	after	the	communal	 conflicts	 he	 presented	 himself	 as	 Shi’ite	 in	 public.	 Abdurrahman	
                                                136	Interview	with	Hanna,	April	5,	2015.	137	Interview	with	Hasyim,	April	9,	2015.	138	Interview	with	Jailani,	April	9,	2015.	139	Interview	with	Sahid,	March	25,	2015	
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claimed	that	most	of	his	family	members	have	converted	to	Shi’ism.	Before	his	own	conversion,	he	was	motivated	to	search	for	true	Islam	and	he	found	it	in	Shi’ite	 teachings	 such	 as	 in	 prayer,	 fasting,	 and	 other	 forms	 of	 worship,	especially	 after	 his	 intensive	 discussion	with	 his	 uncle,	 Ali	 Assagaf,	who	 had	converted	to	Shi’ite	earlier.140	Another	Shi’ite	I	met	who	had	converted	after	the	conflicts	 is	Farhat	(35	years	old)	who	 is	 from	a	Sada	 family.	Farhat	was	exposed	 to	Shi’ism	through	his	uncle	in-law	(a	husband	of	his	father’s	elder’s	sister),	who	lives	in	Jakarta.	His	uncle-in-law	has	memorized	the	entire	Qur’an.		He	studied	in	an	al-Khairat	school	in	Ternate	and	later	at	another	school	in	Jakarta.	His	uncle	has	a	majelis	
ta’lim,	a	religious	forum,	and	is	involved	in	a	Shi’ite	foundation	called	Fatimah	Az-Zahra.	 Farhat	 himself	 became	 interested	 in	 learning	more	 about	 religious	matters	 after	 the	 conflicts,	 especially	 after	 the	 booming	 of	 religious	 thought	and	 ideas	 such	 as	 Wahhabism,	 Salafism	 and	 the	 Sunni-Shi’a	 controversy	 in	Ambon.	He	shared	his	confusion	about	these	different	views	with	his	uncle	in	Jakarta	 whom	 Farhat	 considered	 somebody	 with	 the	 adequate	 religious	knowledge	to	help	him.	The	explanation	that	his	uncle	gave	him	made	sense	to	him,	 especially	 when	 his	 uncle	 based	 his	 justifications	 on	 the	 Qur’an	 rather	than	on	the	Hadith	which	 for	him	is	deemed	to	be	corrupted	by	some	earlier	Muslims.	141		 The	 uncle	 in-law	 whom	 Farhat	 consulted	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 younger	brother	 of	Husain	 al-Habshi,	 founder	of	 a	 Shi’ite	 organization,	 IMI	 (Ikhwanul	Muslimin	 Indonesia,	 Indonesian	 Muslim	 Brotherhood).142		 Husain	 al-Habshi,	who	is	a	well-known	blind	habib	(religious	scholar/preacher	of	Sada	origin)	is	also	a	cousin	of	my	informant	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	head	of	the	branch	of	the	Rabita	of	Maluku.	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	 told	me	that	his	cousin,	Husain	al-Habshi	 was	 prisoned	 for	 his	 involvement	 of	 bombing	 Borobudur	 temple	 in	Central	 Java.143		He	 further	 claimed	 that	his	 cousin,	Husain	al-Habshi,	 and	Ali	Assagaf,	 Abdurrahman	 Assagaf’s	 uncle,	 were	 part	 of	 the	 same	 religious	learning	 forum	 (Shi’ite	 forum),	 and	 went	 to	 a	 religious	 forum	 of	 Husain	 al-Habshi	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 YAPI.	 According	 to	Hasan	Bin	 Syech	Abubakar	 his	cousin,	Husain	al-Habshi	head	of	the	IMI,	sometimes	comes	to	Ambon	to	visit	his	relatives	and	is	then	invited	to	deliver	sermon,	such	as	in	 ‘ashura	festivity,	held	by	the	orphanage	foundation	Melati	al-Khairat.	As	 the	 examples	 above	 show,	 mobility,	 particularly	 within	 Indonesia	 is	part	of	 the	 life-style	of	many	Hadramis.	Even	before	 the	1999-2002	conflicts,	
                                                140	Interview	with	Abdurrahman	Assagaf,	March	25,	2015.	141	Interview	with	Farhat,	March	26,	2015.		142	The	Ikhwanul	Muslimin	Indonesia	(IMI)	that	was	established	in	around	2001	should	not	be	confused	with	Ikhwanul	Muslimin	(Muslim	Brotherhood),	an	Islamist	movement	in	 Egypt	 founded	 by	Hasan	 al-Banna	 in	 1928	which	 inspired	 some	Muslim	 groups	 in	Indonesia	to	establish	a	political	party,	PKS,	in	1999	(see	Ufen	2009).		143	Interview	with	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar,	October	4,	2014.	
Chapter	5:	Religious	Developments	within	the	Hadrami	Community	of	Ambon	
184		
some	Hadrami	members	moved	in	and	out	of	Ambon	and	other	places.	Most	of	my	informants	told	me	that	they	have	family	members	and	relatives	scattered	around	Maluku	and	beyond.	There	are	various	reasons	for	such	mobility:	a	job,	marriage,	education,	etc	(see	chapter	3	on	family	distribution	in	Ambon).	From	what	I	have	observed,	most	of	the	earliest	Shi’ite	converts	among	the	Hadrami	community	 in	 Ambon	 are	 those	whose	mobility	 between	Ambon	 and	 Java	 is	high.	This	allowed	them	to	come	into	contact	with	Shi’ite	 ideas	and	teachings	when	 they	 went	 to	 Java	 for	 temporary	 or	 longer	 visits	 or	 to	 live	 there	permanently.	Those	who	converted	to	Shi’ism,	then,	have	actively	proselytized	Shi’ism	 among	 their	 own	 family	 members	 and	 relatives	 in	 Ambon.	 In	 this	regard,	propagation	of	Shi’ism	in	Indonesia	and	of	Ambon	in	particular	can	be	attributed	 to	 the	 mobility	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 community,	 especially	 from	 Sada	families,	in	the	diaspora.	The	aforementioned	examples	also	indicate	that	kinship	ties	have	played	a	major	role	in	Shi’ite	conversion	in	Ambon,	especially	among	those	Hadramis	of	 Sada	 background.	 Nonetheless,	 some	 Shi’ite	 converts	 have	 non-Hadrami	backgrounds.	 Their	 conversion	 is	 often	 the	 result	 of	 their	 colleagual	connections,	especially	with	Shi’ite	Hadramis.	I	noticed	that	Shi’ite	followers	of	non-Hadrami	origin	work	in	the	same	workplace	as	their	colleagues	who	had	converted	 to	 Shi’ism	 earlier.	 Their	 day	 to	 day	 encounters	 with	 Shi’ite	colleagues	in	the	workplace	and	also	their	shared	interest	in	Islamic	teachings	led	 those	 of	 non-Hadrami	 backgrounds	 to	 convert	 to	 Shi’ism	 or	 to	 become	sympathizers	of	Shi’ism.		A	 case	 in	point	 is	 the	non-Hadrami	Rifai	 (38	years	old),	who	works	 in	a	pearl	handicract	business.	Rifai	converted	to	Shi’ism	in	2011.	He	told	me	that	he	was	 engaged	 in	 discussions	 about	 Shi’ism	with	 his	 Shi’ite	 colleague.	 Rifai	had	read	about	a	story	of	the	murder	of	the	Prophet’s	grandson,	Husain.	After	discussing	 this	with	 his	 colleague,	 Rifai	 found	 that	 teachings	 from	 the	 Sunni	version	of	 the	 story	 that	 he	had	previously	 learned	were	 less	 convincing.	He	then	 became	 interested	 in	 becoming	 a	 Shi’ite	 follower.144	On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	conversion	 stories	 they	 told	 me,	 Rifai	 and	 other	 Shi’ite	 converts	 in	 Ambon	share	 similarities	 with	 other	 Shi’ite	 converts	 in	 Indonesia.	 They	 all	 forward	reasons	 for	 their	 conversion	 related	 to	 what	 they	 perceived	 as	 correct	 and	reasonable	 Islamic	 teachings	 in	 four	doctrinal	 concepts:	 justice	 in	 leadership,	position	of	reason,	 ijtihad	or	 independent	endevour	 to	 formulate	 Islamic	 law,	and	marja’	al-taqlid	or	religious	authority	to	be	followed	(Zulkifli	2013,	47-8).	Today,	 Shi’ite	 followers	 in	Ambon	 can	 basically	 be	 categorized	 into	 two	groups.	 The	 first	 group	 consists	 of	 people	 active	 in	 academia.	 Unlike	 the	situation	 in	 Java,	 where	 Shi’ism	 has	 attracted	 people	 working	 in	 secular	campuses,	 in	 Ambon	 it	 is	 predominantly	 people	 with	 a	 higher	 education	 in	
                                                144	Interview	with	Rifai,	May	02,	2015.	
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Islamic	studies	or	IAIN	who	are	attracted	to	Shi’ism.	The	people	who	become	sympathizers	 or	 converts	 to	 Shi’ism	 are	 predominantly	 those	 working	 as	lecturers.	 These	 people	 are	 also	 called	ustadh	 by	 students	 or	 local	 people	 as	they	 specialize	 in	 an	 Islamic	 field.	 This	 campus	 circle	 was	 set	 up	 by	 my	informant	Umar	Attamimy’s	brother,	Muhammad	Attamimy,	who	led	the	IAIN	around	 2006-2008.	 	 The	 propagation	 of	 Shi’ism	 among	 members	 of	 the	campus	 circle	was	most	 intensive	 during	Attamimy’s	 leadership.	 Afterwards,	discussions	 within	 the	 campus	 circle	 have	 been	 limited	 to	 Attamimy’s	 close	relatives	and	his	 loyal	colleagues	who	have	a	more	traditionalist	background.	Religious	 discussions	 or	 gatherings	 are	 usually	 held	 in	 the	 leader’s	 house.	During	my	2014-2015	fieldwork,	Muhammad	Attamimy	was	rarely	 in	Ambon	as	he	was	in	charge	of	leading	the	waqf	department	in	the	Ministry	of	Religious	Affairs	in	Jakarta.		When	I	attended	a	religious	gathering	in	Attamimy’s	house	in	January	28,	2015,	 I	 only	 met	 his	 close	 colleague	 of	 non-Hadrami	 origin	 Saif,	 and	Attamimy’s	 wife	 and	 nephew.	 Saif	 (50	 years	 old)	 told	 me	 that	 religious	gatherings	 in	 Attamimy’s	 house	 are	 attended	 by	 a	 few	 people.	 Saif	 himself	stated	 that	 he	 is	member	 of	 a	 branch	 of	 the	NU,	 the	 largest	 national	 Islamic	organization	with	traditionalist	background,	but	he	also	stated	that	he	is	open	to	 any	 kind	 of	 Islamic	 thoughts	 including	 Shi’ism.	 Saif	 also	 told	 me	 that	 his	daughter	studied	at	the	YAPI	in	Bangil	and	then	continued	her	studies	to	Qum	in	 2012-2014.	 	 During	 Attamimi’s	 leadership	 in	 the	 IAIN,	 he	 created	 the	‘Iranian	Corner’	as	a	reading	room	(a	small	library	on	Iranian	culture,	including	Shi’ism)	on	the	campus.		When	I	visited	this	Iranian	Corner	at	the	IAIN	campus	during	my	fieldwork	 in	2015,	students	 there	seemed	to	 lack	 interest	 in	using	this	Iranian	corner	room	as	there	was	hardly	any	visitor	in	the	room.	The	second	group	of	Shi’ites	consist	of	people	from	outside	academia.	 In	the	 beginning	 this	 group	 consisted	mainly	 of	 individuals	 from	 Sada	Hadrami	families.	Later	some	non-Hadrami	converts	 joined	the	group,	especially	when	regular	 Islamic	 rituals	 were	 initiated.	 After	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 ABI	 of	Indonesia	 in	 2010/11,	 the	 branch	 of	 ABI	 in	Ambon	was	 founded	 in	 2013	 by	this	 group.	 My	 informant	 Abdurrahman	 Assagaf	 is	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	 ABI	branch	of	Maluku.	He	told	me	that	the	ABI	in	Maluku	has	become	an	umbrella	organization	 for	 the	Shi’ite	community	 in	Ambon	and	Maluku	 in	general.	 	 	 Its	legal	 establishment	 serves	 as	 a	 means	 of	 obtaining	 social	 recognition	 and	acceptance.	According	to	my	Sada	 informant	Husna,	a	 local	Shi’ite	 foundation	called	al-‘Adl	was	established	by	Faisal,	a	Shi’ite	convert	of	Javanese	origin	who	used	 to	work	 at	 the	 IAIN	 campus.	 This	 so-called	 al-‘Adl	 foundation	 received	books	 donated	 by	 a	 Shi’ite	 foundation	 called	 al-Huda	 foundation	 in	 Jakarta.	Unfortunately,	the	donated	books	were	not	well	managed.	Since	the	founder	of	this	 al-‘Adl	 foundation	moved	 to	West	 Java,	 the	 foundation	 no	 longer	 exists.	Yet,	the	founder’s	younger	brother	has	joined	a	branch	of	ABI	organization	in	
Chapter	5:	Religious	Developments	within	the	Hadrami	Community	of	Ambon	
186		
Ambon.145	Apart	 from	 that,	 the	 current	 leader	 of	 the	Nurul	 Tsaqalain	 school,	Jamaludin	 Bugis,	 is	 also	 part	 of	 the	 ABI	 structure,	 where	 he	 occupies	 the	position	 of	 secretary	 of	 the	 ABI	 of	 Maluku.	 The	 ABI	 in	 Ambon	 organizes	 a	weekly	Islamic	learning	forum	and	some	annual	festivities,	such	as	‘ashura.	For	instance,	 every	 Tuesday	 evening	 the	 group	 organizes	 a	 religious	 meeting	where	Qur’anic	exegesis	is	provided	in	the	house	of	one	of	the	members	after	the	 sunset	 (maghrib)	 prayer	 (see	 figure	 5.5).	 The	 sessions	 are	 attended	 by	eight	 to	 twelve	 people.	 Due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 local	 religious	 Shi’ite	 preachers	(scholars),	 the	 group	 usually	 receives	 help	 from	 central	 ABI	 organization	 in	Jakarta	 by	 conducting	 this	 kind	 of	 interactive	 distant-learning.	 When	 the	participants	are	ready	to	 listen	to	the	preaching,	 the	preacher	from	Jakarta	 is	called	 in	 via	 cellphone.	 The	 preacher	 then	 teaches	 the	 participants	 in	accordance	 to	 a	 specific	 theme/topic	 he	 has	 announced	 in	 advance.	 The	cellphone	is	put	on	loudspeaker,	which	is	then	amplified,	so	that	the	preacher’s	voice	 can	 be	 heard	 by	 all	 the	 participants	 who	 listen	 to	 his	 lesson.	 The	participants	can	also	ask	him	questions.		Teachers	are	not	always	the	same	and	regularly	rotate.	In	the	distant	learning	session	that	I	attended,	the	teacher	was	a	Sada	from	an	al-Hamid	family,	who	is	a	relative	of	my	informants	Husna	and	her	cousins.		
	Figure	5.5:	Distant	Shi’ite	teaching	on	Qur’anic	exegesis	held	in		a	Shi’ite	follower’s	house	in	Batumerah	(photographed	by	the	author)		The	two	groups	of	Shi’ites	in	Ambon	have	different	characteristics.	The	second	group	 consisting	 of	 non-academics	 focuses	 on	 the	 strict	 application	 of	 Ja’fari	
                                                145	Interview	with	Hasyim,	May	3,	2015.	
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school	 of	 thought.	 The	 Campus	 group	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 claims	 to	 take	 a	moderate	 position	 by	 accomodating	 both	 Sunni	 and	 Shi’ite	 teachings.	 Their	downplaying	 their	 affiliation	 to	 Shi’ism	may	 well	 be	 related	 to	 the	 minority	position	 of	 the	 Shi’ite	 community	 in	 Indonesia	 in	 general	 and	 Ambon	 in	particular.	 In	 general,	 the	 term	 Shi’ism	 carries	 negative	 connotations	 in	Indonesia	 for	 its	 direct	 reference	 to	 Iran’s	 official	 religious	 thought	 (Assegaf	2015).	The	 diversity	 of	 the	 Shi’ite	 community	 in	 Ambon,	 however,	 has	 not	resulted	in	the	strong	polarization	of	organizational	affiliations	that	one	might	see	elsewhere.	 In	 Java,	 the	difference	between	 the	 two	Shi’ite	 types	 is	 shown	through	 their	 different	 affiliations	 to	 the	 two	 Shi’ite	 organizations:	 IJABI	 and	ABI.	 In	 Ambon,	 the	 outside	 academia	 group	 sticks	 structurally	 to	 the	 ABI	organization,	while	the	campus	group	keeps	its	connection	to	the	ustadh	circle	without	formally	declaring	its	membership	to	the	ABI	organization.		
3.3.3 Neo-Traditionalism	The	position	of	traditionalist	groups	within	the	Hadrami	community	in	Ambon	today	 is	 revitalized	 through	 a	 renewed	 connection	 between	 Hadramaut	 and	Indonesia.	 Unlike	 traditionalist	 Hadramis	 in	 Java	 who	 were	 reconnected	 to	Hadramaut	in	the	mid	1990s	(Knysh	2001;	Alatas	2014),	Ambonese	Hadramis	have	been	in	contact	again	with	their	forefathers’	homeland	only	since	the	last	ten	years,	mainly	 following	the	1999-2002	communal	conflicts.	This	renewed	connection	has	paved	the	way	for	interested	Hadramis	to	search	for	religious	knowledge	 in	 Hadramaut.	 Some	 of	 my	 informants	 have	 graduated	 from	traditional	Islamic	schools	in	Hadramaut,	and	upon	their	return	to	Ambon	they	have	 committed	 themselves	 to	 Islamic	 preaching,	 da’wa,	 by	 transmitting	religious	 knowledge	 and	 traditions	 from	 Hadramaut	 to	 other	 Muslims	 in	Ambon.		An	 example	 is	my	 informant	Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 (see	 chapter	 3	pages	 72-73),	 a	 young	 Sada	 preacher	 who	 established	 the	 Ar-Rahmah	foundation,	which	 is	 concerned	with	da’wa	 based	on	 traditionalist	notions	of	Islam	 in	 Hadramaut.	 Established	 in	 2012,	 the	 Ar-Rahmah	 was	 officially	launched	on	February	14,	2013.	Unfortunately,	I	was	not	able	to	participate	in	its	 launching.	 Drawing	 inspiration	 from	 his	 teacher	 Habib	 Umar	 in	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	in	Hadramaut,	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid	established	the	foundation	in	order	 to	spread	 the	main	 teachings	of	his	 teacher.	The	 influence	of	Dar	al-Mustafa’s	 Islamic	 education	 in	 Hadramaut	 on	 Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid’s	religious	life	and	missionary	work	is	enormous.146	Under	his	leadership	the	ar-
                                                146	Al-Hamid’s	 journey	to	Islamic	education	to	the	Hadramaut,	and	how	traditionalism	combined	with	Tariqa	‘Alawiyya	is	revitalized	through	the	kind	of	connections	that	al-
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Rahmah	 foundation	set	up	a	religious	 forum,	majelis,	which	delivers	 informal	teachings,	 following	the	 Islamic	 teachings	 in	Hadramaut.	Apart	 from	informal	religious	teachings,	the	ar-Rahmah	has	planned	to	establish	a	religious	school,	which	 is	more	 or	 less	 governed	 by	 the	 same	 rules	 and	 teachings	 as	 in	many	traditional	 Islamic	 schools	 in	 Hadramaut,	 especially	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa.	 This	means	that	the	school	curriculum	will	only	consist	of	religious	subjects.	The	ar-Rahmah	also	offers	religious	travel	tours.	It	offers	not	only	include	pilgrimage	tours	 to	 Mecca	 for	 the	 mandatory	 hajj	 or	 the	 voluntary	 umra,	 but	 also	 to	shrines	in	Hadramaut	(see	further	chapter	6	pages	228-229).	Apart	 from	 his	 activities	 as	 a	 preacher,	 together	 with	 his	 wife	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 set	 up	 a	 regular	 Islamic	 study	 circle	 that	 focuses	 on	 learning	 basic	Hadith	texts	and	Shafi’i	Islamic	jurisprudence.	During	my	fieldwork,	I	attended	both	meetings	 organized	 by	 him	 and	 those	 of	 his	wife.	 The	 aim	of	 the	 study	circles	 is	 to	 train	 male	 and	 female	 Ambonese	 Muslims	 of	 all	 generations	 to	cultivate	religious	values	(see	figure	5.6).		
	Figure	5.6:		A	Hadith	teaching	in	an-Nur	mosque	(on	the	left)	and	a	religious	ritual	reciting	burda,	poems	to	the	Prophet,	in	the	ar-Rahmah	building	(on	the	right),	(photographed	by	the	author)		The	 activities	 of	 Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 and	 his	 wife	 demonstrate	 that	religious	 scholarship	 in	Hadramaut	 is	 a	 salient	 source	not	 only	 for	 obtaining	religious	authority	 among	 the	Hadramis	 from	 traditionalist	backgrounds,	but	also	 of	 maintaining	 religious	 authority	 among	 the	 broader	 Muslim	communities	 in	 general.	 This	 religious	 knowledge,	 borrowing	 the	 words	 of	Piere	Bourdieu,	comprises	‘a	field	of	cultural	reproduction	within	which	those	
                                                                                                              Hamid	 has	 with	 Hadramaut	 will	 be	 described	 further	 in	 chapter	 6	 on	 the	 section	 of	religious	revitalization.		
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who	monopolise	the	specific	cultural	capital	devise	strategies	of	safeguarding	and	perpetuating	their	command’	(Bourdieu	cited	in	Ephrat	and	Hatina	2013,	11).	 The	 main	 reason	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 neo-traditionalism	 in	 Ambon	 is	 to	protect	the	identity	of	the	Sada	group	from	other	ideological	influences.	Within	the	 context	 of	 the	 expansion	 of	 Wahhabism,	 neo-Salafism	 and	 Shi’ism	 in	Indonesia	since	the	1980s	onwards,	the	Sunni	community	of	Sada	background	has	tried	to	reformulate	the	definition	of	the	community	of	 ‘Alawi	(Sada)	as	a	community	 imbued	with	 a	 Sunni	 ideology.	 In	 one	 of	my	 interviews	with	 the	founder	of	Ar-Rahmah,	for	instance,	he	showed	me	a	video	containing	a	lecture	in	 Arabic	 by	 Habib	 Alkaff	 from	 Solo,	 Central	 Java.	 The	 lecture	 discussed	 the	Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya	 (a	 Sufi	 path	which	 is	 ascribed	 to	 ‘Alawi,	 descendants	of	 the	Prophet	 from	Hadramaut)	 and	 its	meaning.	 The	 founder	 of	 Ar-Rahmah	 used	the	video	 to	underscore	his	 view	 that	 the	 status	of	 ‘Alawi	 can	be	maintained	only	 through	 following	 the	 old	 tariqa,	 a	 religious	 way	 practiced	 by	 his	ancestors	who	adopted	the	Shafi’i	school	of	thought,	loving	the	Prophet	and	his	descendants,	and	performing	religious	rituals,	such	as	the	maulid	(celebration	of	 the	 Prophet’s	 birthday),	as	well	 as	 the	 practice	 of	kafa’a	marriage.	 On	 the	basis	 of	 the	 same	 video	 he	 claimed	 that	members	 of	 the	 Sada	 or	 ‘Alawi	 (the	Prophet’s	descendants)	can	no	longer	categorized	as	part	of	the	‘Alawi	if	they	follow	 other	ways	 (schools	 of	 thought),	 such	 as	 Salafism	 or	 Shi’ism.	 The	 Ar-Rahmah	 founder	 thus	 claimed	 that	 many	 Sada	 people	 have	 actually	 left	 the	‘Alawi	tradition	by	becoming	followers	of	Wahhabism	or	Shi’ism.147		What	the	statement	 of	my	 informant	 hints	 at,	 is	 that	 the	 revitalization	 of	 traditionalist	Islam	 is	 a	 means	 to	 protext	 an	 orthodoxy	 of	 the	 Sada’s	 identity	 from	 other	Islamic	 ‘threats’	such	as	Salafism,	Wahhabism,	and	Shi’ism,	as	well	as	being	a	means	of	maintaining	religious	authority	of	the	Sada	group	within	the	Hadrami	community	 in	 particular	 and	 the	 Muslim	 society	 in	 general.	 	 Al-Hamid’s	statement	also	shows	that	the	reformulation	of	such	a	distinct	cultural	identity,	and	 that	 of	 Sada	 identity	 in	 particular,	 does	 not	merely	 depend	 on	 claims	 of	descent	in	terms	of	ethnicity,	but	also	other	cultural	content	such	as	a	religious	ideology	as	a	way	of	boundary	maintenance.		
3.4 Religious	Groups	and	Overlapping	Religious	Practices		As	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 past	 the	Hadrami	 community	 in	 Ambon	 today	 has	 become	 more	 heterogeneous	 in	terms	of	 their	 Islamic	views	and	practices.	The	Hadramis	can	be	divided	 into	several	 Islamic	 groups,	 each	 of	 which,	 to	 some	 extent,	 has	 different	 Islamic	beliefs	 and	 practices,	 ranging	 from	 Sunnism	 to	 Shi’ism,	 traditionalism	 to	
                                                147	Interview	with	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid,	January	3,	2015.		
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reformism,	 and	 they	 can	 be	 anything	 between	 moderate	 and	 conservative.	However,	 and	 within	 the	 Indonesian	 context	 this	 may	 well	 be	 specific	 to	Ambon,	 as	 I	 will	 argue,	 these	 groups	 do	 not	 operate	 completely	 separately.	Some	 activities	 are	 attended	 by	 members	 of	 different	 religious	 affiliations.	Below,	 I	 take	 two	 examples	 of	 how	 different	 religious	 groups	 may	 practice	similar	rituals,	which	seem	to	contradict	to	their	doctrinal	teachings.			
3.4.1 Maulid	Celebration	A	maulid	is	celebration	of	the	birthdays	of	exemplary	role	models	or	religious	figures	 in	 Islamic	 community,	 such	 as	 saints	 or	 the	 Prophet.	 Among	 popular	
maulid	 celebrations	 in	 Indonesia	 is	maulid	al-nabi	or	 the	 commemoration	 of	the	Prophet	Muhammad’s	birthday	held	on	the	twelfth	of	 the	month	Rabi’	al-Awwal	 or	 the	 third	 month	 of	 the	 Islamic	 calendar.	 The	 celebration	 may	comprise	 different	 activities,	 such	 as	 participating	 in	 colourful	 processions;	reciting	Qur’anic	passages	as	well	as	stories	from	the	Prophet’s	biography	and	poems	 extolling	 his	 virtues;	 giving	 alms	 to	 the	 poor;	 attending	 Sufi	 dhikr	ceremonies;	 eating	 festive	 meals,	 organizing	 fairs,	 singing,	 and	 dancing	(Schusman	 1998,	 1;	 Kaptein	 1993).	 Muslims	 around	 the	 world,	 including	Indonesia,	 organize	maulid	 festivities	with	 their	 own	 specificities	 (Sila	 2015,	91-	106).		In	 Ambon,	 maulid	 celebrations	 are	 predominantly	 popular	 among	traditionalist	 Sunni	 and	 among	 Shi’ite	 followers.	 Traditionalists	 and	 Shi’ite	celebrate	 the	maulid	 in	 order	 to	 remember	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Prophet	 as	 the	messenger	 of	 Islam	 but	 also	 to	 take	 him	 as	 a	 role	 model	 for	 being	 a	 good	Muslim.	 For	 those	with	 Sada	 background,	 performing	 the	maulid	 is	 a	way	 of	tracing	 their	 origin,	 and	 of	 reminding	 them	 to	 follow	 the	 path	 of	 their	exemplary	ancestor.	Maulid	celebrations	are	not	accepted	by	Salafis.	However,	they	 are	 not	 totally	 condemned	 by	 some	 local	 Salafis	 in	 Ambon.	 This	 is	especially	true	among	those	with	reformist-modernist	inclinations.	Reformist-modernist	 Salafis	 celebrate	 the	maulid,	 albeit	with	 a	 different	 emphasis	 than	traditionalists	and	Shi’ites.	My	 informant	 Hadi	 Basalamah	 argued	 that	 the	 maulid	 celebration	 is	allowed	as	long	as	it	is	not	understood	as	a	religious	teaching,	but	rather	as	a	local	tradition.	He	further	emphasized	the	social	function	of	the	celebration	as	a	 way	 of	 binding	 social	 ties	 among	 Islamic	 members.	 Another	 non-Sada	informant,	 sixty-eight-year-old	 Yayah,	 told	me	 that	 she	 has	 personal	 reasons	for	 liking	 to	 attend	 the	 maulid	 festivities.	 She	 reasoned	 that	 the	 maulid	celebration	is	a	means	of	freeing	herself	from	the	daily	routines	as	a	household	wife	and	to	engage	more	 in	socializing	outside	 the	house,	such	as	 to	meet	up	
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with	 friends	 and	 have	 chit-chats. 148	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 Yayah’s	husband	 is	 a	 neo-Salafi	 follower	 who	 has	 a	 stricter	 view	 on	 the	 maulid	celebration,	 which	 he	 regards	 as	 religious	 innovation,	 bid’a.	 He	 does	 not	participate	 in	maulid	 celebrations.	 Other	 informants,	 Said	 Muzakkir	 Assagaf	(43	years	old	Sada)	and	Fahri	al-Kathiri	(43	years	old	non-Sada),	leaders	of	the	PKS	 party	 in	 Ambon	 (see	 chapter	 3	 page	 86),	 similarly	 told	 me	 when	 I	interviewed	 them	 in	 their	 office	 in	 the	 People’s	 Representative	 Council	 in	Karangpanjang	of	Ambon	that	Ambonese	Muslims	are	generally	traditionalists,	even	many	of	those	who	are	affiliated	to	reformist-modernist	organizations	or	even	to	such	an	Islamist-inspired	party	as	PKS.149	My	 observations	 during	 religious	 practices	 in	 Ambon	 reconfirm	 the	suggestion	 that	Muslims	who	 hold	 reformist-modernist	 notions	 in	 Ambon	 in	general	are	more	 tolerant	vis-a-vis	 local	practices.	Figure	5.7	shows	a	maulid	celebration	 held	 on	 the	 campus	 of	 the	 State	 Institute	 of	 Islamic	 Studies	 of	Ambon,	IAIN,	which	was	attended	by	both	traditionalist	and	modernist	staff.	In	this	regard,	my	informants	Basalamah	and	Yayah	are	not	alone;	other	Muslims	of	 non-Hadrami	 origin	with	 reformist-modernist	 notions	 have	 similar	 views.	The	reformist-modernist	Salafis’	participation	in	celebrating	the	maulid	are	in	line	with	 dominant	 Islamic	 practices	 among	Ambonese	Muslims,	who	have	 a	long	 tradition	 of	 engaging	 with	 a	 form	 of	 cultural	 Islam	 or	 Islam	 adat	(customary	Islam),	that	is	adaptive	to	local	culture	or	mixed	with	existing	local	tradition	(Cooley	1962;	Bartels	1977;	Bräuchler	2010).		
	Figure	5.7:	Maulid	celebration	at	the	IAIN	campus	(photographed	by	the	author)		 	




3.4.2 ‘Ashura	Celebration	Another	example	of	how	in	Ambon	Muslims	from	various	denominations	come	together	 to	 celebrate	 is	 ‘ashura,	 the	 commemoration	 day	 of	 the	 murder	 in	Karbala	of	Husain,	one	of	the	two	sons	of	the	Prophet’s	daughter	Fatimah	and	her	husband	on	tenth	day	of	the	Muslim	month	of	Muharram.	Although	‘ashura	is	a	well-known	holy	day	 for	 the	Shi’ite	community,	not	only	members	of	 the	Shi’ite	community	observe	the	celebration,	but	some	traditionalist	Muslims	do	as	well.	 In	 this	case,	Hadramis	of	 traditionalist	background	 in	Ambon	usually	organize	an‘ashura	celebration	in	the	office	of	the	Rabita	and	Melati	al-Khairat.	For	 these	 traditionalists,	 especially	 for	 those	 with	 Sada	 origin,	 celebrating	
‘ashura	 is	 not	 only	 commemorating	 the	 death	 of	Husain,	 but	 also	 expressing	one’s	 gratitude	 to	God	 for	 saving	His	messengers	who	preceded	 the	 Prophet	Muhammad.	Unlike	Shi’ite	followers	do	for	‘ashura,	the	traditionalist	attendees	of	this	celebration	do	not	wear	black	clothes.	In	contrast,	the	Shi’ite	followers	celebrate	‘ashura	in	order	to	express	their	grievance	over	the	unjust	treatment	and	murder	of	Husain	by	the	Sunni	ruler	regime	at	the	time.	Their	grievance	is	symbolized	by	wearing	black	clothes	and	by	weeping	as	they	pray	for	Husain	and	 others	 who	 in	 their	 view	 died	 as	 martyrs.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 not	 the	celebration	 of	 ‘ashura	 itself	 that	 marks	 an	 ideological	 boundary	 among	Muslims	in	Ambon,	but	rather	the	way	the	celebration	is	performed,	related	to	different	socio-religious	collective	memories	of	the	formative	years	of	Islam.			That	 the	boundaries	 between	Muslims	of	 different	 affiliations	blur	 or	 at	least	 prove	 to	 be	 porous	 also	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 diversity	 of	 opinions	 I	observed	 among	 traditionalist	 Hadramis	 with	 a	 Sada	 background	 about	Shi’ism.	 For	 instance,	 I	 noted	 a	 contrast	 between	 founders	 of	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 and	 ar-Rahmah.	 The	 founder	 of	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 organizes	 a	celebration	of	 ‘ashura	each	year	and	is	very	keen	on	emphasizing	her	identity	as	 a	 member	 of	 ahl	 al-bayt	 (the	 Prophet’s	 family)	 rather	 than	 criticizing	doctrinal	 difference	 between	 Sunnite	 and	 Shi’ite.	 The	 Melati	 al-Khairat	sometimes	 invites	 a	 Shi’ite	 preacher	 to	 give	 sermon	 during	 the	 ‘ashura	celebration.	 This	 preacher	 is	 called	 Husain	 al-Habshi,	 head	 of	 the	 IMI,	Indonesian	 Muslim	 Brotherhood,	 a	 Shi’ite	 affiliated	 organization	 (see	 page	183).	 The	 founder	 of	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 thus	 tries	 to	 accommodate	 both	Sunni	and	Shi’ite	religious	rituals.	For	instance,	I	attended	a	religious	gathering	for	women	conducted	by	 the	Melati	al-Khairat	on	April	28,	2013.	Held	 in	 the	afternoon	(13.30),	the	religious	ritual	consisted	of	reciting	prayers	called	asma	
al-husna150	and	jaushan	kabir151.	The	former	is	a	popular	prayer	among	Sunni,	
                                                150	Asma	al-husna	 literally	means	‘good	names’.	It	refers	to	the	prayer	that	contains	99	names	attributed	to	God.	The	prayer	is	common	among	traditionalist	Sunni	Muslims.		
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while	 the	 latter	 is	 popular	 in	 Shi’ite	 religious	 practices.	 Although	 the	participants	brought	small	prayer	books	themselves,	the	Melati	al-Khairat	also	provided	 some	 copies	 for	 participants	who	did	 not	 bring	 or	 have	 the	 prayer	books.	As	I	noticed,	the	prayer	book	on	this	 jaushan	kabir	prayer	is	published	by	Fatimah	Azzahra	foundation	in	Jakarta,	a	publisher	which	is	affiliated	with	the	Shi’ite	group,	ABI.	On	the	other	hand,	the	founder	of	ar-Rahmah	also	attempts	to	strengthen	traditionalist	 notions	 of	 Islam	 based	 on	 Shafi’i	 school	 of	 thought	 and	 Tariqa	‘Alawiyya	 teachings	 from	Hadramaut.	 In	 this	 regard,	he	 forbids	any	practices	related	 to	 Shi’ite	 practices	 that	 in	 his	 view	 cannot	 be	 incorporated	 in	 local	religious	practices	that	have	been	performed	on	Ambon	for	generations.						
4. Hadramis’	Contribution	to	Islamic	Development	of	Ambon	
This	section	discusses	the	contribution	of	Hadramis	to	Islamic	development	in	Ambon,	 focusing	 on	 their	 role	 in	 Islamic	 education	 and	 Muslim	 community	building.	This	discussion	aims	to	describe	the	importance	of	religious	identity	as	 a	 cultural	 characteristic	 in	 bridging	 ethnic	 differences	 and	 bringing	 social	integration	between	the	Hadramis	and	other	Muslim	communities	of	Ambon	in	general.			
4.1 Islamic	Missionary	Activities	and	Muslim	Community	Building		Christians	 and	 Muslims	 constitute	 the	 two	 major	 religious	 communities	 in	Ambon	today.	However,	much	of	the	history	of	Islam	in	Ambon	is	yet	unknown.		There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 concerning	 details	 of	 proselytization,	 such	 as:	date,	actor,	denomination,	and	process.	Islam	in	Ambon	can	be	traced	back	to	the	 late	 fifteenth	 century	 just	 before	 an	 arrival	 of	 the	 Portuguese	 (Andaya	1991).	 It	 was	 competing	 with	 Christianity	 in	 converting	 many	 local	 pagans	during	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 (Broersma	 1936,	 31-32;	 Chauvel	 1990).	Some	historical	scholars	characterize	Ambonese	Muslims	as	syncretic	Muslims,	combining	 local	 customs	 with	 Islamic	 practices	 (Broersma	 1936,	 32;	 Cooley	1962;	Bartels	1977).		In	this	regard,	the	Hadramis,	who	massively	migrated	to	Maluku	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries	(William	Clarence-Smith	 1998;	 Roy	 Ellen	 1996	&	 2003),	 came	 to	Ambon	when	 Islam	had	 been	already	 proselytized.	 As	 I	 mentioned	 in	 an	 earlier	 chapter,	 although	 their	
                                                                                                              151	Jaushan	 kabir	 literally	 means	 ‘steel	 plate’	 or	 mail.	 It	 is	 the	 name	 of	 a	 prayer	 that	contains	1000	names	and	attributes	of	God.	The	prayer	is	said	to	have	been	taught	by	Gabriel	 to	Muhammad	 in	 his	 battle	 as	 a	 protection	 from	 injuries	 in	war.	 In	 Shi’a	 the	prayer/supplication	is	an	essential	part	in	Shi’a	religious	rituals	(Kose	2006).			
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migration	was	 obviously	motivated	 by	 economic	 reasons,	 Islamic	missionary	work	may	well	have	been	their	concern	too.		The	 motivation	 to	 engage	 in	 Islamic	 missionary	 work	 was	 most	 likely	linked	to	the	wish	to	protect	the	Hadramis’	own	religious	identity	as	Muslims.	Besides,	it	was	also	interwoven	with	the	socio-political	context	of	Ambon	town	at	 the	 time;	 Christianity	was	 dominant	 during	 the	 colonial	 era	 (Knaap	 1991;	Chauvel	1990).	The	minority	position	of	the	Muslims	and	the	fear	for	Christian	missionaries	 have	 been	 reflected	 in	 most	 of	 my	 informants’	 narratives.	 	 My	informant	 Hasan	 bin	 Syech	 Abubakar,	 for	 example,	 told	 me	 that	 one	 of	 his	great-grandfathers	came	to	Ambon	in	order	to	become	a	religious	teacher	at	a	special	 request	 of	 the	 already	 settled	 Hadrami	 people	 who	 were	 concerned	about	the	lack	of	Islamic	teachers.	The	need	to	protect	the	religious	identity	of	the	 Hadrami	 community	 and	 the	 broader	Muslim	 population	 in	 general	 was	thus	part	of	the	Hadramis’	main	concerns.	In	 order	 to	 achieve	 their	 religious	 missionary	 work	 effectively,	 the	Hadramis	 have	 established	modern	 Islamic	 schools	 since	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	twentieth	century.	Through	the	establishment	of	the	al-Hilal	schools	and	other	previously	 initiated	 Islamic	 schools,	 Hadramis	 have	 contributed	 to	 providing	basic	Islamic	education	for	young	Muslim	generations	in	Ambon.	 	By	building	Islamic	schools,	they	have	also	contributed	to	(re)	production	of	local	religious	teachers	 and	 scholars.	 According	 to	 my	 informants,	 in	 former	 times	 most	Muslims	 in	 Ambon	 town	 sent	 their	 children	 to	 the	 al-Hilal	 schools.	 Many	graduates	have	become	leading	religious	figures	in	society.	My	informant	Hadi	Basalamah,	who	has	occupied	a	leading	position	in	the	al-Hilal,	is	a	graduate	of	the	al-Hilal	 school	himself.	He	gave	me	several	names	of	 the	 school’s	 alumni,	not	all	from	Hadrami	origin,	who	have	become	prominent	religious	clerics	and	leaders	in	Ambon.	In	 other	 aspects,	 the	 Hadramis	 have	 contributed	 to	 providing	 an	 equal	access	 to	 Islamic	 literacy	 for	 men	 and	 women.	 Gender	 equality	 in	 Islamic	education	 has	 been	 embedded	 in	 the	 reformist-modernist	 foundations’	main	programmes	in	the	schools.	Women	as	well	as	men	have	been	given	an	equal	opportunity	to	get	access	to	Islamic	education.	As	a	result	of	this	policy,	some	women	 have	 benefitted	 by	 succeeding	 to	 obtain	 important	 religious	 roles	 in	society.	My	informant	Rugaya	Alatas	(see	page	162),	for	instance,	is	among	the	first	 female	 graduates	 from	 the	 al-Hilal	 School	 for	 Religious	 teaching	 (PGA),	and	since	 then	has	become	a	well-known	female	religious	 teacher	(preacher)	in	 the	 Muslim	 communities	 of	 Ambon.	 Her	 contribution	 to	 Islamic	development	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	sub-section.	Moreover,	 the	Hadramis	 have	 adapted	 Islamic	 reformism	 in	 a	 way	 that	ties	 in	 with	 traditional	 religious	 practices	 among	 Muslims	 in	 Ambon.	 As	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 unlike	 al-Irshad	 in	 Java,	 the	 al-Hilal	foundation	has	 accommodated	public	 festivities,	 such	 as	maulid	 celebrations.	
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In	 this	 sense,	 certain	 local	 practices	 that	 are	 associated	 with	 traditionalist	Islam	 are	 tolerated	 rather	 than	 totally	 condemned.	 Also,	 the	 competition	between	Muslims	and	Christians	as	socio-political	groups	should	be	taken	into	account	in	this	stance.	These	two	aspects	have	resulted	in	emphasizing	sharing	one	 faith	 among	 fellow	Muslims	 over	 stressing	 internal	 differences.	 In	 post-communal	 conflict	 Ambon,	 a	 narrative	 about	 solidarity	 among	 Muslims	 has	been	 voiced	 by	 many	 Muslims,	 especially	 among	 their	 religious	 figures	including	those	of	Hadrami	origin.	In	 this	 context,	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon	 have	 positioned	themselves	 as	 part	 of	 Ambonese	 community	 of	Muslims	 in	 general,	 bringing	new	 developments	 to	 society	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 accepting	 certain	 local	values	as	a	way	of	social	integration	among	Muslims.	 	By	extension,	tolerance	toward	 certain	 local	 practices	 is	 a	 way	 for	 the	 Hadramis	 to	 integrate	themselves	into	a	broader	Ambonese	Muslims.		In	addition	to	the	al-Hilal	are	two	other	reformist-modernist	foundations	in	Ambon,	 al-Irshad	and	al-Khairat.	 	As	was	mentioned	 in	 the	 first	 section	of	this	chapter,	al-Irshad	al-Islamiyya	was	established	in	Jakarta	in	1914/1915	by	the	 Sudanese	 scholar	 Ahmad	 Surkati,	 who	 was	 first	 affiliated	 to	 the	 already	established	 Hadrami-based	 Islamic	 organization	 called	 Jam’iyya	 Khair	 in	Jakarta	 (see	 the	 aforementioned	 section	 2	 here).	 As	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 al-Irshad	 gained	 fame,	 the	 al-Irshad	 significantly	 spread	 to	 other	 regions.	However,	 the	 al-Irshad	was	 limited	 to	 the	western	 part	 of	 Indonesia	 namely	Java	and	Sumatra.	In	Maluku,	 the	 foundation	only	 established	 its	 formal	 branch	 in	 the	 late	1980s	 (1987-1989).	 According	 to	 my	 non-Sada	 informant	 Hadi	 Basalamah,	who	is	current	leader	of	the	al-Hilal	and	at	the	same	time	has	occupied	the	top	position	 in	 the	 al-Irshad	 of	 Maluku	 province,	 the	 al-Irshad	 in	 Maluku	 was	mainly	established	for	reasons	of	survival	of	 the	central	organization,	 instead	of	merely	 propagating	 reformist	 ideas.	 The	New	Order	 Government	 issued	 a	regulation	 around	 the	 1980s	 to	 reorganize	 social	 and	mass	 organizations	 in	Indonesia	 and	 required	 every	 organization	 to	 have	 many	 branches	 around	Indonesia	 which	 is	 at	 least	 two	 third	 of	 the	 whole	 regions/provinces	 in	Indonesia	in	order	to	be	legally	permitted.	In	other	words,	the	establishment	of	the	 al-Irshad	 branch	 in	 Ambon	 was	 said	 to	 have	 protected	 the	 central	organization	 against	 being	 closed	 by	 the	 Government.	 Similar	 to	 its	 central	foundation	 in	 Jakarta,	 the	 al-Irshad	 branch	 in	 Maluku	 province	 and	 Ambon	district	was	led	by	Hadramis	of	non-Sada	origin.	Many	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	 descendants	 have	 occupied	 management	positions	 in	 the	 al-Irshad	 of	 both	 in	 provincial	 and	 district	 levels	 of	Maluku.	This	does	not	mean	that	its	membership	is	closed	to	Muslims	of	other	origins,	as	Saiful	Ali	al-Maskati,	a	fifty-year-old	non-Sada	Hadrami,	(see	chapter	3	page	86),	the	current	leader	of	the	al-Irshad	in	Ambon	district,	claims.	The	al-Irshad	
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in	Maluku	 and	Ambon	 is	 quite	 independent	 from	 the	 central	 organization	 in	terms	of	both	financial	and	administrative	managements.	In	its	early	phase	of	establishment	in	Ambon,	the	central	organization	helped	the	Maluku	al-Irshad	branch	 by	 donating	 Islamic	 books	 for	 the	 schools,	 but	 soon	 afterwards	 the	branch	organized	 its	programmes	and	activities	 itself	without	 interference	of	the	central	organization.	Like	the	al-Hilal,	the	al-Irshad	received	waqf,	religious	endowment,	 from	wealthy	Hadrami	 families	 to	erect	buildings	 to	 run	 Islamic	education	and	other	 Islamic	activities.	One	of	 the	Hadrami	 families	who	gave	the	 waqf	 to	 the	 al-Irshad	 is	 from	 a	 Ba’adillah	 family,	 who	 was	 among	 the	wealthy	merchants	in	Maluku	during	the	colonial	era.152	Like	 the	 al-Hilal,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 activities	 of	 the	 al-Irshad	 in	 Maluku	concerns	 Islamic	 education,	 but	 its	 scope	 is	 far	 smaller	 than	 that	 of	 al-Hilal.		The	al-Irshad	of	Maluku	only	manages	a	few	schools	from	kindergarten	up	to	junior	high	 levels.	Although	 the	al-Irshad	 foundation	 is	 involved	with	 Islamic	education	 by	 establishing	 Islamic	 schools,	 there	 is	 separation	 between	 the	management	of	 the	 foundation	and	 the	schools.	When	 I	visited	one	of	 the	al-Irshad	 schools,	 the	 teachers	 told	 me	 that	 the	 al-Irshad	 foundation	 did	 not	interfere	in	the	management	of	the	school	and	that	the	school	curriculum	was	adopted	 from	 that	 of	 the	 State	 school.	 The	 teachers	whom	 I	 talked	 to	 at	 the	school	 explained	 that	 the	 school	 had	 only	 asked	 permission	 from	 the	foundation	 to	 use	 its	 name	 in	 order	 to	 get	 legal	 permission	 from	 the	government	 to	 run	 the	 school.	 Apart	 from	 religious	 education,	 the	 al-Irshad	also	 engages	 in	 other	 religious	 activities,	 such	 as	 organizing	 maulid	celebrations	 and	 public	 preachings.	 The	 al-Irshad	 branch	 of	 Maluku	 is	 thus	more	tolerant	than	the	central	organization.	Unlike	its	central	foundation	that	has	 faced	 an	 internal	 split	 between	 those	 with	 modernist	 and	 those	 with	fundamentalist	views	(Rijal	2017,	15-22),	the	al-Irshad	in	Maluku	seems	to	be	far	from	internal	friction	and	very	independently	manages	the	local	branch	of	the	foundation.	Another	 foundation	 that	 offers	 Islamic	 education	 is	 al-Khairat.	 The	 al-Khairat	was	established	in	Palu	on	June	30,	1930	by	Idrus	bin	Salim	al-Jufri,	a	Hadrami	 of	 Sada	 origin.	 In	 the	 first	muktamar	 (congress),	 the	 al-Khairat	 of	1956	had	25	schools.	From	the	second	congress	until	the	last	congress	of	2004,	the	al-Khairat	increased	its	branches	from	150	to	732	and	presently	manages	1561	 schools,	 34	 boarding	 schools	 spread	 around	 North	 Maluku,	 North	 and	South	 Sulawesi,	 Kalimantan,	 Maluku,	 and	West	 Papua	 (Kadir	 2008).	 The	 al-Khairat	 in	Ambon	 is	 a	 branch	 of	 al-Khairat	 in	 Palu,	 Central	 Sulawesi.	 The	 al-Khairat	is	a	modern	Islamic	foundation	concerned	mainly	with	modern	Islamic	education	in	line	with	a	moderate	Sunni	oriented	ideology,	although	it	has	also	
                                                152	Interview	with	Iza,	October	17,	2014.		
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contributed	to	sending	local	students	to	Qum	of	Iran	to	study	Shi’ism	(Zulkifli	2013,	27).	The	branch	of	the	al-Khairat	in	Ambon	was	established	in	1986	by	several	Hadramis	 of	 both	 non-Sada	 and	 Sada	 origin.	One	 of	 the	 prominent	members	contributing	 to	 its	 establishment	 is	 a	 Sada	 from	 Ternate,	 North	 Maluku.	 My	informant	 Alwi	 al-Hadar	 (69	 years	 old)	 from	 a	 Sada	 family	 told	 me	 that	 he	established	the	foundation	when	he	lived	in	Ambon	for	twenty	years	during	his	career	at	the	ministry	of	public	construction.	Afterwards,	he	moved	back	to	his	hometown,	Ternate.153	The	management	of	the	foundation	and	school	has	been	taken	 over	 by	 Ibrahim	 al-Kathiri	 (57	 years	 old),	 a	 non-Sada	 Hadrami.	 Since	then,	 the	 branch	 of	 the	 al-Khairat	 in	 Ambon	 has	 adopted	 a	 more	 reformist	ideology.	 This	 shifting	 orientation	 of	 the	 foundation	 is	 related	 to	 religious	education	background	of	the	leader.	After	completing	his	secondary	school	 in	the	 al-Khairat	 school	 of	 Palu,	 Ibrahim	 al-Kathiri	 continued	 his	 studies	 in	Medina	 University,	 Saudi	 Arabia. 154 	I	 surmise	 that	 Ibrahim	 al-Kathiri’s	experience	 in	Medina	 is	 related	 to	 the	way	 the	al-Khairat	school	 in	Ambon	 is	organized.	 From	my	 observation,	 activities	 in	 the	 boarding	 school	 of	 the	 al-Khairat	 in	 Ambon	 have	 emphasized	 reformist-modernist	 teachings,	 unlike	those	 of	 the	 school	 in	 Palu	 which	 are	 infused	 with	 traditionalist	 ways	 of	teachings.		The	 different	 activities	 between	 the	 central	 al-Khairat	 and	 its	 branch	 in	Ambon	 illustrate	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	 branches	 to	 arrange	 and	 manage	 the	schools.	My	informant	Alwi	al-Hadar	told	me	that	the	central	foundation	of	al-Khairat	 is	 only	 responsible	 for	 appointing	 a	 leader	 in	 its	 region,	 but	 each	branch	has	the	 full	right	to	organize	 its	school	and	foundation.	 I	surmise	that	this	 flexibility	 individual	 branches	 are	 allowed	 to	 organize	 its	 school	 and	foundation	is	part	of	a	strategy	to	expand	its	 influences	and	branches	around	Eastern	 Indonesia	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allowing	 each	 branch	 to	 gain	financial	 support	 from	 other	 sources.	 Besides,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 activities	 and	programmes	do	not	contradict	the	main	objectives	of	the	central	foundation	to	undertake	 Islamic	 missionary	 activities,	 any	 initiative	 is	 allowed.	 The	 al-Khairat	 school	 in	 Ambon	 thus	 focuses	 on	 studying	 Qur’anic	 science	 and	 its	memorization.	Like	 the	al-Hilal,	 both	al-Irshad	and	al-Khairat	 in	Ambon	 take	a	 tolerant	stance	towards	certain	local	traditions.	However,	of	the	three,	the	al-Hilal	is	a	foundation	 that	 is	 the	 most	 local	 in	 character	 as	 it	 was	 initiated	 by	 local	Hadramis,	while	 the	al-Irshad	and	al-Khairat	are	branches	of	other	Hadrami-Islamic	foundations,	from	national	and	regional	respectively.	
                                                153	Interview	with	Alwi	al-Hadar,	October	28,	2014.		154	During	my	fieldwork	I	could	not	meet	Ibrahim	al-Kathiri	as	he	was	always	busy,	but	I	could	interview	one	of	the	teachers	in	the	school.	Interview	with	Nariya,	April	3,	2015.		
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Today,	 Hadramis	 from	 non-reformist-modernist	 background	 try	 to	engage	in	similar	kinds	of	educational	organizations.	As	far	as	I	have	observed,	the	 Hadramis	 who	 are	 affiliated	 with	 neo-Salafism	 do	 not	 establish	 a	foundation	 themselves.	 They	 rather	 join	 newly	 established	 local	 foundations	initiated	by	Muslims	of	non-Hadrami	backgrounds	or	other	national	branches.	Most	Salafi	schools	that	have	obtained	many	students	are	initiated	by	Muslims	of	 non-Hadrami	 origin	 (mainly	 Javanese).	 Due	 to	 its	 minority	 position,	followers	 of	 Shi’ism	 mainly	 restrict	 themselves	 to	 local	 informal	 religious	circles,	 and	 prefer	 to	 send	 their	 children	 to	 Shi’ite	 schools	 outside	 Ambon	(such	 as	 Java).	 As	 for	 the	 traditionalist	 revivalists	 (neo-traditionalists),	 their	effort	 to	 establish	 their	 own	 school	 is	 underway	 as	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	school	needs	much	support.155		
4.2 Female	Leadership	in	Religious	and	Social	Empowerment		Aiming	at	gender	equality	in	education	has	been	voiced	since	the	propagation	of	Islamic	reformism	by	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon.	In	principle,	men	and	women	have	 equal	 access	 to	 Islamic	 literacy.	 Despite	 this,	 religious	 authority	within	the	Hadrami	community	is	strongly	gendered.	Most	of	the	prominent	religious	leaders	 are	 men.	 One	 of	 the	 few	 exceptions	 is	 Rugaya	 Alatas,	 who	 plays	 an	important	role	in	religious	and	social	empowerment.	Rugaya	 Alatas	 was	 born	 to	 a	 religious	 Sada	 family	 with	 a	 traditionalist	background.156	She	is	married	to	a	Sada	man	from	Assagaf	of	Namlea	in	Buru.	She	spent	her	entire	education	in	the	al-Hilal	school,	from	primary	until	senior	high	school	levels.157	After	finishing	her	senior	high	school,	she	began	to	offer	
                                                155	My	 informant	Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid,	 founder	 of	 ar-Rahmah,	 lamented	 to	me	that	his	effort	to	establish	ar-Rahmah	school	faced	barriers	from	the	local	community.	He	 told	me	 that	 a	 previously	 donated	 plot	 of	 land	 in	 Liang	 village	 for	 an	 ar-Rahmah	school	in	2010	has	been	taken	over	by	the	villagers	as	the	villagers	wanted	to	manage	the	school	themselves.	The	school,	or	boarding	school,	which	he	has	intended	to	build,	will	focus	on	religious	knowledge,	copying	the	curricula	of	traditional	boarding	schools	in	the	Hadramaut.	Interview	with	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid,	April	7,	2015.		156	Rugaya	Alatas	 told	me	 that	her	grandfather	and	uncle	were	well-known	preachers	and	were	considered	to	be	saints.	The	story	that	was	passed	on	to	her	was	that	the	body	of	her	grandfather	called	Habib	Abdullah	Alatas,	who	died	 in	1956	and	was	buried	 in	Benhill	 Tanah	 Abang	 Jakarta,	 did	 not	 show	 any	 signs	 of	 decay	 when	 the	 local	government	in	Jakarta	relocated	his	grave	in	1978.	Rugaya	Alatas’s	grandfather’s	tomb	is	also	one	of	the	shrines	where	Indonesian	Muslims	go	on	pilgrimage.	Interview	with	Rugaya	Alatas,	March	7,	2015.		157	Rugaya	 Alatas	 was	 among	 the	 favorite	 students	 for	 her	 religious	 teachers	 in	 the	school	as	she	expressed	with	pride	to	me.	Although	she	could	not	continue	her	study	to	a	 university,	 she	 is	 a	 ‘learner	 person’	 as	 she	 likes	 to	 study	 new	 things	 herself.	 She	confided	to	me	that	she	 is	 jealous	of	women	who	can	continue	their	studies	 in	higher	educational	institutions.	She	explained	that	her	parents	had	not	allowed	her	to	continue	her	 higher	 education	 because	 she	 was	 a	 girl.	 Yet,	 her	 traditional	 upbringing	 did	 not	
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informal	 religious	 lessons	 and	 classes	 to	 children	 in	 the	 afternoon	 and	 in	weekends	in	1973,	while	at	the	same	time	officially	starting	to	work	as	a	civil	servant.	Rugaya	Alatas’s	 involvement	 in	 religious	 activities	 and	 her	 commitment	to	 educate	 the	 young	 Muslim	 generation	 is	 proven	 by	 her	 efforts	 to	 run	 an	orphanage	foundation,	or	dar	al-aytam	in	Arabic,	called	Melati	al-Khairat.	The	name	of	Melati	itself	bears	the	name	of	the	street	where	her	parents	formerly	lived.158		 Established	 in	 1999,	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 was	 initiated	 by	 Rugaya	Alatas,	together	with	a	wife	of	the	man	who	at	the	time	was	regent	of	Central	Maluku.	During	the	communal	conflicts	the	regent’s	family	fled	to	Semarang	in	Central	Java,	and	since	then	there	has	been	no	contact	between	Rugaya	Alatas	and	the	regent’s	family	even	after	the	regent’s	family	came	back	to	lead	Central	Maluku	regency.	With	the	help	of	her	family	members	Rugaya	Alatas	has	taken	up	a	leading	role	in	managing	the	Melati	al-Khairat.	Rugaya	 Alatas	 told	me	 that	 she	was	 inspired	 to	 establish	 the	Melati	 al-Khairat	 by	 some	 of	 her	 relatives	 in	 Jakarta,	 who	 worked	 for	 a	 charity	foundation	focusing	on	Islamic	education.		Initially,	the	main	purpose	of	Melati	al-Khairat	 was	 to	 help	 orphans	 to	 perform	 well	 in	 school.	 Yet,	 during	 the	conflicts	many	 children	 from	poor	 families	 did	 not	 have	 access	 to	 education.	Since	 then,	 the	 foundation	 has	 attempted	 to	 support	 children	 from	 poor	families	as	well,	rather	than	only	those	who	are	good	at	school.	Rugaya	Alatas	told	me:		During	the	1999-2002	conflicts,	the	condition	of	the	Muslims	was	bad	and	there	were	many	orphans	 left	by	 fathers	who	had	 left	 to	 fight	and	were	killed.		As	Yayasan	Kesuma	initially	focused	particularly	for	those	orphans	with	good	records	in	their	school,	many	other	orphans	could	not	benefit	from	the	donation.	 I	began	to	propose	an	idea	for	 local	donators	to	 fund	these	 orphans.	 	 There	 were	 about	 250	 children	 who	 benefitted	 from	donations	 during	 the	 conflicts.	 Afterwards,	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	 has	regularly	 given	 donation	 to	 orphans	 with	 or	 without	 good	 grades	 at	school.	What	we	achieve	now	is	from	Allah.	Rugaya	 Alatas’	 statement	 reflects	 her	 social	 commitment	 to	 support	 needy	children	 by	 developing	 the	 foundation.	 Through	 kinship	 ties	 and	 social	networks	of	the	founder,	she	has	managed	to	engage	people	to	help	the	Melati	al-Khairat	grow.	The	Melati	al-Khairat	operates	the	foundation	using	donations	
                                                                                                              prevent	 her	 from	 learning	 something	 (knowledge)	 outside	 formal	 educational	institutions.	Interview	with	Rugaya	Alatas,	March	7,	2015.		158	Rugaya	Alatas,	together	with	her	parents,	 formerly	lived	in	street	Melati,	one	block	street	 near	 Anthony	 Rhebok	 street	 where	 the	 headquarter	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	 is	 located.	After	 the	 conflicts,	 she	 has	moved	 to	 Silale,	 one	 of	 the	 neighbourhoods	 where	many	Muslims	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Ambon	 were	 relocated	 during	 the	 conflicts.	 Interview	 with	Rugaya	Alatas,	March	7,	2015.			
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Apart	 from	 empowering	 society	 through	 providing	 basic	 education	 to	 the	needy,	 the	Melati	 al-Khairat	 also	 conducts	 regular	 religious	 activities,	mainly	teachings	 and	 gatherings.	 The	 religious	 teachings	 and	 gatherings	 address	women	 of	 any	 age.	 During	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 participated	 in	 Rugaya	 Alatas’s	religious	 meetings	 several	 times.	 Most	 of	 them	 take	 place	 in	 the	 Melati	 al-Khairat	building.	Rugaya	Alatas	told	me	that	she	was	disappointed	by	the	fact	that	many	Muslim	women	in	Ambon	lack	what	she	considers	‘a	good	attitude’.	Her	religious	calling	is	to	teach	them	and	educate	some	women	to	continue	her	work,	 but	 only	 few	women	 are	 interested	 in	 doing	 this	 work.	 Thus,	 Rugaya	Alatas’s	 role	 in	 the	 social	 empowerment	 of	 local	Muslim	 citizens	 is	 not	 only	concerns	 her	 commitment	 to	 support	 needy	 children,	 but	 also	 her	 efforts	 to	empower	 Ambonese	 Muslim	 women	 and	 protect	 their	 identities	 as	 both	women	and	Muslims	against	what	 she	designates	as	 ‘corrupt	behaviour’	 (see	figure	5.9).		
5. Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	presented	how	 religious	 authority	within	 the	Hadrami	community	has	developed.	It	was	originally	embedded	in	the	traditional	social	stratification	 system	 that	 characterized	 social	 relationships	 in	 Hadramaut.	Contestation	of	traditional	religious	authority	within	the	Hadrami	community	in	 Ambon	 began	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 in	 tandem	 with	 Islamic	reformism	 voicing	 an	 egalitarian	 Islam	 that	 influenced	 on	 a	 large	 number	 of	the	 Hadramis	 from	 non-Sada	 groups	 in	 Indonesia.	 This	 contestation	 led	 to	differentiation	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 in	 Ambon	 in	 terms	 of	 different	understandings	of	Islam,	on	a	more	private	level	rather	than	in	an	institutional	one.		In	this	respect,	the	role	of	the	al-Hilal	as	a	unified	organization	within	the	Hadrami	community	was	indispensable.	The	loss	of	control	of	the	al-Hilal	over	the	community	as	a	whole	has	become	particularly	visible	after	the	communal	conflicts	 (1999-2002).	 The	 conflicts	 have	 significantly	 changed	 the	 religious	configuration	 within	 Muslim	 communities	 in	 Ambon	 in	 general	 and	 the	Hadrami	community	in	particular,	bringing	new	understandings	on	Islam	that	contested	 earlier	 traditions.	 Earlier	 dominant	 notions	 of	 Islam,	 consisting	 of	traditionalist	 and	 reformist-modernist	 views	 and	 practices,	 are	 now	challenged	by	neo-Salafism	and	Shi’ism,	while	at	 the	 same	 time	 traditionalist	Islam	 is	 revitalized	 through	 renewed	 connections	 between	 Hadramaut	 and	Indonesia.	 A	 competition	 over	 religious	 authority	 can	 be	 noted	 through	building	 local,	 national,	 and	 transnational	 religious	 networks,	 searching	 for	religious	 scholarship,	 and	 establishing/engaging	 in	 Islamic	 foundations.	 The	religious	 differentiation	 within	 the	 Hadrami	 community,	 to	 some	 extent,	
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This	chapter	examines	the	orientation	of	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	towards	their	forefathers’	 homeland	 by	 focusing	 on	 their	 current	 journeys	 to	 Hadramaut.		The	 chapter	 consists	 of	 three	 parts:	 the	 first	 part	 deals	with	 the	 contexts	 of	renewed	connections	between	Hadramaut	and	Ambon;	the	second	illuminates	the	impact	of	the	restored	links	on	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	in	the	revitalization	of	Hadrami	 identity;	and	 the	concluding	section	will	 reflect	on	 the	continuity	and	 change	 in	 the	 orientation	 of	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora	 towards	 a	homeland.	 	 This	 chapter	 argues	 that	 Hadramaut	 as	 an	 imaginary	 homeland	continues	 to	 be	 an	 authoritative	 source	 of	 identity	 for	 many	 Hadrami	descendants	while	at	the	same	time	its	position	has	been	contested	due	to	the	influence	of	new	religious	views	and	practices.		
2. Wider	 Context	 of	 the	 Renewed	 Connections	 between	
Hadramaut	and	Ambon	
The	 apex	 of	 Arab	 migration	 from	 Hadramaut	 in	 South	 Yemen	 to	 the	 Indian	Ocean	 region	 during	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 the	 first	quarter	of	 the	 twentieth	century	has	 left	 its	 legacy	 in	 the	diversity	of	Muslim	society	in	contemporary	Indonesia.	Scattered	across	numerous	coastal	islands,	today’s	 Hadramis	 in	 Indonesia	 are	 mainly	 third	 and	 fourth	 generation-descendants	of	Hadrami	migrants	 (Jacobsen	2009).	After	having	been	 cut	off	from	 their	 forefathers’	 homeland	 for	 several	 decades,	 the	 Hadrami	descendants	 in	 Indonesia	 were	 able	 to	 undertake	 return	 journeys	 to	Hadramaut	 since	 the	 1990s,	 and	 many	 have	 done	 so.	 Their	 journeys	 to	Hadramaut	have	largely	been	motivated	by	one	or	several	of	three	interests:	to	renew	 family	 ties,	 to	 pursue	 religious	 education	 in	 religious	 schools,	 and	 to	perform	pilgrimage	(Slama	2005;	Ho	2006;	Alatas	2016b).	The	 current	 back	 and	 forth	 movement	 of	 Hadramis	 between	 Indonesia	and	Hadramaut	is	not	a	novel	phenomenon.	Historically,	it	can	be	traced	back	to	the	period	of	the	massive	wave	of	Hadrami	migration	towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	 century	 until	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 	 During	 this	period	of	Dutch	colonial	occupation,	Indonesia	hosted	the	greatest	numbers	of	Hadrami	 migrants,	 most	 of	 whom	 were	 mainly	 engaged	 in	 trade.	 As	 the	Hadrami	migrants	 felt	a	strong	attachment	 to	 their	homeland,	 they	sought	 to	maintain	 their	 ties	with	Hadramaut	 by	 sending	 remittances	 to	 their	 families.	Some	wealthy	merchants	even	made	regular	journeys	back	and	forth	between	Hadramaut	 and	 Indonesia.	 Their	 sons	 born	 to	 Indonesian	women	were	 also	
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sent	 back	 to	 Hadramaut	 in	 order	 to	 get	 acquainted	 with	 and	 search	 for	religious	knowledge	in	their	fathers’	homeland.	The	 Second	 World	 War	 and	 the	 subsequent	 two	 decades,	 which	 were	characterized	amongst	others	by	 the	emergence	of	nation-states,	marked	 the	first	 major	 phase	 of	 disintegration	 of	 the	 networks	 between	 Hadramis	 in	Hadramaut	 and	 their	 diaspora	 in	 the	 Indian	 Ocean	 region	 particularly	 with	those	 in	 Indonesia	 (Freitag	 2003).	 During	 this	 period,	 the	 Hadramis	 in	Indonesia	were	 forced	 to	 opt	 for	 Indonesia	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 state’s	 national	integration	 policy.	 The	 second	 major	 disruption	 was	 during	 the	 Cold	 War,	when	 Indonesia	 and	 South	 Yemen	 were	 governed	 by	 regimes	 of	 different	political	 ideologies	 divided	 into	 Western	 and	 Eastern	 blocks,	 which	 in	 turn	exacerbated	 the	 contacts	between	Hadramaut	 and	Hadramis	 in	 the	diaspora.	For	state	security	reasons,	they	could	not	easily	travel	back	and	forth	between	Indonesia	and	Hadramaut	(Freitag	2003).	The	 restoration	 of	 the	 connections	 between	 Indonesia	 and	 Hadramaut	gained	momentum	around	the	1990s	when	the	political	regimes	in	Indonesia	and	South	Yemen	changed	their	policies.	On	the	one	hand,	the	collapse	of	the	socialist	regime	in	South	Yemen	and	the	unification	of	North	and	South	Yemen	in	1990	resulted	 in	a	 relatively	 free	political	 climate	among	different	Muslim	groups	in	Hadramaut.	This	enabled	them	to	revitalize	their	religious	ideologies	and	to	express	their	beliefs	in	public	spaces	(Freitag	2003;	Slama	2005;	Alatas	2016b).	 Among	 various	 religious	 strands,	 Salafism	 and	 Sufism	 are	 the	 two	most	 important	 religious	 currents	 in	 South	 Yemen	 that	 have	 attempted	 to	exert	their	influence	on	the	diaspora.	In	Indonesia	on	the	other	hand,	a	shifting	policy	toward	Islamic	groups	in	the	late	New	Order	followed	by	the	fall	of	the	regime	in	1998	gave	freedom	to	Indonesian	Muslims	to	voice	their	religiosity	in	public	domains.	This	is	indicated	by	the	flourishing	of	Islamic	organizations	and	 activities	 undertaken	mostly	 by	 people	 belonging	 to	 the	middle	 class	 in	urban	 areas,	 the	 increase	 of	 local	 practices	 such	 as	 pilgrimage	 to	 shrines	 in	rural	 areas,	 and	 the	 burgeoning	 of	 Islamic	 publications	 and	 the	 use	 of	mass	media	 for	 Islamic	 propagation.	 These	 dynamics	 of	 political	 changes	 in	 both	Hadramaut	 and	 Indonesia	 have	 shaped	 the	 desires	 and	 possibilities	 of	Indonesian	 Muslims,	 including	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants,	 to	 participate	 in	religious	journeys	such	as	pilgrimage	to	Hadramaut	(Alatas	2016b).	Specific	 to	 the	 Ambonese	 context	 is	 that	 ties	 between	 the	 Hadramis	 in	Ambon	 and	 their	 relatives	 in	 Hadramaut	were	 renewed	 after	 the	 communal	conflicts	 in	 Ambon	 between	 1999-2002.	 The	 communal	 conflicts	 between	Muslims	and	Christians	in	Ambon	displaced	a	considerable	number	of	people,	including	Muslims	of	Hadrami	descent,	to	safer	places	outside	Maluku.		During	the	 riots,	 many	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 moved	 to	 Java	 for	 a	 permanent	 or	temporary	period.	Java	became	one	of	the	main	destinations	for	the	Hadramis	in	 Ambon	 to	 move	 to	 as	 they	 had	 relatives	 there	 to	 support	 them.	 Their	
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displacement	 to	 Java	 not	 only	 resulted	 in	 strengthening	 kinship	 ties	 with	relatives	in	Java	but	also	those	with	relatives	in	Hadramaut	as	the	Hadramis	in	Java	 had	 already	 restored	 ties	 with	 their	 family	 members	 in	 Hadramaut	 a	decade	earlier.	In	 addition,	 the	 connections	 between	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 and	Hadramaut	 after	 the	 religious	 conflicts	 were	 restored	 by	 Hadramis	 living	 in	Saudi	 Arabia.	 Given	 their	 proximity	 to	 Yemen,	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 the	 Gulf	countries	had	become	new	destinations	for	Hadramis	in	search	for	a	better	life	during	 the	 oil	 boom	 and	 the	 Cold	 War,	 when	 the	 connection	 between	 the	Hadramis	and	their	diaspora	in	the	Indian	Ocean	was	disrupted	(Freitag	2003).	The	 countries	 were	 new	 routes	 of	 migration	 not	 only	 for	 the	 Hadramis	 in	Hadramaut	but	also	for	those	in	the	diaspora,	particularly	in	Indonesia.	Some	Hadramis	in	Ambon	who	were	sent	to	Hadramaut	by	their	fathers	by	the	end	of	 the	 1960s	 did	 not	 stay	 there	 for	 a	 long	 period.	 Rather,	 they	 departed	 to	Saudi	 Arabia.	 Some	 of	 them	 later	 returned	 to	 Indonesia,	 while	 others	 have	settled	in	Saudi	Arabia	where	they	continue	to	live	until	today.	Through	their	relatives	in	Saudi	Arabia	and	Java,	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	began	to	reconnect	with	their	family	members	in	Hadramaut.	At	the	same	time,	a	 new	 transnational	 connection	 was	 established	 between	 a	 number	 of	Hadramis	in	Indonesia	and	Iran.	The	influence	of	the	1979	Shi’ite	revolution	in	Iran	on	 the	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	was	 also	mediated	by	 their	 relatives	 in	 Java	after	their	displacement	during	the	communal	conflicts.		In	fact,	the	connection	between	 Ambon	 and	 Iran	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 multiplication	 of	 travel	destinations	 outside	 Indonesia	 among	 Hadramis,	 mostly	 in	 line	 with	 the	specific	Islamic	affiliation	of	travellers.			Regarding	 the	 context	 outlined	 above,	 despite	 the	 disrupted	 connection	between	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 those	 in	 the	 Indonesian	 diaspora	during	the	Second	World	War	and	the	Cold	War,	networks	among	Hadramis	in	various	localities	within	Indonesia	became	established	and	strengthened.	This	resulted	in	what	Martin	Slama	has	called	a	 ‘diaspora	within	a	country’	(2011,	241).		At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 networks	 among	 Hadramis	 have	 been	 extended	beyond	 their	 forefathers’	 country	 of	 origin	 and	 their	 country	 of	 residence,	thereby	forming	new	transnational	links	that	connect	Hadramis	in	localities	of	different	 nation-states.	 The	 recently	 renewed	 connections	 between	 the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	and	Hadramaut	are,	indeed,	a	result	of	various	trans-local	networks	established	among	 the	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	and	other	 regions	both	inside	Indonesia,	particularly	Java,	but	also	outside	Indonesia,	especially	Saudi	Arabia.	Therefore,	‘diaspora’	as	a	concept	related	to	transnationalism	does	not	seem	 to	 decrease	 in	 significance.	 In	 fact,	 it	 should	 be	 broadened	 to	 include	various	 trans-local	 connections,	 which	 may	 cover	 localities	 not	 necessarily	
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linked	 to	 political	 boundaries	 of	 nation-states	 (Freitag	 and	Von	Oppen	2010,	11-12).		
3. The	 Impact	 of	 the	Renewed	 Connections	 between	Hadramaut	
and	Ambon	
The	 participation	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 from	 Ambon	 in	 return	 journeys	 to	 their	ancestors’	homeland	after	the	1999	–	2002	communal	conflicts	has	revitalized	their	 construction	 of	 certain	 elements	 of	 Hadrami	 identity	 related	 to	 three	following	aspects:	ethnicity,	religion,	and	gender.			
3.1 Kinship,	Social	Hierarchy,	and	Marriage		The	renewed	links	between	Hadramaut	and	Indonesia,	and	those	with	Ambon	in	particular	over	the	last	two	decades	have	had	an	impact	on	the	revitalization	of	some	elements	of	Hadrami	ethnic	identity,	notably	those	related	to	kinship,	social	hierarchy,	and	marriage	patterns.	As	I	discussed	in	chapter	four,	kinship	relations	 constitute	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 elements	 of	 ethnic	 identity	formation	 among	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon.	 One	 of	 the	 cultural	markers	of	Hadrami	ethnic	 identity	 is	 family	names.	The	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	still	 maintain	 family	 names	 by	 following	 their	 Hadrami	 agnatic	 lineage.	 The	oldest	 families	 now	 consist	 of	 seventh	 generation	 of	 Hadrami	 migrants.	 An	even	 stronger	 feature	 of	 the	 pattern	 of	 keeping	 genealogical	 imaginary	 alive	are	 the	 systematic	 genealogical	 records	 based	 on	 patrilineal	 kinship	 system	that	are	kept	by	some	Hadrami	families,	particularly	among	the	Sada.		Thanks	 to	 the	 active	 maintenance	 of	 family	 names	 and	 genealogical	records,	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	have	not	faced	many	difficulties	in	rebuilding	their	ties	with	the	Hadramis	in	Hadramaut	even	though	their	connections	had	been	 disrupted	 several	 decades	 before.	 During	 my	 short	 fieldwork	 in	Hadramaut	 in	 February	 2015,	 I	 observed	 that	 genealogy	 was	 one	 of	 the	important	 subjects	 of	 communication	 both	 among	 Sada	 Hadramis	 in	Hadramaut	 and	 those	 on	 Ambon.	 For	 example,	 when	 meeting	 people	 in	Hadramaut,	 my	 informants	 from	 Ambon	 introduced	 themselves	 by	 stating	their	 family	 origin	 and	 even	mentioned	 their	 family	 tree	 up	 to	 the	 Prophet,	which	means	that	they	cited	names	of	more	than	thirty	generations.	This	style	of	 communication	 demonstrates	 how	 genealogy	 does	 not	 merely	 link	 the	Hadramis	 in	Hadramaut	 and	 in	 the	diaspora	but	 it	 also	 serves	 as	 a	 symbolic	marker	regulating	social	relationships	between	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora	and	in	Hadramaut.	The	 renewed	 connections	 between	 Hadramis	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 in	Indonesia	particularly	those	in	Ambon	have	indeed	strengthened	their	kinship	ties	 predicated	 on	 traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 stratification.	 As	 I	 stated	 in	
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chapter	 three	 (section	2.1)	 the	 traditional	Hadrami	 social	 stratification	 ranks	members	of	the	Hadrami	society	according	to	several	strata:		Sada,	mashaikh-
qabail,	 masakin-du’afa	 (Bujra	 1971).	 The	 hierarchy	 today,	 however,	 is	 only	based	 on	 two	 ranks,	 in	which	 prophetic	 descendants,	 Sada	 are	 distinguished	from	 non-prophetic	 descendants,	 non-Sada.	 With	 regard	 to	 this	 social	hierarchy,	 the	 Sada	 and	non-Sada	 tend	 to	have	different	ways	 to	 reconstruct	their	 kinship	 ties	 with	 Hadramaut.	 Members	 of	 the	 non-Sada	 usually	 renew	ties	with	their	core	family	members	only,	while	those	of	the	Sada	extend	their	ties	with	a	larger	category	of	descendants	of	the	Prophet.	Irrespective	of	their	dissimilar	clans,	the	Sada	regard	all	descendants	of	the	Prophet	as	one	family.	Unlike	the	non-Sada,	for	the	Sada,	meeting	with	core	family	members	seems	to	be	 not	 a	 priority,	 and	 the	 ones	 I	 travelled	 with	 did	 not	 put	 much	 effort	 in	searching	 for	 their	 core	 family	 members.	 In	 fact,	 during	 my	 fieldtrip	 to	 the	Hadramaut	 I	 noted	 that	 some	 Sada	 informants	 were	 much	 more	 concerned	with	 performing	 religious	 rituals	 such	 as	 visiting	 shrines,	 attending	 religious	festivals,	meeting	religious	leaders,	and	attending	religious	schools.	The	 strengthening	 of	 various	 levels	 of	 kinship	 ties	 between	 Hadramaut	and	Ambon	has	resulted	in	the	maintenance	of	the	traditional	Hadrami	social	hierarchy	 through	 the	continued	application	of	asymmetrical	marriage	based	on	kafa’a	doctrines.	One	of	the	main	channels	through	which	the	kafa’a	norm	is	reinforced	is	through	socialization	by	way	of	religious	education.	Tarim	is	one	of	the	religious	centers	in	Hadramaut	that	many	Sada	members	in	the	diaspora	visit	to	revitalize	their	religious	identity.	Thus,	it	functions	as	a	model	of	socio-religious	hierarchy	and	at	the	same	time	as	the	site	of	cultural	reproduction	of	that	hierarchy.	This	came	to	the	fore,	for	instance,	in	a	conversation	I	had	with	my	thirty-eight-year-old	 informant	 Anisa	 from	 Tarim,	 who	 is	 a	 teacher	 in	 a	 religious	school.	I	asked	her	about	kafa’a,	and	whether	it	was	still	 locally	practiced,	for	instance.	 She	 responded	 that	 she	 had	 hardly	 heard	 any	member	 of	 the	 local	society	 violating	 this	 social	 norm,	 and	 she	 also	 contended	 that	 it	 was	 not	merely	local	custom	but	also	a	religious	norm	justified	by	Islam.	As	part	of	its	teaching	 curriculum	 the	 school	 uses	 Shafi’ite	 Islamic	 jurisprudence	 books,	which	Hadramis	in	Hadramaut	and	the	diaspora	refer	to	as	providing	religious	grounds	for	the	legitimacy	of	the	practice	of	kafa’a	based	on	the	compatibility	of	descent	ranks.	The	 renewed	 connections	 between	Hadramaut	 and	 Indonesia	 have	 also	revived	 the	 old	 Hadrami	 marriage	 patterns	 of	 exogamy,	 endogamy	 and	polygamy	on	the	basis	of	kafa’a	rulings	and	gender	difference.	As	I	discussed	in	chapter	 four	 (section	 3.1)	 in	 former	 times,	many	Hadrami	migrants	 came	 to	Indonesia	without	 their	wives	and	 then	married	 Indonesian	women	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999,	22-23).	This	polygamous	intermarriage	was	a	common	practice	during	the	early	phase	of	Hadrami	migration.	It	provided	a	basis	for	local	social	
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support	 and	 for	 the	 Hadrami	 community’s	 expansion	 outside	 the	 homeland,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 was	 a	means	 of	 overcoming	 a	 problem	 of	 natural	shortage	 partners	 for	 women	 of	 a	 particular	 social	 origin	 such	 as	 the	 Sada	(Slama	2014,	73).	During	 my	 fieldtrip	 to	 Hadramaut,	 I	 found	 one	 case	 of	 a	 polygamous	intermarriage	 between	 a	 Sada	 Hadrami,	 who	 is	 an	 elder	 brother	 of	 Habib	Umar,	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 religious	 boarding	 school	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 in	 Tarim,	with	an	Indonesian	woman	from	Java.	The	brother	of	Dar	al-Mustafa’s	founder	was	a	successful	construction	businessman	who	frequently	travelled	between	Hadramaut	and	other	countries	to	expand	his	economic	activities.	Saudi	Arabia	and	 Indonesia	 were	 two	 countries	 outside	 Yemen	 between	 which	 he	 most	frequently	 moved	 back	 and	 forth.	 For	 his	 third	 marriage,	 he	 married	 an	Indonesian	woman,	who	had	no	patrilineal	affiliation	with	the	Hadramis,	and	whom	he	brought	to	Tarim	when	their	first	child	was	five	years	old.	In	 Ambon	 itself,	 I	 came	 across	 various	 examples	 of	 Hadramis	marrying	and/or	 proposing	 partners	 from	Hadramaut.	 Ajib	 (see	 chapter	 3	 page	 71),	 a	construction	 businessman	 and	 second	 generation	 of	 a	 non-Sada	 migrant	 in	Ambon,	 told	me,	 for	 example,	 that	 his	 nephew	 from	Ambon	working	 in	 Abu	Dabi	 married	 his	 cousin	 in	 Hadramaut.	 Another	 non-Sada	 informant	 had	proposed	 his	 two	 sons	 to	 marry	 his	 nieces	 in	 Hadramaut,	 but	 his	 sons	 had	declined	his	father’s	suggestion.	In	another	part	of	Indonesia,	Jacobsen	(2009,	47)	 similarly	observed	 that	one	of	his	 informants	planned	 to	 send	his	 son	 to	Hadramaut	in	order	to	search	for	a	suitable	wife.		The	 last	 examples	 above	 illustrate	 that	 marriage	 between	 Hadramis	 in	Hadramaut	and	Indonesia	is	used	as	an	important	tool	not	only	to	renew	ties	between	 the	homeland	and	 the	diaspora	but	 also	 to	prevent	 the	present-day	Hadrami	 generation	 in	 the	 diaspora	 from	 losing	 their	 Hadrami	 identity.	 As	women	within	the	Hadrami	community	have	been	crucial	subjects	of	cultural	reproduction	 and	 social	 boundary	maintenance	 (Freitag	 2003,	 41),	marrying	women	 from	 Hadramaut	 may	 become	 a	 strategy	 of	 preserving	 a	 sense	 of	Hadraminess,	or	Arabness,	for	future	offspring	in	the	diaspora.	The	 differences	 in	 views	 between	 what	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 consider	family	 in	Hadramaut	tend	to	be	closely	related	to	contrasting	religious	views.	Also,	 these	differences	often	 result	 in	different	kinds	of	 activities	undertaken	when	visiting	the	country	of	origin.	Every	time	my	non-Sada	informant	Hasan	al-Kathiri	 (see	 chapter	 4	 pages	 131-132)	 visited	Hadramaut,	 for	 example,	 he	stayed	with	his	step-sister’s	family	members	for	several	weeks	or	months.	This	was	also	the	case	when	his	wife	and	one	of	his	sons	accompanied	him.	While	staying	with	their	family,	they	had	the	opportunity	to	visit	their	relatives	and	neighbours	in	the	neighbourhood.		They	also	made	some	tours	to	visit	heritage	centers	 such	 as	 a	 museum	 and	 a	 palace	 located	 in	 historical	 towns	 such	 as	Sa’yun	 and	 Shibam	 (see	 figure	 6.1).	 In	 contrast,	 I	 noted	 during	 my	 stay	 in	
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Yemen	that	Sada	who	visit	Hadramaut	stay	mainly	in	lodges	or	hotels	in	Tarim	or	other	adjacent	towns.	The	primary	purpose	of	their	visit	was	to	make	tours	to	several	shrines	and	religious	sites,	and	to	visit	religious	leaders	and	attend	religious	celebrations	such	as	haul	and	maulid.	They	tended	to	visit	their	core	family	members	 –	 if	 they	 knew	where	 they	 lived,	which	was	 not	 always	 the	case	-	only	after	completing	such	religious	rituals.	As	most	of	the	shrines	were	of	 members	 of	 Sada	 clans,	 visiting	 their	 graves	 and	 religious	 leaders	 was	deemed	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 their	 origin	 linked	 to	 Hadrami	 religious	 leaders	claiming	descent	from	the	Prophet.		
	Figure	6.1:	Hasan	al-Kathiri	(on	the	left)	with	his	step-sister’s	son	and	grandson	in	Bahere,	Say’un,	Hadramaut.	This	picture	is	part	of	al-Kathiri’s	photo	collection	concerning	his	visit	in	2013		The	different	activities	that	non-Sada	and	Sada	engage	in	reflect	their	different	Islamic	 affiliations,	 which	 roughly	 divide	 them	 into	 more	 Salafi	 and	traditionalist	Islamic	groups.	Among	the	group	of	Ambonese	Hadramis	whom	I	accompanied	 on	 their	 visit	 to	 Hadramaut	 there	 were	 no	 followers	 of	 Salafi	Islam.		When	I	talked	to	Salafi	Hadramis	in	Ambon	about	their	return	visits	to	Hadramaut,	they	told	me	that	they	did	not	go	to	any	shrine	as	they	considered	visiting	shrines	heretic.	I	noted	that	the	Sada	informants	whom	I	accompanied,	on	the	other	hand,	were	very	keen	on	engaging	in	any	religious	activity	related	to	 requesting	 blessings	 from	 both	 living	 and	 deceased	 ‘imagined’	 family	members.	They	conceive	of	such	‘family	members’	as	mediators	of	God.	I	also	noted	that	differences	in	interpretations	of	Islam	come	to	the	fore	in	the	shopping	activities	of	the	people	I	accompanied	to	Hadramaut.		Both	Sada	and	 non-Sada	were	 busy	 collecting	what	 in	 their	 eyes	were	 typical	 Hadrami	items	as	 gifts	 for	 their	 relatives	or	 friends	 in	 Indonesia.	My	Sada	 informants,	
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for	instance,	showed	me	typically	Hadrami	food,	clothes,	and	accessories	such	as	honey,	tribal	dresses	and	other	items	they	took	back	to	Ambon.	In	addition	to	typically	Hadrami	products,	 I	noticed	that	my	Sada	informants	also	bought	religious	souvenirs	such	as	a	headdress	with	the	stamp	of	the	Prophet’s	hand,	religious	chanting	booklets,	and	other	religion	related	items	which	may	mark	particular	 signs	 of	 their	 traditionalist	 affiliation.	 	 In	 contrast,	 when	my	 non-Sada	 informant	 Hasan	 al-Kathiri	 showed	 to	 me	 what	 items	 he	 bought	 from	Hadramaut,	he	produced	some	Hadrami	items,	such	as	a	dagger,	men’s	clothes,	and	 honey.	 He	 explained	 that	 he	 considered	 them	 as	mere	 traditional	 items	that	 reminded	 him	 about	 the	 homeland,	 rather	 than	 considering	 them	 as	something	Islamic.			
3.2 Religious	Revitalization		Religious	differentiation	among	the	Hadramis	in	Indonesia	differs	slightly	from	that	 in	 Hadramaut.	 As	 I	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 five,	 after	 the	 Islamic	 reform	movement	 initiated	 by	 Jamaludin	 al-Afghani	 and	 his	 followers	 Muhammad	Abduh	and	Muhammad	Rashid	Rida	gained	its	foothold	in	Egypt	in	the	end	of	nineteenth	century	and	was	spread	to	other	Muslim	colonies	in	the	beginning	of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 traditionalist	 Sunni	 Islam	based	on	Shafi’i	 school	of	thought	 brought	 by	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 to	 the	 diaspora	 began	 to	 be	contested	 (Mobini-Kesheh	 1999,	 52-53).	 Since	 then	 traditionalist	 and	(classical)	Salafi	Sunni	Islam	have	been	in	competition	with	each	other	among	Hadramis	in	Indonesia	and	also	in	Hadramaut	until	today.	While	a	more	rigid	Salafi	ideology	from	Saudi	Arabia	has	found	support	both	among	Hadramis	in	Indonesia	 and	 those	 in	Hadramaut,	 Twelver	 Shi’a	 Islam	has	 caused	 religious	polarization	 among	 the	 Indonesian	 Hadramis,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 account	suggesting	the	penetration	of	Twelver	Shi’a	into	Hadramaut.159		The	dominant	views	on	 Islam	 in	Hadramaut	 still	 concern	 traditionalist	 and	Salafi	 Sunnis,	 in	which	 the	 latter	 is	 categorized	 into	 reformist,	 fundamentalist,	 and	 politicist	streams	(Knysh	2008).		The	 polarization	 between	 Salafi	 and	 traditionalist	 (Sufi)	 Islam	 in	Hadramaut	has	been	a	striking	feature	after	the	fall	of	the	socialist	government	in	 1990	 (Freitag	 2003;	 Ho	 2006;	 Knysh	 2008;	 Arai	 2011;	 Alatas	 2016b).		However,	 traditionalist	 Islam	 is	 more	 dominantly	 present	 than	 Salafi	 Islam	because	 the	 traditionalists	 have	 gained	 a	 strong	 support	 from	 locals	 or	‘nativists’,	 while	 Salafism	 is	 viewed	 by	many	 as	 a	 foreign	 ideological	 import	(Knysh	2001).	Traditionalists	and	Salafis	can	also	be	distinguished	in	terms	of	different	institutionalization	of	both	groups.	Traditionalists	have	a	long	history	
                                                159	This	situation	may	have	changed	 in	 the	 last	 few	years	when	the	war	 in	Yemen	has	been	supported	by	various	foreign	parties,	at	least	by	Saudi	Arabia	in	one	hand	and	Iran	on	the	other	hand.		
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of	 experience	 in	 managing	 religious	 institutions.	 	 In	 the	 late	 nineteenth	century,	Hadramaut	was	one	of	the	religious	centres	of	Shafi’i	scholarship	and	jurisprudence,	and	of	a	Sufi	order,	Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya,	among	the	 Indian	Ocean	religious	 scholars.	 Many	 religious	 schools	 were	 established	 throughout	Hadramaut	especially	in	towns	of	Say’un	and	Tarim.	They	were	closed	during	the	 Socialist	 regime	 but	 reopened	 after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 regime	 (Freitag	1999).	During	 my	 fieldtrip	 to	 Hadramaut	 I	 noted	 that	 most	 of	 the	 Islamic	boarding	schools	are	affiliated	with	the	traditionalists.	My	informants	told	me	that	 the	Salafis	also	have	 religious	 schools,	but	 their	 schools	are	mainly	non-boarding	 schools.	A	well-known	Salafi	 boarding	 school	 is	 located	outside	 the	province	 of	 Hadramaut.	 This	 school	 was	 called	 Dar	 al-Hadith,	 located	 in	Dammaj,	the	northern	governorate	of	Sa’dah.	The	Dar	al-Hadith	has	attracted	many	 students	 from	around	 the	world	 (Bonnefoy	2011).	 It	was	 closed	down	during	the	siege	of	the	Yemeni	capital	by	the	Houthi	group,	a	member	of	Zaydi	Shi’ite	 Islam,	 in	 September	 2014.	 A	 non-Sada	 informant	 said	 that	 a	 Salafi	school	 in	 the	 North	 was	 relocated	 to	 Mukalla,	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 Hadramaut	governorate	 in	 the	 South.	 He	 did	 not	 know	 its	 name,	 but	 I	 surmise	 he	 was	referring	 to	 the	Dar	 al-Hadith.	He	 added	 that	 three	brothers	of	 non-Hadrami	descent,	 sons	 of	 a	 Butonese	 trader	 in	Ambon	went	 to	North	Yemen	 to	 study	there.	 The	 eldest	 was	 killed	 during	 the	 clashes	 between	 Sunni	 and	 Shi’ite	militias,	but	it	was	not	clear	whether	the	deceased	student	was	involved	in	the	fighting	against	the	Shi’ite.		As	the	Zaydi	branch	of	Shi’ism	has	dominated	North	Yemen,	the	growing	Salafi	activism	after	the	1990	Yemeni	unification	in	the	region	has	threatened	Zaydism.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 several	 clashes	 between	 Zaydi	 and	 Salafi	 followers	(Salmoni	 et	 al	 2010,	 3-6).	 In	 this	 regard,	 although	 the	 Salafi	 movement	 in	Yemen	 has	 been	 rising	 significantly	 since	 the	 1980s	 (Vom	 Bruck	 2005)	 and	even	more	so	in	the	1990s	(Knysh	2001[2008]),	it	has	not	been	supported	by	educational	institutions	such	as	religious	boarding	schools	in	Hadramaut.	This	was	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	I	found	no	Salafi	Hadrami	from	Ambon	who	came	 to	Hadramaut	 to	 study	 religion.	 	 Instead	 of	 going	 to	 Hadramaut,	 some	Salafi	Hadramis	from	Ambon	departed	to	universities	of	other	Middle	Eastern	countries	such	as	Riyadh	University	in	Saudi	Arabia	and	al-Azhar	University	in	Egypt.	In	 line	with	 the	 above	 Islamic	 configurations	 both	 in	Hadramaut	 and	 in	Indonesia	 and	 Ambon	 in	 particular,	 one	 of	 the	main	 results	 of	 the	 renewed	connections	 between	 Hadramaut	 and	 Indonesia	 is	 the	 revitalization	 of	traditionalist	 Sunni	 Islam	based	on	 the	 Shafi’i	 school	 of	 thought	 and	 the	 Sufi	order	 Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya	 (Knysh	 2001;	 Alatas	 2008	 [2011]	 [2016b]).	 The	revitalization	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 traditionalist	 Sunni	 Islam	 is	 marked	 by	 the	establishment	 of	 traditionalist	 schools	 and	 networks	 around	 Indonesia,	 and	
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the	 emergence	 of	 pilgrimage	 centers	 linked	 to	 the	 Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya	 in	Hadramaut.		
3.2.1 Traditionalist	 Schools	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 their	 Networks	 in	
Ambon	Hadramaut	 has	 several	 religious	 educational	 institutions	 linked	 to	traditionalist	 Islam.	 One	 can	 find	 such	 institutions	 throughout	 the	 whole	region,	with	a	concentration	in	the	interior.	 	Say’un	and	Tarim	are	among	the	main	oldest	religious	educational	centres	in	the	region	and	have	a	long	history	of	relations	with	the	Hadrami	community	in	the	Indian	Ocean	littoral	(Freitag	1999).		The	oldest	religious	school,	rubat,	was	founded	in	Say’un	around	1878/9	by	 Ali	 b.	 Muhammad	 al-Habshi	 (1843-1915).	 Al-Habshi	 studied	 in	 the	 Hijaz	with	 his	 father,	 the	 Shafi’i	 mufti	 of	 Mecca,	 as	 well	 as	 with	 the	 prominent	scholar	and	teacher	of	so	many	Shafi’i	 ‘ulama	of	his	generation,	Ahmad	Zayni	al-Dahlan.	After	his	return	to	Say’un,	he	regularly	preached	in	mosques	until	he	built	 his	 own	 mosque,	 al-Riyad,	 in	 1878/9.	 Later,	 the	 mosque	 became	 the	foundation	for	the	school,	rubat.	Less	than	a	decade	later,	another	school	was	established	in	Tarim.	This	Rubat	Tarim	was	initiated	by	members	of	a	Hadrami	reform	 society	 based	 in	 Singapore	 and	 Java.	 The	 members	 of	 the	 reform	society	 appointed	 Abd	 al-Rahman	 b.	 Muhammad	 al-Mashur,	 the	 Mufti	 of	Hadramaut	 and	 author	 of	 shams	 al-zahira,	 the	 famous	 genealogy	 of	 the	Hadrami	 Sada,	 as	 the	 director	 of	 the	 Rubat.	 One	 of	 the	 graduates	 from	 the	Rubat	Tarim	was	Sayyid	Idrus	b.	Salim	al-Jufri,	who	travelled	to	Indonesia	and	founded	a	religious	school,	al-Khairat,	in	Central	Sulawesi,	in	1930.	Branches	of	this	school	have	spread	mainly	to	northeastern	Indonesia,	ranging	from	North	Maluku	to	West	Papua	(Slama	2011,	245-248).	We	can	also	find	its	branch	in	Ambon	 (see	 chapter	 5	 pages	 206-207).	 During	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century,	some	smaller	religious	schools	were	also	erected	in	other	parts	of	Hadramaut.	Most	of	 them	were	related	 to	 religious	scholars	of	Sada	origin	 (Freitag	1999,	165).		During	the	Socialist	era	(1967-1990),	the	religious	schools	in	Hadramaut	were	closed	down,	and	they	were	revived	again	after	the	collapse	of	the	regime	(Arai	2011,	54).	The	unification	of	North	Yemen	and	South	Yemen	marked	the	beginning	of	 period	 in	 which	 religious	 schools	 would	 flourish.	 Apart	 from	 the	revitalization	 of	 existing	 schools,	 new	 religious	 schools	 have	 been	 founded,	especially	in	Tarim.	Today,	there	are	several	religious	schools	in	Tarim,	such	as	Rubat	Tarim,	Dar	al-Mustafa,	Dar	al-Guraba,	and	Ahqaf	Shari’a	faculty,	each	of	which	has	its	own	religious	specificity.	Dar	al-Mustafa	emphasizes	its	learning	curriculum	on	da’wa,	while	Dar	al-Guraba	focuses	on	Qur’anic	sciences.	While	the	Rubat	Tarim,	Dar	al-Mustafa	and	Dar	al-Guraba	are	non-formal	education	
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institutions	 that	 use	 traditional	 methods	 of	 religious	 learning,	 the	 faculty	 of	Shari’a	of	Ahqaf	is	the	only	formal	religious	education	which	focuses	on	Islamic	law	 and	 is	 addressed	 particularly	 to	 students	 of	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 education.	Although	each	school	operates	independently,	the	schools	allow	students	from	other	 religious	 institutions	 to	 participate	 in	 each	 other’s	 religious	 courses,	rituals,	and	other	activities.	Each	school	is	founded	by	prominent	members	of	Sada	families,	whose	kinship	ties	play	a	role	 in	building	a	cooperation	among	their	religious	institutions.	The	 revived	connections	between	 the	Hadramis	 in	Hadramaut	and	 their	diasporas	 in	 the	 Indian	 Ocean	 is	 reflected	 in	 student	 enrollment	 in	 the	religious	schools	of	Hadramaut.	 	During	my	fieldtrip	in	2015,	I	noted	that	the	majority	of	students	 in	the	schools	came	from	Malay	speaking	countries	such	as	 Indonesia	 and	 Malaysia.	 This	 was	 followed	 by	 students	 from	 Africa	 and	Yemen.	Furthermore,	there	appear	to	be	new	entries	from	Western	countries.		Among	these	religious	educational	institutions,	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	is	the	most	popular	 school.	Having	gone	 through	vast	 improvements	 it	 currently	attracts	many	 Indonesian	 students	 (Knysh	2001;	Ho	2006;	Alatas	2016b).	One	of	 the	alumni	of	 this	 school	 is	my	 informant	Muhammad	Rifki	 al-Hamid,	 founder	of	the	ar-Rahmah	(see	chapter	5	pages	187-188).	Al-Hamid	was	the	first	initiator	among	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	who	established	a	link	with	the	school.	The	 success	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 is	 due	 to	 the	 many	 activities	 of	 its	founder,	 Habib	 Umar,	 and	 of	 its	 alumni,	 who	 have	 built	 religious	 networks	around	Indonesia	and	other	countries	(Knysh	2001;	Arai	2011;	Alatas	2016b).	Apart	 from	Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid,	 two	 other	 Hadrami	 informants	 from	Indonesia	now	living	in	Hadramaut	told	me	about	their	relationship	to	the	Dar	al-Mustafa.		The	 first	 was	 Hakim,	 an	 	 Indonesian	 Sada	 descendant	 from	 al-Khiyyid	family	in	Tegal	who	was	35	years	old	when	I	met	him.	He	came	to	Hadramaut	to	study	in	Rubat	Inat	in	2006/2007	and	also	spent	time	at	the	Dar	al-Mustafa.	After	 finishing	his	studies	 five	years	 later	he	married	a	Sada	woman	 from	Ba	Shura	family	in	Pasuruan	East	Java,	and	brought	his	wife	to	Tarim.	Since	2011,	Hakim	and	his	wife	has	 lived	opposite	of	 the	Dar	al-Zahra,	which	 is	 a	 female	religious	boarding	school	and	a	co-joint	school	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	managed	by	 Habib	 Umar’s	 first	 wife	 and	 their	 daughters.	 Apart	 from	 assisting	 the	development	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 its	 founder,	 Habib	 Umar,	 Hakim	 has	also	 opened	 a	 souvenir	 and	 grocery	 store	 and	 he	 has	 begun	 a	 business	 as	 a	pilgrimage	tour	operator.	Al-Hamid,	his	aunt,	and	I,	as	well	as	other	pilgrims,	were	staying	in	his	rented	house	during	our	stay	in	Tarim.	Besides	running	his	office,	Hakim	 also	 acts	 himself	 as	 a	 tour	 leader	 for	 pilgrims,	 especially	 those	from	Indonesia.	The	other	informant	is	Sunan,	a	Sada	Hadrami	of	the	bin	Jindan	clan	from	Jakarta.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 my	 fieldtrip	 to	 Yemen,	 Sunan	 was	 28	 years	 old.	 His	
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father	had	died	when	he	was	five	years	old.	Habib	Umar,	the	founder	of	Dar	al-Mustafa,	adopted	him	and	his	brother	in	2005.	Sunan	and	his	brother	lived	in	Habib	 Umar’s	 house	 from	 2005	 to	 2012.	 Sunan	 then	married	 an	 Indonesian	woman	of	the	Sada	al-Atas	family	in	2013	and	brought	his	wife	to	Tarim	where	he	 rented	 an	 apartment	 nearby	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 complex.	 Apart	 from	assisting	the	Dar	al-Mustafa,	Sunan	also	has	opened	a	restaurant	in	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	 school	 and	 he	 runs	 a	 food	 catering	 enterprise.	 During	 my	 stay	 in	Tarim,	Sunan	was	the	one	who	cooked	for	the	Indonesian	pilgrims	who	were	staying	in	Hakim’s	house.	Both	Hakim	and	Sunan	told	me	that	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	was	a	product	of	Habib	Umar’s	first	trip	to	Indonesia	in	1993.	His	visit	to	his	relatives	and	other	religious	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya	 was	 the	 initial	 step	 of	establishing	a	religious	school	in	Tarim.	The	Rabita	al-‘Alawiyya	(see	chapter	4	pages	 117-121)	 functioned	 as	 co-founder.	 Its	main	 task	was	 to	 send	 around	thirty	 to	 forty	 Indonesian	students	 to	Tarim.	Thirty	 Indonesian	students	who	were	 recruited	 in	 1994	 became	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 the	 school.	 They	completed	their	studies	in	four	years.	I	was	told	that	the	first	generation	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	was	students	of	various	backgrounds,	although	many	of	 them	originated	from	Sada	families.	Since	1994,	Indonesia	has	sent	students	to	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	every	year,	and	it	has	become	the	biggest	student-sending	country.	Hakim	told	me	that	the	number	of	 Indonesian	graduates	 from	 the	 school	 reached	3.000	 in	2015.	 	As	the	graduates	founded	several	majelis	ta’lim,	non-formal	religious	study	circles	or	 forums	 after	 their	 return,	 approximately	 3.000	 alumni	 have	 established	religious	forums/centers	all	over	Indonesia.	The	graduates	have	thus	acted	as	religious	 preachers	 and	 promoters	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Hadrami	traditionalist	Islam	in	Indonesia.	My	informant	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid	is	an	example	of	being	both	an	object	 and	 subject	 of	 diaspora	 of	 Hadrami	 traditionalist	 Islam.	 	 Al-Hamid	became	interested	in	seeking	religious	knowledge	in	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	when	he	attended	some	non-formal	religious	courses	during	the	1999-2002	conflicts	in	 Ambon	 and	 his	 temporary	 stay	 in	 East	 Java.	 His	 teachers	 in	 the	 courses	introduced	 him	 to	 former	 alumni	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa,	 who	 frequently	travelled	to	Hadramaut.	Al-Hamid’s	dream	to	study	in	Hadramaut	was	realized	after	completing	his	bachelor	in	computer	science	in	a	college	in	East	Java.	He	studied	in	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	from	2008	to	2010	with	a	scholarship	from	the	Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya.	 After	 his	 return	 to	 Ambon,	 he	 established	 a	 foundation,	called	 ar-Rahmah,	which	 conducts	 a	 regular	majelis	ta’lim	(religious	 teaching	forum).	 In	2014,	the	ar-Rahmah	granted	scholarship	to	five	students	to	study	to	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 other	 traditional	 schools	 in	 Hadramaut.	 	 This	example	 illustrates	 how	 al-Hamid	 has	 transformed	 from	 being	 a	 passive	
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receiver	 toward	 an	 active	 transmitter	 of	 traditionalist	 Islam.	 This	transformation	was	the	result	of	his	mobility	and	religious	networking.	As	a	centre	of	the	Sada	organization	in	Indonesia	since	the	very	beginning	of	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa,	 the	 Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya	 has	 been	one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 supporting	 institutions	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	revitalization	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 other	 traditionalist	 schools	 in	Hadramaut.	 	 With	 the	 spread	 of	 several	 religious	 schools	 and	 religious	institutions	 initiated	 by	 the	 Indonesian	 alumni	 from	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	other	religious	schools	in	Hadramaut,	scholarships	to	study	in	Hadramaut	are	not	only	provided	by	the	Rabita	but	also	by	these	newly	religious	foundations	and	 schools	 such	 as	 the	 ar-Rahmah	 foundation	 initiated	 by	 my	 informant	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid.	Many	 Indonesian	 students	 in	 Hadramaut,	 however,	 do	 not	 receive	 a	scholarship,	but	are	supported	by	their	own	families.	This	is	especially	the	case	for	those	who	are	related	to	Hadrami-initiated	traditionalist	boarding	schools	in	 Indonesia.	When	I	was	 in	Tarim,	 I	met	several	people	 from	Indonesia	who	had	 come	 to	 visit	 their	 children	 or	 relatives,	 and	 to	make	 a	 pilgrimage	 tour.	Most	 of	 these	 people	 manage	 traditionalist	 boarding	 schools	 in	 Indonesia	themselves.	 For	 example,	 a	 Sada	 descendant	 from	 the	 al-Muhdar	 family	who	founded	a	boarding	school	 in	East	 Java	came	to	Hadramaut	together	with	his	wife,	 his	 wife’s	 sister	 and	 brother’s	 in	 law.	 Apart	 from	 performing	 the	pilgrimage	 to	Mecca	and	visiting	 several	pilgrimage	 sites	 in	Hadramaut,	 they	also	came	to	visit	 their	son	and	nieces	who	were	at	 that	 time	studying	at	 the	Dar	al-Mustafa	and	Dar	al-Zahra.	During	 their	pilgrimage	 tour	 in	Hadramaut,	they	 were	 staying	 in	 the	 same	 lodge	 run	 by	 my	 informant	 Hakim	 where	 I	stayed.	Some	religious	leaders	related	to	these	traditionalist	schools	in	Indonesia	have	 invested	 money	 to	 provide	 their	 children	 with	 an	 education	 in	Hadramaut	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 preparing	 them	 to	 replace	 their	 fathers	 as	religious	leaders	when	they	become	older.	This	shows	that	acquiring	religious	knowledge	in	Hadramaut	is	still	an	important	form	of	symbolic	capital	among	the	 Hadrami	 traditionalist	 descendants	 in	 the	 diaspora	 to	 gain	 religious	authority.	Maintaining	 contacts	 between	 the	 schools	 in	 Hadramaut	 and	 graduates	and	Sada	descendants	in	Indonesia	is	not	only	undertaken	by	sending	students	to	 Hadramaut,	 but	 also	 by	 convening	 meetings	 and	 founding	 a	 network	association.	 My	 informant	 Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 told	 me	 that	 twice	 a	year,	Indonesian	graduates	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	organize	meetings	during	the	months	of	Muharram	(the	first	month	of	the	Islamic	calendar)	and	Rajab	(the	seventh	month	of	the	Islamic	calendar)	for	which	they	invite	the	founder	of	the	Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 his	 family	 to	 Indonesia.	 Many	 other	 former	 students	 in	Indonesia,	 particularly	 in	 Java,	 invite	 the	 founder	 of	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 Habib	
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	Thanks	 to	 its	 massive	 networking	 activities	 in	 the	 diaspora,	 particularly	 in	Indonesia,	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 has	 been	 able	 to	 grow	 significantly.	My	 informant	Hakim	 (see	pages	213-214)	 told	me	 that	 in	 its	 early	days,	 the	 school	did	not	have	a	boarding	house	but	used	a	 local	mosque	to	teach	the	 first	pupils	 from	Indonesia.	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 building	 was	 carried	 out	around	 between	 1999	 and	 2000	with	 the	 help	 of	 two	 Indonesian	 architects	from	 Sada	 families.	 Hakim	 pointed	 out	 me	 that	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 its	neighbourhood	 is	 a	 religious	 endowment	 from	 a	 successful	 businessman	 of	Sada	origin	in	Abu	Dabi.	The	building	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	is	the	only	religious	school	 in	 Hadramaut	 built	 of	 modern	 brick	 instead	 of	 mud.	 Some	 modern	facilities	such	as	ACs,	electricity,	computers,	and	internet	have	gradually	been	installed	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 the	 institute.	 	 The	 teaching	 staffs	 of	 the	 school,	including	 the	 founder,	 have	 been	 trained	 to	 use	 modern	 communication	technology.	 During	 my	 fieldtrip	 in	 Hadramaut,	 I	 met	 a	 Sada	 man	 (about	 30	years	old)	from	Jakarta	who	specialized	on	TV	broadcasting.	 	He	had	come	to	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	to	train	some	of	its	staff	members	to	use	camera	recording	to	make	videos.	The	use	of	such	modern	amenities	for	supporting	the	religious	missionary	 activities	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 reflects	 how	 the	 revival	 of	traditionalist	 Islam	 in	 Hadramaut	 in	 the	 twenty	 first	 century	 has	 been	reshaped	 by	 its	 entanglement	 with	 a	 more	 modern	 world	 in	 the	 diaspora,	which	 results	 in	 reforming	 a	 homeland	 as	 occurred	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	century	(Freitag	2003).	The	 branches	 of	 the	Dar	 al-Mustafa	 presently	 include	 the	Dar	 al-Safa	 in	Sana’a,	Rubat	Inat	in	Inat,	Rubat	in	As-Sihr,	Rubat	in	Mukalla,	and	Dar	al-Idrus	in	 Tarim.	 Another	 goal	 for	 further	 development	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 is	 the	broadening	of	the	school’s	branches	and	targeting	new	categories	of	students	by	establishing	new	branches	and	offering	short	religious	courses,	daura.		The	Dar	al-Mustafa	has	recently	started	to	attract	female	students,	for	example	by	establishing	Dar	al-Zahra	as	a	co-joint	school	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa.	Consisting	of	 a	 seven	 years	 programme,	 the	 religious	 education	 at	 the	 Dar	 al-Zahra	consists	of	three	levels:	beginner,	intermediate,	and	advanced.	I	had	the	opportunity	to	interview	the	vice	principal	of	the	Dar	al-Zahra,	Muniba	who	was	40	years	old	when	I	met	her.160	She	told	me	that	 the	school	
                                                160	Muniba	 was	 born	 in	 East	 Africa	 to	 parents	 of	 African	 Yemeni	 origin,	 who	moved	from	East	Africa	to	Canada	in	1990.	Her	father	was	an	accountant	and	her	mother	is	a	housewife.	 Muniba	 is	 a	 graduate	 from	 a	 university	 in	 Toronto	 Canada,	 majoring	 in	mathematics,	 and	 then	 took	 an	 Arabic	 course	 in	 al-Azhar	 University	 of	 Egypt.	Afterwards,	 she	went	back	 to	Canada	 to	 teach	 in	an	 Islamic	 school.	When	 teaching	 in	that	 school,	 Muniba	 felt	 that	 something	 was	 lacking.	 It	 was	 the	 spirituality	 that	 she	finally	found	in	the	Dar	al-Zahra	in	Tarim.	Her	hunger	for	spirituality	led	her	to	quit	her	job	as	a	teacher	in	that	Islamic	school	in	Canada.	In	the	Dar	al-Zahra	Muniba	has	spent	
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began	 in	 2004	 –	 2005	 and	 that	 twenty	 out	 of	 the	 thirty	 first	 generation	 of	students	were	from	Indonesia.	These	girls	were	accommodated	in	the	house	of	Habib	Umar’s	first	wife.	As	more	and	more	students	enrolled,	after	few	years	a	boarding	 school	 was	 opened	 to	 accommodate	 the	 students.	 According	 to	Muniba,	 the	 school	 had	 350	 students	 in	 2015,	 100	 of	 whom	 came	 from	Indonesia,	 followed	 by	 students	 from	Malaysia,	 Thailand,	 Africa,	 Yemen,	 and	Western	countries	(e.g	America,	Scotland,	Britain,	and	France).161		When	I	visited	the	Dar	al-Zahra,	I	met	many	Indonesian	female	students.	Salima	(17	years	old	at	that	time),	a	student	from	a	Sada	family	of	al-Muhdar	in	East	Java	helped	me	to	make	a	list	of	the	students	studying	at	Dar	al-Zahra	at	the	 time.	 Approximately	 twenty	 five	 of	 the	 hundred	 Indonesian	 students	turned	 out	 to	 be	 from	Sada	 families	 from	 all	 over	 Indonesia,	 especially	 from	Java.		As	of	2010,	 the	Dar	al-Mustafa	has	 introduced	more	restrictive	entrance	requirements	 for	 new	 students,	 who	 must	 now	 master	 Arabic	 and	 have	memorized	 at	 least	 half	 of	 the	 Qur’an	 before	 enrollment.	 	 The	 different	branches	that	were	established	in	order	to	accommodate	the	influx	of	students	from	abroad	have	less	strict	requirements	than	those	of	its	main	school.	Also,	a	one-month	religious	course	during	the	month	of	Sha’ban	is	offered	every	year,	providing	 a	 preliminary	 religious	 training	 for	 those	 interested	 in	 the	Dar	 al-Mustafa’s	 method	 of	 learning	 but	 who	 do	 not	 yet	 have	 any	 adequate	knowledge	of	Islam,	such	as	new	converts.	The	growing	expansion	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	has	had	a	significant	impact	on	 its	 surrounding	 neighbourhood.	 Many	 shops	 have	 opened	 in	 order	 to	respond	to	the	needs	of	both	the	students	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	and	short-term	visitors	 such	 as	 pilgrims.	 Newly	 constructed	 houses	 have	 also	 emerged	 in	response	 to	 an	 increasing	 demand	 and	 interest	 of	 religious	 seekers	 and	pilgrims	from	overseas	who	come	to	visit	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	for	a	short	period	of	time.	Also,	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	boarding	school	has	resulted	in	the	development	of	 a	 new	 neighbourhood	 surrounding	 the	 school	 called	 bi’a	 mustafiya	(translation:	 ‘chosen	 environment’).	 	 Walking	 through	 the	 neighbourhood,	 I	noted	that	it	was	in	fact	a	multicultural	area	with	settlers	mainly	from	outside	Tarim	and	outside	Yemen,	many	among	whom	Indonesians.	At	the	time	of	my	visit,	 there	were	 about	 thirty	 Indonesian	 families	 of	 both	 Hadrami	 and	 non-Hadrami	 descent	 who	 rented	 houses	 and	 flats	 nearby	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	
                                                                                                             most	of	the	time	on	teaching,	preaching,	and	doing	social	work/charity.	This	brings	her	more	satisfaction	in	life.	Muniba	has	been	at	the	Dar	al-Zahra	9	years	(since	2006)	when	I	met	her.	The	first	 time	she	came	to	the	Dar	al-Zahra	was	when	she	participated	 in	a	religious	course,	daura,	as	the	third	batch	for	forty	days	and	then	she	extended	her	stay	for	a	year	until	I	met	her	in	February	2015.	Interview	with	Muniba,	February	16,	2015.		161	Interview	with	Muniba,	February	16,	2015.		
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compound.	 They	 were	 mainly	 alumni	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 other	educational	 institutions	 in	Hadramaut	who	had	brought	back	their	wives	and	children	to	settle	nearby	the	school.	They	returned	to	Tarim	in	order	to	deepen	their	religious	knowledge	as	well	as	for	khidma	(assistance)	to	the	founder	of	the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 his	 religious	 missionary	 project.	 Both	 Hakim,	 who	rented	 a	 room	 to	me	and	other	pilgrims,	 and	Sunan,	who	 cooked	during	our	stay	in	Tarim	belong	to	this	group	of	alumni.	The	Indonesian	alumni	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	who	have	settled	in	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	 complex	 play	 a	 major	 role	 in	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 religious	missionary	 work	 of	 the	 school.	 The	 khidma	 or	 assistance	 in	 religious	missionary	 activities	 includes	 participation	 in	 educational	 programmes	 and	organizing	pilgrimage	activities.	 In	 terms	of	 education,	 the	alumni	have	been	involved	in	recruiting	new	students	from	Indonesia	and	helping	them	to	adjust	to	a	new	environment.		When	pilgrims	from	Indonesia	visit,	they	serve	as	tour	leaders.	 Some	 of	 them	 also	 run	 their	 own	 business	 such	 as	 shops	 selling	miscellaneous	 goods	 including	 souvenirs,	 or	 they	 may	 rent	 out	 rooms	 for	guests	or	pilgrims	from	abroad.	The	 alumni’s	 assistance	 to	 the	Dar	 al-Mustafa	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 religious	missionary	activities	as	such.	Some	of	them	assist	in	internal	affairs	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa.	I	met	some	people	who	managed	the	logistics	in	the	house	of	Habib	Umar’s	 family	and	his	boarding	school.	Those	who	are	not	married	stay	with	the	family	as	household	assistants.	While	living	with	the	family	of	the	founder,	they	 follow	some	religious	courses	held	by	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	and/or	Dar	al-Zahra	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 working	 schedule.	 These	 students	 who	 stay	with	the	family	of	the	founder	are	recruited	on	the	basis	of	their	lineage.	More	precisely,	 the	 founder	 has	 prioritized	 to	 recruit	 orphans	 with	 Sada	backgrounds.	The	 popularity	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 its	 religious	 teachings	 is	mediated	by	 the	use	of	 social	media,	 particularly	 the	 internet.	Many	users	of	social	 media	 use	 images	 of	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 and	 other	prominent	Hadrami	scholars	of	Sada	origin	 in	 their	profile	pictures,	and	they	also	set	up	online	religious	forums	and	websites	linked	to	the	school.	Many	of	the	users	of	 these	 forums	are	graduates	of	 the	Dar	al-Mustafa,	who	regularly	update	news	about	the	school	and	Habib	Umar’s	religious	missionary	work.	Habib	 Umar	 is	 a	 very	 famous	 and	 respected	mobile	 preacher,	 who	 has	visited	 many	 regions	 and	 countries	 including	 Western	 countries.	 Thanks	 to	modern	 communication	 technology,	 his	 trips	 around	 the	world	 can	be	 easily	watched	on	Youtube	where	they	are	uploaded	by	his	followers.		Anthropologist	Alexander	Knysh	(2001,	407)	reports	that	when	he	spent	some	time	in	Tarim,	Habib	 Umar	 was	 constantly	 on	 the	move,	 having	 an	 agenda	 of	 preaching	 in	several	areas	 in	Yemen.	This	was	the	case	during	my	visit	as	well.	During	my	fieldtrip	 in	 Yemen,	 Habib	 Umar	 had	 a	 very	 busy	 schedule,	moving	 from	 one	
Chapter	6:	Hadramaut	as	an	Imaginary	Homeland	
221		
place	to	another,	including	Abu	Dabi	where	he	regularly	visits	a	hospital	for	a	medical	 check-up.	 	 Unfortunately,	 I	 could	 not	manage	 to	 arrange	 a	 personal	interview	 with	 him.	 Besides	 his	 busy	 travelling	 programme,	 other	 obstacles	were	the	strict	regulations	of	gender	segregation,	which	did	not	allow	me	as	a	woman	 to	 interview	 a	 male	 religious	 preacher.	 Fortunately,	 I	 did	 visit	 his	house	 to	meet	his	 first	wife	and	daughter,	who	are	responsible	 for	managing	the	Dar	al-Zahra	school.	The	use	of	social	media	in	promoting	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	and	its	teachings	has	 facilitated	 extending	 religious	 networks	 from	 offline	 to	 online	 contacts.	Having	 majored	 in	 computer	 science	 before	 starting	 his	 religious	 studies	 in	Tarim,	my	 informant	Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	modern	religious	 leader	 who	 uses	 social	 media	 to	 support	 the	 religious	 missionary	work	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa.	 He	 regularly	 shares	 his	 religious	 activities,	including	 his	 several	 visits	 to	 Hadramaut,	 on	 his	 Whatsapp	 group	 and	Facebook.	 	Like	al-Hamid,	many	alumni	of	the	religious	schools	in	Hadramaut	have	expanded	their	roles	from	offline	 ‘faith	entrepreneurs’	(Reetz	2013,	10),	who	 open	 a	 ‘religious	 shop’	 in	 the	 religious	 market,	 into	 online	 faith	entrepreneurs,	 who	 open	 virtual	 religious	 shops,	 thereby	 creating	 virtual	religious	travels	for	both	old	and	new	followers.	Although	virtual	mobility	can	be	an	alternative	form	of	travelling	for	the	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora	in	order	to	increase	their	religious	knowledge	and	revive	their	religious	identity,	physical	mobility,	which	is	always	emphasized	by	the	Hadrami	Sada,	 is	still	a	stronger	form	of	cultural	capital.	The	reason	for	this	 is	 that	 it	signifies	direct	access	to	what	 is	 considered	 as	 the	 truth	 and	 blessing	 from	 owners	 or	 guardians	 of	religious	knowledge.	What	characterizes	the	religious	education	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	is	a	focus	on	 cultivating	 values	 and	morality	 rather	 than	 Islamic	 scholarship.	 As	Knysh	(2001,	 409)	 argues,	 training	 students	 in	 developing	moral	 and	 spiritual	 self-discipline	 is	 based	 on	 Shafi’i	 and	 Sufi	 practices.	 The	 school’s	 educational	philosophy	 focuses	 on	 preparing	 students	 to	 become	 future	 religious	preachers	who	will	 propagate	 Islamic	 values	 to	 ordinary	 people	 in	 a	 simple	manner,	 instead	 of	 training	 students	 to	 become	 religious	 scholars	 such	 as	jurists	or	judges.	Furthermore,	 as	 there	 are	 many	 religious	 schools	 in	 Hadramaut,	specialization	 in	 a	 specific	 educational	 curriculum	 is	 not	 only	 a	 way	 to	distinguish	 one	 school	 from	 other	 religious	 schools,	 but	 is	 also	 a	 strategy	 to	meet	 people’s	 diverse	 demands	 and	 interests	 and	 thus	 survive	 in	 a	 highly	competing	religious	market.	For	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	what	is	most	significant	in	the	activities	of	the	Dar	 al-Mustafa	 is	 its	 strong	 ties	with	Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Indonesia.	The	 institution	 owes	 its	 success	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 to	 the	 interest	 of	students,	particularly	students	 from	Sada	backgrounds,	who	are	 interested	 in	
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pursuing	 their	 studies	 in	Hadramaut.	 For	Hadrami	 families	 in	 Indonesia	 and	Ambon,	 in	turn,	staying	at	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	 is	not	only	a	means	of	religious	self-development,	 but	 it	 also	 provides	 them	 with	 highly	 valued	 symbolic	capital	 in	 their	countries	of	residence	and	allows	 them	to	expand	their	social	capital	 by	 building	 on	 the	 networks	 that	 connects	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 alumni.	Having	attended	the	Dar	al-Mustafa	is	thus	a	way	of	expressing	distinction,	that	is,	distinction	from	fellow	Indonesian	Muslims	who	have	no	roots	on	the	Arab	Peninsula,	 and	distinction	 also	 between	 Sada	 families	 and	non-Sada	 families.	The	strength	of	a	focus	on	spiritual	growth	and	avoiding	scholarly	debates	on	the	interpretation	of	Islamic	texts,	allows	Dar	al-Mustafa	networks	to	include	a	heterogeneity	 of	 traditionalist	 views,	 thus	 enhancing	 rather	 than	 hampering	the	 opportunities	 of	 alumni	 to	 expand	 their	 networks	 both	 in	 Indonesia	 and	elsewhere.	
	
3.2.2 Local	Pilgrimage	and	Religious	Tour	Industries		
a. Pilgrimage	to	Shrines		The	 revival	 of	 traditionalist	 Sunni	 Islam	 that	 has	 resulted	 from	 the	 renewed	connections	 between	 Indonesia	 and	 Hadramaut	 since	 the	 mid-1990s	 also	comes	to	the	fore	in	the	emergence	of	pilgrimage	activities.	Knysh	(2008,	518)	points	 out	 that	 the	 position	 of	 a	 traditional,	 shrine-centered	 Islam	 in	Hadramaut	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 particularly	 robust.	 This	 shrine-culture	 is	centered	on	saint	veneration	and	graves-based	rituals.	As	most	of	the	religious	shrines	 and	 sites	 in	 Hadramaut	 are	 related	 to	 the	 ancestors	 of	 the	 Sada,	performing	 pilgrimage	 to	Hadramaut	 has	 been	mainly	 of	 a	 great	 interest	 for	Indonesian	Hadramis	of	Sada	descent.	However,	Indonesian	pilgrims	who	visit	Hadramaut	are	not	necessarily	all	of	Hadrami	descent.	The	 main	 activities	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 pilgrims	 I	 accompanied	 to	Hadramaut	consisted	of	visiting	religious	shrines	such	as	tombs,	mosques,	and	houses.	These	visits	to	shrines	and	sites	mainly	followed	the	trajectories	of	the	most	important	symbolic	figures	in	the	formation	of	the	Sada	community	and	the	 development	 of	 the	 Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya.	 The	 formation	 of	 the	 Sada	community	in	Hadramaut	started	with	the	migration	of	the	first	descendant	of	the	Prophet,	Ahmad	b.	Isa,	from	Iraq	in	the	tenth	century	(Ho	2006,	206).	His	settlement	in	Hadramaut	is	marked	as	a	corner	stone	of	the	construction	of	the	Sada	community	in	Hadramaut.	As	Ahmad’s	descendants	have	spread	beyond	his	 original	 area	 inside	 Hadramaut,	 the	 graves	 of	 his	 offspring	 form	 new	centers	of	pilgrimage	for	their	progeny	outside	Hadramaut.	These	shrines	are	mainly	 located	 in	 the	 interior	 such	 as	 Tarim,	Gurfah,	Huraidah,	 Inat,	Hautah,	Sa’yun,	and	other	adjacent	regions,	such	as	Wadi	Du’an.	Some	diasporic	places	could,	however,	also	be	found	on	the	coast	such	as	Mukalla	and	As-Shir.	
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Tarim	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	main	 pilgrimage	 centres	 for	 traditionalist	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora	(Ho	2006).	Thousands	of	religious	leaders	are	buried	there,	some	of	whom	have	founded	mosques	such	as	the	Ba’Alawi	mosque,	the	al-Aydrus	mosque,	 the	 al-Saqqaf	mosque,	 the	 al-Muhdar	mosque,	 and	 the	 al-Haddad	mosque.	The	names	of	the	mosques	are	ascribed	to	the	clan	names	of	their	founders.	Each	has	its	own	mystical	stories	related	to	their	founder.	One	of	 these	 mosques,	 the	 al-Muhdar	 mosque,	 has	 the	 highest	 minaret	 of	 all	mosques	and	has	become	an	icon	of	the	town	of	Tarim.		Of	Tarim’s	three	public	cemeteries,	Zanbal,	where	members	of	Sada	are	buried,	 is	 the	cemetery	most	pilgrims	 whom	 I	 accompanied	 on	 the	 journey	 from	 Ambon	 to	 Hadramaut	intended	to	perform	prayers	(see	 figure	6.3).	Bujra	(1971,	17)	noted	 in	1971	that	the	main	class	distinction	within	the	Hadrami	society	was	reflected	in	the	separation	of	graveyards,	and	 this	separation	exists	until	 the	present-day.	To	distinguish	Zanbal	from	the	other	two	cemeteries--Furat	and	Akdar--	is	that	it	has	 several	whitewashed	 domes,	which	 symbolize	 its	 grandeur	 and	 the	 high	social	and	religious	status	of	the	founder	who	lies	buried	there.			
	Figure	6.3:	Indonesian	male	and	female	pilgrims	listening	a	story	from	the	tour	guides	and	leaders	about	a	saint	in	Zanbal	cemetery,	Tarim,	Hadramaut.	While	listening	to	the	story,	some	of	them	were	taking	pictures		(photographed	by	the	author)	When	visiting	Zanbal,	together	with	other	pilgrims,	I	was	provided	with	a	map	for	directions	(see	figure	6.3	above).	As	most	of	the	Indonesian	pilgrims	were	not	 familiar	with	the	cemetery,	 they	depended	on	their	group	tour	 leaders	to	direct	them	where	to	begin	and	end	their	visit.	Yet,	the	pilgrims	stopped	only	at	 several	 tombs	 to	 conduct	 prayers.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 striking	 features	 I	observed	 in	 the	 Zanbal	 graveyard	 complex	 was	 the	 blackening	 of	 the	 white	
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gravestones	 in	 the	 tombs	 where	 the	 pilgrims	 performed	 their	 prayers.	 This	was	the	result	of	ritual	touching	and	kissing	by	the	pilgrims.	They	touch	or	kiss	the	tombs	either	before,	after,	or	during	the	prayers.	The	black	stains	on	white	gravestones	were	 therefore	 fair	 signs	 of	where	 the	most	 significant	 spiritual	leaders	within	the	Tariqa	‘Alawiyya’s	chain	lie	buried.	We	found	the	tombs	my	companions	wanted	to	visit,	 thanks	to	a	manual	 for	visiting	the	Zanbal	which	was	 first	 written	 by	 Ahmad	 al-Junaid	 (d.	 1858)	 and	 then	 published	 in	 an	abridged	version	by	Abd	al-Rahman	al-Mashur	(d.	1904),	 the	 first	director	of	the	Rubat	Tarim.	The	al-Junaid’s	manual	Salve	for	the	Sickly	 consists	not	only	 information	on	what	to	recite	and	to	whom	the	recital	prayers	should	be	addressed,	but	it	also	 gives	 the	 sequence	 in	which	graves	 should	be	visited.	The	 chronological	order	of	pilgrims’	movement	from	one	station	to	another	is	not	based	on	who	was	 first	 buried	 there.	 Rather,	 the	 sequence	 is	 symbolically	 linked	 to	 the	foundation	of	the	Tariqa,	which	was	established	by	Muhammad	b.	Ali,	al-Faqih	al-Muqaddam	 (the	 first	 Jurist),	 in	 the	 thirteenth	 century	 (Ho	 2006,	 221).	 	 In	this	 regard,	 the	 al-Junaid’s	manual	 has	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 constructing	 the	ritual	 process	 of	 contemporary	 pilgrimage	 into	 a	 symbolic	 order	 of	 the	 Sufi	order,	which	has	 left	 its	 traces	 in	 the	 forms	of	 tombs	of	 important	 leaders	of	the	order.	Shrines	 in	 Hadramaut	 are	 mainly,	 although	 not	 exclusively,	 related	 to	members	 of	 prophetic	 lineage.	 The	 devotion	 to	 the	 Prophet	 and	 his	descendants	 is	 a	key	aspect	 emphasized	within	 the	 shrine-culture	embedded	in	Sufi	 traditions	particularly	the	Tariqa	 ‘Alawiyya.	Knysh	(2001,	407)	argues	that	 this	 devotion	 to	 the	 Prophet	 and	 his	 descendants	 is	 one	 of	 the	 greatest	values	 Habib	 Umar	 and	 his	 followers	 appropriated	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 their	religious	 status	 in	 general	 and	 their	 Sufi-based	 educational	 philosophy	 in	particular.	I	also	heard	this	value	emphasis	from	the	tour	leaders	many	times	when	 visiting	 the	 shrines.	 For	 example,	 the	 tour	 leaders	 often	 said	 that	devotion	for	those	buried	in	the	shrines	was	a	means	of	gaining	access	of	God’s	knowledge	 for	 ordinary	 people.	 It	would	 elevate	 their	 religious	 status	 in	 the	eye	of	God	because	access	 to	 religious	knowledge	 is	an	exclusive	 right	of	 the	descendants	 of	 the	 Prophet.	 I	 heard	 this	 explanation	 also	 when	 visiting	 the	tombs	 of	 the	 two	 saints	 Shaikh	 Abd	 al-Rahman	 Ba	 Jalhabban	 and	 Shaikh	Abdullah	b.	Ahmad	Basaudan.	The	tour	 leaders	told	us	that	these	saints	were	not	of	Sada	origin,	but	that	due	to	their	closeness	and	devotion	to	descendants	of	 the	Prophet,	 they	had	become	 saintly	 religious	 scholars,	whose	 tombs	 are	among	 the	major	 shrines	 that	 people	 visit	 in	Hadramaut.	 Shaikh	Abdullah	 b.	Ahmad	Basaudan	is	said	to	be	co-author	of	a	religious	litany,	Hadrah	Basaudan,	which	is	ritually	recited	by	traditionalist	Hadramis	both	in	Hadramaut	and	in	the	 diaspora	 every	 Tuesday	 afternoon	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 people	 from	 bad	
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luck.	Indeed,	I	observed	the	prayer	being	said	by	traditionalist	Sada	people	in	Ambon.		Sainthood	 in	 Hadramaut	 seems	 to	 be	 predominantly	 a	 male	 affair.	However,	 there	 was	 one	 female	 saint	 whose	 shrine	 was	 included	 in	 the	pilgrimage	 tours.	This	 female	 saint	was	called	Shaikha	Sultana.	 She	 is	 said	 to	have	lived	in	the	period	of	Abd	al-Rahman	al-Saqqaf	(d.1416),	one	of	the	saints	buried	 in	 the	 Zanbal	 cemetery.	 According	 to	 our	 tour	 leader,	Hakim,	 Sultana	remained	 single	 and	 devoted	 her	 entire	 life	 to	 performing	 worship.	 In	 this	sense,	 this	 female	 saint	 resembles	 the	 famous	 historical	 Islamic	 female	 saint	Rabi’a	al-Adawiya	(717-801),	who	 is	also	said	to	have	remained	single	 in	her	entire	life	(Ahmed	1992;	Smith	2010).	Besides	the	tombs	of	saints,	the	tomb	of	the	Prophet	Hud	located	in	north	eastern	part	of	the	region	is	among	the	most	popular	pilgrimage	destinations	in	 Hadramaut.	 In	 the	 present-day,	 local	 people	 visit	 the	 tomb	 during	 the	Islamic	month	of	 Sha’ban,	 especially	 on	 the	 fifteenth	day	 (Al-Shabban	1998).	However,	pilgrims	or	visitors	from	abroad	or	other	places	outside	Hadramaut	are	welcome	to	visit	the	tomb	at	any	time.		A	popular	story	about	the	tomb	of	Prophet	Hud	is	about	the	river	nearby	the	 tomb	 complex.	 It	 is	 said	 to	 never	 fall	 dry	 because	 it	 is	 blessed.	Unfortunately,	 during	 my	 visit	 because	 of	 long	 drought	 it	 had	 dried	 up,	nonetheless.	One	of	the	pilgrims	in	the	group	I	accompanied	told	me	that	there	is	a	sad	story	related	to	this	river;	one	of	the	sons	of	Habib	Umar,	the	founder	of	the	Dar	al-Mustafa,	was	swept	away	by	the	current	when	he	was	swimming	in	the	river.	The	yearly	ritual	at	the	tomb	of	the	Prophet	Hud	has	thus	gained	additional	 significance	 to	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 Dar	 al-Mustafa	 as	 a	commemoration	 of	 his	 son.	 After	 the	 boy	 had	 died,	 Habib	 Umar	 built	 a	boarding	 house	 within	 the	 tomb	 complex,	 which	 can	 accommodate	 his	students	during	the	yearly	ritual	of	prophet	Hud.	Pilgrims	are	also	directed	to	visit	a	tomb	of	the	Prophet	(nabi)	Haudan,	a	prophet	who	 is	 less	 popular	 as	 he	 is	 not	mentioned	 in	 the	 Islamic	 scripture.	The	 tomb	of	 the	Prophet	Haudan	 is	 located	near	 the	complex	of	 the	grave	of	the	saint	Shaikh	Ba	Saudan.	Through	 the	 pilgrimage	 tours,	 shrines	 and	 objects-related	 to	 shrines	undergo	 a	 process	 of	 sacralization.	 	 The	most	 common	 practice	 during	 such	pilgrimage	 rituals	 is	 drinking	 water.	 Religious	 shrines	 and	 sites	 such	 as	graveyards	 and	mosques	provide	water	 for	 the	 visitors	 to	drink	 from	and	 to	use	 for	 their	 ablutions	 before	 prayers.	 Echoing	 the	 highly	 valued	 Zamzam	water	 from	Mecca,	 this	water	 is	considered	to	contain	special	powers	 to	heal	people.	 	Indeed,	the	pilgrims	with	whom	I	travelled	regard	the	water	in	these	places	as	a	conduit	of	blessing	and	having	the	power	to	cure	illnesses.	Besides	drinking	the	water	at	the	site,	they	also	took	some	bottles	back	home.	I	noted	that	when	visiting	religious	leaders	and	attending	religious	rituals,	the	pilgrims	
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similarly	 brought	 water	 bottles	 with	 them	 and	 asked	 the	 leaders	 to	 say	 a	prayer	to	bless	the	water	(see	figure	6.4).	
	Figure	6.4:	A	tour	leader	pouring	water	that		has	been	blessed	by	a	religious	preacher	in	water	bottles	that	pilgrims	brought	with	them	(photographed	by	the	author)		All	 objects	 related	 to	 the	 shrines	 are	 considered	 to	 possess	 similar	 special	qualities.		Sand	from	the	complex	of	Shaikh	Abu	Bakar	b.	Salim,	for	example,	is	also	used	as	a	medicine.	When	visiting	Shaikh	Abu	Bakar	b.	Salim	grave	in	‘Inat,	I	saw	pilgrims	taking	some	sand	from	the	graveyard	complex	and	putting	it	in	plastic	bottles	(see	figure	6.5).	The	pilgrims	brought	the	sand	back	to	home	to	Indonesia	 to	keep	some	 for	 themselves	and	also	 to	give	some	of	 it	away	as	a	gift.	 Some	 people	 specifically	 ask	 their	 relatives	 or	 friends	 who	 visit	Hadramaut	to	bring	them	sand	from	saint	shrines	there.		The	popularity	of	the	sand	 as	medicine	 is	 related	 to	 a	 story	 about	 saints	 such	 as	 the	 one	 the	 tour	leaders	told	us	when	we	visited	a	specific	shrine:	A	student	once	came	to	ask	his	teacher	for	an	ijaza,	a	religious	certificate	that	 proves	 that	 someone	 had	 completed	 his	 religious	 studies	 and	 is	allowed	 to	 teach	 the	 texts	 he	 had	 learned	 from	 his	 teacher.	 The	 Shaikh	told	 his	 student	 that	 two	 thirds	 of	 his	 religious	 knowledge	 certificates	would	not	be	given	to	anybody	other	than	his	own	descendants,	but	that	one	third	could	be	obtained	by	others	through	his	graveyard.	So	the	sand	is	considered	as	a	proof	of	connection	to	the	saint.	The	sand	in	the	graveyard	 of	 the	 saint	 is	 said	 to	 bring	 about	 miracles	 for	 every	 pilgrim,	particularly	 those	 of	 non-prophetic	 lineage.	 In	 this	 case,	 sacredness	 of	 this	sand	 lies	 in	 a	 popular	 invented	 story,	which	 is	 orally	 passed	 on	 and	written	down	by	 the	 saint’s	 followers	 in	a	 form	of	hagiography.	Not	all	pilgrims	may	know	such	stories,	but	it	is	common	wisdom	that	sand	from	a	saint’s	graveyard	
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has	 healing	 power.	 	 For	 Hadrami	 living	 in	 the	 diaspora	 taking	 home	 sand	carries	 an	 extra	 layer	 of	 significance	 by	 connecting	 them	 to	 the	 country	 of	origin.		
	Figure	6.5:	Indonesian	pilgrims	collecting	sand	at	the	shrine	of	Shaikh	b.	Abu	Bakr		in	Hadramaut	(photographed	by	the	author)		Another	 example	 of	 the	 sacralization	 of	 objects	 pertains	 to	 the	 personal	belongings	 of	 the	 saints.	 Some	 descendants	 of	 saints	 have	 kept	 some	belongings	of	their	holy	ancestor.	When	visiting	the	munsib	(leader	of	a	clan)	of	al-Habshi	clan	in	Gurfah	after	visiting	the	graveyard	of	a	saint	of	al-Habshi	clan	called	‘Aydrus	b.	Umar	al-Habshi,	we	were	welcomed	into	his	living	room	and	shown	some	remains	of	his	grandfather’s	belongings.	The	remains	consisted	of	an	 imama	 (headgear),	 a	 janbiyya	 (traditional	 dagger),	 and	 some	 other	 dress	accessories.	 Every	 pilgrim	 was	 allowed	 to	 touch	 them	 before	 passing	 them	onto	others.	This	ritual	of	touching	the	saints’	belongings	is	performed	in	order	to	 receive	 blessings	 from	 the	 saint.	 	 A	 similar	 rite	 was	 performed	when	we	visited	the	house	of	Shaikh	Abu	Bakar	b.	Salim,	where	we	were	shown	Shaikh’s	private	 bedroom.	 In	 the	 bedroom	 a	 recently	 painted	 piece	 of	 the	 Shaikh’s	wooden	bed	was	on	display.	Pilgrims	were	allowed	to	get	into	the	bed	in	order	to	experience	how	it	was	used	by	the	saint.	Moreover,	actually	lying	in	the	bed	where	the	saint	slept	himself	gives	the	pilgrims	a	strong	sense	of	his	presence.		This	house	was	taken	care	of	a	descendant	of	the	saint,	who	functioned	also	as	
munsib	or	clan	leader.	This	 phenomenon	 of	 cherishing	 and	 displaying	 personal	 belongings	 of	saints	 is	 not	 unique.	 There	 are	 pilgrimage	 sites,	 both	 Islamic	 and	 otherwise	where	similar	practices	can	be	noted	(Turner	1969;	Turner	and	Turner	1978;	Cohen	1993;	Reader	and	Walter	1993;	Coleman	and	Elsner	1995).	The	practice	
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of	 keeping	 the	 saints’	 belongings	 in	Hadramaut	 is	 not	merely	 to	 connect	 the	living	 to	 the	 past.	 The	 belongings	 of	 the	 dead	 are	 valuable	 treasures	 that	provide	 symbolic	 capital	 to	 the	 descendants	 of	 the	 saint.	 The	 material	authenticity	that	is	claimed	through	ownership	of	such	belongings	also	relates	to	claims	of	legitimate	continuity	of	the	leadership	for	present-day	and	future	descendants	of	the	saints.	Particularly	for	Indonesian	Hadrami	of	Sada	descent,	seeing	and	 touching	 the	belongings	has	a	 special	 ring	 to	 it:	 again,	 it	 connects	them	 to	 their	 cultural	 background	 and	 reminds	 them	of	 their	 Sada	 origin.	 In	this	way,	 their	 religious	 identity	and	ethnic	 identity	mutually	 constitute	each	other.		




	Although	 their	 motivations	 to	 visit	 Hadramaut	 may	 differ,	 Indonesian	Hadramis	 with	 different	 religious	 affiliations	 benefit	 equally	 from	 the	 hajj-




	My	 informant	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid,	 for	 instance,	 started	his	pilgrimage	tour	business	 in	2013	 through	his	ar-Rahmah	 foundation	(see	 figure	6.7).	He	offers	three	kinds	of	pilgrimage	tour	packages:	hajj-umra	pilgrimage,	hajj-umra	and	 Hadramaut	 pilgrimage,	 and	 Hadramaut	 pilgrimage.	 He	 mainly	 sells	 the	first	 and	 the	 second	 package,	 as	most	 of	 his	 customers	 are	 not	 interested	 in	only	visiting	Hadramaut.	Malika	(see	chapter	introduction,	page	1)	and	myself,	were	 in	 fact,	 al-Hamid’s	 first	 customers	who	 took	 the	 last	 tour	 package	 that	only	included	Hadramaut.	Because	of	the	civil	war	in	Yemen	that	was	quickly	getting	worse	during	our	stay,	 it	 turned	out	 that	 for	 the	 time	being,	we	were	also	his	last	customers	for	a	package	tour	that	included	Hadramaut.	It	must	be	noted	that	unlike	many	other	cultural	heritage	tours	elsewhere	in	 the	 world,	 such	 as	 the	 Orkney	 Homecoming	 described	 by	 Basu	 (2004),	North	 American	 Jewish	 missions	 to	 Poland	 (Kugelmass	 1992)	 or	 African-American	pilgrimage	tourism	in	Ghana	(Schramm	2004),	there	are	no	package	tours	 to	 Hadramaut	 that	 are	 exclusively	 designed	 for	 Hadrami	 descendants.	Pilgrimage	tours	to	Hadramaut	are	open	to	all	Muslims	of	any	descent.	Indeed,	the	 pilgrims	 and	 religious	 seekers	 in	 Hadramaut	 from	 Indonesia	 are	 not	exclusively	linked	to	Hadrami	descent.	My	informant	Muhammad	Rifki	al-Hamid,	however,	operates	his	business	in	 close	 cooperation	 with	 a	 Sada-owned	 tour	 agency	 based	 in	 Jakarta	 and	Indonesian	 Hadrami	 Sada	 people	 based	 in	 Hadramaut.	 	 He	 does	 not	 only	provide	his	customers	with	religious	tour	packages,	but	also	acts	as	a	religious	tour	 guide	 for	 them,	 and	 he	 regularly	 travels	 back	 and	 forth	 between	Hadramaut	 and	Ambon.	His	main	 task	 is	 arranging	 a	 tour	 from	 Indonesia	 to	Mecca	and	to	Hadramaut.	Once	his	pilgrim	customers	arrive	in	Hadramaut,	the	Indonesian	alumni	based	 in	Hadramaut	 take	part	 in	 the	 tours	as	 tour	guides,	interpreters,	 and	 also	 as	 logistic	 managers	 of	 the	 tour,	 arranging	accommodation,	 food,	 and	 transportation.	 They	 are	 also	 in	 charge	 of	 the	contacts	 with	 local	 actors	 such	 as	 religious	 leaders	 and	 gatekeepers	 of	 the	shrines	in	Hadramaut.	Together	with	his	co-organizers	of	the	tour	packages,	al-Hamid	 can	 adjust	 the	 tours	 in	 terms	 of	 budget,	 taste,	 and	 demands	 of	Indonesian	 pilgrims.	 In	 this	 respect,	 similar	 to	 the	 religious	 authorities	 and	pilgrimage	 tour	 operators	 described	 by	 Ian	 Reader	 (2014)	 they	 use	 their	agency	 as	 ‘entrepreneurial	 religious	 leaders’	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 creating	 of	sacred	 spaces	 commensurate	 with	 visions	 and	 expectations	 of	 the	 pilgrims	(Reader	2014,	119).	The	traditionalist	Hadrami	pilgrims	from	Indonesia	to	Hadramaut	rely	on	tour	 packages	 they	 buy	 from	 travel	 agencies	 in	 Indonesia.	 The	 activities	 for	pilgrims	are	not	confined	to	visiting	religious	shrines	and	sites,	but	 there	are	also	 town	 tours	 that	 consist	also	of	visiting	 religious	 leaders,	public	markets,	and	 other	 non-religious	 places.	 The	 tour	 agents	 offer	 the	 pilgrims	 the	
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opportunity	 to	attend	religious	 feasts	 such	as	haul,	maulid,	 or	other	 religious	rituals,	depending	on	the	season	of	the	pilgrim’s	visit.	In	my	case,	as	I	chose	a	two	weeks-tour	package	tour	our	group	was	given	several	excursions	such	as	visiting	 religious	 celebrations,	 religious	 leaders,	 clan	 leaders,	 and	 religious	schools	such	as	the	Rubat	Tarim,	the	Dar	al-Mustafa,	the	Rubat	Say’un,	and	the	Rubat	Hautah.	The	main	purpose	of	visiting	these	religious	leaders	is	similar	to	that	 of	 visiting	 the	 shrines,	 which	 is	 asking	 for	 blessing,	 healing,	 and	 other	requests	 related	 to	 issues	 in	daily	 life	 such	as	success	 in	one’s	career,	 family,	marriage,	children,	and	others.		The	commercialization	of	pilgrimage	tours	 in	Hadramaut	has	resulted	 in	local	 and	 transnational	 economic,	 social,	 and	 cultural	 changes.	 Pilgrims	 are	recommended	to	offer	money	to	gatekeepers	of	the	tombs	and	to	the	religious	leaders	 they	 visit.	 	 Some	 of	 the	 shrines	 have	 become	 begging	 sites	 for	 local	children	and	incidental	beggars,	most	of	whom	poor	local	women.	Hotels	and	shops	 are	 built	 to	 cater	 pilgrims’	 needs	 and	 seemingly	 ordinary	 Hadramaut	commodities	 are	 sold	 to	 the	 pilgrims	 as	 souvenirs	 alongside	 newly	 invented	ones.	 	 The	meals	 served	 to	 pilgrims	 in	 the	 hotels	 or	 the	 apartments	 are	 not	purely	local	food,	but	they	are	adjusted	to	the	pilgrims’	taste	and/or	cuisine.	In	many	shops,	the	Indonesian	currency,	the	rupiah,	is	accepted	if	pilgrims	prefer	that	 over	 paying	 in	 the	 Yemeni	 Reals.	 Also,	 local	 shopkeepers	 and	 religious	leaders	may	 intersperse	 Indonesian	 (Malay)	words	 in	 their	 social	 interaction	with	pilgrims	from	Indonesia	and	other	Malay	people.	Reader	 argues	 that	 pilgrimage	 patterns	 tend	 to	 be	 refashioned	 in	accordance	with	wishes	of	the	pilgrims	(Reader	2014,	139).	Similarly,	Bruner	points	 out	 that	 not	 only	 should	 travelers	 respect	 the	 tradition	 of	 the	 local	population,	in	turn	local	people	are	forced	to	adjust	to	social,	cultural,	political	and	 economic	 resources	 of	 the	 travelers	 as	 well	 (Bruner	 1991,	 239).	 In	Hadramaut	this	has	led	to	modification	of	some	religious	and	cultural	practices	and	 values.	 One	 that	 particularly	 struck	me	was	 the	 negotiation	 over	 taking	pictures	of	people.	Indonesian	pilgrims	like	to	take	pictures	of	themselves	and	other	people	present	at	any	event	they	visit	to	document	their	trip,	while	most	of	 the	 local	 people	 in	 Hadramaut	 are	 against	 being	 photographed.	 Their	reluctance	 is	 related	 to	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 evil	 eye;	 it	 is	 believed	 to	 cause	 ‘eye	illness’,	which	 is	meant	 here	 jealousy.	 For	 example,	 I	 could	 not	 easily	 take	 a	picture	 of	 inhabitants	 of	 Hadramaut	 during	my	 visit.	 Interestingly,	 however,	the	 religious	 leaders	 we	 visited	 did	 not	 mind	 when	 we	 asked	 to	 have	 our	picture	taken	with	them.		Changes	in	local	cultural	beliefs	and	practices	due	to	the	increased	influx	of	 visitors	 from	 Indonesia	 also	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 views	 and	 practices	concerning	 gender	 relations.	 Male	 religious	 leaders	 in	 Hadramaut	 are	 more	flexible	 about	 the	 presence	 of	 female	 pilgrims	 than	 female	 religious	 leaders	with	regard	to	male	pilgrims.	The	male	leaders	are	not	against	being	visited	by	
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female	pilgrims	and	both	male	and	female	pilgrims	can	be	hosted	in	the	same	living	 room.	 Although	 in	 general	 male	 religious	 leaders	 do	 not	 shake	 hands	with	 female	 pilgrims,	 an	 exception	 is	 made	 during	 ritual	 performances.	 At	request	 they	may	put	 their	hands	on	heads	of	 the	 female	pilgrims	during	 the	prayer.	Male	 leaders	also	allow	 the	 female	pilgrims	 to	stand	at	his	 side	 to	be	photographed	together.	 	 In	contrast,	 female	religious	leaders,	who	are	mainly	the	wives	of	 the	 religious	 leaders,	 only	 receive	 female	visitors.	 In	 contrast	 to	male	leaders	they	refuse	to	be	photographed	with	their	visitors.	Tour	 leaders	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 bridging	 the	 demands	 of	 the	pilgrims	and	the	religious	leaders	they	visit.	What	struck	me	was	that	not	only	the	 pilgrims	 themselves	 wanted	 to	 document	 every	 step	 in	 their	 pilgrimage	tour,	but	that	such	documentation	was	also	in	the	interest	of	the	tour	leaders.	The	 tour	 leader	 of	 the	 group	 of	 pilgrims	 I	 accompanied,	 my	 informant	Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid,	 for	 instance,	 never	 forgot	 to	 take	 photographs	himself,	which	he	used	 for	promoting	his	 tour	business	 once	he	was	back	 to	Indonesia.	The	pilgrims’	 interest	 in	visiting	saints’	shrines	also	affects	 local	cultural	practices.	When	visiting	one	of	the	shrines,	my	informant	Hakim	explained	that	only	few	of	the	local	people	who	live	in	the	surroundings	of	the	shrine	came	to	visit	the	tomb.	Hakim	added	that	the	bond	between	Indonesians	and	the	saints	in	Hadramaut	was	stronger	than	those	of	the	local	Hadramis,	who	were	mainly	from	 non-prophetic	 lineage	 and	 whom	 he	 labelled	 as	 Salafis.	 His	 statement	hints	at	two	developments.	The	first	is	related	to	the	polarization	between	Sufi	and	Salafi	practices	 in	Hadramaut,	which	occurs	mostly	along	the	 lines	of	 the	traditional	 Hadrami	 social	 stratification	 in	 terms	 of	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	descent.	The	second	trend	deals	with	the	efforts	of	repositioning	religious	identity	among	 traditionalist	 Hadramis	 and	 their	 reconnection	 with	 those	 in	 the	diaspora.	As	 Indonesia	has	one	of	 the	biggest	 concentrations	of	 traditionalist	Muslims	and	of	Hadramis,	 the	renewed	connections	between	Hadramaut	and	Indonesia	 are	 a	 means	 for	 Sada	 Hadramis	 in	 both	 locations	 to	 protect	themselves	 against	 the	 danger	 of	 losing	 both	 religious	 and	 non-religious	positions	 in	Hadramaut	and	diaspora.	 In	other	words,	 the	attempts	 to	 revive	religious	 traditions	 based	 on	 Shafi’i	 and	 Sufi	 practices	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	motivated	by	more	than	religious	reasons	only.	They	are	projects	of	 the	Sada	members	to	regain	their	status	 in	Hadramaut,	which	was	undermined	during	the	socialist	regime,	as	well	as	in	the	Indonesian	diaspora	(Knysh	2001;	Alatas	2016b).	Taking	 up	 pilgrimage	 projects	 by	 traditionalist	 Hadramis	 after	 the	collapse	 of	 socialist	 regime	 has	 been	 in	 line	 with	 global	 economic	transformations	in	the	tourism	industry.	Recreation	and	tourism	have	become	the	 largest	and	 fastest-growing	economy	sector	 in	 the	world	and	rank	 fourth	
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after	fuels,	chemicals	and	automotive	products	(Post	and	Van	Tongeren	2014,	11).	 Pilgrimage	 is	 a	 very	 promising	 field	 in	 the	 global	 booming	 tourism	industry,	 which	 has	 led	 to	 a	 blurring	 dichotomy	 between	 pilgrimage	 and	tourism	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 religious	 and	 secular	 nature	 of	 travels	 (Badone	 and	Roseman	 2004;	 Post	 and	 Van	 Tongeren	 2014;	 Reader	 2014).	 This	 also	questions	a	purely	religious	motive	behind	the	pilgrimage	projects	of	the	Sada	Hadramis	 and	 raises	 the	 point	 about	 additional	 commercial	 interests.	 The	revived	 pilgrimage	 activities	 in	 Hadramaut	 are	 not	 merely	 the	 result	 of	 the	dissemination	 of	 traditionalist	 Islam,	 but	 also	 of	 modern	 modification	 and	commodification	of	 traditionalist	 Islam,	which	 in	 turn	contributes	 to	creation	of	what	 Ian	Reader	 (2014)	 calls	 a	 ‘consumerist	 culture’	 among	 the	Hadramis	both	in	Hadramaut	and	diaspora.		
3.3 Gender	Identity	Construct	Over	the	last	two	decades,	the	renewed	connections	between	Hadramaut	and	Indonesia	have	 led	 to	 the	 transformation	of	 the	mobility	of	Hadrami	women.	Although	there	is	no	source	that	gives	the	exact	number	of	women	travelling	to	Hadramaut,	many	 female	Hadramis	have	 recently	participated	 in	 journeys	 to	their	 ancestors’	 homeland.	 Unlike	 the	 situation	 in	 former	 times,	 present-day	Hadrami	women	in	Indonesia	have	equal	opportunities	to	visit	Hadramaut	as	men.		As	I	mentioned	in	earlier	chapters,	in	former	times,	especially	during	the	massive	waves	of	Hadrami	emigration	to	the	Indian	Ocean,	Hadrami	mobility	was	an	exclusively	male	affair	(Freitag	2003).	The	Hadrami	migrants	and	their	male	 descendants	 in	 Indonesia	 made	 return	 trips	 to	 Hadramaut	 without	female	 members	 (Mobini-Kesheh	 1999).	 The	 Hadrami	 women	 were	 left	 at	home	 and	 thus	 did	 not	 experience	 to	 live	 in	 their	 (fore)	 fathers’	 homeland	(Mobini-Kesheh	1999).			The	 inclusion	of	women	 in	 today’s	Hadrami	mobility	has	a	 considerable	impact	 on	 how	 the	 reconstruction	 of	Hadrami	 identity	 is	 gendered.	Hadrami	women	in	the	diaspora	are	active	players	in	the	reshaping	of	Hadrami	identity.	This	reshaping	comes	to	the	fore	in	reconfigurations	of	Hadrami	gender	roles,	in	patterns	of	gender	segregation,	and	in	the	performance	of	religious	piety	as	manifested	in	bodily	comportment	and	veiling.		However,	the	reconstruction	of	Hadrami	gender	identity	that	results	from	new	patterns	of	women’s	mobility	is	multi-vocal	 and	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 different	 objectives	 that	 women	may	have	 to	 travel	 to	Hadramaut.	 	 In	 the	 following,	 I	will	 reflect	on	 the	 impact	of	divergent	travel	motivations	such	as	seeing	relatives,	visiting	saint	shrines	or	attending	religious	courses	on	Hadrami	gender	 identity	as	coming	to	the	fore	in	 patterns	 of	 gender	 segregation	 and	 veiling	 in	 public	 places	 (see	 figure	6.8	below).			 	
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	Figure	6.8:	Indonesian	Female	pilgrims	of	Hadrami	and	non-Hadrami	background	pose	with	the	author	(the	second	from	the	right)	on	the	roof	of	a	graveyard	complex	of	saint	Habib	Ahmad	al-Muhdar	in	Quwereh	Wadi	Du’an	Hadramaut		One	 of	 the	most	 striking	 features	 of	 gender	 relations	 that	 is	 associated	with	countries	in	the	Middle	East	is	a	patriarchal	value	system	which	comes	to	the	fore,	 amongst	 others,	 in	 a	 strongly	 gendered	 division	 of	 space	 (Marin	 2012,	355-357).	 Men	 are	 conceived	 of	 as	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 households	 who	 work	outside	 the	home,	and	women	are	primarily	 seen	as	housewives	who	stay	at	home.		In	terms	of	spatial	arrangements,	this	ideal	has	often	been	interpreted	by	 locating	men	primarily	 in	 the	public	sphere	and	women	predominantly	 in	the	domestic	sphere.	Feminist	scholars	have	pointed	out,	however,	that	not	all	women-only	space	is	necessarily	private.	Judged	by	other	criteria	than	gender	only,	 such	 spaces	 can	 be	 equally	 public	 as	 men	 only	 spaces	 (see	 Buitelaar	1998;	Van	Geel	2018).		It	is	therefore	more	correct	to	state	that	the	patriarchal	value	system	prevalent	in	the	Middle	East	is	characterized	by	regulating	social	relationships	between	men	and	women	by	sex-segregation.	Female	veiling,	an	ideal	of	women’s	seclusion	 in	the	domestic	sphere	and	women-only	places	 in	the	semi-public	sphere,	as	well	as	strict	regulations	of	sexual	relations	are	the	main	features	through	which	sex-segregation	is	regulated.	Although	 women’s	 movements	 are	 subject	 to	 strict	 social	 regulations,	they	 are	 not	 completely	 invisible	 in	 public	 places.	 The	 extent	 of	 women’s	visibility	 in	 public	 spaces	 and	 differentiated	 practices	 of	 veiling	 is	 closely	associated	with	class,	status,	and	age.	The	covering	of	the	whole	female	body	in	public	places	to	protect	her	‘private	parts’	(aura)	against	men’s	gaze,	is	related	to	preventing	fitna	(disorder)	that	may	result	from	illicit	sexual	relations	if	the	natural	 sexual	 drive	 of	 people	 is	 not	 restrained.	 Avoiding	 social	 disorder	 by	veiling	is	justified	with	reference	to	religious	doctrines	which	relate	veiling	to	
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religious	 piety	 and	 modesty.	 Lower	 class	 families	 cannot	 always	 afford	 to	respect	 the	 regulations	of	 sex-segregation.	Therefore,	women’s	 seclusion	and	veiling	are	related	to	status.	Among	families	in	the	higher	classes,	the	visibility	of	women	in	public	places	is	considered	a	transgression	of	social	norms,	which	implies	a	loss	of	family	honor,	particularly	for	its	male	members.	Women	in	Hadramaut	are	restricted	in	their	movements	to	a	considerable	extent.	Ideally,	they	are	only	allowed	to	go	out	in	public	places	in	the	company	of	a	mahram	or	male	guardian	such	as	husbands	or	male	relatives.		In	addition,	women	may	go	out	in	the	company	of	their	female	fellows	for	visiting	specific	women’s	shops	or	 for	performing	rituals	at	religious	shrines.	 In	general	then,	gender	 relations	 in	 Hadramaut	 should	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 gender	segregation	 so	 that	 unrelated	men	 and	women	 are	 prevented	 from	mingling	each	 other,	 thus	 allowing	 the	 creation	 of	 separate	 male	 and	 female	 public	spaces.	 In	 practice,	 the	 rules	 of	 sex-segregation	 are	 not	 always	 met.	 Some	women	 may	 have	 professions	 outside	 the	 home,	 such	 as	 teachers	 and	shopkeepers,	for	instance,	and	one	can	also	see	female	beggars	or	shepherds	in	the	streets.		What	nearly	all	women	abide,	however,	are	local	veiling	practices;	Hadrami	 girls	 reaching	 puberty	 should	 cover	 their	 body	 and	 face	with	 black	clothes	with	exception	of	their	eyes,	while	married	women	should	cover	their	face	including	their	eyes.	Indonesian	women	who	visit	Hadramaut	to	see	their	relatives	or	to	visit	saint	 shrines	 usually	 abide	Hadrami	 cultural	 values	 for	 the	 duration	 of	 their	visit,	but	discontinue	to	do	so	in	a	strict	sense	once	they	are	back	in	their	daily	routines	 at	 home	 in	 Indonesia.	 From	 the	 conversations	 I	 had	with	women,	 I	learned	 that	 this	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 outright	 rejection	 of	 the	practices	 of	 sex-segregation	 and	 veiling	 in	 the	 Hadramaut,	 although	 some	women	 stated	 that	 they	 found	 it	 difficult	 for	 themselves	 and	 that	 they	were	happy	that	they	lived	in	Ambon	rather	than	in	the	homeland	of	their	ancestors.	Whilst	 in	 Hadramaut,	 however,	 many	 felt	 more	 comfortable	 respecting	 the	rules	 of	 seclusion	 and	 veiling	 and	 would	 feel	 awkward	 transgressing	 local	cultural	norms.	Also,	they	realized	that	the	restrictions	they	faced	during	their	stay	in	Hadramaut	were	of	a	temporary	nature	and	would	be	lifted	again	upon	return	home.		In	their	daily	lives	in	Indonesia,	however,	they	are	accustomed	to	another	 ‘gender	 order’	 (Robinson	2009,	 10-32)	 that	 is	 not	 organized	 around	gender	 segregation	 and	 the	 accompanying	 dressing	 codes	 and	 sanctions	 for	gender	mingling.	 In	 their	 daily	 life	worlds,	 they	 therefore	 find	 it	much	more	difficult	or	inconvenient	to	live	by	the	rules	of	sex-segregation	as	practiced	in	Hadramaut.	One	 of	 the	 women	with	 whom	 I	 discussed	 the	 issue	 of	 sex-segregation	was	Asri,	a	sixty-five-year-old	non-Sada.	Asri	travelled	to	Hadramaut	with	her	husband	 in	 2013.	 She	 spent	 about	 a	 month	 with	 her	 husband’s	 family	 in	Bahere,	 Say’un.	 For	 the	 duration	 of	 her	 stay,	 she	 left	 the	 house	 only	
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sporadically	and	hardly	interacted	with	the	men	in	the	family.	She	told	me	that	she	was	happy	 that	 she	 lived	 in	Ambon	because	 covering	her	 entire	body	 as	she	 had	 done	 in	Hadramaut	 had	made	 her	 perspire	 a	 lot,	 particularly	 as	 the	weather	 had	 been	 extremely	 hot.	 The	 restricted	 freedom	 of	 movement	 of	women	and	the	use	of	a	face	veil	and	the	anonymity	of	being	covered	in	black	cloth	had	added	to	her	discomfort.	Fifty-year-old	 Malika	 (see	 chapter	 1	 pages	 1-2),	 whom	 I	 accompanied	during	 the	 visit	 to	 Hadramaut,	 felt	 slightly	 different.	 Malika	 is	 from	 a	 Sada	family.	 She	 is	married	 to	a	Sada	man	and	 the	mother	of	 five	 children.	Malika	told	me	that	she	would	never	be	able	to	live	in	Hadramaut	because	she	thought	that	many	women	in	the	Hadramaut	are	household	wives	who	spend	most	of	the	time	at	home	whereas	she	has	a	career	and	works	outside	home.	Neither	would	she	be	able	 to	wear	a	 face	veil	 in	public	places.	 In	her	daily	 life,	when	going	 out	 in	 public	 she	 dresses	 up	 in	 a	 fashionable	 Islamic	 dress,	 combining	religious	modesty	and	the	latest	fashion	trends.		She	also	told	me	how	she	had	struggled	to	pursue	her	education	until	she	managed	to	obtain	her	university	degree.	Wishing	 her	 children	 to	 have	 a	 better	 future,	 she,	 together	with	 her	husband,	 were	 saving	 money	 for	 the	 future	 education	 of	 her	 children.	 She	criticized	 the	 life	 of	 women	 in	 Hadramaut,	 for	 whom	 a	 good	 education	 was	much	 more	 difficult	 to	 get	 and	 whose	 career	 perspectives	 were	 slim	 in	comparison	to	those	of	women	in	Indonesia.	In	addition	to	her	profession	as	a	civil	 servant,	 Malika	 is	 engaged	 in	 various	 religious	 activities	 as	 a	 religious	teacher.	 However,	 she	 does	 not	 view	 women’s	 visibility	 in	 public	 places	 as	violating	Islamic	piety.	With	her	educational	and	professional	background,	she	could	never	apply	the	segregation	rule	in	her	hometown.	As	a	civil	servant	she	has	to	interact	with	both	men	and	women,	and	she	is	accustomed	to	traveling	outside	home	without	the	company	of	her	husband	or	male	relatives.	The	 pattern	 seems	 somewhat	 different	 among	 women	 who	 travel	 to	Hadramaut	 to	 study	 religion.	 These	 religious	 seekers	 spent	 more	 time	 in	Hadramaut	and	have	the	opportunity	to	learn	local	traditions	and	adapt	to	the	societal	norms	in	Hadramaut.	Despite	their	prolonged	stay,	however,	they	have	only	 limited	 access	 to	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 local	 population.	 As	 part	 of	 obligatory	religious	 educational	 trainings,	 students	 in	 religious	 schools	 spent	 most	 of	their	 time	 in	 the	compound	of	 their	boarding	school.	The	students	of	 the	Dar	al-Zahra	 school	 who	 I	 followed	 a	 few	 days,	 spend	 their	 days	 studying	 and	performing	 religious	 rituals	 from	 three	 o	 ‘clock	 in	 the	 morning	 until	 ten	 o	‘clock	in	the	evening.	 	They	are	not	allowed	to	leave	the	compound	except	for	visiting	shrines	and	religious	leaders,	or	for	attending	religious	feasts.	They	are	obliged	 to	 cover	 their	whole	body	 including	 their	 face	when	 they	go	outside.	They	are	also	prohibited	to	interact	with	men	other	than	their	male	relatives.	The	religious	schools	in	Hadramaut	have	contributed	to	the	assertion	and	the	 implementation	of	Hadrami	gender	values	by	 the	 religious	students	after	
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they	 return	 to	 Indonesia.	 The	 students	 learn	Hadrami	 customs	 and	practices	from	 a	 religious	 point	 of	 view,	 which	 then	 motivates	 them	 to	 adopt	 some	Hadrami	customs	in	their	home-places.	When	asked,	some	female	Indonesian	students	 in	 the	Dar	al-Zahra	whom	I	 talked	to	stated	that	covering	the	entire	body	from	head	to	toe	was	an	obligatory	teaching	of	Islam,	and	they	also	said	that	they	would	wear	the	niqab	(face	cover)	once	they	returned	to	Indonesia.	For	example,	my	informant	Lubna	Mauladawilah,	wife	of	the	founder	of	the	ar-Rahmah	stated,	“Many	say	that	covering	our	face	is	an	Arab	tradition,	but	it	is	in	 fact	 Islamic.	 According	 to	 the	 Shafi’i	 school	 of	 thought,	 the	 face	 is	 aura	(private	 part	 of	 body	 that	may	 attract	 sexual	 impulses)”.	 She	 added	 that	 she	preferred	working	 in	 the	 privacy	 of	 her	 home	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	mixing	with	men.	Mauladawilah’s	receptivity	 for	Hadrami	customs	thus	overlaps	with	her	receptivity	for	religious	teachings.	To	 some	 extent,	 different	 views	 on	 face	 veiling	 are	 therefore	 related	 to	different	 expectations	 embedded	 in	 particular	 objectives	 for	 travelling	 to	Hadramaut.	 For	 instance,	 Elma	 a	 38	 years	 old	woman	 of	 Sada	 descent	 from	East	Java	who	is	married	with	a	Sada	man	from	Ambon	distinguished	visitors	such	as	pilgrims	 from	religious	students	by	saying	 that	many	of	her	relatives	and	 friends	 in	 Java	 wore	 black	 robes	 and	 face	 covers	 after	 they	 completed	
ta’lim	 (religious	 study)	 from	 the	Dar	al-Zahra.	 She	 further	explained	 that	 she	did	not	wear	a	face	cover	because	she	did	not	take	the	ta’lim.	People	who	travel	to	Hadramaut	for	family	visits	or	to	perform	pilgrimage	are	not	 expected	 to	make	 considerable	 changes	 in	 their	 dress	 codes	because	they	are	not	driven	by	any	particular	religious	missionary	activity.	In	contrast,	religious	students	 travelling	 to	Hadramaut	expect	or	are	expected	 to	become	future	religious	teachers	who	pass	on	the	religious	 lessons	they	have	 learned	to	others	in	their	home	environment.	As	a	consequence,	religious	students	are	expected	to	be	rigorously	modest	in	their	attitudes	and	appearance	and	to	act	as	role	models	for	devout	Muslim	women.	Respecting	strictly	the	dress	codes	and	 other	 rules	 of	 sex-segregation	 is	 considered	 a	 sign	 of	 the	 religious	discipline	they	have	developed	(Mahmood	2005).	The	use	of	face	veils	among	women	who	studied	in	Hadramaut	after	their	return	home	also	depends	on	the	socio-political	situation	of	their	home-places.		Before	 she	 left	 Ambon	 to	 study	 at	 the	 Dar	 al-Zahra	 in	 2014,	 Lubna	Mauladawilah	confided	to	me	that	she	was	quite	doubtful	whether	she	would	be	able	to	cover	her	face	once	she	would	be	back	in	Ambon,	where,	since	the	practice	 is	 often	 associated	 with	 Muslim	 terrorist	 groups.	 She	 feared	 that	covering	would	actually	hinder	her	religious	missionary	activities	she	planned	to	 undertake	 upon	 her	 return	 to	 Ambon.	 She	 mentioned	 her	 mother	 as	 an	example:	“My	mother	wears	a	face	veil,	but	that	is	different,	because	she	lives	in	Java.	I	wish	I	could	do	that	here.	Let’s	see,	I	don’t	know”.	She	reasoned	that	it	
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was	due	to	the	situation	in	Ambon	compared	to	Java,	in	which	the	freedom	to	wear	a	face	veil	in	Java	was	a	much	easier	option.	Likewise,	my	informant	Elma	told	me	that	she	would	rather	stay	at	home	than	covering	her	face	when	going	out	as	she	was	not	prepared	to	be	mistaken	for	belonging	to	militant	groups	such	as	the	Laskar	Jihad	(see	chapter	5	pages	173-175).	 The	 situation	 in	 the	 post-religious	 conflict	 area,	 where	 relations	between	 Muslims	 and	 non-Muslims	 in	 general	 and	 between	 diverse	 Muslim	groups	in	particular	can	be	tense,	has	caused	Mauladawilah	and	Elma	to	fear	to	be	 associated	with	Muslims	who	 in	 the	 local	 general	 imagery	 are	 viewed	 as	‘foreigners’	(non-indigenous	Ambonese)	and	terrorists,	and	who	are	hated	for	having	played	a	major	role	in	the	escalation	of	the	1999-2002	conflicts.	On	Java	the	situation	is	different;	Muslims	there	constitute	the	majority	of	the	population	and	 the	atmosphere	 there	has	been	relatively	open	 to	diverse	articulations	 of	 Islam	 after	 the	 reform	 era	 (Robinson	 2009).	 	 In	 this	 regard,	public	representations	of	religious	terrorism	and	militancy	after	the	so-called	global	‘War	on	Terror’	and	the	1999	–	2002	communal	conflicts	in	Ambon	play	a	part	in	shaping	different	women’s	subject-positions	and	embodied	practices	of	piety	like	veiling.	As	I	explained	earlier	in	this	chapter,	it	is	mostly	students	of	Sada	descent	who	 come	 to	 Hadramaut	 to	 study	 in	 a	 religious	 school.	 The	 practice	 of	 face	veiling	 among	 the	 female	 religious	 seekers	 after	 their	 return	home	 therefore	also	has	connotations	of	distinction;	it	functions	as	a	symbolic	marker	of	status	differences	 between	 learned	 and	 lay	 people.	 When	 I	 met	 Mauladawilah	 in	Ambon	after	she	had	returned	from	her	studies	in	Hadramaut	in	March	2015,	she	 was	 totally	 covered	 with	 black	 robes	 and	 tried	 to	 be	 invisible	 to	 men’s	gazes.	 Before	 her	 departure	 to	 Tarim	 to	 study,	 she	 had	 told	me	 that	 she	 felt	uncomfortable	 in	 front	 of	 the	 alumni	 from	 Hadramaut	 because	 she	 was	 the	only	wife	of	a	graduate	student	from	Hadramaut	who	did	not	cover	her	face.	As	the	wife	of	a	religious	preacher	trained	in	one	of	the	schools	in	Hadramaut	and	particularly	after	she	herself	had	also	studied	there,	she	had	more	reasons	to	cover	 her	 face	 and	 thus	 distinguish	 herself	 from	others	 of	 her	 social	 rank	 in	order	to	be	accepted	within	the	circle	of	the	religious	elite.	In	this	regard,	the	religious	pedagogy	in	Hadramaut	is	not	only	a	means	of	generating	a	capacity	for	 the	 enactment	 of	 gender	 identity	 linking	 piety	 with	 body	 performance	(Mahmood	2005),	but	it	also	contributes	to	acquiring	cultural	capital	that	may	produce	 social	 inequality.	 Thus,	 articulated	 in	 what	 Bourdieu	 (1977)	 called	‘bodily	 hexis’	 the	 practice	 of	 a	 face	 veil	 creates	 a	 boundary	 between	 the	religious	elite	and	non-religious	elite.	As	most	of	the	religious	seekers	among	the	Indonesian	female	Hadramis	are	 of	 Sada	 origin,	 women	 who	 are	 deeply	 conscious	 of	 their	 social	distinctiveness,	their	mobility	to	travel	to	Hadramaut	is	not	merely	motivated	by	a	search	for	religious	knowledge	but	also	by	a	wish	to	find	a	religious	basis	
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for	 reconstructing	 their	 own	 class	 identities,	 thereby	 maintaining	 gender	inequality	 in	 terms	of	marriage.	Compared	to	 the	men	within	 the	Sada	group	who	are	 freer	 to	 choose	any	suitable	partner	 from	any	descent,	 Sada	women	are	subject	to	strict	regulations	in	terms	of	marriage	partnership.	As	the	core	issue	of	 Sada	 identity	 and	 the	 survival	 of	 Sada	 community	 is	 in	 the	hands	of	women	 by	 controlling	 their	 behaviors	 and	 prevent	 their	mingling	with	 non-Sada	 men	 (Ho	 2006,	 181-184),	 seeking	 religious	 knowledge	 in	 Hadramaut	provides	 them	 a	 religious	 basis	 for	 the	maintenance	 of	 their	 ascribed	 social	status	based	on	descent.	Sada	Hadramis	find	religious	legitimacy	for	the	kafa’a	principles	that	safeguards	their	superior	social	status	in	Shafi’ite	jurisprudence	taught	 in	 the	 schools	 in	 Hadramaut.	 Pursuing	 religious	 knowledge	 in	Hadramaut	 becomes	 a	 way	 for	 female	 Sada	 Hadramis	 to	 reassert	 their	imagined	hierarchical	identity	in	terms	of	marriage	and	gender	inequality.	Adopting	the	practice	of	strict	covering	by	some	Indonesian	traditionalist	Hadramis	as	a	result	of	their	religious	studies	in	Hadramaut,	has	also	created	a	new	 boundary	 between	 them	 and	 other	 Indonesian	 traditionalist	 Muslims.	Indonesian	 traditionalist	 Muslims	 have	 been	 identified	 with	 their	 ability	 to	adjust	 to	 local	 traditions	 by	 recontextualizing	 regulations	 in	 religious	scriptures	 on	 dressing	 and	 veiling.	 Indonesian	 Muslims	 with	 a	 traditionalist	point	 of	 view	 see	 the	 practice	 of	 veiling	 as	 part	 of	 a	 contested	 religious	discourse,	 and	 they	 emphasize	 that	 the	 practice	 should	 be	 put	 into	 socio-cultural	contexts.	As	a	consequence,	they	do	not	consider	veiling	an	obligatory	teaching	 of	 Islam.	 In	 contrast,	 non-traditionalist	Muslims	 such	 as	 neo-Salafis	and	Islamists	use	their	textual	interpretation	of	Islam	and	the	tradition	of	early	Islam	 to	 justify	 the	 practice	 of	 veiling	 (Robinson	 2009).	 Therefore,	 the	transformation	 of	 Indonesian	 traditionalist	 Hadramis	 that	 I	 have	 described	above	 into	 strict	veiling	blurs	 the	distinction	between	 them	and	 Islamist	 and	neo-Salafi	groups	in	Indonesia	in	terms	of	religious	performance	and	symbols.		The	 transformation	 mentioned	 above	 seems	 to	 refer	 to	 an	 ongoing	discourse	of	the	relationship	between	being	Arab	and	being	Muslim.	As	one	of	the	 authoritative	 religious	 centres	 for	 Indonesian	 traditionalist	 Hadramis,	Hadramaut	has	become	a	model	for	the	implementation	of	Islamic	values	and	for	the	reconstruction	of	an	imagined	Islamic	identity.	This	 is	particularly	the	case	since	 it	 is	 located	 in	Arabian	Peninsula,	where	 Islam	originates.	Many	of	my	informants	from	traditionalist	backgrounds,	for	example,	argued	that	Islam	and	Arabness	are	 two	 inseparable	entities,	and	any	kind	of	effort	 to	separate	Islam	 from	 its	 origin	 is	 a	mistake.	 This	 is	 basically	 an	 argument	 shared	with	neo-Salafis	and	Islamists,	who	view	any	practice	including	gender	segregation	and	veiling	in	the	Arab	countries	as	intrinsically	Islamic,	practices	that	should	therefore	be	applied	in	other	countries	as	well.	To	sum	up,	 the	restored	connections	between	Hadramaut	and	Indonesia	and	Ambon	 in	particular	have	 a	 specific	 effect	 on	 the	 construction	of	 gender	
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identity.	This	gender	 identity	 construction	 in	 terms	of	 religious	piety	 reflects	how	 the	 body	 has	 become	 a	 contested	 site	 in	 the	 production	 of	 a	 pious	 self	among	Hadrami	women	in	the	diaspora,	as	well	as	having	become	the	subject	of	 multiple	 (re)	 constructions,	 which	 create	 symbolic	 and	 non-symbolic	performativity.	 Hadrami	 women’s	 articulations	 of	 their	 gender	 identity	 are	thus	 shaped	 not	 only	 by	 religion,	 class,	 education,	 occupation,	 and	 family	upbringing,	 but	 also	 by	 their	 diasporic	 return	 journeys	 to	 the	 homeland.	Religious	 education	 is	 a	 key	 to	 a	 major	 transformation	 for	 the	 Indonesian	traditionalist	Hadrami	women	in	enacting	their	gender	identity.			
4. Return	Visits	to	Hadramaut	as	Homecoming			
The	 renewed	 connections	 between	 diaspora	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 and	Hadramis	in	Yemen	over	the	last	one-decade	show	that	Hadramaut	continues	to	be	of	big	significance	for	many	Hadrami	descendants.	Their	back	and	forth	movement	 is	 undoubtedly	 related	 to	 Hadramaut	 being	 their	 ancestral	homeland	where	 they	 have	 kinship	 ties.	 As	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon	have	 a	 desire	 of	 return	 to	 Hadramaut	 and	 stay	 in	 contact	 with	 Hadramis	 in	Indonesia	 and	 in	 other	 diasporic	 communities,	 questions	 remain	 on	 the	symbolic	meanings	 of	 this	 diasporic	 return	 and	whether	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	Hadrami	attach	similar	or	different	meanings	to	these	returns.	To	analyze	the	Hadramis’	 journeys	 to	 their	 ancestral	 homeland,	 and	 in	 particular	 to	understand	how	class	distinctions	play	a	role	in	their	symbolic	return	practices	and	 the	meanings	 they	attach	 to	 them,	 in	what	 follows	 I	will	use	Paul	Basu’s	conceptualization	 of	 what	 he	 calles	 three	 ‘root-metaphors’	 of	 roots-tourism:	homecoming,	quest,	and	pilgrimage	(Basu	2004,	153-179)		The	 first	 root-metaphor	 of	 roots-tourism	 is	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘homecoming’.	The	notion	of	homecoming	 in	diasporic	 communities	 reflects	 the	diversity	of	perspectives	 on	 ‘home’	 which	 captures	 the	 physical,	 social	 and	 cognitive	experience	of	 returning	 to	a	distant	place	where	one	knows	oneself	best	and	where	 one’s	 self-identity	 is	 best	 grounded	 (Basu	 1995,	 150-189).	 A	 ‘thick’	notion	of	homecoming	is	exemplified	by	the	Jewish	diaspora,	which	carries	all	the	 connotations	 of	 forced	 exile,	 oppression	 and	 genocide.	 	 The	 Scottish	diaspora	 that	 Basu	 (1995)	 studied	 share	 some	 similarities	 with	 the	 Jewish	diaspora	in	attaching	symbolic	meanings	to	a	distant	homeland:		the	‘desire	of	the	dislocate	self	 to	relocate	 itself	 in	 time	and	place;	a	sense	of	 ’metaphysical	loss	 of	 home’;	 feelings	 of	 ‘dislocation	 or	 alienation	 in	 physical,	 social,	 and	psychological	 home-place’;	 and	 conceptions	 of	 the	distant	 ‘homeland	 as	 both	imaginary	and	material	lands’.	In	the	case	of	Hadrami	diaspora,	Ho	(2006,	227-229)	has	pointed	out	that	many	muwallads,	 Hadrami	 descendants	 who	 were	 sent	 back	 to	 Hadramaut	
Chapter	6:	Hadramaut	as	an	Imaginary	Homeland	
241		
from	 the	 diaspora	 in	 the	 1990s	 experienced	 displacement	 instead	 of	homecoming.	 In	my	 study,	 I	 will	 show	 that	 there	 is	 a	 variety	 of	 experiences	among	the	Hadramis	from	Ambon	who	made	return	journeys	to	Hadramaut,	in	which	the	notion	of	homecoming	is	still	valid	for	some	of	them,	especially	for	those	who	regard	Hadramaut	as	an	authoritative	source	of	value	and	identity.		For	traditionalist	Hadramis,	especially	those	from	Sada	families,	going	to	Hadramaut	 is,	 to	 some	 extent,	 a	 kind	 of	 coming	 home.	 This	 homecoming	 is	combined	with	 their	 search	 for	 spirituality	and	blessing.	This	homecoming	 is	enacted	 through	 their	 strong	 connection	 and	 devotion	 to	 their	 spiritual	leaders.	 In	this	regard,	 their	 lived	experiences	 in	Hadramaut	are	restricted	to	the	ideal	place	of	the	religious	compound	next	to	their	spiritual	leaders’	houses	or	 religious	 institutions,	 instead	 of	 having	 actual	 lived	 experiences	 with	Hadrami	culture.	Hadrami	descendants	who	 feel	 ‘this	homecoming’	are	 those	who	come	to	seek	religious	knowledge	in	Hadramaut.	As	I	have	argued	above,	pursuing	 religious	 education	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 purposes	 for	 traditionalist	Hadramis	 to	 come	 to	 Hadramaut,	 especially	 those	 of	 Sada	 origin.	 I	 would	argue,	 however,	 that	 seeking	 religious	 knowledge	 is	 more	 than	 acquiring	knowledge	in	a	formal	sense	for	them;	it	is	also	a	‘quest’	of	the	indeterminate,	the	 second	 root-metaphor	 that	 Basu	 (2004,	 162)	 distinguishes.	 This	indeterminacy	 is	 characterized	 by	 Basu	 as	 mysterious	 and	 incommunicable,	and	 related	 to	 individual	 hunger	 for	 a	 deeper,	 more	 unified,	 coherent	 and	enduring	 sense	 of	 self	 (Basu	 2004,	 162-164).	 This	 notion	 of	 quest	 can	 be	recognized	in	the	story	of	my	informant	Lubna	Mauladawilah,	who	told	me:		I	really	wanted	to	come	to	Hadramaut.	 I	really	want	to	be	close	to	pious	people	because	they	are	close	to	God	and	the	Prophet.	I	am	very	grateful	now	that	I	am	here.	People	here	devote	their	life	to	God	and	the	Prophet.	By	being	close	to	the	pious	people	here,	I	hope	I	can	feel	the	presence	of	the	Prophet	in	their	existence,	and	I	have	been	longing	to	be	able	to	meet	him	too.	Staying	here	(the	boarding	school,	 Istiqomah)	makes	me	feel	 in	peace	 because	 I	 spend	my	 entire	 time	 only	 performing	worship.	 People	here	 just	 think	 about	 the	 hereafter,	 and	 they	 do	 not	 have	 time	 for	 the	world.	Rather	 than	 homecoming,	 Mauladawilah	 here	 expresses	 a	 wish	 for	 spiritual	development.	 Hagiographical	 stories	 of	 saints	 often	 emphasize	 miracles	 of	pious	 people	 in	 experiencing	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 Prophet	 and	 they	mention	that	dreaming	 the	presence	of	 the	Prophet	 is	 the	only	 true	dream.	This	 ‘true	dreaming’	 is	 accordingly	 thought	 to	 guarantee	 a	 reward	 from	heaven	 for	 the	dreamer.	In	this	sense,	for	my	informant,	a	pious	milieu	may	satisfy	her	hunger	for	the	kind	of	prophetic	figure	that	is	embodied	in	pious	saints.	Although	 the	 Hadrami	 migration	 to	 Indonesia	 was	 voluntary,	 unlike	Jewish,	 Armenian,	 and	 Scottish	 diasporas,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	connotation	of	 ‘nostalgia’	in	the	notion	of	homecoming	is	absent	for	diasporic	
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Hadramis.	Those	who	undertake	short	journeys	to	their	forefathers’	homeland	often	 experience	 this	 as	 a	 ‘homecoming’	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 what	 Basu	characterizes	 as	 ‘an	 existential	 journey	 to	 the	 source	of	 the	 self’	 (Basu	2004,	161).	The	 feeling	 of	 homecoming,	 however,	 is	 not	 shared	 by	 all	 Hadrami	descendants	 who	 come	 to	 Hadramaut	 for	 a	 short	 period	 of	 time,	 such	 as	performing	 pilgrimage.	 Earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 how	diasporic	return	visits	of	the	Sada	are	also	motivated	to	perform	pilgrimage	to	shrines.	 Half	 of	 the	 Sada	 travelers	 to	 Hadramaut	 are	 pilgrims,	 whose	 main	intentions	are	to	conduct	religious	rituals	near	their	ancestors’	graves	in	order	to	ask	blessings	(baraka)	from	the	saints.	My	informant	Malika	underlined	the	significance	to	her	of	her	journey	by	saying:	“It	is	not	cheap	to	come	here	and	I	can	spend	my	money	for	something	else,	but	coming	here	is	different	because	I	want	 my	 life	 to	 be	 blessed”.	 Her	 statement	 implies	 the	 belief	 in	 the	effectiveness	 of	 religious	 consumption	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 she	 hopes	 that	 the	financial	 cost	 of	 the	 journey	 will	 have	 a	 religious	 impact	 on	 her	 life.	 Malika	further	shared	with	me	that	she	felt	strange	 in	Hadramaut	 in	regard	to	many	aspects	of	her	everyday	life.	She	felt	grateful	that	she	was	born	and	raised	up	in	Ambon	where	she	enjoyed	the	freedom	to	achieve	a	high	educational	level,	to	have	a	career	and	to	combine	her	career	with	her	responsibilities	as	a	wife	and	mother.	In	 a	 similar	 vein	 but	 for	 different	 reasons,	 some	 other	 Hadrami	descendants,	 especially	 from	 non-Sada	 background	 told	me	 that	 they	 would	not	want	to	live	in	Hadramaut	in	the	long	run;	they	did	not	feel	familiar	enough	with	 the	place.	Haris,	 a	 thirty-year-old	non-Sada	man	of	 the	 al-Khatiri	 family	said	that	his	father	had	arranged	his	trip	to	Hadramaut	since	his	father	wanted	him	to	learn	Arabic	with	his	step-cousin	in	Bahere	for	one	year.	But	after	three	months,	 Haris	 left	 Hadramaut	 and	 went	 back	 to	 Ambon.	 “How	 could	 I	 live	there,	I	did	not	like	the	food,	I	 felt	very	isolated	and	I	could	not	do	anything...	everyday	 I	 felt	 just	 like	being	homeless,	 I	missed	my	 family	 in	 Indonesia”,	he	explained.162	Haris’	 statement	 reflects	a	 feeling	of	displacement	 rather	 than	a	homecoming	in	the	way	he	experienced	the	actual	Hadrami	life	and	culture	in	Hadramaut.	The	statement	also	shows	that	although	Hadramaut	is	claimed	to	be	part	of	the	multiple	roots	or	 identities	of	the	Hadramis,	some	Hadramis	in	Ambon	 do	 not	 feel	 at	 home	 or	 attached	 to	 the	 place.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	imaginary	homeland	can	be	disappointing	when	the	actual	encounter	involves	too	much	 unfamiliarity,	 resonating	 the	 argument	 by	 Jan	William	 Duyvendak	that	 familiarity	 in	 the	 sense	 of,	 ‘knowing	 the	 place	 or	 inhabiting	 it’,	 is	 an	important	 factor	 in	 one’s	 feelings	 of	 attachment	 or	 being	 at	 home	 in	 a	 place	(Duyvendak	2011,	38).	
                                                162	Interview	with	Haris,	March	27,	2015.	
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As	I	argued	earlier	in	this	chapter,	for	most	non-Sada,	visiting	Hadramaut	is	motivated	by	the	desire	to	visit	their	immediate	family	members	with	whom	contact	had	been	lost	for	several	years	or	even	generations.	Their	return	visits	reflect	the	limited	scope	of	their	maintaining	links	with	Hadramaut.	Their	goal	is	 to	 renew	 the	 contacts	 with	 core	 family	members	 of	 their	 forefathers	 in	 a	particular	place	within	Hadramaut.	 In	 contrast,	 for	 Sada,	return	 journeys	 are	not	motivated	exclusively	 to	visiting	 their	 core	 family	members.	Rather,	 they	also	aim	at	seeking	religious	knowledge	and	performing	pilgrimage.		Unlike	the	non-Sada,	the	Sada	have	succeeded	in	extending	their	sense	of	belonging	to	a	larger	imagined	community,	members	of	prophetic	lineage,	regardless	of	their	different	clans.	This	is	reflected	in	the	practice	of	pilgrimage	to	religious	saints	of	any	Sada	origin	instead	of	visiting	graves	of	their	own	clans.	Hadramaut	for	the	Sada	is	therefore	more	than	a	place	of	origin	where	some	of	their	relatives	live.	It	is	also	a	spiritual,	sacred	place	which	symbolizes	their	lineage	and	their	legacy	 of	 sharing	 in	 Islamic	 sacredness	 through	 their	 descent	 of	 the	 Prophet	Muhammad.		Generally	speaking	then,	the	distinction	between	the	meaning	of	journeys	to	Hadramaut	for	traditionalist	Hadramis	and	non-traditionalist	(reformist	and	neo-reformist)	ones	lies	 in	their	conceptions	of	the	sacredness	of	Hadramaut.	Traditionalists	 regard	 Hadramaut	 as	 a	 sacred	 place	 and	 a	 source	 of	 self-renewal	where	 they	 seek	 blessings,	 authenticity,	 tranquility,	 and	 spirituality.	This	 view	 is	 mostly	 voiced	 by	 Sada	 descendants.	 From	 my	 interviews	 with	informants	 belonging	 to	 this	 category	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 to	 them,	Hadramaut	 is	 a	 place	 of	 thousands	 of	 saints	 who	 are	 their	 ancestors,	 who	taught	truth	and	who	inherited	religious	knowledge	from	their	 first	ancestor,	the	 Prophet	 Muhammad,	 and	 who	 spread	 Islamic	 messages	 to	 the	 world.	Visiting	Hadramaut	to	them	brings	blessings,	but	vice	versa,	to	be	able	to	visit	Hadramaut	 is	 regarded	 as	 being	 blessed,	 since	 not	 many	 people	 have	 an	opportunity	to	go	for	this	distant	trip.	On	the	other	hand,	Hadramaut	 is	regarded	by	other	Hadramis	as	part	of	their	 multiple	 roots	 but	 without	 sacredness.	 This	 view	 is	 shared	 by	 many	Hadrami	descendants	 from	non-Sada	 families.	Within	 this	 category,	 the	main	reason	to	come	to	Hadramaut	is	to	renew	ties	with	immediate	family	members.	Visiting	shrines	and	religious	scholars	seems	to	be	even	out	of	the	question	for	those	who	hold	a	Salafi	ideology	that	bans	the	practice	of	pilgrimage	to	shrines	and	condemn	it	as	a	bid’a,	religious	innovation.	In	this	regard,	the	practice	and	meanings	 of	 visits	 of	 different	 categories	 of	 Muslims	 from	 Ambon	 to	Hadramaut	largely	overlap	with	their	different	Islamic	orientations.	Apart	 from	 their	 original	 intentions	 to	 visit	 Hadramaut,	 hardly	 any	Hadrami	descendant	who	actually	visits	 the	region	has	only	one	objective.	 In	fact,	 many	 descendants	 have	 multiple	 purposes	 of	 their	 journeys	 to	Hadramaut.	The	pilgrims	who	visit	religious	shrines	also	try	to	obtain	religious	
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knowledge	from	religious	scholars	or	from	their	relatives	who	are	supposed	to	be	more	learned	because	they	study	at	religious	schools	in	Hadramaut.	For	the	religious	seekers,	performing	a	pilgrimage	to	shrines	 is	part	of	their	religious	rituals	as	well.	Since	most	pilgrims	and	religious	seekers	are	of	Sada	origin,	the	journeys	 of	 the	 Sada	 descendants	 to	 Hadramaut	 are	 not	 only	 a	 sign	 of	homecoming,	but	also	at	the	same	time	a	‘quest’,	seeking	authenticity,	religious	knowledge,	 and	 ‘pilgrimage’.	 Moreover,	 visiting	 Hadramaut	 for	 Hadrami	descendants	is	also	meant	for	relaxation	or	a	break	from	their	daily	routines	at	home.	 	My	 informant	Malika	said	 that	 she	had	 longed	 to	visit	 the	 land	of	her	ancestors	for	a	few	years	but	she	had	had	a	difficult	time	trying	to	realize	her	plan,	as	she	was	always	very	busy	with	her	work,	family,	and	other	activities	in	several	organizations.	Her	trip	to	Hadramaut	is	also	motivated	by	the	wish	to	have	 a	 short	 break	 from	 her	 daily	 life.	 	 Furthermore,	 economic	motives	 are	interlocked	with	other	motivations	for	a	return	journey	as	well.	In	some	cases,	both	informants	of	Sada	and	non-Sada	have	benefitted	from	the	opportunity	to	renew	 their	 connections	 with	 Hadramaut	 for	 commercial	 activities	 such	 as	organizing	pilgrimage	tours	and	trades.	From	several	examples	of	return-journeys	of	the	Hadramis	mentioned	in	 this	 section	we	 can	 say	 that	 simultaneous	 connections	with	 a	 country	of	destination	 and	 a	 country	 of	 origin	 and	 multiple	 belongings	 are	 possible.	However,	variations	can	be	observed	between	those	who	exhibit	‘transnational	ways	 of	 being’	 but	 not	 necessarily	 ‘transnational	 ways	 of	 belonging’,	 or	 the	other	way	around,	those	who	exhibit	‘transnational	ways	of	belonging’	but	not	necessarily	 ‘transnational	 ways	 of	 being’.	 Or,	 again,	 those	 who	 actually	combine	 transnational	ways	of	being	and	belonging.163	As	already	mentioned	in	the	examples	I	presented,	some	Hadramis	went	to	Hadramaut	as	a	quest	in	search	 for	 their	 roots,	 whereas	 other	 made	 their	 journeys	 at	 the	 request	 of	their	parents.	In	other	words,	some	went	for	their	own	will,	while	others	went	because	 their	 parents	 forced	 to	 do	 so.	 In	 this	 light,	 Hadramis’	 transnational	ways	 of	 being	 are	 not	 necessarily	 a	 reflection	 of	 their	 attachment	 to	 the	country	of	origin	of	 their	 forefathers	and	thus	 they	do	not	necessarily	have	a	sense	of	transnational	belonging.	On	the	other	hand,	many	Hadramis	in	Ambon	who	 never	 travel	 to	 Hadramaut	 and	 who	 are	 not	 in	 touch	 with	 people	 in	Yemen	 maintain	 contacts	 with	 Hadramis	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 diaspora	 and	preserve	 the	 kafa’a	 marriage	 tradition	 as	 they	 consider	 it	 their	 forefathers’	tradition.	 In	 this	 sense,	 their	 ‘transnational	 ways	 of	 belonging’	 overlap	 with	’transnational	ways	of	being’	 in	 relation	 to	other	people	of	Hadramaut	origin	but	not	to	Hadramaut	itself.			




As	was	described	 in	 the	previous	section,	Hadramaut	 is	still	a	place	 to	which	many	diasporic	Hadramis	make	return	journeys.	Irrespective	of	their	different	opinions	 about	 Hadramaut	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 sacredness,	 many	 Hadrami	descendants	in	Ambon	share	the	view	of	Hadramaut	as	a	point	of	reference	to	construct	their	diasporic	identity.	They	continue	to	share	a	collective	memory	of	sharing	a	common	origin,	heritage	and	religious	tradition.	The	attribution	to	Hadramaut	 as	 a	 shared	 place	 of	 origin	 comes	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 the	 specific	meaning	 for	 Hadramis	 of	 the	 term	 ‘jama’a’,	 an	 Arabic	 word	 meaning	 a	congregation,	 group	 or	 community.	 Hadrami	 descendants	 use	 the	 term	exclusively	to	denote	the	community	of	those	of	Arab	or	specifically	Hadrami	origin.	 The	 visible	 identification	 of	 being	 a	 jama’a	 is	 the	 continued	 use	 and	protection	 of	Hadrami	 clan	 names,	which	 lead	 to	 their	 perception	 of	 being	 a	member	 of	 an	 imagined	 group	 or	 community.	 As	 Anderson	 (1991)	 argues,	being	 an	 imagined	 group	 does	 not	 require	 members	 to	 have	 a	 face-to-face	interaction.	Moreover,	sharing	a	common	origin	in	a	far	away	land	in	southern	Arabia	 that	 can	 still	 be	 visited,	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 the	 Malay	 diaspora	believe	 that	 their	 ties	with	 Hadramaut	 as	 their	 ancestors’	 homeland	 are	 not	just	 imagined,	but	 rooted	 in	 a	 specific	 geographical	 terrain	 (Tilley	1994,	33).	Hadrami	 descendants	 who	 have	 visited	 this	 homeland	 come	 back	 with	narratives,	objects	and	comportment	picked	up	in	Hadramaut,	thus	feeding	the	desire	of	others	to	follow	suit	and	reconfirm	their	own	ties	with	the	idealized	country	of	origin.	Also,	 despite	 their	 identification	 as	 part	 of	 the	 jama’a,	 most	 Hadrami	descendants	 in	Ambon	are	aware	of	 their	 status	as	muwallads	 (descendants)	which	refers	to	Hadramis	born	in	mahjar,	diaspora.	As	muwallads	they	do	not	only	 identify	 with	 people	 in	 Hadramaut	 but	 being	 of	 Hadrami	 descent	 also	connects	 them	 to	 other	Hadramis	 in	 several	 localities	 in	 addition	 to	 those	 in	the	country	of	origin.	Furthermore,	as	I	have	demonstrated	in	several	chapters	of	 this	 dissertation,	 they	 also	 identify	 with	 fellow	 Muslims	 in	 Indonesia	 in	general,	 and	 against	 the	 background	 of	 the	 1999-2002	 communal	 conflicts	even	more	closely	with	fellow	Muslims	in	Ambon.	In	this	respect,	the	Hadrami	diaspora	 confirm	 the	 argument	 that	 Rima	 Berns-McGown	 makes	 about	diaspora	being	no	more	than	a	space	of	imagination	and	a	space	of	two	vectors	of	 connections;	 connections	 between	 the	 mythic	 or	 real	 homeland	 and	 the	host-land,	 and	 connections	 to	 the	 wider	 (mainstream)	 society	 in	 the	 host-society	(Berns-McGown	2007-2008,	8).	It	should	be	pointed	out,	however,	that	the	significance	of	Hadramaut	as	a	locus	 of	 transnational	 sense	 of	 belonging	 is	 not	 the	 same	 for	 all	 Hadrami	descendants.	 As	 I	 have	 described	 in	 chapter	 five,	 since	 the	 1990s,	 especially	
Chapter	6:	Hadramaut	as	an	Imaginary	Homeland	
246		
after	the	1999-2002	conflicts,	some	Hadrami	descendants,	most	of	whom	from	Sada	 families,	 have	 converted	 to	 Twelver	 Shi’a.	 Their	 conversion	 from	traditionalist	Sunni	to	Twelver	Shi’a	has	transformed	their	view	on	Hadramaut	as	their	primary	imaginary	homeland.	As	Hadramaut	and	other	southern	parts	of	Yemen	have	been	dominated	by	religious	centers	following	the	Shafi’i	school	of	 thought	 and	 other	 new	 reformist	 Sunni	 groups,	 Shi’ite	 followers	 have	 no	interest	 in	 visiting	 Hadramaut	 for	 religious	 education.	 Rather,	 they	 are	oriented	 towards	other	 sacred	places	where	 they	 can	make	 similar	 claims	of	being	of	prophetic	descent.	For	Shi’ite	Hadramis,	Karbala	 in	Iran,	has	become	an	 important	 point	 of	 orientation	 since	Husain,	 one	 of	 the	 grand-sons	 of	 the	Prophet	is	buried	there.	Husain	has	become	a	symbol	of	the	Shi’ite	struggle	and	ideology	of	ahl	al-bayt,	 the	Prophet’s	 family	 and	 therefore	Karbala,	where	he	was	killed	and	buried,	is	of	great	significance	to	Shi’ite	Muslims.	By	extension,	as	home	of	Sunni	Muslims,	Hadramaut	is	no	longer	their	ideal	place	to	return	as.	My	informant	Abdurahman	Assagaf,	the	leader	of	the	ABI	branch,	the	Shi’ite	association	in	Maluku,	conducted	a	pilgrimage	tour	to	Iran	in	March	2015.	He	went	in	a	group	of	twenty	Shi’ite	followers	from	all	over	Indonesia.	He	spent	a	month	 in	 Iran	 and	 visited	 several	 shrines,	 mosques,	 and	 religious	 scholars.	Telling	me	about	his	trip	to	Iran,	he	said	that	he	longed	to	visit	Iran	again	in	the	future.	Other	followers	who	have	not	visited	Iran	even	told	me	that	they	have	dreamed	to	 live	 in	 Iran	as	 they	 imagined	 that	 there	 they	might	practice	 their	belief	 publicly.	 They	 wanted	 to	 feel	 the	 atmosphere	 of	 an	 ideal	 Shi’ite	community,	which	they	imagined	to	be	characterized	by	peace,	spirituality	and	truth.	 In	 this	 sense,	 for	 Shi’ite	 Hadrami,	 Iran	 plays	 a	 similar	 role	 as	 an	imaginary	homeland	as	Hadramaut	for	Sunni	Hadrami,	albeit	more	one-sidedly	as	 a	 spiritual	 point	 of	 orientation.	 For	 the	majority	 of	 Hadrami	 descendants,	however,	in	addition	to	Ambon	in	particular	and	Indonesia	or	the	Malay	region	in	 general,	 Hadramaut	 remains	 the	 primary	 imaginary	 homeland	 in	 their	translocal	sense	of	belonging.		
6. Conclusion		
This	 chapter	 discussed	 the	 diasporic	 return	 journeys	 of	 some	 Hadrami	descendants	 in	 Ambon	 to	 Hadramaut.	 I	 have	 described	 how	 the	 renewed	connections	 between	 Indonesia	 and	 Hadramaut	 since	 the	 mid-1990s	 have	encouraged	both	male	and	female	Hadramis	in	Ambon	to	visit	their	ancestor’s	homeland.	 Such	 visits	 to	 Hadramaut	 take	 several	 forms:	 family	 visits,	 taking	courses	 at	 religious	 institutions,	 and	 performing	 pilgrimage.	 To	 some	 extent,	the	various	purposes	that	different	people	may	have	for	visiting	the	country	of	origin	 run	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 their	 ideological	 orientations,	 such	 as	 being	traditionalist	or	Salafi,	and	their	status	as	Sada	or	non-Sada.		
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This	dissertation	is	the	result	of	an	ethnographic	study	of	the	Hadrami	Arabs	of	Ambon	in	the	present-day	era.	The	aim	of	the	research	was	to	understand	the	interplay	 between	 ethnicity	 and	 religion	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 diasporic	identity	 and	 on	 the	 social	 integration	 of	 the	 descendants	 of	 Hadrami	 Arab	migrants	in	Ambon	by	way	of	a	contextualized	analysis	of	how	they	articulate	their	 identity	 through	 everyday	 life	 practices.	 The	 overarching	 research	question	addressed	in	this	dissertation	is	how	ethnicity	and	religion	intersect	in	individual	and	collective	constructions	of	identity	of	present-day	Ambonese	Hadramis	 and	 how	 this	 intersection	 relates	 to	 their	 positions	 in	 Ambonese	socio-economic,	political	and	religious	power	constellations.	I	have	formulated	answers	 to	 this	 question	 in	 the	 various	 chapters	 that	make	up	 this	 thesis	 by	addressing	the	following	subquestions:	How	do	Hadrami	Arabs	actively	claim	and	maintain	their	ethnic	identity	in	everyday	practices?	How	do	they	present	their	multiple	 senses	 of	 belonging	 in	 individual	 and	 collective	 self-narratives	and	what	 (wishes	 for)	 concrete	 relations	with	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 do	 they	have?	What	kind	of	 religious	discourses	and	practices	do	 they	engage	 in	and	how	 do	 these	 discourses	 and	 practices	 relate	 to	 their	 various	 claims	 of	belonging	to	certain	groups?	What	kind	of	local	religious,	social,	economic	and	political	 networks	 do	 they	 participate	 in	 and	 how	do	 these	 networks	 extend	over	various	ethnic	and	religious	communities	in	and	outside	Ambon?	This	 is	 the	 first	 comprehensive	 study	 on	 the	 lives	 and	 identifications	 of	Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon.	 For	 historical	 information	 about	 the	 ways	they	 adapted	 to	 local	 society,	 I	 therefore	 had	 to	 rely	 on	 literature	 about	diasporic	Hadrami	communities	 in	 the	wider	Malay	Archipelago.	Much	of	 the	existing	 historical	 literature	 on	 Hadramis	 suggests	 that	 because	 Hadrami	migrants	and	their	descendants	maintained	a	distinct	cultural	ethnic	 identity,	they	 never	 fully	 assimilated	 into	 the	 host	 societies.	 The	 literature	 also	indicates,	 however,	 that	 their	 religious	 identification	helped	 the	Hadramis	 to	integrate	 in	 their	host-societies	 in	 certain	 respects,	 if	 in	 those	 societies	 there	were	 communities	with	 the	 same	 religious	 affiliation.	 The	 existing	 literature	also	 points	 out	 that	 the	 Hadramis	 have	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 social,	political,	 economic,	 and	 religious	 social	 domains	 in	 the	 local	 societies	where	they	 settled,	 not	 in	 the	 least	 by	 drawing	 on	 their	 transnational	 connections	with	 diasporic	 Hadramis	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 world,	 and	 with	 Hadramis	 in	 the	country	 of	 origin	 (Freitag	 and	 Clarence-Smith	 1997;	 Mobini-Kesheh	 1999;	Boxberger	 2002;	 De	 Jong	 and	 Kaptein	 2002;	 Freitag	 2003;	 Manger	 2010;	Mandal	2018).	
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The	 existing	 body	 of	 anthropological	 literature	 on	 Hadrami	 diaspora	similarly	suggests	that	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora	play	an	important	role	in	local	religious	 spheres,	 while	 ethnicity	 features	 as	 a	 salient	 marker	 in	 the	maintenance	of	a	distinct	cultural	identity	in	the	private	domain	(Clegg	2005;	Fachrudin	 2005;	 Shahab	 2005;	 Ho	 2006;	 Hafizhah	 2007	 Jacobsen	 2009;	Siregar	2009;	Tridewiyanti	2009;	Slama	2011[2014];	Sila	2012[2015];	Alatas	2008[2011][2014][2016a][2016b][2016c]).	 This	 distinct	 cultural	 identity,	however,	 is	 not	 homogenous.	 An	 important	 internal	 axis	 of	 differentiation	among	 the	Hadramis,	 for	 instance,	 is	 the	 distinction	 between	 those	 claiming	descent	 from	the	Prophet	Muhammad,	 the	Sada,	and	those	who	cannot	make	such	claims,	the	non-Sada.	The	reproduction	of	a	social	hierarchy	based	on	this	distinction	 has	 been	 maintained	 through	 an	 asymmetrical	 marriage	 system	justified	 by	 kafa’a	 rulings.	 The	 findings	 of	 recent	 studies	 also	 suggest	 that	religion	plays	a	major	role	in	the	renewed	connections	between	the	homeland	Hadramaut	 and	 the	 diaspora	 (Knysh	 2001;	 Slama	 2005;	 Ho	 2006;	 Jacobsen	2009;	Alatas	2008[2016b]).	Based	on	 the	main	 findings	of	 the	previous	 studies	mentioned	above,	 in	this	study	I	take	diaspora	not	only	as	a	category	of	practice,	but	also	a	category	of	analysis	 to	examine	the	Hadramis’	 identifications.	While	ethnicity,	religion,	class,	 and	 gender	 are	 mentioned	 by	 most	 scholars	 as	 contributing	 to	 the	reproduction	of	diasporic	Hadrami	identity,	 in	most	studies	these	dimensions	of	 identity	 are	 predominantly	 approached	 as	 separate	 social	 categories.	 For	this	 study,	 I	 have	 rather	 used	 diaspora	 as	 an	 analytical	 lens	 in	 combination	with	 the	 intersectionality	 perspective	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 multiple	intersecting	 social	 categories	 such	 as	 ethnicity,	 religion,	 class,	 and	 gender	mutually	 shape	each	other	 in	 	 constructing	 a	diasporic	Hadrami	 identity	 and	the	positions	that	individual	Hadramis	occupy	in	a	particular	context.			
2. The	Main	findings	
2.1 Claims	and	Maintenance	of	an	Ethnic	Identity		In	the	historical	overview	presented	in	chapter	2,	it	came	to	the	fore	that	Dutch	colonial	rule	contributed	significantly	to	shaping	the	construction	of	a	distinct	cultural	identity	of	the	Hadrami	migrants	and	their	descendants	in	Indonesia.	During	the	colonial	era,	Dutch	colonials	positioned	the	Hadramis	as	a	group	of	second-class	citizens	that	was	lower	in	position	than	the	Europeans	but	higher	than	the	indigenous	population.	In	the	Dutch	East	Indies	Arabs	were	subjected	to	 residential	 segregation	 and	 travel	 restrictions.	 In	 Maluku,	 residential	segregation	 was	 applied	 only	 in	 the	 southeastern	 parts	 of	 Maluku,	 namely	Banda	and	Dobo.		
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These	 colonial	 policies	 influenced	 the	 ways	 the	 Hadramis	 and	 their	descendants	interacted	with	other	communities	in	the	diaspora,	as	well	as	the	ways	 they	 perceived	 and	 identified	 themselves	 as	 part	 of	 a	 specific	 ethnic	group.	 In	 fact,	 considering	oneself	 superior	 to	 local	 ethnic	 groups	because	of	one’s	 ethnic	 identification	 as	 Arabs	 or	 Arab	 muwallads	 (descendants)	 still	characterizes	 the	 views	 of	 many	 Hadrami	 descendants	 today,	 as	 I	demonstrated	 in	 chapter	 3-6.	 Although	 the	 colonial	 policies	 contributed	 to	 a	heigthened	 sense	 of	 Arabness,	 this	 sense	 of	 Arabness	 came	 in	 different	modalities.	 In	 chapter	 2,	 I	 described	 that	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 came	 from	various	 different	 clans	 and	 brought	 with	 them	 their	 traditional	 social	stratification,	 distinguishing	 different	 strata	 of	 Arabs	 based	 on	 descent:	 	 the	Sada	were	the	highest	in	terms	of	social	status,	and	they	were	followed	by	the	
mashaikh-qabail	and	the	masakin.	As	I	have	argued	in	chapter	3-6,	despite	the	fact	 that	 the	differentiation	 into	clans	of	different	social	status	still	exists,	 the	most	 important	distinction	 that	 counts	 today	among	Hadrami	descendants	 is	between	the	two	general	categories	of	Sada	and	non-Sada.	More	particularly,	I	have	demonstrated	that	contrary	to	the	situation	in	the	past,	the	Sada	and	non-Sada	distinction	today	is	based	more	on	status	differences	rather	than	on	class	differences.	 Life	 in	 the	 Ambonese	 diaspora	 has	 enabled	 shifts	 in	 the	 power	relationship	between	Sada	and	non-Sada,	 resulting	 in	a	partial	breakdown	of	the	traditional	social	stratification.	The	dynamics	of	power	relationships	between	Sada	and	non-Sada	groups	in	the	diaspora	is	related	first	and	foremost	to	economic	developments.	Many	Hadramis	of	non-Sada	origin	have	engaged	in	successful	economic	enterprises	in	 the	 diaspora.	 This	 economic	 success	 enhanced	 their	 socio-political,	 and	religious	 positions,	which,	 in	 turn	 led	 to	 the	 breakdown	 of	 traditional	 social	stratification	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 I	 have	 described,	 for	 instance,	 how	 in	 Ambon,	non-Sada	 people,	 such	 as	 the	 families	 az-Zagladi,	 Bahasoan,	 Basalamah,	Ba’adillah,	 and	 others,	 were	 quite	 successful	 in	 their	 trading	 activities	 in	Ambon,	thus	gaining	much	economic	capital	and	allowing	some	entrepreneurs	to	 obtain	 high	 political	 positions	 as	 Arab	 leaders	 or	 ‘kapiteins’	 appointed	 by	the	Dutch	colonial	authorities.	Chapter	2	also	addressed	the	specific	genderedness	of	how	the	Hadrami	identity	 in	 general	 and	 the	 Sada	 non-Sada	 distinction	 has	 been	 maintained.	Since	it	was	Hadrami	men	who	migrated	to	Indonesia	and	Ambon	in	particular,	they	 began	 to	 build	 Hadrami	 communities	 by	marrying	 local	women.	 I	 have	demonstrated	 how	 this	 specific	 intersection	 of	 ethnicity,	 religion,	 class,	 and	gender	 in	 the	 diasporic	 identity	 construction	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 can	 still	 be	recognized	 in	 today’s	 context	 and	 how	 this	 marriage	 pattern	 affects	contemporary	male	and	female	Hadramis	in	Ambon	differently.	The	descendants	of	Hadrami	Arab	migrants	in	Ambon	today	are	all	born	in	Indonesia	and	have	Indonesian	citizenship.	The	Indonesian	political	system	
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does	not	recognize	Indonesian	citizenship	in	combination	with	a	foreign	ethnic	label,	 such	 as	 being	 Hadrami	 or	 Yemeni	 or	 Arab.	 Rather,	 the	 official	 census	categorizes	 the	 Indonesian	 population	 in	 terms	 of	 regional	 residencies	 and	religious	 affiliations.	 In	 everyday	 life	 classifications	 on	 the	 ground,	 however,	ethnic	categorization	does	take	place,	although	more	often	than	not,	 in	public	discourse	 in	 Ambon	 the	more	 specific	 categories	 of	 Hadrami	 or	 Yemeni	 are	subsumed	 under	 the	 broader	 label	 of	 Arabness.	 In	 chapter	 3,	 I	 have	demonstrated	 in	 this	respect	 that	 the	descendants	of	Hadrami	Arab	migrants	in	Ambon	 today	 commonly	 self-identify	 and	 are	 identified	 by	 others	 as	Arab	
muwallads	or	descendants,	with	reference	to	Hadramaut	as	 the	place	of	 their	forefathers’	 origin.	 In	 chapter	 4,	 I	 have	 described	 how	 this	 Arab	 ethnic	identification	 has	 been	 constructed	 through	 specific	 cultural	 traditions	concerning	 marriage	 patterns	 and	 kinship	 reckoning.	 In	 this	 light,	 Hadrami	Arab	ethnic	identity	in	Ambon	largely	pertains	to	socially	constructed	claims	to	similarity	 and	 difference	 that	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 conception	 of	 ethnicity	 as	theorized	by	Eriksen	(1992)	and	Jenkins	(1995),	who	understand	ethnicity	as	the	product	of	 social	processes,	 specifically	 creating	 social	boundaries	 rather	than	a	cultural	given,	made	and	remade	rather	than	taken	for	granted,	chosen	depending	on	circumstances	rather	than	ascribed	through	birth.	Both	authors	also	 argue	 that	 ethnic	 belonging	 is	 best	 conceived	 as	 an	 ongoing	 process	 of	ethnic	 identification,	which	my	 analysis	 of	 the	multiple	 identifications	 of	 the	Hadramis	of	Ambon	seems	to	confirm.	The	 analysis	 of	 marriage	 patterns	 and	 kinship	 reckoning	 among	 the	Hadramis	 in	 chapter	 4	 highlights	 how	 cultural	 domains	 of	 power	 operate	Hadramis	 in	 social	 relations.	 These	 cultural	 domains	 of	 power	 are	 directly	related	 to	 conceptions	 about	what	 establishes	 the	 ideal	marriage	 in	 terms	of	providing	a	basis	to	create	a	stable	group.	These	ideas	stem	from	a	traditional	Hadrami	 kinship	 system	 and	 marriage	 traditions,	 as	 well	 as	 from	 certain	religious	 understandings.	 Patrilineal	 descent	 reckoning	 combined	 with	 an	asymmetrical	marriage	based	on	kafa’a	doctrines	according	 to	which	women	may	marry	 ‘up’	 but	 never	 ‘down’,	 whereas	 for	men	marrying	 down	 is	much	less	problematic	as	it	does	not	affect	patrilineal	descent	which	is	applied	based	on	claims	of	social	ranks	and	gender	differences	that	are	imbued	with	religious	justification.	 A	 caste-like	 social	 hierarchy	 is	 thus	 embedded	 in	 marriage	relations	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	 Hadramis	 and	 between	 Hadramis	 in	general	and	the	broader	local	society.	I	have	argued	that	in	this	light,	marriage	is	 the	 main	 factor	 in	 defining	 both	 internal	 boundaries	 within	 a	 variety	 of	forms	of	Hadrami	identity,	as	well	as	defining	external	boundaries	with	a	host-society.	Chapter	4	brought	to	the	fore	specifically	how	shifting	understandings	of	 asymmetrical	 marriage	 based	 on	 kafa’a	 rulings	 differ	 between	 Sada	 and	non-Sada	Hadramis,	 in	 the	sense	 that	non-Sada	descendants	 tend	 to	be	more	flexible	in	the	application	of	kafa’a	principles	than	Sada	ones.	As	a	result,	Sada	
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women	 are	 more	 affected	 by	 upholding	 the	 kafa’a	 tradition	 than	 non-Sada	women.	 Social	 sanctions	 and	 a	 taboo	 on	 breaking	 the	 ideal	 marriage	 are	stronger	 in	 Sada	 families	 than	 in	 non-Sada	 families.	 This	 patrilineal	 kinship	reckoning	 combined	 with	 a	 religiously	 justified	 asymmetrical	 marriage	(kafa’a),	 thus,	 has	 generated	 gender	 inequality	 in	 marriage,	 particularly	 in	Sada	families.	In	 principle	 Hadrami	 descendants	 adopt	 a	 patrilineal	 kinship	 system	 in	order	 to	 maintain	 a	 particular	 Hadrami	 or	 Arab	 group	 identity.	 I	 have	demonstrated,	 however,	 that	 in	 practice,	 they	 also	 recognize	 their	 maternal	relations	 with	 local	 families,	 and	 in	 certain	 cirmcumstances	 present	themselves	 as	 Ambonese	 of	 Arab	 origin.	 	 In	 some	 cases,	 they	 use	 their	maternal	relations	 in	order	to	pursue	particular	 interests.	For	example,	 those	who	have	maternal	 relations	with	 local	 royal	 families,	 cherish	 such	 relations	and	benefit	from	them	for	economic	gain	and	in	order	to	enhance	their	social	status.	 In	 this	 regard,	 my	 data	 confirm	 for	 the	 Hadramis	 that	 genealogical	reckoning	 is	 ‘a	 symbolic	 cultural	 construct	 expressed	 through	 a	 kinship	terminology	constituted	as	an	interconnected	system	of	symbols,	with	person	defined	 as	 kin	 to	 one	 another	 realized	 in	 many	 different	 modalities’	 (Read	2007,	331).	Whereas	marriage	and	kinship	relations	operate	very	much	as	a	societal	arena	where	 the	Hadramis	have	maintained	 their	distinct	cultural	 identity	as	Arabs,	 other	 cultural	 features,	 such	 as	 dress,	 dietary,	 language,	 art	 festivals,	appear	 to	be	very	much	adapted	 to	 local	Ambonese	 culture	as	 I	described	 in	chapter	 3.	 The	 Hadramis	 also	 show	 high	 adaptability	 and	 heterogeneity	 in	their	engagement	in	domains	of	public	life	such	as	in	education,	the	job	market,	and	 in	politics.	A	 special	note	must	be	made	on	 the	participation	of	Hadrami	women	 in	 the	public	 sphere,	 a	 situation	which	 is	quite	different	 from	 that	 in	Hadramaut	 or	 other	 diaspora	 places.	 These	 local	 differences	 underscore	 the	main	argument	that	I	make	in	this	dissertation	that	Hadrami	identity	must	be	understood	 as	 a	 product	 of	 an	 on-going	 process	 of	 positioning	 and	 being	positioned	 and	 also	 how	 in	maintaining	 a	 particular	 Hadrami	 identity,	 some	cultural	 elements	 are	preserved	while	 other	 cultural	 features	 are	 abandoned	or	blend	with	non-Hadrami	cultural	practices.	In	some	respects,	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	 thus	 share	more	 some	 cultural	 features	with	 local	Ambonese	 than	with	people	in	Hadramaut,	while	at	the	same	time	they	are	able	to	claim	their	specific	 Hadrami	 Arab	 ethnic	 identity.	 My	 data	 therefore	 confirms	 the	suggestion	made	by	Leif	Manger	(2010)	that	the	cultural	content	of	a	category	of	 Hadrami	 Arab	 identity	 (identification)	 may	 differ	 considerably	 from	 one	diaspora	 place	 to	 another;	 	 the	 reproduction	 of	 a	 particular	 Hadrami	 group	identity	is	informed	by	the	reproduction	of	the	multiple	identities	of	individual	Hadramis	 as	 they	 are	 embedded	 in	 different	 local	 cultural	 contexts	 (Manger	2010,	 116).	As	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 in	 several	 chapters	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 how	
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Hadrami	 identification	 intersects	 with	 other	 axes	 of	 differentiation	 in	Ambonese	 society	 is	 particularly	 influenced	 by	 the	 1999	 –	 2002	 communal	conflicts	between	Christians	and	Muslims,	the	effects	of	which	are	still	tangible	in	everyday	life.			
2.2 Multiple	Senses	of	Belonging	and	Orientation	towards	a	Homeland		The	 Hadrami	 migrants	 in	 Ambon	 often	 express	 their	 multiple	 senses	 of	belongings	by	making	references	to	both	foreign	and	local	ethnic	categories	in	presenting	 themselves	 as	 Ambonese	 Arabs.	 On	 other	 occasions,	 they	 may	present	 themselves	 by	 highlighting	 only	 one	 of	 the	 two	 ethnic	 categories	 of	being	 Arab	 or	 Ambonese.	 Alternatively,	 in	 yet	 different	 situations	 they	 may	present	 themselves	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 religious	 identification	 as	 Muslims,	 or	both	 in	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 categories	 as	 Ambonese	 Arab	 Muslims.	 Such	contextualized	general	ethnic	and/or	 religious	 identification	 is	 in	many	ways	specified	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 status,	 gender,	 and	 ideological	 orientations,	namely	as	Sada	or	non-Sada,	men	or	women,	Sunni	or	Shi’a	 (traditionalist	or	Salafi,	etc.).	Moreover,	all	 these	categories	 that	refer	 to	what	Steven	Vertovec	(1997)	would	call	 the	 ‘multicultural	 competence’	of	Hadramis	are	sometimes	combined	together	with	references	to	citizenship	status	as	Indonesians.	In	the	various	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 how	 this	 multicultural	competence	 is	 played	 out	 and	 improvised	 upon	 by	 Hadrami	 individuals	 in	different	contexts	and	in	relation	to	different	webs	of	social	relationships.	These	 various	 intersecting	 categories	 of	 ethnicity,	 religion,	 class,	 and	gender	 also	 have	 different	 implications	 for	 how	Hadrami	 descendants	 orient	themselves	 toward	 Hadramaut	 as	 the	 homeland	 of	 their	 forefathers.	 The	findings	 of	 chapter	 6	 suggest	 a	 variegated	 dynamics	 of	 diasporic-return	journeys	 among	 present	 day	 Hadrami	 descendants.	 As	 a	 site	 of	 diasporic	return,	Hadramaut	is	internally	contested.		Some	Hadrami	descendants	have	an	 orientation	 toward	 their	 forefathers’	 homeland	 not	 only	 as	 the	 place	 of	origin	 but	 also	 as	 the	 place	 to	 turn	 to	 for	 authoritative	 sources	 of	 religious	value	 and	 spirituality.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 particularly	 among	 Hadramis	 with	traditionalist	views,	who	visit	Hadramaut	to	study	at	Islamic	boarding	schools	and	to	perform	local	pilgrimage.	 In	contrast,	others	only	consider	Hadramaut	to	be	their	place	of	origin	and	disregard	it	as	a	place	of	authoritative	source	of	spirituality.	 Rather,	 to	 cultivate	 religious	 values	 and	 comportment	 the	 latter	turn	to	places	such	as	Saudi	Arabia	or	Iran.	Global	Islamic	movements,	such	as	Salafism	(and	Wahabism)	and	Shi’ism,	contribute	to	this	reorientation.	As	 I	 demonstrated	 in	 chapter	 6,	 for	 Hadrami	 women,	 who	 have	 only	recently	 begun	 to	 participate	 in	 return-journeys,	 such	 trips	 take	 on	 partly	different	 patterns	 and	meanings	 than	 for	men.	 The	most	 important	 factor	 in	the	 gendered	 experiences	 of	 return	 journeys	 is	 related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 sex-
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segregation	 and	 the	 related	 full	 body	 veiling	 for	 women	 in	 public	 spaces	 is	much	more	strictly	adhered	 to	 in	Hadramaut	 than	 in	Ambon.	The	practice	of	strict	sex-segregation	in	Hadramaut	both	restricts	women’s	movements	while	there,	but	by	bringing	them	home	to	Ambon,	 local	Hadrami	dress	and	veiling		practices	also	provide	women	with	attributes	to	express	their	special	status	as	Muslims	with	a	specific	affiliation	and	background.	My	 descriptive	 analysis	 of	 return	 journeys	 demonstrate	 that	 for	 some	Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon,	 diaspora	 is	 not	 only	 a	 space	 of	 imagined	relations	 but	 rather	 one	 of	 very	 concrete	 relations	 between	 diasporic	communities	 and	 the	 homeland.	 The	 nature	 and	 relevance	 of	 these	 real	 or	imagined	 relations	depend	very	much	on	 the	 context	 in	which	 the	Hadramis	whom	 I	 studied	 find	 themselves	 in	 and	 the	 variety	 of	 experiences	 that	 they	have	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 	 their	 participation	 in	 various	 contexts.	 Between	 the	emergence	 of	 nation-states	 and	 the	 mid-1990s,	 the	 connections	 between	Hadramaut	 and	 Indonesia	 were	 disrupted	 and	 weakened.	 Generations	 who	were	 born	 and	 lived	 around	 this	 period	 could	 only	 remember	 and	 imagine	their	 relations	 with	 the	 homeland,	 since	 it	 was	 very	 difficult	 to	 visit	 their	forefathers’	country	of	origin	due	to	the	specific	socio-political	circumstances	both	in	Indonesia	and	Hadramaut.	During	the	time	that	their	relations	with	their	forefathers’	homeland	were	weakened,	they	did	build	networks	with	other	Hadramis	in	various	dispersed	places	 in	 the	diaspora.	This	can	be	seen	 from	 in-marriages	between	Hadrami	communities	 living	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 Ambon	 and	 other	 places	 around	Indonesia.	Through	these	marriage	practices,	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	enacted	their	 imagined	 relations	 and	 maintained	 their	 specific	 cultural	 identity	 as	Hadramis.	Since	 the	unification	of	 two	Yemeni	states	and	the	changing	socio-political	contexts	 in	both	Yemen	and	Indonesia,	more	and	more	people	travel	to	Yemen	to	build	real	connections	with	people	in	the	homeland,	and	the	same	holds	 for	 Hadramis	 from	 Hadramaut	 who	 come	 to	 Indonesia.	 	 However,	 we	should	realize	that	the	number	of	people	who	are	in	a	position	to	travel	to	the	homeland	 remains	 limited.	 Also,	 the	 renewed	 contacts	 between	Hadramis	 in	the	diaspora	 and	 those	 in	Hadramaut	have	 suffered	 from	 the	 recent	political	unrest	and	civil	wars	between	the	Houthi	rebels	and	the	Yemeni	government	since	2011.	Illustrating	the	strong	pull	of	Hadramaut	to	present-day	diasporic	Hadramis,	this	political	unrest	has	hardly	reduced	the	motivation	and	efforts	of	some	Hadramis	in	Indonesia	to	travel	to	Yemen,	as	I	experienced	when	joining	a	group	of	Ambonese	Hadramis	to	Hadramaut	in	2015,	when	the	tense	political	situation	in	Yemen	was	turning	violent.	For	 some	 Hadrami	 descendants	 from	 the	 Indonesian	 Archipelago,	 then,	diasporic-return	journeys	are	not	the	kind	of	‘myth’	that	Hall	(1990)	and	Gilroy	(1997)	argue	as	central	features	of	diasporic	dreams	of	return	journeys	on	the	basis	 of	 their	 research	 among	African	diasporas	 living	 in	 the	West.	 Although	
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return	 to	 the	 homeland	 for	 diasporic	 Hadramis	 is	 not	 a	 myth,	 neither	 are	return	 journeys	 intended	 to	 reclaim	 the	 land	 and	 resettle	 in	 the	 country	 of	origin	permanently.	In	this	sense,	for	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon,	diaspora	is	not	a	‘social	 form’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 Vertovec	 uses	 the	 term	 to	 designate	 the	condition	 of,	 for	 instance,	 the	 Jewish	 diaspora	 (Vertovec	 1997,	 278-279).	Rather,	 living	diasporic	 lives	 for	Ambonese	Hadramis	and	those	elsewhere	 in	the	 Indonesian	Archipelago	means	having	 the	opportunity	 to	build	networks	with	 Hadramis	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 diaspora	 and	 in	 the	 homeland	 and	 thus	expand	their	local	networks.	This	orientation	to	Hadramis	elsewhere,	however,	should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 indication	 that	 building	 social	 ties	 with	 the	host-society	is	not	important	for	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon.	The	 multiple	 cultural	 and	 social	 competence	 of	 Ambonese	 Hadramis	touches	 upon	 the	 issue	 –	 often	 a	 highly	 politicized	 one	 –	 on	 whether	maintenance	 of	 such	 a	 distinct	 cultural	 identity	 can	 co-exist	with	 integration	into	the	host-societies	or	whether	multiple	belongings	both	within	and	beyond	the	nation-state	 are	 possible.	 The	 findings	 of	my	 study	demonstrate	 that	 the	Hadramis	 of	 Ambon	 are	 quite	 successful	 in	 maintaining	 simultaneous	connections	 with	 Indonesia	 and	 Yemen.	 In	 this	 light,	 variations	 can	 be	observed	between	 those	who	display	 a	 ‘transnational	ways	 of	 being’	 but	 not	necessarily	‘transnational	ways	of	belonging’,	or	vice	versa,	those	who	display	‘transnational	 ways	 of	 belonging’	 but	 not	 necessarily	 ‘transnational	 ways	 of	being’.	Or,	again,	those	who	actually	combine	transnational	ways	of	being	and	belonging	(see	Levitt	and	Glick-Schiller	2004).		As	I	described	in	chapter	6,	although	some	of	my	informants	have	visited	Hadramaut,	their	diasporic	return	journeys	cannot	be	generalized	as	having	a	single	meaning.	For	some,	for	instance,	it	concerned	a	quest	in		search	for	their	roots,	whereas	others	made	their	journeys	because	their	parents	forced	them	to	do	so.	In	other	words,	‘their	transnational	ways	of	being’	are	not	necessarily	a	reflection	of	their	own	attachment	to	their	forefathers’	country	of	origin;	they	do	not	necessarily	have	a	sense	of	transnational	belonging.	On	the	other	hand,	many	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 who	 never	 travel	 to	 their	 forefathers’	 origin	 and	who	are	not	 in	 touch	with	people	 in	Yemen	do	keep	contacts	with	Hadramis	elsewhere	in	the	diaspora	and	maintain	the	kafa’a	marriage	tradition	because	they	 cherish	 it	 as	 their	 forefathers’	 tradition.	 In	 this	 instance	 their	‘transnational	ways	of	belonging’	overlap	with	‘transnational	ways	of	being’	in	relation	to	other	people	with	Hadramaut	roots	but	not	to	Hadramaut	itself.	Another	 dimension	 of	 a	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 ‘diaspora’	 that	 the	findings	of	this	thesis	point	to	is	that	in	order	to	grasp	the	nature	and	degree	of	attachment	 to	 the	country	of	origin,	 a	distinction	must	be	made	between	 the	first	 generation	of	migrants	and	 their	descendants.	The	 findings	of	my	 thesis	illustrate	 that	 the	nature	and	 intensity	of	attachment	 to	 the	country	of	origin	depend	very	much	on	the	place	where	one	was	born	and	raised.	Consisting	of	a	
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variety	of	generations,	from	second	to	seventh	generation,	the	descendants	of	Hadrami	migrants	 in	Ambon	 today	 are	 all	 born	 and	 raised	 in	Ambon	and	on	other	Maluku	Islands,	or	else	in	other	regions	in	Indonesia.	The	conception	of	the	 country	 of	 origin	 of	 their	 migrant	 fathers	 for	 members	 of	 the	 second	generation,	 although	 they	 are	 rare	 today,	 is	 very	 much	 informed	 by	romanticized	stories	directly	transmitted	to	them	by	the	first	generation	who	came	directly	from	Hadramaut.	 	For	the	third	and	later	generations,	however,	the	cultural	memory	of	migration	is	much	less	closely	linked	to	their	own	lives.	Besides	factors	such	as	their	place	of	birth	and	the	context	in	which	they	grew	up,	their	attachment	to	the	host-societies	is	also	informed	by	the	fact	that	they	have	 maternal	 relations	 with	 local	 ethnic	 groups.	 For	 these	 Hadrami	descendants,	 Ambon	 represents	 the	 country	 of	 their	 mother’s	 origin,	 their	‘motherland’	 in	 other	 words.	 These	 maternal	 relations	 have	 played	 a	significant	 role	 in	 building	 relations	 with	 the	 mainstream	 population	 in	Indonesia	 in	 general	 and	 in	 Ambonese	 society	 in	 particular,	 thus	 creating	different	 Hadrami	 identities.	 In	 line	 with	 what	 Carment	 and	 Sadjed	 (2017)	argue,	 then,	 in	 this	context,	diaspora	needs	 to	be	understood	as	consisting	of	‘cultures	 of	 cooperation’	 rather	 than	 being	 viewed	 of	 as	 representing	 an	antagonistic	 relationship	 with	 the	 host-societies	 in	 order	 to	 accommodate	various	customs	and	norms	in	both	homeland	and	host-lands.	Also,	 my	 findings	 demonstrate	 that	 living	 diasporic	 lives	 in	 the	contemporary	 world	 where	 global	 communication	 and	 travel	 has	 become	much	 easier	 than	 in	 the	 past,	 often	 entails	 balancing	 triangular	 relations	between	 the	 homeland,	 host-land,	 and	 dispersed	 communities	 elsewhere	 in	the	diaspora	in	which	different	 individuals	play	out	their	various	intersecting	identities	in	different	contexts	and	relations	(see	Berns-McGown	2007-2008).				
2.3 Islamic	Discourses	and	Practices	Besides	 ethnicity,	 religion	 is	 another	 crucial	 dimension	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	diasporic	identity	by	the	Hadrami	descendants	in	Ambon.	Religious	heritage	is	played	out	both	in	individual	and	collective	narratives	among	the	present-day	Hadramis	 in	 their	 everyday	 life	 practices.	 On	 an	 individual	 level,	 Hadrami	descendants	commonly	present	themselves	as	Muslims,	thereby	sharing	their	religious	identity	with	the	Muslim	minority	communities	in	Ambon	as	well	as	the	majority	of	 the	 Indonesian	population	and	 the	global	umma.	 Yet,	 they	do	not	 constitute	 a	 homogeneous	 group,	 but	 are	 heterogeneous	 in	 practice,	beliefs,	and	in	building	and	participating	in	organizational	structures.	Chapter	5	has	highlighted	how	religion	 is	played	out	 in	 the	construction	and	maintenance	of	the	Hadrami	descendants’	multiple	identities,	and	how	the	religious	 field	 functions	 as	 a	 socio-cultural	 space	 to	 build	 social	 networks	among	 the	 Hadramis	 themselves,	 as	 well	 as	 between	 the	 Hadramis	 and	 the	
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broader	local	society.	In	chapter	5,	I	discussed	how	the	religious	identity	of	the	Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora	 has	 been	 affected	 by	 the	 dynamics	 of	 Islamic	movements	in	global,	national	and	local	contexts.	I	have	demonstrated	how	the	encounter	with	the	Muslim	‘Other’	or	those	with	distinct	Islamic	practices	has	influenced	 the	 ways	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants	 articulate	 their	 religious	identity.	Of	 particular	 interest	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 comparative	 study	 of	 Hadrami	communities	in	the	diaspora	are	the	ways	in	which	my	findings	shed	light	on	how	the	 local	 context	has	shaped	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	Hadramis	 in	Ambon	articulate	their	religious	identity	as	being	part	of	a	Muslim	minority	population	which	has	known	serious,	violent	clashes	with	the	dominant	Christian	majority	population	 of	 Ambon.	 The	 intricate	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 Hadramis	 both	distinguish	 themselves	 from	 and	 identify	 with	 other	 Muslims	 in	 Ambon	illustrate	that	in	line	with	what	Eickelman	and	Piscatori	(1990,	xv)	argue,	the	encounter	with	 the	Muslim	 ‘Other’	 is	 thus	as	 important	 for	 the	self-definition	as	 Hadrami	 Muslims	 as	 the	 confrontation	 with	 the	 non-Muslim	 Christian	‘Other’.	 As	 a	 result,	 both	 continuity	 and	 change	 in	 religious	 understandings	marks	the	dynamics	of	and	diversity	in	the	Hadramis’	Islamic	identity.	Two	 specific	 developments	 in	Ambon	have	 affected	 how	 some	Hadrami	practices,	beliefs	and	organizations	have	persisted	while	others	were	created,	became	contested	or	were	transformed.	The	first	one	occurred	in	the	late	19th	and	 early	 20th	 century,	 when	 modernist	 Islamic	 reformism	 challenged	 the	traditional	authority	of	 the	Sada	group	and	affected	 the	 institutional	building	of	a	Hadrami	community	reflected	 in	 the	 ‘Alawi-Irshadi	distinction.	The	main	Islamic	 debates	 during	 this	 period	 focused	 on	 the	 purification	 of	 religious	practices,	 touching	 directly	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 equality	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada	and,	by	extension,	on	the	issue	of	traditional	Hadrami	social	hierachy.	In	the	 case	 of	 Ambon,	 reformists	 took	 a	 moderate	 stance	 and	 the	 wave	 of	reformism	that	swept	through	the	Malay	Archipelago	as	much	as	through	the	Middle	East	did	not	affect	the	internal	organization	of	the	Hadrami	community	to	the	extent	of	breaking	it	up.	The	second	major	religious	transformation	occurred	during	and	after	the	communal	conflicts	between	Muslims	and	Christians	in	Ambon	between	1999	and	 2002.	 Adherents	 of	 neo-Salafism,	 Shi’ism	 and	 neo-traditionalism	 have	tried	 to	 exert	 their	 influence	 on	Ambonese	Muslims	 and	 on	 the	Hadramis	 in	particular.	A	variety	of	Islamic	discourses	to	choose	between	has	come	to	the	fore,	 resulting	 in	 further	 differentiation	 of	 views	 among	 Hadramis	 on	 the	correct	understanding	of	performing	 religious	practices	and	 the	political	 and	religious	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Prophet’s	 successors.	During	 this	 second	 religious	transformation,	 new	 religious	 elites	 and	 new	 Islamic	 foundations	 emerged	which	contested	the	old	established	foundation,	al-Hilal.	Despite	efforts	of	the	newly	 emerging	 foundations	 to	 undermine	 the	 al-Hilal,	 it	 still	 serves	 as	 a	
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symbol	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 collectivity	 and	 continues	 to	 function	 as	 a	 platform	where	Hadrami	identities	are	maintained.	At	the	same	time,	al-Hilal	functions	as	 a	 socio-religious	 channel	 to	 build	 relations	 with	 non-Hadramis	 by	contributing	to	local	Islamic	development	in	Ambon.	By	mapping	these	developments,	chapter	5	sheds	light	on	the	complexity	of	religious	articulations	among	the	Hadrami	descendants	today	and	how	such	articulations	 are	 shaped	 by	 local	 contexts.	 In	 some	 instances,	 traditionalists	may	differ	in	practice	from	those	with	Salafi	affiliations,	but	traditionalists	may	also	share	more	practices	with	Salafis	than	with	Shi’ite	followers	or,	the	other	way	 around,	 instances	 in	 which	 traditionalists	 share	 certain	 practices	 with	Shi’ites	 but	 not	 with	 Salafis.	 Even	 among	 those	 with	 the	 same	 ideological	orientation	 there	 are	 those	 with	 more	 moderate	 and	 those	 with	 more	conservative	views,	reflecting	or	expressing	internal	discord	on	some	issues.		Furthermore,	 in	 chapter	 5	 and	 6	 it	 came	 to	 the	 fore	 how	 in	 the	 face	 of	external	 challenges,	 traditionalism	 has	 been	 revitalized	 through	 a	 renewed	connection	 between	 the	 homeland	 and	 diaspora.	 Traditionalist	 beliefs	 and	practices	 such	 as	 pilgrimage	 to	 local	 shrines	 in	 Hadramaut	 have	 been	reinvigorated.	 Obedience	 to	 strict	 Shafi’ite	 jurisprudence	 has	 been	 reshaped,	and	 other	 traditions	 and	 teachings	 from	 the	 homeland	 have	 been	 promoted.	Also,	 this	 revitalization	 of	 a	 traditionalist	 stance	 has	 affected	 views	 on	 how	other	 Islamic	 variants	 such	 as	 Shi’ism,	 Salafism,	 and	 Wahabbism	 are	 to	 be	tolerated.	 For	 instance,	 in	 spite	 of	 sharing	 similar	 views	 on	 Salafism	 and	Wahabbism,	 neo-traditionalists	 are	 harsher	 than	 other	 traditionalists	 in	condemning	Shi’ite	beliefs	 and	practices.	What	 should	be	 taken	 into	account,	however,	 is	 that	 this	 revitalization	of	 traditionalism	 is	not	 simply	an	 issue	of	transplanting	the	kind	of	traditionalism	that	characterizes	dominant	views	and	practices	in	Hadramaut	to	the	Muslim	community	of	Ambon,	but	rather	one	of	reshaping	them,	so	that	they	acquire	new	meanings	and	functions	in	the	new	context.	 More	 precisely,	 the	 differences	 between	 Hadramaut	 and	 Ambon	 in	terms	of	 socio-cultural	 issues	play	a	major	 role	 in	how	 traditional	 views	and	practices	are	revitalized.	For	 instance,	whereas	ritual	practices	 in	Hadramaut	oblige	gender	segregation,	 in	Ambon	 this	gender	segregation	 is	modified	and	applied	 differently.	 	 By	 extension,	 although	 neo-traditionalism	 can	 be	considered	 as	 an	 avant-garde	 of	 orthodox	 traditional	 Hadrami	 religious	identity,	 in	 their	 performance	 of	 these	 ritual	 practices,	 neo-traditionalists	refashion	them	by	adapting	them	to	Ambonese	cultural	traditions.	Another	example	of	the	complexity	of	religious	articulations	was	provided	by	my	 presentation	 of	 the	 views	 and	 practices	 among	 followers	 of	 Salafism.	Despite	 the	 popular	 dictum	 to	 return	 to	 the	 Qur’an	 and	 Hadith	 as	 the	 only	authoritative	original	 sources	 to	 ‘purify’	 Islam,	 the	ways	 in	which	Salafism	 is	articulated	are	also	shaped	by	the	local	context.	Unlike	traditionalist	Muslims,	Salafis	 in	Ambon	emphasize	the	distinction	between	religion	and	culture.	For	
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instance,	 they	 reject	 practices	 such	 as	maulid	 celebrations.	 	 Yet,	 a	 difference	can	be	observed	between	those	with	modernist	and	those	with	fundamentalist	orientations.	 Modernists	 may	 tolerate	 the	 practice,	 while	 Salafis	 with	 more	fundamentalist	 inclinations	 tend	 to	 condemn	 the	 practice.	 Modernist	 Salafis	may	 even	 participate	 in	 maulid	 festivities	 or	 organize	 them	 themselves,	approaching	 the	 celebration	 as	 a	 cultural	 festival	 rather	 than	 a	 religious	tradition.	The	distinction	between	modernists	and	fundamentalists	in	the	case	of	maulid	celebrations	 is	 related	 to	contestations	between	old	and	new	Salafi	oriented	 Muslims,	 in	 which	 the	 former	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 social	integration	 and	 strive	 to	 be	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 local	Muslim	 communities	 in	Ambon,	whereas	 the	 latter	 foreground	 doctrinal	matters	 on	 purification	 and	strive	 to	 implement	 rigorous	 religious	 tenets	 freed	 from	 any	 non-religious	elements.	Furthermore,	 the	 findings	 of	 chapter	 5	 suggest	 that	 more	 non-Sada	Hadramis	tend	to	embrace	or	at	least	be	inspired	by	Salafism	than	Sada,	while	those	 who	 convert	 to	 Shi’	 ite	 orientations	 are	 more	 often	 Sada	 Hadramis.		Traditionalists	are	found	mostly	among	Sada	rather	than	non-Sada.		However,	these	patterns	of	Sada	and	non-Sada	differences	in	ideological	orientations	are	not	carved	in	stone.	I	came	across	several	instances	in	which	members	of	one	family,	 be	 they	 either	 Sada	or	 non-Sada,	 had	different	 ideological	 affiliations,	yet	 they	 saw	 little	 objections	 in	 living	 or	 socializing	with	 each	 other	 despite	their	differences.	My	 analysis	 of	 religious	 developments	 among	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	thus	 illustrates	 that	 religion,	 like	 ethnicity,	 is	 not	 cultural	 given,	 but	 rather	 a	living	 tradition	 that	 evolves	 in	 an	 on-going	 process	 of	 construction	 and	reconstruction,	 reinventing	 and	 reinterpretating	 stories,	 symbols	 and	practices.	 More	 specifically,	 my	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 among	 the	Hadramis	 in	 Ambon,	 religion	 has	 become	 an	 arena	 for	 both	 internal	 and	external	boundary	making	between	different	Hadrami	identities,	and	between	Hadramis	 and	 other	 Muslims.	 Religion,	 thus,	 plays	 a	 dual	 role;	 by	 bridging	different	ethnic	and	national	boundaries	 it	 enhances	 the	 social	 integration	of	Hadramis	in	Ambonese	society,	while	at	the	same	time		it	can	lead	to	internal	frictions	 and	 divisions	 due	 to	 different	 ideological	 orientations.	 In	 sum,	 the	ways	 in	 which	 Hadramis	 articulate	 their	 religious	 views,	 practices	 and	identities	can	only	be	understood	against	the	background	of	local,	national	and	global	 forces	 that	 have	 co-shaped	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 they	make	 sense	 their	lives.			
2.4 Networks	Extending	beyond	Ethnic	and	Religious	Communities		While	the	findings	of	my	research	certainly	point	to	dimensions	in	the	lives	of	contemporary	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambonese	 society	 in	 which	 claims	 to	 ethnic	 and	
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religious	specificities	stand	out,	 I	have	argued	that	such	specificities	 intersect	with	commonalities	shared	with	other	citizens	of	Ambon	and,	more	generally,	citizens	 of	 Indonesia,	 so	 that	 no	 clear-cut	 boundaries	 can	be	drawn	between	specific	Hadrami	groups	or	between	Hadramis	as	a	group	and	other	categories	within	 the	 Indonesian	or	Ambonese	 society.	 In	 chapter	3,	 I	have	mapped	 the	engagement	 of	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 societal	 domains	 such	 as	 the	educational,	 economic,	 political	 and	 cultural	 fields.	 The	picture	 that	 emerged	indicates	 that	 their	 engagement	 in	 these	 various	 social	 fields	 in	Ambon	does	not	distinguish	the	Hadrami	descendants	from	the	rest	of	Ambonese	society.	In	fact,	through	their	engagement	in	these	various	public	arenas,	they	have	built	social	networks	that	extend	over	different	ethno-religious	communities	within	and	outside	Ambon.	The	 Hadrami	 descendants	 of	 Ambon	 engage	 in	 different	 economic	activities,	ranging	from	those	in	the	public	sector	to	private	ones,	participating	in	 and	 building	 economic	 networks	 crosscutting	 ethnic,	 religious,	 and	 even	national	categories.	This	is	not	to	say	that	being	a	Hadrami	does	not	play	a	role	at	 all;	 as	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 in	 chapter	 3,	 relying	 on	 shared	 kinship	 ties	continues	to	be	an	important	asset	in	building	economic	networks	among	the	Hadramis,	especially	for	those	engaged	in	trade.	In	the	political	arena,	some	Hadrami	descendants	are	active	participants	of	 local	and	national	politics,	 ranging	 from	operating	 in	 Islamic-based	parties	to	being	active	 in	 secular	ones.	 I	have	sketched	 the	political	activities	of	Said	Assagaf,	a	figure	of	the	former	governor	of	Maluku	province,	as	an	example	of	a	Hadrami	descendant	who	has	been	engaged	in	local	politics	and	is	affiliated	to	a	non-religious	based	party,	which	allowed	him	to	build	networks	crosscutting	specific	 religious	 and	 ethnic	 groups.	 There	 are	 also	many	Hadramis	who	 are	engaged	in	Islamic-based	parties	which	cross	cut	ideological	orientations.	For	instance,	the	PKS,	an	Islamic-based	party	that	has	a	pan-Islamic	ideology,	and	whose	 platforms	 are	 largely	 shared	 by	 Islamist	 and	 reformist	 followers,	 has	gained	 popularity	 among	 Ambonese	 Hadramis	 with	 traditionalist	backgrounds.	 The	 Hadramis’	 various	 engagements	 in	 different	 Islamic-based	parties,	 at	 times	 tapping	 into	 the	 sources	 that	 Hadrami	 background	 provide	them	 with,	 on	 other	 occastions	 operating	 outside	 them,	 thus	 contribute	 to	broadening	their	religio-political	networking.	In	 the	 religious	 arena,	 the	 Hadramis	 likewise	 build	 networks	 through	engaging	 in	 various	 organizations.	 	 Some	 of	 them	 actively	 engage	 in	 various	religious	organizations	on	 local,	 national,	 and	 transnational	 levels.	On	a	 local	level,	 they	 engage	 in	 organizations/foundations	 that	 have	 a	 limited	 scope,	targeting	 only	 Muslims	 in	 Ambon	 or	 Maluku,	 such	 as	 al-Hilal,	 ar-Rahmah,	Melati	al-Khairat.	On	a	national	level,	some	of	them	also	participate	in	regional	branches	of	national	 religious	organizations,	 such	as	NU,	Muhammadiyah,	 al-Irshad,	 Rabita	 al-‘Alawiyya,	MMI,	DDII,	 ABI,	 etc.	 On	 a	 transnational	 level,	 the	
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Hadramis	 build	 religious	 ties	 mostly	 through	 platforms	 that	 operate	 on	 a	national	level.	Although	to	some	extent	the	Hadramis’	engagement	in	religious	organizations	 is	 influenced	by	 their	particular	 ideological	 traditionalist,	Salafi	or	 Shi’ite	 orientation,	 operating	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 such	 affiliations	 can	 be	overruled	 by	 drawing	 on	 individual	 networks,	 such	 as	 on	 the	 basis	 of	professional	 and	 humanitarian	 matters.	 Therefore,	 the	 various	 political	projects	that	Hadramis	engage	in	can	be	based	on	various	criteria,	depending	on	which	networks	are	most	productive	to	draw	on	for	a	particular	goal.	The	Hadramis	engagement	in	various	religious,	economic,	social-political	activities	 within	 local,	 national,	 and	 transnational	 levels	 show	 their	multiple	senses	 of	 belonging	 that	 span	 a	myriad	 of	 networks	 that	 are	 not	 necessarily	based	on	kinship	ties.	This	demonstrates	my	main	argument	in	this	thesis	that	in	 the	 Ambonese	 context,	 as	 in	many	 other	 cases,	 the	 active	maintenance	 of	diasporic	 identity	 is	 only	 partially	 undertaken	 through	 making	 exclusive	claims	 on	 boundaries	 between	 one’s	 ‘own’	 group	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 the	population	in	Ambon	and	Indonesia	through	one	particular	exclusive	network,	be	it	cultural,	social,	religion,	or	political.	More	importantly,	the	Hadramis	are	able	 to	 engage	 in	various	 social	webs	of	 relationships	 that	 can	accommodate	different	 customs	 or	 norms,	 without	 fearing	 to	 lose	 their	 distinct	 cultural	identity.	As	described	in	chapter	3-6,	Hadrami	women	participate	in	all	domains	of	the	 public	 sphere	 in	 Ambon.	 Some	 Hadrami	 women	 occupy	 important	positions	 in	 high	 profile	 institutions	 or	 organizations	 and	 have	 managed	 to	build	 networks	 that	 extend	 over	 various	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 communities.	This	situation	is	very	different	compared	to	that	of	the	position	of	most	women	in	Hadramaut	where	active	 female	participation	 in	 the	public	sphere	 is	much	more	 restricted.	 In	 this	 light,	 the	 role	 of	 female	 descendants	 of	 Hadrami	migrants	in	the	making	of	diasporic	identity	in	particular	local	contexts	should	be	taken	into	account.	 I	have	demonstrated	in	this	thesis	that	women	are	not	only	 passive	 receivers,	 but	 also	 active	 participants	 in	 strengthening,	negotiating,	and	transforming	Hadrami	diasporic	identities,	both	on	individual	and	collective	levels.					
3. Reflections	 on	 the	 Scope	 of	 this	 Study	 and	 Suggestions	 for	
Future	Research	
In	 this	 study	 I	 have	 adopted	 an	 ethnographic	 approach	 to	 document	 and	analyse	 the	 practices	 of	 different	 categories	 of	 Hadramis	 and	 different	individual	 descendants	 of	 Hadrami	 migrants	 to	 Ambon	 in	 the	 process	 of	diasporic	 living	 and	 identity	 construction.	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 in	different	 historical	 and	 socio-political	 contexts,	 the	 kind	 of	 Hadrami	 actors	
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who	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 foreground	 of	 various	 societal	 arenas	 are	 liable	 to	change.	Most	notable	 is	 the	recent	entering	of	 the	stage	of	 female	actors	who	claim	their	own	positions	in	the	public	domain.		This	demonstrates	that	in	line	with	the	argument	of	Leif	Manger,	Hadrami	identities	should	be	placed	in	the	context	of	 lived	experience,	and	understood	as	historical,	social,	political,	and	religious	phenomena	which	are	played	out	differently	in	different	social	arenas	(Manger	2010,	123-124).	Besides,	I	have	argued	that	the	diverse	and	shifting,	contextual	 alliances	 of	 	 Hadrami	 descendants	 	 shows	 that	 the	 dynamics	 of	diasporic	 identity	 construction	 consists	 of	 an	 interplay	 between	 multiple	interlocking	 identities	 such	 as	 ethnicity,	 religion,	 class/status,	 gender.	Furthermore,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 diasporic	 identity	 formation	 and	 its	 active	maintenance	among	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	reflect	an	intricate	web	of	power	relations	that	shape	both	intra-and	interpersonal	relations	among	a	variety	of	Hadrami	 identities,	 and	 between	 Hadramis	 and	 other	 communities	 in	 local	society	 and	 those	 in	 the	 homeland.	 This	 intricate	 web	 of	 power	 relations	 is	simultaneously	shaped	by	the	dynamics	of	local,	national,	and	global	contexts.		As	 in	 any	 ethnographic	 study,	 decisions	 had	 to	 be	 made	 as	 to	 what	 to	include	and	what	not.	One	of	the	limitations	of	the	scope	of	my	research	is	that	the	 dimensions	 of	 power	 dynamics	 I	 focused	 on	 pertain	 predominantly	 to	social	 relations	 on	 a	 micro-level	 and	 thus	 my	 study	 does	 not	 elaborately	address	how	structures	at	meso	and	macro	levels	influence	the	construction	of	diasporic	 identity	 of	 Hadrami	 descendants	 today.	 For	 instance,	 I	 have	 only	been	able	to	touch	upon	the	ways	in	which	recent	state	regulations	or	policies	in	 	 Yemen	 and	 Indonesia	 have	 repercussions	 on	 transnational	 ties	 between	various	Hadrami	 communities	 in	Hadramaut	 and	 the	 diaspora.	 The	 renewed	connections	between	Indonesia	and	Yemen	since	the	mid-1990s,	for	instance,	are	influenced	by	state	regulations	concerning	citizenship	and	visa.		Indonesia	does	 not	 recognize	 dual	 citizenship	 except	 for	 individuals	 under	 the	 age	 of	eighteen	according	to	Indonesian	nationality	 law	no.12/2006.	 In	Yemen,	dual	citizenship	 is	not	 recognized	at	 all	 and	a	naturalization	 requires	 ten	years	of	residency	 according	 to	 Yemeni	 citizenship	 law	 no.2,	 1975.	 My	 case	 study	reveals	 that	 due	 to	 the	 renewed	 connections	 between	 Yemen	 and	 Indonesia	some	 Hadramis	 from	 Hadramaut	 married	 Indonesian	 women	 of	 either	Hadrami	 or	 non-Hadrami	 origin.	 	 Children	 that	 were	 born	 out	 of	 these	marriages	 have	 been	 affected	 by	 these	 states’	 citizenship	 policies	 as	 they	should	 deal	 with	 different	 policies	 of	 both	 states	 they	 are	 connected	 to.	 My	study,	however,	does	not	go	in	to	this	issue	further	than	just	identifying	it.	Also,	 the	 focus	 in	this	study	 is	on	a	broad	range	of	Hadrami	 identities	of	‘ordinary’	people	rather	than	on	those	in	leadership	positions.	I	have	therefore	not	 zoomed	 in	 on	 the	 activities	 of	 specific	 political	 actors	 who	 use	 their	diasporic	position	for	certain	political	projects,	such	as	strengthening	relations	between	Hadramaut	and	diaspora,	or	on	certain	political	actors	who	challenge	
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or	 fight	 state	 authorities	 that	 they	 consider	 illegitimate	 infidels.	 While	Hadramis	 tend	 to	 live	 side	 by	 side	 peacefuly	 with	 non-Muslim	 authorities	(Singapore	case),	others	played	a	role	in	resistance	against	what	they	view	as	infidel	 authorities.	 Taking	 the	 findings	 of	 my	 study	 as	 a	 stepping	 stone,	 for	future	research	it	would	be	interesting	to	investigate	the	views	of	Hadramis	in	Ambon	 on	 Abu	 Bakar	 Ba’ashir,	 a	 religious	 preacher	 of	 non-Sada	 Hadrami	origin	 from	 Java	 who	 is	 convicted	 for	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 spreading	 religious	radicalism	in	Indonesia	and	involved	in	radicalizing	perpretators	of	2002	Bali	bombing	and	bombings	 in	other	areas	 in	post	9/11.	 It	was	beyond	 the	scope	and	might	 have	 jeopardized	my	 rapport	 and	 position	 in	 the	 field	 had	 I	 paid	more	 than	 cursory	 attention	 to	 the	 political	 views	 and	 connections	 of	 my	informants	 with	 religious	 political	 movements.	 It	 should	 be	 mentioned,	however,	that	such	connections,	or	at	least	similar	inclinations	exist	in	Ambon.	In	 fact,	much	earlier	 than	Abu	Bakar	Ba’ashir’s	 involvement	 in	 the	2002	Bali	bombing,	 there	was	a	case	 involving	an	Ambon-born	Hadrami	Sada	preacher,	Husain	al-Habshi	or	a	well-known	blind	habib	(a	preacher	of	Sada	origin)	and	founder	of	a	Shi’ite	organization,	 IMI	(Ikhwan	al-Muslimin	Indonesia	(Muslim	Brotherhood	of	Indonesia),	who	was	accused	to	be	the	mastermind	of	bombing	Borobudur	temple,	 the	main	 icon	of	Buddhist	 temples	 in	 Indonesia	 in	central	Java	in	1985.		My	study,	however,	cannot	describe	much	on	the	role	of	Husain	al-Habshi	in	his	involvement	in	violence	against	people	with	different	religious	affiliations.		Furthermore,	 a	 recent	 trend	 that	 I	 identified	but	 could	not	 follow	up	on	within	the	scope	of	my	present	research,	is	the	use	and	impact	of	social	media	on	 Hadrami	 identity	 constructions	 and	 translocal	 senses	 of	 belonging.	 	 For	instance,	 I	 have	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 study	 that	 Hadrami	 women	 in	 the	Ambonese	diaspora	increasingly	play	a	significant	role	in	many	societal	arenas	in	Ambon	while	at	the	same	time	playing	a	major	role	in	the	maintenance	of	a	Hadrami	 diasporic	 identity.	 Many	 women	 of	 younger	 generations	 appear	 to	use	the	social	media	to	find	suitable	partners	based	on	kafa’a	principles.	Some	also	use	the	internet	to	find	religious	content	that	helps	them	to	revitalize	their	diasporic	sense	of	identity,	while	others	seek	out	information	that	helps	them	challenge	 what	 they	 view	 as	 restrictive	 traditions.	 Future	 research	 might	examine	 how	 (social)	 media	 contribute	 to	 shaping	 the	 diasporic	 identity	construction	among	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	and	what	its	 implications	are	on	current	power	relations	and	social	networks.	I	hope	and	trust	that	I	and	other	researchers	who	will	be	inspired	to	take	up	the	themes	identified	above	in	future	research	will	be	able	to	benefit	from	the	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 I	 have	 conducted,	 the	 ethnographic	 nature	 of	which	 has	 allowed	me	 to	map	how	present-day	Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 the	hitherto	 understudied	 region	 of	 Ambon	 claim	 and	 live	 their	 multiple	belongings	 ‘on	the	ground’.	By	taking	this	approach,	 this	study	contributes	to	
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Hadrami	 studies	 by	pointing	 out	 commonalities	 and	 specificities	 in	 the	ways	that	 Ambonese	 Hadramis	 in	 comparison	 to	 Hadrami	 diasporic	 communities	elsewhere	 in	 Indonesia	 and	 the	 Malay	 Archipelago	 have	 constructed	 their	diasporic	 identity	 and	 how	 they	 have	 maintained	 relations	 with	 fellow	Hadramis	 and	 other	 categories	 of	 people	 in	 the	 country	 of	 settlement	 and	beyond.	Another	 implication	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 more	 insights	 in	(post)migration	 issues	 within	 the	 Global	 South,	 which	 in	 most	migration/diaspora	 studies	 have	 been	 neglected.	 In	 this	 study,	 diasporic	identifications	 focus	 on	 positioning	 oneself	 as	 Asian	 (Indonesian)-Arab	 or	Arab-Asian	(Indonesian)	rather	than	on	identifications	of	hyphenated	western	individuals.	 Focusing	 on	 migration	 and	 diasporic	 communities	 within	 the	Global	South	contributes	 to	 the	 field	of	diaspora	studies	by	going	beyond	the	focus	in	many	studies	on	relations	between	the	West	and	former	colonies.	Also,	while	 studies	 that	 do	 focus	 on	 South-South	migration	 tend	 to	 emphasize	 the	impact	of	colonialism	on	migration	flows,	this	study	also	takes	into	account	the	ways	 in	 which	 commercial	 and	 religious	 activities	 of	 south-south	 migrants	have	 shaped	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 formations	 and	 relations	 people	 find	themselves	 in,	 thus	highlighting	 the	agency	of	 these	migrants.	Therefore,	 this	study	attempts	to	contribute	to	migration	and	diaspora	studies	by	combining	insights	from	the	study	of	(post)colonial	migration	and	diasporic	communities	by	adding	a	South-South	migration	perspective.		
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Appendices	






Partai	Bulan	Bintang	(Crescent	Star	Party)	Partai	Bintang	Reformasi	(Star	Reform	Party)	Partai	Demokrasi	Kebangsaan	(Nationality	Democratic	Party)	Partai	Damai	Sejahtera	(Prosperous	Peaceful	Party)	Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Democratic	Party)	PDI-P	 :	 Partai	Demokrasi	Indonesia	Perjuangan	(Indonesian	Democratic	Party-Struggle)	Perti	 :	 Perhimpunan	Tarbiyah	Islam	(Islamic	educators	Association)	PGA	 :	 Pendidikan	Guru	Agama	(School	for	Religious	teaching)		PIM	 :	 Partai	Indonesia	Maluku	(Indonesian	Maluku	Party)	PKB	 :	 Partai	Kebangkitan	Bangsa	(National	Awakening	Party)		PKI	 :	 Partai	Komunis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Communist	Party)	PKPB	PKS	 :	:	 Partai	Karya	Peduli	Bangsa	(Nation	Functional	Care	Party)	Partai	Keadilan	Sejahtera	(Prosperous	Justice	Party)		PNBKI		PNI	 :		:	 Partai	Nasional	Benteng	Kerakyatan	Indonesia	(Indonesian	National	Fortress	Citizenship	Party)		Partai	Nasionalis	Indonesia	(Indonesian	National	Party)	PNI	 :	 Partai	Nasional	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Nationalist	Party)	PNI-Marhaenisme	 :	 Partai	Nasionalis	Indonesia-Marhaenisme	(Indonesian	Nationalist	Party-Marhaenism)	PPD	PPNUI		PPP	
:	:		:	
Partai	Persatuan	Daerah	(United	Region	Party)	Partai	Persatuan	Nahdatul	Ummah	Indonesia	(Indonesian	United	Awakening	of	Islamic	Community	Party)	Partai	Persatuan	Pembangunan	(United	Development	Party)		PSII	 :	 Partai	Serikat	Islam	Indonesia	(Indonesian	Islamic	Union	Party)		RMS	 :	 Republik	Maluku	Selatan,	Republic	of	South	Maluku	founded	on	April	25,	1950	SI	 :	 Sarekat	Islam	(Islamic	Union)	UI	 :	 Universitas	Indonesia	(University	of	Indonesia)	VOC		YAPI	 :		:	 Vereenigde	Oost-Indische	Compagnie	(the	Dutch	East	India	Company)	Yayasan	Pesantren	Islam	(Foundation	of	Islamic	Pesantren)			
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Appendix	2:	Glossary		Select	glossary	items	are	Arabic	unless	those	indicated	




:	 spirit	 of	 kinship;	 social	 solidarity	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	group	consciousness,	unity	and	cohesiveness				anniversary	 of	 the	 martyrdom	 of	 Husain,	one	 of	 the	 Prophet	 Muhammad’s	grandsons,	 commemorated	 on	 the	 tenth	day	 of	 Muharram,	 the	 first	 month	 of	 the	Muslim	calendar		
‘ulama	 :	 Muslim	religious	scholars	
adat	 :	 customary	law	





































habib	 :	 beloved;	a	religious	preacher	or	scholar	of	the	Prophet’s	descent	or	a	popular	call	for	any	male	descendant	of	the	Prophet	Hadith	 :	 account	 of	 the	 words	 and	 deeds	 of	 the	 Prophet	Muhammad	 transmitted	 through	 a	 chain	 of	narrators	 as	 one	 of	 the	 basic	 sources	 of	 Islamic	law	hajj	 :	 major	pilgrimage	to	Mecca	in	Islam.	halal	
halqa	
:	:	 permissible	circle;	a	forum	for	the	study	of	Islamic	sciences,	in	which	a	 teacher	 or	 preacher,	 gives	 lessons	 based	 on	 certain	books	 and	 his	 participants	 sit	 around	 him	 to	 hear	 and	scrutinize	his	lessons		
haul	 :	 annual	 commemoration	 of	 deceased	 persons,	 usually	saints	or	religious	scholars	
hikayat	(Ind.)	 :	 Malay	historical	tale	or	account	
ijaza	 :	 license,	 the	authority	granted	by	a	religious	scholar	to	a	student	to	exercise		
ijtihad	 :	 independent	 interpretation	 of	 Islamic	 doctrine	 or	question	 based	 on	 a	 sufficient	 knowledge	 of	 the	Qur’an	and	Sunna	




















kopiah	 :	 black	 headdress	 for	 men,	 and	 kerudung	 for	 women	 in	Indonesia	






maghrib	 :	 dawn/sunset		mahdi	 :	 the	expected	final	imam	as	a	key	concept	in	Shi‘ism	
mahram	 :	 men	who	are	not	allowed	to	be	married	(male	guardians)	
majelis	ta’lim	(Ind.)	 :	 a	place	to	conduct	religious	study		
marja‘	al-taqlid	 :	 literally	 reference	 for	 emulation;	 in	 Shi‘ism	 the	authoritative	 source	 who	 through	 his	 learning	 and	probity	 is	 to	 be	 followed	 by	 the	 laity	 in	 all	 points	 of	religious	practice	and	law	
mardijkers	(D.)	
masakin	
:	:	 freed	slaves	a	 plural	 form	 of	miskin,	 literally	 means	 poor	 people;	 a	group	 of	 people	 from	 lower	 class	 in	 the	 traditional	Hadrami	social	stratification		
mashaikh	 :	 a	 plural	 form	 of	 shaikh,	 a	 learned	 Muslim	 in	 Islamic	studies;	 a	 group	 of	 people	 in	 the	 second	 rank	 in	traditional	Hadrami	social	stratification	





















:			:	 the	 fifteenth	 day	 of	 the	 month	 of	 Sha’ban	 (the	 eight	month)	of	the	Islamic	calendar	light	of	two	weighty	things;	an	exegesis	of	the	thaqalayn	hadith	 text,	 which	 is	 well-known	 as	 the	 reference	 of	Shi’ism	 to	 claim	 a	 political	 religious	 legitimacy	 of	 the	successors	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad		
passen	stelsel	(D.)	
pela	(Ind.)	 :		:	 pass	 system;	 regulation	 obliging	 individuals	 to	 obtain	 a	travel	pass	when	leaving	their	place	of	residence		alliance		
pela-gandong	(Ind.)	 :	 a	 concept	of	 inter-village	 alliance	between	Muslims	and	Christians	 in	 Maluku	 based	 on	 claiming	 to	 putative	common	descent	
pengajian	(Ind.)		 :	 religious	preaching	or	forum	
pesantren	(Ind.)	 :	 Islamic	boarding	school(s)	





a	 group	 of	 people	 or	 tribe	 originate	 from	 the	 southern	region	of	Arabian	Peninsula,	especially	Yemen,	and	who	is	considered	as	pure	Arabs	tribe		Qur’an	 :	 God’s	 word	 revealed	 to	 the	 Prophet	 Muhammad	 and	absolute	authority	for	Islam	Rabi’	al-Awwal	Rajab	
ratib	
:	:	:	 the	third	month	of	the	Islamic	calendar	the	seventh	month	of	the	Islamic	calendar	formulae	 of	 dhikr	 and	 prayers	 formulated	 by	 a	 Sufi	teacher	
rebana	 :	 a	traditional		kind	of	tambourine	
rubat	 :	 religious	school(s)	Sada,	sayyid	 :	 the	Prophet’s	offspring	through	Fatimah	and	Ali	through	their	sons	Hasan	and	Husain	





shalawat	 :	 an	 Arabic	 phrase	 containing	 the	 salutation	 to	 the	Prophet,	 usually	 recited	 during	 Muslims’	 daily	 prayers	and	when	the	name	of	the	Prophet	is	mentioned		Shari’a	 :	 Islamic	law	




simt	al-durar	 :	 string	 of	 pearls;	 a	 text	 containing	 on	 poetries	 and	compliments	on	 the	Prophet’s	 life	or	 a	well-known	as	 a	al-Habshi	 maulid	 text	 which	 was	 composed	 by	 Ali	 b.	Muhammad	 al-Habshi	 (1839-1913)	 from	 Tarim,	Hadramaut	Sunna	 :	 established	customs	and	normative	precedents	based	on	the	example	of	the	life	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad	Sunnism	
	
ta’lim	
:		:	 adherence	 to	 Sunni	 Islam;	 the	 name	 comes	 from	 the	word	‘Sunna’		and	it	is	the	largest	Islamic	denomination	in	the	world	religious	study	






























visitation	to	graves		adultery		visit;	visitation	to	graves	of	saints	or	prominent	religious	scholars		 	 	 	
 294	
Appendix	3:	List	of	Informants			All	listed	informants	are	pseudonyms	except	those	who	hold	leading	positions	in	social,	political,	and	religious	organizations		1. Abdurahman	Assagaf:	 35	 year-old	 Sada	 from	Ambon,	 head	 of	 the	 ABI	 of	Maluku	2. Ahmad:		59	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon		3. Aisha	 Bin	 Shaikh	 Abu	 Bakr:	 39	 year-old,	 Sada	 Hadrami	 from	 Tarim,	principal	of	the	Dar	al-Zahra	of	Tarim	4. Ajib:	67	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	5. Alif:	57	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	6. Aliya:	47	year-	old	non-Sada	from	Ambon		7. Alvina:	43	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	8. Alwi	al-Hadar:	69	year-old	Sada	 from	Ternate,	one	of	 the	 founders	of	 the	al-Khairat	of	Ambon	9. Amar:	68	year-old	non-Sada	from	Fak-Fak	Papua	10. Anisa:	67	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	11. Asma:	80	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	12. Asri:	65	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	13. Dara:	23	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	14. Dila:	53	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	15. Elma:	38	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	16. Fahira:	53	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	17. Fahri	 al-Kathiri:	 43	 year-old	 non-Sada	 from	 Ambon,	 legislative	 member	from	the	PKS	party	18. Faiza:	50	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	19. Farhat:	35	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	20. Fariha:	65	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	21. Fathur:	33	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	22. Fatma:	44	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	23. Feryal	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar:	 50	 year-old	 Sada	 from	 Ambon,	 former	secretary	of	an	association	of	Sada	families		24. Fira:	68	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	25. Gaia:	68	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	26. Hababa	Nur:	58	year-old	Sada	from	Tarim,	former	principal	of	the	Dar	al-Zahra	in	Tarim	Hadramaut	27. Hadi	Basalamah:	 69	 year-old	 non-Sada	 from	Ambon,	 head	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	and	of	the	al-Irshad	in	Maluku,	former	lecturer	at	the	IAIN	28. Haikal:	46	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	29. Hakim:	39	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	30. Hanna:	64	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	31. Haris:	30	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	32. Hasan	al-Kathiri:	75	year-old	non-Sada	 from	Ambon,	 former	 secretary	of	the	al-Hilal	and	owner	of	Bameru	shop	in	Batumerah	market	
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33. Hasan	 Bin	 Syech	 Abubakar:	 43	 year-old	 Sada	 from	 Ambon,	 head	 of	 the	Rabita	al-‘Alawiyya	in	Maluku	and	owner	of	Salim	shop	34. Hasna:	56	year-old	non-Sada	from	Banda	35. Hasnan:	67	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Ambon	36. Hasyim:	43	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	37. Hilya:	30	year-old	Sada	from	Java	38. Hisham:	67	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	39. Husna:	50	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	40. Inaya:	55	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	41. Iza:	65	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon		42. Jailani:	37	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	43. Jamaludin	Bugis:	45	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Ambon,	head	of	the	Nurul	Tsaqalain	44. Jasmin:	48	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	45. Liana:	37	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	East	Java	46. Lubna	Mauladawilah:	 33	 year-old	 Sada,	 religious	 preacher	 and	 owner	 of	the	ar-Rahmah	shop	47. Malika:	54	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	48. Muawana:	55	year-old	Sada	from	Jakarta		49. Muhammad	 Rifki	 al-Hamid:	 33	 year-old	 Sada	 from	 Ambon,	 religious	preacher	and	head	of	the	ar-Rahmah	foundation	50. Muniba:	44	year-old	African	descent,	vice	principal	of	the	Dar	al-Zahra	in	Tarim	Hadramaut	51. Munir:	50	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Ambon	52. Nadia:	37	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon			53. Najwa:	22	year-old	Sada	from	East	Java	54. Nariya:	35	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Ambon	55. Nashuha:	33	year-old	Sada	from	East	Java	56. Naufal	al-Kathiri:	43	year-old	non-Sada	from	Tual,	head	of	the	PPP	party	in	Tual-Kei	57. Naura:	38	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Jakarta	58. Niswa:	45	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	59. Rafa:	33	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	60. Rahma:	54	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	61. Rifai:	38	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Ambon	62. Rina:	70	year-old	non-Sada	from	Ambon	63. Rugaya	Alatas:	75	year-old	Sada,	head	of	the	Melati	al-Khairat	foundation	64. Sadiq:	23	year-old	non-Hadrami	from	Ambon	65. Safira:	23	year-old	Sada	from	East	Java	66. Sahid:	49	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon	67. Said	Assagaf:	65	year-old	Sada,	former	Governor	of	Maluku	(2013-2018)	68. Said	Muzakir	Assagaf:	43	year-old	Sada	from	Ambon,	parliament	member	from	the	PKS	party		69. Said	Muzakir	Assagaf:	43	year-old	Sada,	parliament	member	from	the	PKS	party		70. Saiful	Ali	al-Maskati:	50	year-old	non-Sada,	head	of	the	al-Irshad	of	Ambon	town	district	71. Saima:	56	year-old	non-Sada	from	Banda	
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Appendix	5:	List	of	Figures			 Figure	2.1	 :	 Map	 of	 Hadramaut.Source:	http://www.paleophilatelie.eu/country/quaiti.html.	Accessed	September	22,	2016	Figure	2.2	 :	 Map	of	Ambon-Lease	Islands	Figure	2.3	 :	 Photograph	of	Ali	b.	Hasan	b.	Haider	al-Hamid,	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar’s	grandmother’s	father.		Source:	a	private	collection	of	Hasan	Bin	Syech	Abubakar	Figure	3.1	 :	 Map	of	Ambon	town,	numbers	1-10	are	where	the	Hadrami	descendants	live	taken	from	Google	map	and	elaborated	by	the	author	Figure	3.2	 :	 Jami’	Mosque	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	3.3	 :	 Making	Pearl	Handcraft	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	3.4	 :	 The	 ar-Rahmah	 foundation’s	 office	 and	 shop	 (photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	3.5	 :	 A	portrait	of	S.	Assagaf	taken	from	Ambon	public	library’s	recollection	of	photographs	of	mayors	in	the	district	of	Ambon	town,	and	reproduced	by	the	author	Figure	3.6	 :	 Poster	 of	 Said	 Assagaf’s	 candidacy	 in	 the	 2013	 election	 in	Maluku	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	3.7	 :	 Hadrami	food	served	to	my	Indonesian	informants	and	me		during	 our	 visit	 to	 a	 local	 family	 in	 Hadramaut	 in	 2015	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	4.1	 :	 Genealogy	Book	of	a	Sada	Descendant	(photographed	by	the	author)		Figure	4.2		Figure	4.3	 :		:	 Genealogy	of	a	Sada	Descendant	(photographed	by	the	author)	Public	 Cemetery	 of	 Prince	 Diponegoro’s	 descendants	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.1	 :	 Headquarter	 of	 the	 al-Hilal	 in	 Ambon	 (photographed	 by	 the	author)	Figure	5.2	 :	 An-Nur	Mosque	in	Ambon	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.3	 :	 An	al-Hilal	school	in	Namlea,	Buru	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.4	 :	 Nurul	Tsaqalain	Pesantren,	Hila	Ambon	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.5	 :	 Distant	Shi’ite	teaching	on	Qur’anic	exegesis	held	in	a	Shi’ite	follower’s	house	in	Batumerah	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.6	 :	 A	 Hadith	 teaching	 in	 an-Nur	 mosque	 (on	 the	 left)	 and	 a	religious	ritual	reciting	burda,	poems	to	the	Prophet,	in	the	ar-Rahmah	building	(on	the	right),	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.7	 :	 Maulid	celebration	at	the	IAIN	campus	(photographed	by	the	author)		
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Figure	5.8	 :	 Melati	al-Khairat	Building	in	Galunggung	Batumerah	Atas	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	5.9	 :	 Religious	preaching	of	Rugaya	Alatas	in	the	Melati	al-Khairat,	Galunggung	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	6.1	 :	 Hasan	al-Kathiri	(on	the	left)	with	his	step-sister’s	son	and	grandson	in	Bahere,	Say’un,	Hadramaut.	This	picture	is	part	of	the	al-Kathiri’s	photo	collection	concerning	his	visit	in	2013	Figure	6.2	 :	 Poster	about	a	public	sermon	inviting	Indonesian	alumni	from	Dar	al-Mustafa	school	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	6.3	 :	 Indonesian	 male	 and	 female	 pilgrims	 listening	 a	 story	 from	the	tour	guides	and	leaders	about	a	saint	in	Zanbal	cemetery,	Tarim,	Hadramaut.	While	listening	to	the	story,	some	of	them	were	taking	pictures	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	6.4	 :	 A	tour	leader	pouring	water	that	had	been	already	blessed	by	a	 religious	 preacher	 in	 water	 bottles	 that	 pilgrims	 had	brought	with	them	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	6.5	 :	 Indonesian	pilgrims	collecting	sand	at	the	shrine	of	Shaikh	b.	Abu	Bakr	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	6.7	 :	 Poster	of	the	ar-Rahmah’s	tour	agency	that	promotes	pilgrimage	tours	to	Hadramaut	(photographed	by	the	author)	Figure	6.8	 :	 Indonesian	 Female	 pilgrims	 of	 Hadrami	 and	 non-Hadrami	background	pose	with,	the	author	(the	second	from	the	right)	on	the	roof	of	a	graveyard	complex	of	saint	Habib	Ahmad	al-Muhdar	in	Quwereh	Wadi	Du’an	Hadramaut				
 300	
























































1. Problem	Analysis,	Objectives,	and	Research	Questions	This	dissertation	is	the	first	comprehensive	study	on	the	lives	and	identifications	of	Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon.	 It	 is	 the	 result	 of	 an	 ethnographic	 study	 of	present-day	 descendants	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 Arab	 migrants	 in	 Ambon.	 It	 aims	 at	understanding	the	interplay	between	ethnicity	and	religion	on	the	construction	of	diasporic	identity	and	on	the	social	integration	of	the	descendants	of	Hadrami	Arab	migrants	 in	 Ambon.	 The	 overarching	 research	 question	 addressed	 in	 this	dissertation	 is	 how	 ethnicity	 and	 religion	 intersect	 in	 individual	 and	 collective	constructions	 of	 identity	 of	 present-day	 Ambonese	 Hadramis	 and	 how	 this	intersection	 relates	 to	 their	 positions	 in	 Ambonese	 socio-economic,	 political	 and	religious	 power	 constellations.	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 the	 following	subquestions	were	formulated:	How	do	Hadrami	Arabs	actively	claim	and	maintain	their	 ethnic	 identity	 in	 everyday	 practices?	 How	 do	 they	 present	 their	 multiple	senses	 of	 belonging	 in	 individual	 and	 collective	 self-narratives	 and	what	 (wishes	for)	 concrete	 relations	 with	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 do	 they	 have?	 What	 kind	 of	religious	discourses	and	practices	do	they	engage	in	and	how	do	these	discourses	and	practices	 relate	 to	 their	 various	 claims	of	belonging	 to	 certain	groups?	What	kind	of	 local	religious,	social,	economic	and	political	networks	do	they	participate	in	 and	 how	 do	 these	 networks	 extend	 over	 various	 ethnic	 and	 religious	communities	in	and	outside	Ambon?	 	The	history	of	the	Hadrami	Arabs	who	migrated	to	the	Malay	Archipelago	in	the	late	eighteenth	up	to	the	early	twentieth	century	is	often	regarded	as	a	success	story	in	terms	of	transnational	economic,	political,	and	religious	engagement.	The	main	 factors	 contributing	 to	 this	 success	 are	 related	 to	 the	 maintenance	 of	 a	distinct	 cultural	 identity	 that	 touches	 upon	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 collectivity.	 To	investigate	the	situation	of	present-day	descendants	of	the	Hadrami	migrants	it	is	crucial	 to	 build	 upon	 this	 historical	 context	 to	 understand	 changes	 as	 well	 as	continuities	in	their	ethno-religious	identity	making	and	their	social	relations	to	a	larger	society.	To	 a	 considerable	 extent,	 the	 relevance	 of	 this	 study	 lies	 in	 the	 context	 of	Ambon	 itself	 that	 has	 hardly	 received	 any	 attention	 so	 far,	 especially	 after	 the	recent	 communal	 conflicts	 between	 Muslims	 and	 Christians	 (1999-2002).	 	 It	 is	important	to	fill	this	lacune	to	investigate	how	local	social	structures	have	shaped	the	diasporic	identity	construction	of	descendants	of	the	Hadrami	migrants	there.	Another	innovative	dimension	of	this	study	is	concerned	with	gender	identity	construction.	 The	 Hadrami	 diasporic	 life	 and	 identity	 have	 been	 gendered	 in	specific	 ways.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 this	 diasporic	 trajectory,	 the	 female	perspective	needs	to	be	taken	into	account.	This	study	therefore	aims	specifically	
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to	 contribute	 to	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 and	 insights	 into	 the	 views	 and	practices	of	Hadrami	women	in	Ambon	as	well.		There	 is	 a	 wide	 ranch	 of	 research	 on	 Hadrami	 diaspora,	 ranging	 from	historical	to	anthropological	studies.	The	literature	cover	a	broad	range	of	subjects	such	 as	 Hadrami	 migration,	 roles	 in	 economy	 and	 politics,	 Islamic	 role,	 kinship	networks,	social	integration,	renewed	links	to	the	homeland	and	gender	(Van	den	Berg	 1886;	 Freitag	 and	 Clarence-Smith	 1997;	 Mobini-Kesheh	 1999;	 Boxberger	2002;	De	Jong	and	Kaptein	2002;	Freitag	2003;	Feener	2004;	Clegg	2005;	Hafizhah	2005;	Fachrudin	2005;	Sahab	2005;	Slama	2005;	Ho	2006;	Jacobsen	2009;	Siregar	2009;	 Tridewiyanti	 2009;	 Manger	 2010;	 Sila	 2015;	 Alatas	 2008[2016c];	 Alatas	2010;	 Somad	2010;	Mandal	 2018).	An	 analysis	 of	 diasporic	 identity	 construction	among	the	Hadramis	in	the	diaspora,	thus,	has	been	of	much	interest		In	line	with	the	wide	range	of	the	literature,	my	study	discusses	the	Hadrami	diaspora	 in	 Ambon	 from	 both	 historical	 and	 anthropological	 perspectives.	 This	study	 takes	 diaspora	 not	 only	 as	 a	 category	 of	 practice,	 but	 also	 a	 category	 of	analysis	to	examine	the	Hadramis’	 identifications.	For	this	study,	diaspora	is	used	as	an	analytical	lens	in	combination	with	the	intersectionality	perspective	in	order	to	 understand	 how	 multiple	 intersecting	 social	 categories	 such	 as	 ethnicity,	religion,	class,	and	gender	mutually	shape	the	construction	of	a	diasporic	Hadrami	identity	and	the	positions	that	individual	Hadramis	occupy	in	a	particular	context.	Building	 on	 the	wide	 ranch	 of	 research	 on	 the	Hadrami	 diaspora,	 the	 study	thus	aims	at	making	a	contribution	to	filling	the	gap	of	knowledge	on	the	diaspora	of	 the	 Hadrami	 Arabs	 in	 the	 diaspora	 especially	 Eastern	 Indonesia.	 On	 a	 more	meta-level,	this	study	relates	to	the	intersectionality	of	ethnicity,	religion,	class	and	gender	in	the	construction	of	diasporic	identity.	In	order	to	avoid	essentialism	and	to	emphasize	ongoing	processes	of	identification,	this	study	adopts	a	constructivist	approach.	This	PhD.	dissertation	 is	 first	and	 foremost	based	on	ethnographic	 research.	Data	 for	 this	 ethnography	were	mainly	 gathered	 through	 fieldwork	 consisting	 of	interviews	and	participant	observation.	Besides,	the	data	are	documented	through	notes,	photos,	and	audio-visual	recording.	The	fieldwork	in	Ambon	was	conducted	for	nine	months,	from	September	2014	to	May	2015.	The	fieldwork	was	mainly	based	in	Ambon.	Also,	it	was	carried	out	in	several	places	 (multi-sited	 fieldwork),	 such	 as	 Seram,	 Buru,	 Banda,	 Kei,	 and	 Ternate,	 as	well	as	Papua	(particularly	Fak-Fak)	and	Java,	particularly	Jakarta,	and	last	but	not	least	Hadramaut,	where	 I	 joined	 a	 group	 of	 pilgrims	 on	 their	 pilgrimage	 to	 local	shrines	for	two	weeks	from	February	5-21,	2015.	Interviews	were	carried	out	in	both	formal	and	non-formal	settings.	In	formal	interviews,	 in-depth	 semi-structured	 interview	 formats	 were	 used.	 	 The	interviewees	 consisted	 of	 several	 key-informants	 and	 many	 other	 ‘ordinary’	informants,	 aged	 between	 twenty	 and	 eighty	 belonging	 (or	 making	 claims	 to	belong)	to	one	of	the	forty	Hadrami	clans,	from	second	to	seventh	generation	of	the	
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Hadrami	 migrants.	 Participant	 observation	 was	 conducted	 through	 attending	religious	gatherings	and	cultural	 festivities	organized	by	different	 Islamic	groups,	and	also	through	engaging	in	daily	activities.	This	 dissertation	 consists	 of	 seven	 chapters.	 The	 first	 chapter	 presents	 a	problem	 analysis	 of	 the	 research,	 my	 research	 objectives,	 questions,	 methods,	 a	literature	 review	 and	 a	 theoretical	 framework,	 and	 present	 the	 structure	 of	 the	study.	 The	 second	 chapter	 describes	 both	 history	 and	 collective	 memory	 of	 the	Hadrami	 Arabs	 in	 Maluku.	 Chapter	 three	 provides	 a	 general	 overview	 of	 the	present-day	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 Ambon.	 Chapter	 four	 focuses	 on	 kinship,	marriage,	and	gender.	Chapter	five	sketches	the	religious	developments	within	the	Hadrami	 community	 in	 Ambon.	 Chapter	 six	 discusses	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	Hadramis	 toward	 their	 ancestral	 homeland	 through	diasporic-return	 journeys	 as	well	as	 their	 impacts	on	Hadramis’	articulations	 in	cultural	and	religious	 life.	The	final	 chapter	 presents	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 and	 suggestions	 for	 potential	follow-up	research.			
2. Claims	and	Maintenance	of	an	Ethnic	Identity	Chapter	2	shows	that	 the	Dutch	colonial	policies	on	racial	residential	segregation	and	mobility	 restrictions	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 shaping	 a	 construction	 of	 a	distinct	 cultural	 identity	 of	 the	 Hadrami	 migrants	 and	 their	 descendants	 in	Indonesia	 as	 part	 of	 a	 specific	 Arab	 ethnic	 group.	 The	 sense	 of	 Arabness	 can	 be	observed	 until	 today	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 chapter	 3-6.	 This	 sense	 of	 Arabness	 is,	however,	heterogenous	in	terms	of	clan	and	strata	claim	(Sada	and	non-Sada).	The	local	context	of	Ambon	has	thus	enabled	shifts	in	the	power	relationship	between	Sada	 and	 non-Sada,	 resulting	 in	 a	 partial	 breakdown	 of	 the	 traditional	 social	stratification.	 Chapter	 2	 also	 discussed	 the	 specific	 genderedness	 of	 how	 the	reproduction	of	Hadrami	identity	in	general	and	the	Sada	non-Sada	distinction	has	been	maintained.	As	it	was	Hadrami	men	who	migrated	to	Indonesia	and	Ambon	in	particular,	 they	 began	 to	 build	 Hadrami	 communities	 by	marrying	 local	 women.	This	 specific	 intersection	 of	 ethnicity,	 religion,	 class,	 and	 gender	 in	 the	 diasporic	identity	 construction	 of	 Hadramis	 can	 still	 be	 recognized	 in	 today’s	 context	 and	how	 this	 marriage	 pattern	 affects	 contemporary	 male	 and	 female	 Hadramis	 in	Ambon	differently	as	exemplified	in	chapter	4.	Chapter	 4	 highlights	 how	 cultural	 domains	 of	 power	 operate	 in	 Hadramis’	social	 relations.	 These	 cultural	 domains	 of	 power	 are	 directly	 related	 to	conceptions	on	the	ideal	marriage	that	provides	a	basis	to	create	a	stable	group.	A	caste-like	 social	 hierarchy	 combined	 with	 patrilineal	 descent	 reckoning	 is	 thus	embedded	 in	 marriage	 relations	 between	 Sada	 and	 non-Sada,	 and	 between	Hadramis	 in	 general	 and	 the	 broader	 local	 society,	 and	 specifically	 also	 between	men	and	women.	In	this	light,	marriage	is	the	main	factor	in	defining	both	internal	boundaries	 within	 a	 variety	 of	 forms	 of	 Hadrami	 identity,	 as	 well	 as	 defining	
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external	boundaries	with	a	host-society.	Shifting	understandings	of	kafa’a	between	Sada	 and	 non-Sada.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 non-Sada	 descendants	 tend	 to	 be	 more	flexible	in	the	application	of	kafa’a	principles	than	Sada	ones,	and	social	sanctions	and	a	taboo	on	breaking	the	ideal	marriage	are	stronger	in	the	Sada	families	than	in	non-Sada	families.	As	described	in	chapter	4	marriage	and	kinship	relations	operate	very	much	as	 a	 societal	 arena	 where	 the	 Hadramis	 have	 maintained	 their	 distinct	 cultural	identity	as	Arabs,	while	other	cultural	features,	such	as	dress,	dietary,	language,	art	festivals,	appear	to	be	very	much	adapted	to	local	Ambonese	culture	as	described	in	chapter	3.	The	Hadramis	thus	show	high	adaptability	and	heterogeneity	in	their	engagement	 in	 many	 domains	 of	 public	 life.	 Women	 also	 engage	 in	 the	 public	sphere,	 a	 situation	 which	 is	 quite	 different	 from	 that	 in	 Hadramaut	 or	 other	diaspora	 places.	 This	 study	 thus	 argues	 that	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 multiple	identities	of	individual	Hadramis	are	embedded	in	different	local	cultural	contexts.		
3. Multiple		Senses	of	Belonging	and	Orientation	towards	a	Homeland	The	Hadrami	migrants	in	Ambon	often	express	their	multiple	senses	of	belongings	by	making	references	to	various	categories:	as	Ambonese	Arabs,	as	Arabs	only	or	Ambonese	only,	or	as	Ambonese	Arab	Muslims.	Also,	these	references	are	in	many	ways	 specified	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 status,	 gender,	 and	 ideological	 orientations,	namely	 as	 Sada	 or	 non-Sada,	 men	 or	 women,	 Sunni	 or	 Shi’ite,	 traditionalist	 or	Salafi,	 and	 others.	 The	 ‘multicultural	 competence’	 of	 Hadramis	 is	 sometimes	combined	with	references	to	citizenship	status	as	Indonesians.	Several	chapters	of	this	thesis	have	demonstrated	how	this	multicultural	competence	is	played	out	and	improvised	 upon	 by	Hadrami	 individuals	 in	 different	 contexts	 and	 in	 relation	 to	different	webs	of	social	relationships.		These	various	 intersecting	categories	of	ethnicity,	 religion,	 class,	and	gender	also	 have	different	 implications	 for	 how	Hadrami	 descendants	 orient	 themselves	toward	 Hadramaut.	 The	 findings	 of	 chapter	 6	 suggest	 a	 variegated	 dynamics	 of	diasporic-return	 journeys	 among	 present	 day	 Hadrami	 descendants	 and	 how	Hadramaut	 as	 a	 diasporic	 return	 destination	 is	 internally	 contested.	 	 Some	Hadrami	descendants	have	an	orientation	toward	their	forefathers’	homeland	not	only	as	the	place	of	origin	but	also	as	the	place	to	turn	to	for	authoritative	sources	of	religious	value	and	spirituality.	 In	contrast,	others	only	consider	Hadramaut	to	be	 their	 place	 of	 origin	 and	 disregard	 it	 as	 a	 place	 of	 authoritative	 source	 of	spirituality.	Different	ideological	orientations,	such	as	traditionalism,	Salafism	(and	Wahhabism)	 and	 Shi’ism,	 contribute	 to	 this	 different	 orientation.	 Findings	 of	chapter	6	also	demonstrated	the	gendered	experiences	of	return	journeys	in	terms	of	different	sex-segregation	and	 the	related	 full	body	veiling	 for	women	 in	public	spaces	between	Ambon	and	Hadramaut.	
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The	 findings	of	 the	 chapter	also	 suggest	 that	diaspora	 is	not	only	a	 space	of	imagined	 relations	 but	 rather	 one	 of	 very	 concrete	 relations	 between	 diasporic	communities	and	the	homeland.	For	some	Hadrami	descendants	from	Ambon	and	elsewhere	in	Indonesia,	then,	diasporic-return	journeys	are	not	the	kind	of	 ‘myth’	that	 Hall	 (1990)	 and	 Gilroy	 (1997)	 argue	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 research	 among	African	 diasporas	 living	 in	 the	 West,	 nor	 are	 a	 ‘social	 form’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	Vertovec	 uses	 the	 term	 to	 designate	 the	 condition	 of,	 for	 instance,	 the	 Jewish	diaspora	 (Vertovec	 1997,	 278-279).	 Rather,	 living	 diasporic	 lives	 for	 Ambonese	Hadramis	 and	 those	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 Indonesian	 Archipelago,	means	 having	 the	opportunity	to	build	social	ties	with	Hadramis	elsewhere	in	the	diaspora	and	in	the	homeland	and	beyond,	and	between	the	Hadramis	and	the	host-societies.			
4. Islamic	Discourses	and	Practices	As	one	of	the	crucial	dimensions	in	the	formation	of	a	diasporic	identity,	religion	is	played	 out	 both	 in	 individual	 and	 collective	 narratives	 among	 the	 present-day	Hadramis	 in	 their	 everyday	 life	 practices.	 On	 an	 individual	 level,	 Hadrami	descendants	 commonly	 present	 themselves	 as	 Muslims,	 thereby	 sharing	 their	religious	identity	with	other	Muslim	minority	communities	in	Ambon	as	well	as	the	majority	 of	 the	 Indonesian	 population	 and	 the	 	 global	 umma.	 Yet,	 they	 do	 not	constitute	a	homogeneous	group,	but	are	heterogeneous	in	practice,	beliefs,	and	in	building	and	participating	 in	organizational	structures.	As	described	 in	chapter	5,	religion	 is	 played	 out	 in	 the	 construction	 and	 maintenance	 of	 the	 Hadrami	descendants’	multiple	 identities,	 and	how	 the	 religious	 field	 functions	 as	 a	 socio-cultural	space	to	build	social	networks	among	the	Hadramis	themselves,	as	well	as	between	 the	 Hadramis	 and	 the	 broader	 local	 society.	 The	 findings	 of	 chapter	 5	suggest	 that	 the	 religious	 identity	 of	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 the	 diaspora	 has	 been	affected	 by	 the	 dynamics	 of	 Islamic	 movements	 in	 global,	 national	 and	 local	contexts.	Two	 specific	 developments	 in	 Ambon	 have	 affected	 how	 some	 Hadrami	practices,	 beliefs	 and	 organizations	 have	 persisted	 while	 others	 were	 created,	became	contested	or	were	transformed.	The	first	one	occurred	in	the	late	19th	and	early	20th	century,	when	Islamic	reformism	challenged	the	traditional	authority	of	the	 Sada	 group	 and	 affected	 the	 institutional	 building	 of	 a	 Hadrami	 community	reflected	 in	 the	 ‘Alawi-Irshadi	 distinction.	 The	 second	 major	 religious	transformation	 occurred	 during	 and	 after	 the	 communal	 conflicts	 between	Muslims	and	Christians	 in	Ambon	in	1999-2002.	 	A	variety	of	 Islamic	movements	(neo-Salafism,	Shi’ism	and	neo-traditionalism)	has	tried	to	exert	their	influence	on	Ambonese	Muslims	 and	 the	Hadramis	 in	 particular.	 During	 this	 second	 religious	transformation,	new	religious	elites	and	new	 Islamic	 foundations	emerged	which	contested	the	old	established	foundation,	al-Hilal.		
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By	mapping	 these	developments,	 chapter	5	 sheds	 light	on	 the	 complexity	of	religious	 articulations	 among	 the	 Hadrami	 descendants	 today	 and	 how	 such	articulations	are	shaped	by	local	contexts.	The	analysis	of	religious	developments	among	 the	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambon	 in	 this	 study	 thus	 illustrates	 that	 religion,	 like	ethnicity,	is	not	cultural	given,	but	rather	a	living	tradition	that	evolves	in	an	of	on-going	process	of	construction	and	reconstruction,	reinventing	and	reinterpretating	stories,	symbols	and	practices.		
5. Networks	Extending	beyond	Ethnic	and	Religious	Communities	The	 findings	 of	 my	 research	 certainly	 point	 to	 dimensions	 in	 the	 lives	 of	contemporary	 Hadramis	 in	 Ambonese	 society	 in	 which	 claims	 to	 ethnic	 and	religious	 specificities	 stand	 out.	 However,	 the	 findings	 also	 suggest	 that	 such	specificities	intersect	with	commonalities	shared	with	other	citizens	of	Ambon	and,	more	generally,	citizens	of	Indonesia,	so	that	no	clear-cut	boundaries	can	be	drawn	between	 specific	 Hadrami	 groups	 or	 between	 Hadramis	 as	 a	 group	 and	 other	categories	within	the	Indonesian	or	Ambonese	society.	Chapter	3	have	mapped	the	engagement	 of	 Hadrami	 descendants	 in	 various	 societal	 domains	 such	 as	 the	educational,	 economic,	 political	 and	 cultural	 fields.	 The	 picture	 that	 emerged	indicates	 that	 their	 engagement	 in	 various	 social	 fields	 of	 public	 life	 show	 their	multiple	senses	of	belonging	that	span	a	myriad	of	networks	extend	over	different	ethno-religious	 communities	 within	 and	 outside	 Ambon.	 Therefore,	 the	 active	maintenance	of	diasporic	identity	among	the	Hadramis	is	only	partially	undertaken	through	making	exclusive	claims	on	boundaries	between	one’s	‘own’	group	and	the	majority	 of	 the	 population	 in	 Ambon	 and	 Indonesia	 through	 one	 particular	exclusive	 network,	 be	 it	 cultural,	 social,	 religious,	 or	 political.	 More	 importantly,	the	Hadramis	 are	 able	 to	 engage	 in	 various	 social	webs	 of	 relationships	 that	 can	accommodate	 different	 customs	 or	 norms,	 without	 fearing	 to	 lose	 their	 distinct	cultural	identity.	Also,	as	described	in	chapter	3-6,	Hadrami	women	participate	in	all	 domains	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 in	 Ambon	 and	 they	 are	 thus	 not	 only	 passive	receivers,	 but	 also	 active	 participants	 in	 strengthening,	 negotiating,	 and	transforming	Hadrami	diasporic	identities,	both	on	individual	and	collective	levels.					
6. Conclusion	This	 study	 has	 adopted	 an	 ethnographic	 approach	 to	 document	 and	 analyse	 the		practices	of	different	categories	of	Hadramis	and	different	individual	descendants	of	 Hadrami	 migrants	 to	 Ambon	 in	 the	 process	 of	 diasporic	 living	 and	 identity	construction.	 It	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 in	 different	 historical	 and	 socio-political	contexts,	the	kind	of	Hadrami	actors	who	play	a	role	in	the	foreground	of	various	societal	arenas	are	liable	to	change.	Most	notable	is	the	recent	entering	of	the	stage	of	 female	actors	who	claim	their	own	positions	in	the	public	domain.	Besides,	my	
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study	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 diverse	 and	 shifting,	 contextual	 alliances	 of	 	 Hadrami	descendants		shows	that	the	dynamics	of	diasporic	identity	construction	consists	of	an	 interplay	 between	 multiple	 interlocking	 identities	 such	 as	 ethnicity,	 religion,	class/status,	 gender.	 Furthermore,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 diasporic	 identity	 formation	and	its	active	maintenance	among	the	Hadramis	in	Ambon	reflect	an	intricate	web	of	 power	 relations	 that	 shape	 both	 intra-and	 interpersonal	 relations	 among	 a	variety	 of	 Hadrami	 identities,	 and	 between	 Hadramis	 and	 other	 communities	 in	local	 society	 and	 those	 in	 the	homeland.	This	 intricate	web	of	 power	 relations	 is	simultaneously	shaped	by	the	dynamics	of	local,	national,	and	global	contexts.	One	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	 dimensions	 of	power	 dynamics	 pertain	 predominantly	 to	 social	 relations	 on	 a	 micro-level	 and	thus	 this	 study	 does	 not	 elaborately	 address	 how	 structures	 at	meso	 and	macro	levels	 influence	 the	 construction	 of	 diasporic	 identity	 of	 Hadrami	 descendants	today.	 Another	 limitation	 is	 that	 the	 study	 covers	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 Hadrami	identities	of	‘ordinary’	people	rather	than	on	those	in	leadership	positions.	With	all	these	 limitations,	 this	 study,	 hopefully	 can	 still	 contribute	 to	Hadrami	 studies	 by	pointing	out	commonalities	and	specificities	in	the	ways	that	Ambonese	Hadramis	in	 comparison	 to	 Hadrami	 diasporic	 communities	 elsewhere	 have	 constructed	their	 diasporic	 identity	 and	 how	 they	 have	 maintained	 relations	 with	 fellow	Hadramis	and	other	categories	of	people	in	the	country	of	settlement	and	beyond.	this	study	attempts	to	contribute	to	migration	and	diaspora	studies	by	combining	insights	 from	the	study	of	(post)colonial	migration	and	diasporic	communities	by	adding	a	South-South	migration	perspective.				 	
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Samenvatting van het proefschrift 	
1. Probleemanalyse,	doelen	en	onderzoeksvragen	Dit	 proefschrift	 is	 de	 eerste	 integrale	 studie	 van	 de	 levens	 en	 identificaties	 van	Hadrami	 afstammelingen	 in	 Ambon.	 Het	 is	 het	 resultaat	 van	 een	 etnografische	studie	 van	 hedendaagse	 nakomelingen	 van	 Hadrami	 Arabische	 migranten	 in	Ambon.	Het	doel	is	inzicht	te	krijgen	in	de	wisselwerking	tussen	etniciteit	en	religie	op	 de	 constructie	 van	 diasporische	 identiteit	 en	 de	 sociale	 integratie	 van	 de	nakomelingen	 van	 Hadrami	 Arabische	 migranten	 in	 Ambon.	 De	 overkoepelende	onderzoeksvraag	 die	 in	 dit	 proefschrift	 wordt	 beantwoord	 is	 hoe	 etniciteit	 en	religie	elkaar	wederzijds	beïnvloeden	in	individuele	en	collectieve	constructies	van	identiteit	van	hedendaagse	Ambonese	Hadrami’s,	en	hoe	deze	wisselwerking	zich	verhoudt	tot	hun	posities	in	Ambonese	sociaal-economische,	politieke	en	religieuze	machtsconstellaties.	Om	deze	vraag	te	beantwoorden	zijn	de	volgende	deelvragen	geformuleerd:	 Hoe	 claimen	 en	 onderhouden	 Hadrami	 Arabieren	 actief	 hun	etniciteit	en	identiteit	 in	de	dagelijkse	praktijk?	Hoe	presenteren	ze	hun	gedeelde	identiteit	 in	 individuele	 en	 collectieve	 verhalen	 en	 welke	 wensen	 voor	 concrete	relaties	 met	 het	 land	 van	 herkomst	 hebben	 ze?	 Aan	 wat	 voor	 soort	 religieuze	discussies	en	praktijken	nemen	ze	deel	en	hoe	verhouden	deze	zich	tot	hun	claim	om	tot	een	bepaalde	groep	te	behoren?	In	wat	voor	soort	lokale	religieuze,	sociale,	economische	 en	 politieke	 netwerken	 nemen	 ze	 deel	 en	 hoe	 spreiden	 deze	netwerken	 zich	 uit	 over	 verschillende	 etnische	 en	 religieuze	 gemeenschappen	 in	Ambon	en	daarbuiten?	De	geschiedenis	van	de	Hadrami	Arabieren,	die	eind	achttiende	eeuw	tot	aan	het	begin	van	de	twintigste	eeuw	naar	de	Maleisische	Archipel	migreerden,	wordt	vaak	beschouwd	als	een	succesverhaal	in	termen	van	transnationale	economische,	politieke	en	religieuze	betrokkenheid.	De	belangrijkste	factoren	die	bijdragen	aan	dit	succes	zijn	gerelateerd	aan	het	onderhouden	van	een	eigen	culturele	identiteit	op	 basis	 van	 een	 specifieke	 etnische	 en	 religieuze	 identiteit.	 Om	 de	 situatie	 van	hedendaagse	 nakomelingen	 van	 de	 Hadrami	 migranten	 te	 onderzoeken,	 is	 het	cruciaal	om	voort	te	bouwen	op	deze	historische	context	om	zowel	verandering	als	continuïteit	 in	 de	 manier	 waarop	 ze	 hun	 etno-religieuze	 identiteit	 en	 sociale	relaties	in	een	grotere	maatschappij	vormgeven	te	begrijpen.	Voor	een	groot	deel	ligt	de	relevantie	van	deze	studie	in	de	Ambonese	context	zelf,	die	tot	op	heden	sterk	onderbelicht	is	gebleven	in	onderzoek	naar	Hadrami’s.	Met	 name	 de	 recente	 publieke	 conflicten	 tussen	 moslims	 en	 christenen	 (1999-2002)	spelen	een	belangrijke	rol	in	hedendaagse	identificaties	van	Hadrami’s.	Het	is	 van	 belang	 deze	 lacune	 op	 te	 vullen	 door	 te	 onderzoeken	 hoe	 lokale	 sociale	structuren	 de	 diasporische	 identiteitsconstructie	 van	 de	 nakomelingen	 van	 de	Hadrami	migranten	daar	hebben	gevormd.	
Appendix	8:	Summary	of	the	Dissertation		
322		
Een	andere	 innovatieve	dimensie	van	deze	 studie	betreft	de	 constructie	van	genderidentiteit.	Het	diasporische	leven	van	Ambonese	Hadrami’s	en	hun	identiteit	zijn	 op	 specifieke	 manieren	 sekse-gebonden.	 Om	 dit	 te	 begrijpen,	 is	 het	vrouwelijke	 perspectief	 van	 groot	 belang.	 Deze	 studie	 heeft	 dan	 ook	 als	 doel	specifiek	 kennis	 en	 inzichten	 te	 verschaffen	 ten	 aanzien	 van	 de	 opvattingen	 en	gewoonten	van	de	Hadrami	vrouwen	in	Ambon.	Er	 is	 veel	 onderzoek	 gedaan	 naar	 de	 Hadrami	 diaspora,	 variërend	 van	historische	 tot	 antropologische	 studies.	 De	 literatuur	 behandelt	 een	 grote	verscheidenheid	aan	onderwerpen,	zoals	Hadrami	migratie,	rollen	in	de	economie	en	 politiek,	 de	 rol	 van	 religie,	 verwantschapsnetwerken,	 sociale	 integratie,	vernieuwde	banden	met	het	thuisland	en	gender	(Van	den	Berg	1886;	Freitag	and	Clarence-Smith	1997;	Mobini-Kesheh	1999;	Boxberger	2002;	De	Jong	and	Kaptein	2002;	 Freitag	 2003;	 Feener	 2004;	 Clegg	 2005;	 Hafizhah	 2005;	 Fachrudin	 2005;	Sahab	 2005;	 Slama	 2005;	 Ho	 2006;	 Jacobsen	 2009;	 Siregar	 2009;	 Tridewiyanti	2009;	 Manger	 2010;	 Sila	 2015;	 Alatas	 2008[2016c];	 Alatas	 2010;	 Somad	 2010;	Mandal	 2018).	 Een	 analyse	 van	 de	 diasporische	 identiteitsconstructie	 onder	 de	Hadrami’s	in	de	diaspora	is	dus	zeer	interessant.	In	 lijn	 met	 het	 grote	 spectrum	 aan	 literatuur,	 behandelt	 mijn	 studie	 de	Hadrami	diaspora	in	Ambon	vanuit	historisch	en	antropologisch	perspectief.	Deze	studie	 gebruikt	 diaspora	 als	 categorie	 van	 analyse	 om	 de	 identificaties	 van	 de	Hadrami’s	 te	 onderzoeken.	Voor	deze	 studie	 is	 het	 concept	diaspora	 gebruikt	 als	analytische	 lens	 in	 combinatie	 met	 het	 intersectionaliteitsperspectief	 om	 te	begrijpen	 hoe	 verschillende	 sociale	 categorieën	 zoals	 etniciteit,	 religie,	 klasse,	 en	gender	 elkaar	 doorkruisen	 en	 wederzijds	 vormgeven	 in	 de	 constructie	 van	 een	diasporische	 Hadrami	 identiteit	 en	 om	 te	 analyseren	 welke	 posities	 individuele	Hadrami’s	innemen	in	een	bepaalde	context.	Bouwend	 op	 het	 grote	 spectrum	 aan	 onderzoek	 van	 de	 Hadrami	 diaspora,	heeft	deze	 studie	als	doel	bij	 te	dragen	aan	het	opvullen	van	de	 lacune	 in	kennis	over	 de	 diaspora	 van	de	Hadrami	Arabieren,	 voornamelijk	 in	Oost-Indonesië.	Op	meta-niveau	 relateert	 deze	 studie	 aan	de	 intersectionaliteit	 van	 etniciteit,	 religie,	klasse	en	gender	in	de	constructie	van	diasporische	identiteit.	Om	essentialisme	te	vermijden	 en	 om	 doorlopende	 processen	 van	 identificatie	 te	 benadrukken,	 volgt	deze	studie	een	constructivistische	aanpak.	Dit	 proefschrift	 is	 voornamelijk	 gebaseerd	 op	 etnografisch	 onderzoek.	Gegevens	 voor	deze	 etnografie	 zijn	 vooral	 verzameld	 via	 veldwerk	bestaande	uit	interviews	en	participerende	observatie.	Verder	zijn	de	gegevens	opgetekend	in	de	vorm	van	aantekeningen,	foto’s	en	audio-visuele	opnames.	Het	veldwerk	in	Ambon	werd	in	een	periode	van	negen	maanden	uitgevoerd,	 lopend	van	september	2014	tot	en	met	mei	2015.	Het	veldwerk	werd	voor	het	grootste	deel	op	Ambon	gedaan.	Daarnaast	 werd	 veldwerk	 verricht	 op	 andere	 plaatsen	 (zgn.	 ‘multi-sited	fieldwork’),	zoals	Seram,	Buru,	Banda,	Kei	en	Ternate,	en	ook	op	Papua	(met	name	Fak-Fak)	en	Java,	voornamelijk	Jakarta,	en	tot	slot	Hadramaut,	waar	ik	gedurende	
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twee	weken	van	februari	5-21,	2015	een	groep	Hadrami’s	uit	Indonesië	vergezelde	tijdens	 hun	 bedevaarten	 naar	 heiligdommen	 en	 religieuze	 onderwijsinstituten	bezocht	waar	Ambonese	Hadrami’s	studeren.	Tijdens	 het	 veldwerk	 heb	 ik	 zowel	 formele	 als	 informele	 interviews	afgenomen.	 Voor	 de	 formele	 interviews	 werd	 een	 semi-gestructureerd	 diepte-interview	 formaat	 gebruikt.	 Mijn	 gesprekspartners	 waren	 verschillende	 sleutel-informanten	en	vele	 ‘gewone’	 	 informanten	 tussen	de	 twintig	en	 tachtig	 jaar	oud,	behorend	 (of	 claimend	 te	 behoren)	 tot	 één	 van	 de	 veertig	Hadrami	 clans	 van	 de	tweede	 tot	 de	 zevende	 generatie	 van	 de	 Hadrami	 migranten.	 Participerende	observatie	 werd	 uitgevoerd	 door	 religieuze	 bijeenkomsten	 en	 culturele	festiviteiten	 georganiseerd	 door	 verschillende	 islamitische	 groepen	 te	 bezoeken,	en	ook	door	deel	te	nemen	aan	dagelijkse	activiteiten.		Dit	 proefschrift	 bestaat	 uit	 zeven	 hoofdstukken.	 Het	 eerste	 hoofdstuk	beschrijft	de	probleemanalyse	van	het	onderzoek,	mijn	onderzoeksdoelen,	vragen,	methoden,	 een	 literatuur	 onderzoek	 en	 een	 theoretisch	 kader,	 en	 presenteert	 de	structuur	van	de	studie.	Het	tweede	hoofdstuk	beschrijft	zowel	de	geschiedenis	als	het	 collectief	 geheugen	 van	 de	Hadrami	Arabieren	 op	 de	Molukken.	Hoofdstuk	 3	geeft	 een	 algemeen	 overzicht	 over	 de	 hedendaagse	 Hadrami	 afstammelingen	 in	Ambon.	Hoofdstuk	4	focust	op	afkomst,	huwelijk	en	gender.	Hoofdstuk	5	schetst	de	religieuze	ontwikkelingen	binnen	de	Hadrami	gemeenschap	op	Ambon.	Hoofdstuk	6	bespreekt	de	oriëntatie	van	de	Hadrami’s	tegenover	hun	land	van	herkomst	via	diasporische	terugreizen	alsmede	hun	impact	op	de	manier	waarop	Hadrami’s	hun	culturele	 en	 religieuze	 leven	 vormgeven.	 Het	 laatste	 hoofdstuk	 presenteert	 te	onderzoeksresultaten	en	geeft	suggesties	voor	mogelijk	vervolgonderzoek.	
	
2. Claims	en	behoud	van	een	etnische	identiteit	Hoofdstuk	2	 laat	 zien	dat	 het	Nederlandse	 koloniale	 beleid	 gebaseerd	 op	 raciale,	residentiële	 segregatie	 en	 de	 mobiliteits-restricties	 significant	 heeft	 bijgedragen	aan	 de	 vorming	 van	 een	 constructie	 van	 een	 eigen	 culturele	 identiteit	 van	 de	Hadrami	migranten	en	hun	nakomelingen	in	Indonesië	als	deel	van	een	specifieke	Arabische	 etnische	 groep.	 Het	 gevoel	 van	 Arabier	 zijn	 kan	 tot	 aan	 de	 dag	 van	vandaag	worden	 geobserveerd	 zoals	wordt	 getoond	 in	 hoofdstuk	 3-6.	 Dit	 gevoel	van	Arabier	zijn	is	echter	heterogeen	in	termen	van	clan	en	klasse	claims	(Sada	en	non-Sada).	De	lokale	context	van	Ambon	heeft	zo	verschuivingen	mogelijk	gemaakt	in	de	machtsverhouding	tussen	Sada	en	non-Sada,	resulterend	in	een	gedeeltelijke	afbraak	 van	 de	 traditionele	 sociale	 stratificatie.	 Hoofdstuk	 2	 bespreekt	 ook	 de	specifieke	 gendered	 aard	 van	 de	 reproductie	 van	 Hadrami	 identiteit	 in	 het	algemeen	en	het	Sada	non-Sada	onderscheid.	Omdat	het	Hadrami	mannen	waren	die	 naar	 Indonesië	 en	 met	 name	 Ambon	 migreerden,	 begonnen	 zij	 Hadrami	gemeenschappen	te	bouwen	door	met	lokale	vrouwen	te	trouwen.	Deze	specifieke	overlap	 van	 etniciteit,	 religie,	 klasse	 en	 gender	 in	 de	 diasporische	
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identiteitsconstructie	 van	 de	 Hadrami’s	 kan	 nog	 steeds	 worden	 herkend	 in	 de	context	van	vandaag,	en	hoe	dit	huwelijkspatroon	hedendaagse	Hadrami	mannen	en	vrouwen	verschillend	beïnvloed	zoals	beschreven	in	hoofdstuk	4.	Hoofdstuk	 4	 bespreekt	 hoe	 culturele	 machtsdomeinen	 doorwerken	 in	 de	sociale	 relaties	 van	 de	 Hadrami’s.	 Deze	 culturele	 machtsdomeinen	 zijn	 direct	gerelateerd	 aan	opvattingen	over	het	 ideale	huwelijk	dat	 een	basis	 biedt	 om	een	stabiele	 groep	 te	 creëren.	 Het	 ideaal	 van	 een	 kaste-achtige	 sociale	 hiërarchie	gecombineerd	met	 een	 partilineaire	 afstamming	 bepalen	 het	 kafa’a	 principe	 dat	leidend	is	in	het	aangaan	van	huwelijksrelaties	tussen	Sada	en	non-Sada,	en	tussen	Hadrami’s	 in	 het	 algemeen	 en	 de	 bredere	 lokale	 gemeenschap,	 en	 specifiek	 ook	tussen	mannen	en	vrouwen.	 In	dit	 licht	 is	het	huwelijk	de	voornaamste	 factor	 in	het	markeren	van	zowel	interne	grenzen	binnen	een	verscheidenheid	aan	vormen	van	 Hadrami	 identiteit,	 als	 de	 markering	 van	 externe	 grenzen	 met	 een	 gast-maatschappij,	waarbij	 interpretatie	van	kafa’a	verschilt	 tussen	Sada	en	non-Sada.	Het	 resultaat	 is	 dat	 non-Sada	 nakomelingen	 ertoe	 neigen	 flexibeler	 te	 zijn	 in	 de	toepassing	van	kafa’a	principes	dan	Sada’s,	en	dat	sociale	sancties	en	een	taboe	op	het	 breken	 van	 het	 ideale	 huwelijk	 sterker	 zijn	 in	 Sada	 families	 dan	 in	 non-Sada	families.		Zoals	 in	 hoofdstuk	 4	 wordt	 beschreven,	 opereren	 huwelijk	 en	afstammingsrelaties	 als	 een	 sociaal	 arena	waar	de	Hadrami’s	hun	eigen	 culturele	identiteit	als	Arabieren	hebben	behouden,	terwijl	andere	culturele	eigenschappen,	zoals	 kleding,	 voeding,	 taal,	 kunst	 festivals,	 lijken	 sterk	 aangepast	 te	 zijn	 aan	 de	lokale	Ambonese	cultuur	zoals	beschreven	in	hoofdstuk	3.	De	Hadrami’s	tonen	dus	een	 groot	 aanpassingsvermogen	 en	 hun	 deelname	 	 binnen	 vele	 domeinen	 in	 het	publieke	 leven	 wordt	 gekenmerkt	 door	 heterogeniteit.	 Steeds	 vaker	 en	nadrukkelijker	nemen	vrouwen	ook	deel	aan	het	publieke	domein,	een	situatie	die	behoorlijk	 verschilt	 van	 die	 in	 Hadramaut	 of	 andere	 regio’s	 waar	 zich	 Hadrami	diaspora	bevinden.	Deze	studie	beargumenteert	dus	dat	de	reproductie	van	de	vele	identiteiten	 van	 individuele	 Hadrami’s	 sterk	 zijn	 ingebed	 in	 en	 afgestemd	 op		verschillende	lokale	culturele	contexten.		
3. Meervoudige	 	 gemeenschapsgevoelens	 en	 oriëntatie	 richting	 een	
thuisland	De	Hadrami	migranten	in	Ambon	tonen	hun	meervoudige	gemeenschapsgevoelens	door	 in	 uiteenlopende	 situaties	 zichzelf	 ofwel	 te	 presenteren	 als	 Ambonese	Arabieren,	als	alleen	Arabieren	of	Ambonezen,	of	als	Ambonese	Arabische	moslims.	Ook	 worden	 deze	 zelf-presentaties	 op	 vele	 manieren	 verder	 gespecificeerd	afhankelijk	 van	 sociale	 status,	 gender	 en	 ideologische	 oriëntaties,	 te	 weten	 	 als	Sada	of	non-Sada,	man	of	vrouw,	soenniet	of	shi’	 iet,	 traditionalist	of	Salafi,	en	zo	voort.	 De	 ‘multiculturele	 competentie’	 van	 Hadrami’s	 wordt	 soms	 gecombineerd	met	 zelf-presentaties	 in	 termen	 van	 Indonesisch	 burgerschap.	 Verschillende	
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hoofdstukken	 van	 dit	 proefschrift	 hebben	 gedocumenteerd	 hoe	 individuele	Hadrami’s	 hun	 ‘multiculturele	 competentie’	 improviserend	 inzetten	 in	verschillende	contexten	en	in	relatie	tot	verschillende	netwerken.			De	 manier	 waarop	 de	 categorieën	 van	 etniciteit,	 religie,	 klasse	 en	 gender	elkaar	doorkruisen	heeft	ook	verschillende	implicaties	voor	hoe	Hadrami’s	zichzelf	positioneren	ten	opzichte	van	het	land	van	herkomst;	Hadramaut.	De	bevindingen	in	 hoofstuk	 6	 laten	 een	 gevarieerde	 dynamiek	 zien	 	 in	 de	manier	waarop	 reizen	naar	 Hadramaut	 gestalte	 krijgen	 onder	 huidige	 Hadrami	 nakomelingen	 en	 hoe	Hadramaut	als	diasporisch	thuisland	intern	wordt	betwist.	Sommigen	beschouwen	het	geboorteland	van	hun	voorvaders	niet	alleen	als	plaats	van	herkomst	maar	ook	als	 plaats	 om	 heen	 terug	 te	 keren	 op	 zoek	 naar	 gezaghebbende	 bronnen	 van	religieuze	waarde	en	spiritualiteit.	Daarentegen	beschouwen	anderen	Hadramaut	slechts	 als	 een	 land	 van	 oorsprong	 en	 niet	 als	 een	 plek	 die	 toegang	 biedt	 tot	gezaghebbende	 kennis	 of	 spiritualiteit.	 Verschillende	 ideologische	 oriëntaties,	zoals	 traditionalisme,	 salafisme	 (en	Wahhabisme)	 en	 shi’isme,	 dragen	 bij	 aan	 dit	verschil	in	oriëntatie.	Bevindingen	van	hoofdstuk	6	geven	ook	inzicht	in	de	manier	waarop		ervaringen	reizen	naar	het	land	van	herkomst	gendered	zijn	in	termen	van	verschil	 in	het	praktiseren	van	gender-segregatie	en	daarmee	verbonden	vormen	van	 lichaamsbedekking	 voor	 vrouwen	 in	 publieke	 ruimten	 tussen	 Ambon	 en	Hadramaut.	De	bevindingen	van	dit	hoofdstuk	 tonen	ook	aan	dat	de	diaspora	niet	alleen	een	 ruimte	 is	 van	 imaginaire	 relaties	 maar	 juist	 een	 van	 zeer	 concrete	 relaties	tussen	 diasporische	 gemeenschappen	 en	 het	 land	 van	 herkomst.	 Voor	 sommige	Hadrami’s	 op	 Ambon	 en	 elders	 in	 Indonesië,	 hebben	 diasporische	 reizen	 naar	Hadramaut	 niet	 het	 ‘mythische’	 karakter	 dat	 Hall	 (1990)	 and	 Gilroy	 (1997)	ontwaarden	in	hun	onderzoek	onder	Afrikaanse	diaspora’s	in	het	Westen,	noch	zijn	zij	 te	 karakteriseren	 als	 een	 ‘sociale	 conditie’	 in	 de	 zin	waarin	 Vertovec	 de	 term	gebruikt	 om	 de	 situatie	 van	 bijvoorbeeld	 de	 Joodse	 diaspora	 aan	 te	 duiden	(Vertovec	1997,	278-279).	Voor	Hadrami’s	in	Ambon	en	elders	in	het	Indonesische	archipel	 betekent	 het	 leven	 in	 de	 diaspora	 eerder	 de	 mogelijkheid	 om	 sociale	banden	 te	 onderhouden	 met	 Hadrami’s	 elders	 in	 de	 diaspora	 en	 met	 het	herkomstland	 en	 daarbuiten,	 naast	 banden	 met	 andere	 gemeenschappen	 in		Indonesië	in	het	algemeen	en	Ambon	in	het	bijzonder.	
	
4. Islamitische	discoursen	en	gebruiken	Als	 één	 van	 de	 cruciale	 dimensies	 in	 de	 vorming	 van	 een	 diasporische	 identiteit	speelt	 religie	 een	belangrijke	 rol	 in	de	dagelijkse	praktijk	 van	huidige	Hadrami’s.	Op	 individueel	 niveau	 presenteren	 Hadrami	 nakomelingen	 zichzelf	 vaak	 als	moslims,	 waarbij	 ze	 hun	 religieuze	 identiteit	 delen	 met	 andere	 minderheids-moslim	 gemeenschappen	 in	 Ambon,	 en	 de	 meerderheid	 van	 de	 Indonesische	populatie	en	de	globale	oemma.	Zij	vormen	echter	geen	homogene	groep,	maar	zijn	
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heterogeen	 in	 hun	 praktijken,	 opvattingen	 en	 het	 deelname	 in	 religieuze	organisaties.	 Zoals	 beschreven	 in	 hoofdstuk	 5	 speelt	 religie	 een	 rol	 in	 de	constructie	 en	 het	 behoud	 van	 de	 meervoudige	 identiteiten	 van	 de	 Hadrami	nakomelingen.	Het	religieuze	veld	functioneert	als	een	sociaal-culturele	ruimte	om	sociale	 netwerken	 te	 onderhouden	 onder	 de	 Hadrami’s	 zelf,	 en	 tussen	 de	Hadrami’s	 en	 de	 bredere	 lokale	 gemeenschap.	 De	 bevindingen	 van	 hoofdstuk	 5	tonen	aan	dat	de	religieuze	identiteit	van	de	Hadrami’s	in	de	diaspora	vorm		krijgt		door	middel	van	de	dynamiek	tussen	islamitische	bewegingen	in	globale,	nationale	en	lokale	contexten.	Twee	specifieke	ontwikkelingen	op	Ambon	zijn	van	 invloed	geweest	op	 	hoe	sommige	 Hadrami	 praktijken,	 opvattingen	 en	 organisaties	 zijn	 blijven	 bestaan	terwijl	 andere	 zijn	 aangevochten	 of	 getransformeerd,	 dan	 wel	 hebben	 plaats	gemaakt	voor	nieuwe	ziens-	en	handelwijzen.	De	eerste	ontwikkeling	speelde	zich	af	 	 19e	 en	 begin	 20e	 eeuw,	 toen	 geïnspireerd	 door	 een	 islamitische	hervormingsbeweging	het	 traditionele	gezag	van	de	Sada	groep	werd	uitgedaagd	en	de	institutionele	structuur	van	de	Hadrami	gemeenschap	zoals	tot	uitdrukking	komen	 in	 het	 ‘Alawi-Irshadi	 onderscheid	 afbrokkelde.	 De	 tweede	 ingrijpende	religieuze	transformatie	vond	plaats	tijdens	en	na	de	conflicten	tussen	moslims	en	christenen	op	Ambon	tussen	1999	en	2002.	Verschillende	islamitische	bewegingen	(neo-salafisme,	 shi’isme	 en	 neo-traditionalisme)	 hebben	 geprobeerd	 hun	 invloed	uit	te	oefenen	op	Ambonese	moslims	en	op	de	Hadrami’s	in	het	bijzonder.	Tijdens	deze	 tweede	 religieuze	 transformatie	 kwamen	 nieuwe	 religieuze	 elites	 op	 en	verschenen	er	nieuwe	islamitische		organisaties	ten	tonele	die	de	oude	gevestigde	organisatie	al-Hilal,	bestreden.	Deze	 ontwikkelingen	 die	 in	 hoofdstuk	 5	 in	 kaart	 werden	 gebracht	 bieden	inzicht	 in	 de	 complexiteit	 van	 religieuze	 visies	 en	 praktijken	 onder	 hedendaagse	Ambonese	 Hadrami’s,	 en	 in	 de	 manier	 hoe	 deze	 in	 	 lokale	 contexten	 gestalte	krijgen.	De	analyse	van	religieuze	ontwikkelingen	onder	de	Hadrami’s	op	Ambon	in	deze	 studie	 illustreren	 zodoende	 dat	 religie,	 net	 als	 etniciteit,	 geen	 cultureel	gegeven	 is,	 maar	 eerder	 een	 levende	 traditie	 die	 zich	 ontwikkelt	 in	 een	voortdurend	 proces	 van	 constructie,	 reconstructie,	 herontdekking	 en	herinterpretatie	van	verhalen,	symbolen	en	gebruiken.		
5. Netwerken	 die	 zich	 uitstrekken	 voorbij	 etnische	 en	 religieuze	
gemeenschappen	De	bevindingen	van	mijn	onderzoek	bieden	 inzicht	 in	dimensies	 in	de	 levens	van	hedendaagse	Hadrami’s	 in	de	Ambonese	maatschappij	waarin	 claims	op	etnische	en	 religieuze	 eigenheid	 opvallen.	 Echter,	 de	 bevindingen	 suggereren	 ook	 dat	dergelijke	eigen-aardigheid	overlapt	met	overeenkomsten	die	worden	gedeeld	met	andere	 inwoners	 van	Ambon	 en,	 algemener,	 inwoners	 van	 Indonesië,	 zodat	 geen	duidelijke	grenzen	kunnen	worden	getrokken	tussen	specifieke	Hadrami	groepen	
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of	 tussen	Hadrami’s	 als	 groep	 en	 andere	 categorieën	 binnen	 de	 Indonesische	 en	Ambonese	 maatschappij.	 Hoofdstuk	 3	 schetst	 de	 participatie	 van	 Hadrami	nakomelingen	 in	 verschillende	 sociale	domeinen,	 zoals	 op	 educatief,	 economisch,	politiek	 en	 cultureel	 gebied.	 Het	 beeld	 dat	 verschijnt	 geeft	 aan	 dat	 hun	betrokkenheid	 op	 verschillende	 sociale	 gebieden	 in	 het	 publieke	 leven	meervoudige	 saamhorigheidsgevoelens	 laat	 zien,	 die	 uitstrekken	 over	verschillende	 netwerken	 en	 over	 verschillende	 etno-religieuze	 gemeenschappen	binnen	 en	 buiten	 Ambon.	 Actief	 behoud	 van	 diasporische	 identiteit	 onder	 de	Hadrami’s	 bestaat	 dan	 ook	 slechts	 gedeeltelijk	 uit	 het	 maken	 van	 claims	 die	 de	grenzen	markeren	van		een	‘eigen’	groep	en	de	meerderheid	van	de	populatie	van	Ambon	 en	 Indonesië	 door	middel	 van	 exclusieve	 	 cultureel,	 sociale,	 religieuze	 of	politieke	netwerken.	Nog	belangrijker	 is	dat	de	Hadrami’s	zich	veelal	bewegen	 in	meerdere	sociale	netwerken	waarbij	zij	verschillende	gebruiken	en	normen	in	hun	eigen	 leefwijze	 inpassen	zonder	 te	vrezen	hun	eigen	culturele	 identiteit	daardoor	te	verliezen.	Zoals	beschreven	in	de	hoofstukken	3	tot	en	met	6,	 	nemen	Hadrami	vrouwen	deel	in	alle	dimensies	van	het	publieke	domein	op	Ambon	en	zijn	zij	dus	geenszins	 passieve	 ontvangers,	 maar	 actieve	 actoren	 die	 hun	 eigen	 bijdrage	leveren	 aan	 het	 bevestigen	 en	 transformeren	 van	 Hadrami	 diasporische	identiteiten	op	zowel	individueel	als	collectief	niveau.	
6. Conclusie	Voor	 deze	 studie	 is	 de	 etnografische	 	 benadering	 gehanteerd	 om	 het	 dagelijkse	diasporische	 leven	 en	 de	 identiteitsconstructie	 	 van	 verschillende	 categorieën	Hadrami’s	 in	 Ambon	 op	 te	 tekenen	 en	 te	 analyseren.	 Het	 onderzoek	 heeft	uitgewezen	 dat	 in	 verschillende	 historische	 en	 sociaal-politieke	 contexten	uiteenlopende	 Hadrami	 spelers	 op	 de	 voorgrond	 traden	 en	 dat	 Hadrami’s	 in	verschillende	perioden	afwisselend	in	meerdere	sociale	arena’s	opereerden.	Meest	opmerkelijk	 is	 het	 recente	 betreden	 van	 het	 podium	van	 vrouwelijke	 spelers	 die	hun	 eigen	 posities	 opeisen	 in	 het	 publieke	 domein.	 Daarnaast	 heeft	 mijn	 studie	gedocumenteerd	hoe	de	diverse	en	verschuivende	allianties	van	nakomelingen	van	Hadrami	 migranten	 contextueel	 gevormd	 zijn,	 daarmee	 aantonend	 dat	 de	dynamiek	van	diasporische	identiteitsconstructie	bestaat	uit	een	samenspel	tussen	meerdere,	met	 elkaar	 verweven	 identiteiten	 zoals	 etniciteit,	 religie,	 klasse/status	en	 gender.	 Verder	 tonen	 de	 bevindingen	 aan	 dat	 de	 diasporische	identiteitsconstructie	 en	 haar	 actieve	 behoud	 onder	 de	 Hadrami’s	 in	 Ambon	 het	resultaat	 is	 van	 een	 ingewikkeld	 samenspel	 van	 machtsrelaties	 welke	 zowel	vormgeeft	 aan	een	verscheidenheid	aan	Hadrami	 identiteiten,	 alsook	aan	 relaties		tussen	Hadrami’s	 en	 andere	 gemeenschappen	 in	de	 lokale	 samenleving	 en	die	 in	het	 land	 van	herkomst.	 	Dit	 ingewikkelde	netwerk	 van	machtsrelaties	 kan	 alleen	worden	begrepen	in	de	inbedding	van	lokale,	nationale	en	globale	contexten.	
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Eén	van	de	beperkingen	van	de	gehanteerde	etnografische	benadering	is	dat	de	bevindingen	betrekking	hebben	op	sociale	relaties	op	micro	niveau	en	dat	deze	studie	 dus	 niet	 uitgebreid	 behandelt	 hoe	 machtstructuren	 op	 meso	 en	 macro	niveaus	vandaag	de	dag	de	vorming	van	diasporische	identiteit	van	nakomelingen	van	Hadrami	migranten	 beïnvloeden.	 Een	 andere	 beperking	 is	 dat	 de	 studie	 een	breed	 scala	 aan	 Hadrami	 identiteiten	 van	 ‘gewone’	 mensen	 behandelt	 en	 niet	inzoomt	 op	 personen	 die	 leiderschapsposities	 bekleden.	 Nochtans	 hoop	 ik	 met	deze	studie	een	significante	bijdrage	te	 leveren	aan	het	veld	van	Hadrami	studies	door	 inzicht	 te	 bieden	 in	 overeenkomsten	 en	 verschillen	 tussen	 de	 manieren	waarop	 Ambonese	 Hadrami’s	 in	 vergelijking	 tot	 Hadrami	 diasporische	gemeenschappen	 elders	 hun	diasporische	 identiteit	 hebben	 vormgegeven	 en	 hoe	ze	 relaties	met	 andere	Hadrami’s	 en	 andere	 categorieën	mensen	 in	 het	 land	 van	vestiging	 en	 daarbuiten	 hebben	 onderhouden.	 Deze	 studie	 probeert	 ook	 bij	 te	dragen	 aan	migratie	 en	 diaspora	 studies	 door	 inzichten	 van	 de	 bestudering	 van	(post)koloniale	migratie	en	diasporische	gemeenschappen	te	combineren	door	een	Zuid-Zuid	migratie	perspectief	toe	te	voegen.	
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